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To write, to write, it is a forceful drive and need,
to search, and search, without knowing what I am searching for,
for if I knew what I was searching for, my search would be over.
(The author Albert Dam in an interview with Danmarks Radio 
(Danish Broadcasting Corporation), 9 February 1964) 
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Preface
The path to Heritopia: World Heritage and modernity has been 
a long and steep one. Not for the first time, I have written about 
something both because I have been thinking about it and because 
I want to be free to think about something else. And once again, I 
have tried to understand and explain so as to be able to forget and 
move on. 
But thinking and writing take time. My interest in the meanings 
of the past goes back to my teens, when I read an essay called 
Hvad skal vi med Historien? (“Why do we need history?”), by 
the author and historian Palle Lauring (1969), whose answer was 
that we can learn from history. An enquiry of my own has been 
considered, planned, started, suspended, and resumed on numer-
ous occasions when there was time to spare between other duties 
at the Department of Archaeology and Ancient History at Lund 
University, at home in Lund, and away in Nybro. Heritopia has 
thus been something of a Sisyphean task, in the course of which 
I have tried to survey and maintain order in a constantly growing 
number of books, articles, and press cuttings, as well as in my own 
ideas and those of other people. The first draft of a chapter came 
into being in 2006, but the work could only be completed during 
a more focused effort in 2015–2018. And now I can see that this 
investigation has been given a form that must have been shaped 
by my dual position as both Danish and Swedish, the distinctively 
Danish dimension often being defined by history and the Swedish 
one by modernity.
Heritopia is an attempt to stroll along the paths of curiosity 
without being bound by what characterises the research of today, 
namely strategies, deadlines, applications, budgets, running reports, 
and preferably answers that can be presented in advance – that is to 
say, without being bound by the expectations and demands of others. 
Instead, I have claimed for myself the mixed and  time-consuming 
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Preface xi
pleasure of actually reading all the literature and seeing all the films 
referred to, or very nearly. But I have by no means been able to 
visit all the World Heritage sites in the world. Heritopia is, in short, 
an attempt to conceptualise and write a book on my own terms, a 
book that I would like to read. 
Heritopia has not been written in a state of isolation. First of 
all, I wish to thank my wife Bodil Petersson (Linnaeus University, 
Kalmar), who has followed and encouraged this work and read 
several versions. Next, my thanks go to Björn Magnusson Staaf 
(Lund University) and Asger Wienberg (Lund), who have also read 
the whole manuscript. All three of them have contributed both con-
structive and critical comments. Thanks also to two anonymous 
referees for Lund University Press for their helpful comments. I am 
grateful to the following for permission to reproduce photographs: 
Anders Andrén (Stockholm University) and Ingrid Berg (Uppsala 
University), Henrik Gerding and Lars Larsson (Lund University), 
Bodil Petersson (Linnaeus University, Kalmar), and Jens Vellev 
(Aarhus University). Thanks to Alun Richards of Manchester 
University Press for his help during the production stage. And 
finally, thanks to Marianne Thormählen of Lund University Press 
for providing great support through the entire process from a man-
uscript to a printed book. 
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1
The past is everywhere
Drowned in the Nile
The pharaoh had been able to look at his reflection in the Nile for 
thousands of years. But now his face was sawn off, raised, and 
removed. One by one, stone blocks from the colossal statues were 
removed from the site. Was this because of a desire to obliterate 
the memory of a powerful absolute ruler? Was it an example of 
iconoclasm, in which the face of the god was mutilated? Were the 
sculptures going to be moved to a museum in the West, like so 
many other monuments and finds from Ancient Egypt? Or was it 
quite simply a case of vandalism? 
The cliff temples of Abu Simbel were erected at the initiative of 
Pharaoh Ramses II, whose mummy is now exhibited in Cairo. The 
temples were carved directly out of the cliffs in the years around 
1260 bce. The great temple fronted by the four gigantic statues of 
Ramses II was a homage to the pharaoh himself as divine, a homage 
to the gods Amun-Ra, Ra-Horakhty, and Ptah, a memorial of the 
Battle of Kadesh, and a marker of Egyptian mastery of the Nubian 
border region. Twice a year, the rays of the rising sun would pen-
etrate to the statues in the furthest depths of the temple. The nearby 
smaller temple was a homage to Ramses himself, his favourite wife 
Nefertari, and the goddess Hathor (MacQuitty 1965; Desroches 
Noblecourt 2007: 116ff). 
But the temples of Abu Simbel were soon forgotten and covered 
by sand. The colossal statues were rediscovered in 1813 by the 
Orientalist Johann Ludwig Burckhardt, who had converted to 
Islam and was known in Egypt as Sheik Ibrahim ibn Abdullah; 
he also rediscovered Petra in Jordan. The Egyptologist Giovanni 
Battista Belzoni, who was hunting for antiquities along the Nile 
on behalf of Consul Henry Salt, heard about Abu Simbel from 
Burckhardt. In adventurous circumstances and in rivalry with 
French colleagues, Belzoni had the great temple cleared of so much 
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sand that he was able to access its interior in 1817. After that, the 
temple was emptied of a few moveable items and documented. 
Several scientific expeditions followed during the nineteenth 
century (Fagan 1975: 124ff, 143ff, 172ff).
In an Egypt under British rule, a dam was erected at Aswan in 
1898–1902 to regulate the Nile. The dam was subsequently raised 
several times. As a result of the higher water level, the temples 
along the river were flooded every year; but the cliff temples of Abu 
Simbel, with their relatively elevated location, were not. By con-
trast, the island of Philae, with a temple dedicated to the goddess 
Isis, came under water for 9 of the 12 months of the year. And in 
the decades following the establishment of the dam, there were 
several archaeological campaigns that involved investigations of 
threatened ancient monuments in Nubia, the gold country that is 
divided between Egypt and the Sudan. 
The coup d’état or revolution of the Egyptian “Free Officers” in 
1952 was aimed against the monarchy and the continued British 
influence. It was supported by the United States of America (US), 
the new post-war superpower. Plans were soon made to erect a 
new and higher Aswan dam, the Aswan High Dam, which would 
regulate the Nile and produce electricity, thereby contributing to the 
industrialisation of the country. The Aswan High Dam became a 
symbol of Egypt’s national independence and modernisation, but its 
implementation was to have far-reaching consequences. After trying 
in vain to get the US to finance the project, President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser decided in 1956 to nationalise the strategically important 
Suez Canal so as to obtain the necessary funds. However, the subse-
quent Suez Crisis, in which the two old rivals and colonial powers 
Britain and France tried – along with Israel – to take control of the 
canal, clarified the new post-war world order. The US and the Soviet 
Union (USSR) forced the attackers to withdraw (Laron 2013). 
The Aswan High Dam was not only to have political conse-
quences. The dam would also create a lake, Lake Nasser (Lake 
Nubia in Sudan), which would drown the temples at Abu Simbel 
as well as many other traces of Ancient Nubia. The water might 
dissolve the sandstone of the temples. Consequently, the modernisa-
tion of Egypt  threatened to drown and destroy Nubia’s heritage. 
After millennia, the mighty pharaoh’s monuments would cease to 
exist. Something that had been intended to be permanent would 
 disappear. Abu Simbel risked becoming an icon of impermanence.
The modernisation involving the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam was carried out from 1960 to 1970. But as early as 
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the mid-1950s, several years before the actual construction work, 
intensive documentation of the temples had been initiated, a project 
that included photogrammetry. Soon, however, the ambition was 
extended to salvaging as much as possible with international assis-
tance. Both Egypt and the Sudan approached the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 
1959 for assistance. In 1960, the year in which work on the dam 
began, UNESCO made an appeal for assistance to all its member 
countries. In it, UNESCO’s Director-General Vittorino Veronese 
described the monuments in a new way, as a “common heritage” 
that belonged not to individual countries but to the whole world, 
saying that “treasures of universal value are entitled to universal 
protection” (Veronese 1960: 7). The waters of the Nile were going 
to rise, but the pharaoh and his temples had to be rescued. 
UNESCO organised a major international rescue campaign in 
which engineers, architects, archaeologists, and others cooperated 
over many years. Modernisation threatened the monuments; but at 
the same time, modern methods were applied to avert the threats 
and salvage the temples. The alternative to allowing the pharaoh to 
suffer drowning and destruction was to move the temples, just as 
more than 100,000 Nubians in the area were relocated. 
The plan was to save the temples of Abu Simbel, even though 
a few argued that the temples were not sufficiently outstanding 
as art, and that to do so was to help to preserve the image of a 
 megalomaniac despot (e.g. Allais 2013: 32f). 
There were thorough investigations and discussions of various 
technical, organisational, and economic solutions. In particular, 
there was a protracted dispute about the technical possibilities of 
salvaging the temples, with several competing proposals, while the 
waters of the Nile were rising in a menacing manner: a French pro-
posal to protect the temples behind their own dam; an Italian one 
to raise them in one piece by means of hydraulics; a British one to 
make them visible under the water; another French one to tow them 
on a raft behind a dam; and a Swedish one to cut the temples into 
pieces and subsequently rebuild them at a new site. The Swedish 
proposal made by VBB (Vattenbyggnadsbyrån; now part of Sweco), 
which competitors rhetorically called a “butchering”, was selected, 
and carried out behind a temporary protective dam. In 1965, the 
first stone block could be lifted from Abu Simbel’s ceiling, soon to 
be followed by the face of Ramses II. 
The temples of Abu Simbel were sawn up into stone blocks that 
could weigh up to 30 tonnes. The blocks were lifted to a temporary 
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storage site, whereupon they were moved and used in a reconstruc-
tion 65 metres higher up and 200 metres further inland. The great 
temple was divided up into 807 stone blocks and the small one 
into 235. The temples with their colossal statues were reconstructed 
under two artificial hills, both of which were supported by arched 
domes made of concrete. Next, the relocated temples were given 
lighting and ventilation. 
The move of Abu Simbel was the most spectacular operation, 
but other temples were moved as well. So-called “cultural oases” 
were formed around the temples moved from Kalabsha, Wadi es-
Sebua, and Amada. Some temples were transferred abroad – Debod 
to Madrid, Taffa to Leiden, Dendur to New York, and Ellesiya 
to Turin. Individual monuments, and also sculptures and reliefs, 
were transferred either to the Nubia Museum in Aswan or to the 
National Museum of Sudan in Khartoum. Frescoes from the cathe-
dral in Faras went to Khartoum and Warsaw. The Nubian campaign 
culminated with the move of the temples on the island of Philae to 
the nearby island of Agilkia, where they could be reinaugurated in 
1980. However, it was not possible to save those fortifications and 
churches in Nubia that had been built of sun-dried brick. At Philae, 
numerous clay buildings had already disappeared in the floods after 
the construction of the first Aswan dam. 
While the Aswan High Dam was being built, extensive archaeo-
logical surveys and excavations were carried out on a selection of 
sites along a 500-kilometre stretch of the Nile valley which was 
threatened with flooding. The area was divided up into conces-
sions that were allocated to different countries and institutions. 
There were agreements to the effect that museums in the assisting 
countries would be allowed to retain half of the finds as a reward, 
a model that came in for subsequent criticism. In all, 27 countries 
were directly involved in the investigations in the Nubia campaign 
and 49 countries contributed funding; they included the United 
Kingdom (UK) and France, which had been at war with Egypt only 
a few years before (Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 223ff, 232f; Hassan 
2007: 80, 90ff; 2009). 
The flagship of the campaign was Abu Simbel, which was and 
is an icon of pharaonic Egypt and a well-known tourist destina-
tion; and the campaign led to an increased flow of tourists. The 
temples have featured in numerous contexts since their rediscovery, 
for example in travel literature, novels, films, and computer games. 
A line runs from Napoleon’s Egyptian campaign to the tourism of 
today. Individual trips along the Nile made by well-to-do members 
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of society paved the way for the charter tourism of more recent 
times. The bestseller A Thousand Miles up the Nile by the author 
and Egyptologist Amelia B. Edwards, which depicts a long stay 
at Abu Simbel, was thus an inspiration for new visits (Edwards 
1877: 414ff; cf. Fagan 1975: 309ff). A famous work of fiction is 
Agatha Christie’s crime novel Death on the Nile, in which Abu 
Simbel provides exotic scenery for an attempted murder (Christie 
1937). The book is said to have been written at the Old Cataract 
Hotel in Aswan with a view over the river, and it has been filmed 
several times (e.g. by Guillermin in 1978). 
After many tribulations, the temples could be opened again in 
1968, first for notabilities and then also for tourists, more than ever 
before; for the attention given to the salvage campaign had gener-
ated greater awareness of the site. The temples of Abu Simbel with 
the face of Pharaoh Ramses II had become world famous. Visitors 
now came by bus from Aswan, by cruise ship on Lake Nasser, or 
by way of the nearby airport in order to spend a couple of hours at 
the temples. 
However, since the Arab Spring reached Egypt in 2011, the 
number of tourists has fallen drastically; the disturbances have 
frightened most tourists off. But it could have been worse. Because 
with another kind of political development in Egypt – or if Abu 
Simbel had been located somewhere else in the Middle East – the 
temples might have been deliberately blown up or bombed more 
or less fortuitously, as has happened to monuments in Afghanistan, 
Mali, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. 
The international campaign organised by UNESCO attracted 
a great deal of attention at the time, and this interest has con-
tinued. The campaign has thus resulted in a number of technical 
reports, scientific publications, popular presentations, illustrated 
books, guidebooks, essays, newspaper articles, and films – about 
the investigations, the monuments, and their rescuing (e.g. Hansen 
1961; Keating 1962, 1975; MacQuitty 1965; Franck 1967 film; 
Desroches-Noblecourt & Gerster 1968; The Salvage of the Abu 
Simbel Temples 1976; Berg 1978; Säve-Söderbergh 1987; 1996; 
Kamil 1993: 98ff; Heimlich & Weidenbach 2005 film; Hassan 
2007, 2009; Allais 2013; Berg 2019).
In the course of time, the campaign, and especially the salvage of 
the temples of Abu Simbel and the concrete structures, have been 
described by those involved in effusive terms such as “a complete 
and spectacular success” (whc.unesco.org/en/activities/172), “a 
miracle”, “an unprecedented enterprise”, “a resounding success”, 
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and “a triumph” (Desroches-Noblecourt & Gerster 1968: 7, 9, 
110), “a modern cathedral or a new Temple” (The Salvage of the 
Abu Simbel Temples 1976: 162), a “triumph of civil engineering”, 
and a “triumph for the Egyptian Government and the Egyptian 
authorities involved, triumph for UNESCO and its officials and for 
the  international community” (Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 122). 
And irrespective of whether it is told in the form of a travel novel 
or a technical report, the story of the campaign is narrated on the 
lines of a classic fairy tale – the threat that arises, the many obsta-
cles and dangers that must be overcome, and the final resolution 
when the threat is overcome. Modernity (and humanity) threaten 
the heritage; but modernity (and human actions) will also bring 
solutions. 
At the same time, these stories are infused with melancholy about 
Nubia, which disappears, and about the Nubian people, who are 
obliged to leave. And the Nubians’ way of life is idealised as a con-
trast to the modern way of life (e.g. Hansen 1961; Keating 1975: 
37ff, 208ff; Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 56ff; 1996: 193ff). Decades later, 
Nubians are shown recalling life at Abu Simbel, at the temples, and 
in the lost rural communities, while a return is being planned to a 
new Nubia (Heimlich & Weidenbach 2005 film). Consequently, the 
campaign has generated both technical innovations and  existential 
reflections. 
Abu Simbel and the campaign also play a prominent role in 
the story of the adoption in 1972 of the Convention Concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, or, 
in short, the World Heritage Convention (WHC 1972; cf. Lutyk 
1987: 6ff; Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 220f; 1996: 217f; World 
Heritage Information Kit, 2008: 7f). Here, for the first time, traces 
of the past are recognised as a universal heritage and therefore a 
common responsibility across national borders. And in 1979, the 
monuments relocated in Nubia – from Abu Simbel in the south to 
Philae in the north – were inscribed in UNESCO’s World Heritage 
List (WHL) on the strength of being a masterpiece, a testimony 
to a lost civilisation, and an open-air museum that represents the 
unfolding of a long sequence of Egyptian pharaonic history (The 
World’s Heritage 2018: 56; WHL 88, 1979).
Once the Nubian campaign had ended, the Egyptologist Torgny 
Säve-Söderbergh was able to summarise and justify the actions 
taken officially on behalf of UNESCO. Säve-Söderbergh wrote that 
even those involved might occasionally ask whether it was morally 
 defensible to collect funds for the campaign in a world where  millions 
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were starving, and where innumerable children were dying of hunger 
or did not have a hope of achieving a reasonable standard of living. 
But he took the view that no one would have hesitated. The ancient 
monuments were said to be important, especially for the historical 
and cultural identity of the developing countries. Their preservation 
was not only a moral duty, but also a matter of social and economic 
importance. After all, the excavations and the salvage campaigns 
created jobs in areas of unemployment. And once they had been 
saved, the monuments became tourist attractions, which provided 
economic benefits. Finally, the antiquities and monuments that were 
transferred to foreign museums were described as “new ambassa-
dors extraordinary” of Egypt and the Sudan (Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 
137ff; 1996: 114f).
But in a critical reckoning with UNESCO and its World Heritage 
system, the archaeologist Lynn Meskell has recently designated the 
prioritisation of the monuments at Abu Simbel ahead of the local 
population and the campaign’s archaeological investigations as 
“another hallmark of the modern conservation industry” and the 
salvage of the temples as a “theatrical spectacle” (Meskell 2018: 
30, 32). 
The pharaoh had been reflected in the Nile for millennia before 
the life-giving waters of the river became a menace. Stone block 
by stone block, the pharaoh and his temple at Abu Simbel were 
moved to higher terrain, salvaged from drowning, along with other 
temples. The pharaoh was salvaged in an international campaign 
that was both praised and criticised. In a quite fundamental way, 
however, the campaign arouses amazement. 
The paradoxes of Abu Simbel
The campaign at Abu Simbel is a source of amazement because 
the site and the sequence of events seem to be full of paradoxes, in 
this context meaning absurdity or contradictions. The paradoxes, 
which can be formulated as questions or statements to investigate, 
are like Chinese boxes, one box sitting inside the next one: 
1. The impossible preservation of the past
The past is being preserved for the future; but is preservation for 
the future at all possible? Abu Simbel had long since been eroded by 
sandstorms, one of Ramses’ faces had been destroyed by an earth-
quake already during his reign, and the external painting of the 
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temples is gone. The temples are to be preserved for the future; 
but in the long run, no preservation campaign or relocation, no 
elevation to heritage or even World Heritage, and no consensus can 
prevent change, degradation, and impermanence. Even the unique 
and irreplaceable masterpiece will be lost. 
2. The protection, preservation, and alteration of the past
The past is to be protected and preserved; but do these endeavours 
mean that the past is altered? At Abu Simbel there was a conflict 
not only about whether the cliff temples could be salvaged at all, 
but also about whether this should be done. Should the temples be 
preserved at their original location or might they be moved out of 
their context? The cliff temples of Abu Simbel were salvaged from 
the rising waters of the Nile; but for that to happen they had to be 
sawn into pieces, lifted away, and reconstructed at a new location 
under an arched dome made of concrete. The temples were indeed 
saved, but they did not remain wholly the same as before their pres-
ervation, just as their surroundings changed radically. The  shape 
of the hills was different from that of the original cliffs, and a new 
built-up area emerged with a port, hotels, housing, roads, and an 
airport. All the attention and the elevation to a World Heritage site, 
with more tourist visits, can also increase the wear and tear on the 
temples. Preservation means change.
3. The protection and preservation of the past as an exception
When the past is protected and preserved in one place, does 
that mean that the corresponding proportion of the past disap-
pears from other places? The spectacular temples of Abu Simbel 
were salvaged, but at the same time other Nubian ancient mon-
uments, settlements, graves, churches, and fortifications had 
to drown in the Nile after being investigated and documented; 
skeletons and pottery were often left in place. An even greater 
number of sites and objects could never be investigated. And sal-
vage might mean transfer to museums abroad. So for every site 
that is preserved,  there may be  several that vanish. An apparent 
upturn in protection and preservation may thus conceal an even 
greater upturn in devastation. Protection and preservation are an 
exception.
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4. The past and threats
Threats may elicit history, memory, and heritage; but conversely, 
history, memory, and heritage may also create threats – and can the 
threats then themselves be transformed into history, memory, and 
heritage? The more Abu Simbel was threatened by drowning, the 
more the temples were held up as being worth telling about, remem-
bering, and preserving. The threat was thus crucial in establishing 
the temples as heritage and, later, as World Heritage. Conversely, the 
cliff temples could have prevented the establishment of the Aswan 
High Dam and therefore the modernisation of Egypt. The preserved 
temples may also hamper a development that is not directly linked 
to income from tourism. In the future, then, the original threat, the 
dam – and perhaps also Abu Simbel’s concrete arched domes – will 
be worthy of preservation as unique and irreplaceable testimony to 
the engineering skills of the 1960s. Clearly, history, memory, and 
heritage are interwoven with threats.
5. The past and modernity
Can history, memory, and heritage be a contrast to modernity 
while being part of modernity? The past has associations with the 
unchangeable, with stasis, with what has been, whereas modernity 
carries connotations of change, speed, and the future. Heritage was 
threatened by modernity; the temples of Abu Simbel were threat-
ened by the Aswan High Dam. But heritage and World Heritage 
are modern phenomena. And modernity does not solely repre-
sent a threat; it can also represent a solution. The temples were 
salvaged by engineers and archaeologists using the most modern 
technology of their time, technology that may itself become history, 
memory, and heritage in the future. The past and modernity are 
also  paradoxically interconnected. 
6. Modernity increases or decreases
Can both an increase and a decrease in modernity give rise to his-
tory, memory, and heritage? That is, the more modernity, the more 
history, memory, and heritage; but also, the less modernity, the 
more history, memory, and heritage? The development of moder-
nity leaves relics. At the same time, the decline of modernity breeds 
a renewed interest in the past, with more studies and an increase 
in preservation as well as investment in the experience economy. 
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Paradoxically, there thus appear to be two opposing explanations 
of the relationship between the past and modernity.
7. The crossing of boundaries
Ultimately, does the establishment of World Heritage sites run coun-
ter to current trends? The World Heritage area that extends from 
Abu Simbel to Philae is a local example of a constantly increasing 
category of international protection and preservation adhering to 
uniform principles. World Heritage represents structure, unity, a 
unified whole, and universalism, even though the temples of Abu 
Simbel were fragmented so that they could be reassembled at a 
new site, deconstructed so that they could be reconstructed. World 
Heritage thus goes against a postmodern view of the present, which 
is supposed to be characterised by decay, multiplicity, fragmenta-
tion, the regional, and the local. World Heritage crosses boundaries.
However, the temples of Abu Simbel are only one of innumerable 
heritage sites that arouse a dormant sense of wonderment. Abu 
Simbel is only one of innumerable places that are supposed to be 
threatened and need to be salvaged, places where preservation and 
change are in confrontation, heritage and modernity standing face 
to face. And Abu Simbel is only one of many World Heritage sites; 
that is, a place that is held to be irreplaceable for future generations.
The past is everywhere
Viewed from a satellite or on a map, the World Heritage sites appear 
as points and lines spread across the continents of the globe. Every 
year sees an increase in the number of sites included in UNESCO’s 
World Heritage List. While the list consisted of 12 World Heritage 
sites in 7 countries on its inception in 1978, there are now 1121 World 
Heritage sites in 167 countries (WHL, July 2019; Appendix 1). But 
the World Heritage sites are merely the peak of a gigantic iceberg. 
They only represent a tiny fraction of everything considered to be 
worth protecting and preserving as heritage.
The past is everywhere, and the past is expansive. This is because 
more and more is being viewed as history that ought to be told, 
memory that ought to be retained, or heritage that ought to be 
defended and preserved. Nothing tangible or intangible, large 
or small, visible or hidden, old or new, near or far is neglected. 
Preserve not just the temples of Abu Simbel (WHL 88, 1979), but 
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also old trees, thatched roofs, International Style housing, factories, 
transformer substations, bridges, windmills, station communities, 
battlefields, silos, bunkers, minigolf courses, neon advertising, 
and car mortuaries. Preserve the royal ship Vasa and preserve the 
wreck of the Titanic! Preserve traditions, myths and legends, books, 
letters, newspapers, posters, graffiti, paintings, photographs, films, 
sounds, Internet websites, and digital metadata! Preserve the Earth! 
And preserve the light from stars at night! They are all threatened 
by change, by lack of interest or by other priorities, by silence and 
amnesia, by impermanence and destruction. 
Where remains of the past have burned or been bombed, have 
decayed or simply disappeared, a radical restoration or reconstruc-
tion can recreate the past. Many monuments have thus risen again, 
and several are (or have been) included in the World Heritage list – 
the Parthenon in Athens (WHL 404, 1987), Warsaw city centre 
(WHL 30bis, 1980, 2014), the Globe in London, the Stari Most 
bridge in Mostar (WHL 946rev, 2005), the Cathedral of Christ the 
Saviour in Moscow, the Church of Our Lady in Dresden (WHL 
1156, 2004, delisted 2009), and mausoleums in Timbuktu (WHL 
119rev, 1988). Others, such as the Berlin City Palace, are being pro-
cessed; but UNESCO has given up on reconstructing the Buddha 
statues in Bamiyan in Afghanistan (WHL 208rev, 2003).
The current interest in the past is also seen in the constant increase 
in the number of museums, visitor centres, and recreated environ-
ments ranging across all periods, in places where the past is commu-
nicated and brought to life – from the copy of the Palaeolithic cave 
in Lascaux, France (WHL 85, 1979) via the JORVIK Viking Centre 
in York, England, the annual Medieval Week in Visby in Sweden 
(WHL 731, 1995), and the bringing to life of eighteenth-century 
Colonial Williamsburg in the US, to the Old Town in Aarhus in 
Denmark, which has a reconstructed urban neighbourhood from 
1974. Here the tourist can either be an observer from a reassuring 
distance or participate actively in bringing another period to life. 
Historical role-playing games are another possibility. 
A broad spectrum of literature, film, and television deals with 
historical themes, with a fluid dividing line between fact and fiction. 
This includes everything from Walter Scott’s Ivanhoe and Umberto 
Eco’s The Name of the Rose to Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code, 
everything from Andrei Rublev to Gladiator and Downton Abbey. 
Indeed, the range of historical entertainment is enormous. 
Then there is archaeology, my own discipline, which is only one 
of several methods of studying the past. Supported by both broad 
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popular interest and relatively strong legislation, archaeological 
investigations (in Scandinavia at least) are more numerous, exten-
sive, and ambitious than ever before. And gradually, archaeology has 
expanded to the point where it now covers all periods from the first 
humans to the present, even attempting to look far into the future. 
We can investigate, preserve, and say more about the past than 
ever before. The methodological and technical developments have 
been nothing less than stupendous: aerial photography, metal detec-
tors and georadar, pollen analyses, radiocarbon dating, dendro-
chronology, ice bore cores from inland ice, the use of geographic 
information system (GIS) mapping and drones, DNA analyses, and 
3D scanning. And while we can look at the night sky with the naked 
eye and glimpse the Andromeda galaxy around 2.5 million light 
years away, we can use the Hubble telescope in an orbit around the 
Earth to see so far out into space, and therefore so far back in time, 
that we approach the birth of the expanding universe about 13.8 
billion years ago. 
The past is expanding, too. Almost regardless of what perspec-
tive we choose, the trend appears to be an increase, sometimes an 
exponential one. More history, more memory, more heritage, more 
World Heritage sites, more reconstructions, more museums, visitor 
centres, and role-playing games, more historical books and films. 
More archaeology, both further back in time and further ahead 
in time. In the wake of the upturn for heritage, there is growing 
heritage tourism; that is, tourism focused on traces of the past. 
In initiatives geared to increasing local or regional growth, the 
past is used as an attraction. The past is employed in order to 
create, strengthen, weaken, maintain, change, or discuss identities. 
Finally, heritage is increasing as a separate field of research and 
teaching.
When it comes to World Heritage, there is, in principle, global 
consensus. The basis for this claim is that since 1972, no less than 
193 states have ratified the UNESCO Convention, while the United 
Nations (UN) has precisely 193 member states (whc.unesco.org/en/
statesparties; www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html; September 
2020; Appendix 2). Across all variations with regard to history, 
culture, language, religion, politics, and economics, states are hence 
able to agree about the meaningfulness of a universal natural and 
cultural heritage. 
But why? Why this fascination with the past? Why so much 
history, memory, and heritage? Why try to retell, remember, pre-
serve, reconstruct, bring to life, popularise, dig up, and use the 
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past? What is the point of all this past in our present? And why 
the consensus? 
Is the expansion an expression of a desire to attain greater 
knowledge about the past and therefore about ourselves, a desire 
accompanied by willingness to allocate more resources to such 
efforts? Is the expansion a symptom of a chronic nostalgia in a 
society in crisis, which creates an increasing need? Or is the expan-
sion an expression of a growing moral duty to tell about, remember, 
or preserve remains of previous generations? Is it thus to be inter-
preted as an expression of progress or as a sign of decay? Are we 
witnessing people’s increasing ability to tell about, remember, and 
preserve – or have people lost the ability to be silent, forget, and 
lose? Why not permit silence, oblivion, and impermanence? Why 
not simply let the past remain the past?
There is more than ever to tell about, remember, and preserve; 
and the desire to do these things also seems to be greater than ever, 
at the same time as the ability to do so is improving every day. But 
this endeavour can only be a postponement of the inevitable. For 
in the long run, no narrative, no memorial of stone or bronze, and 
no designation as heritage or World Heritage, no archive, library, 
or museum, no screen of bulletproof glass or global consensus, can 
resist change and therefore impermanence. This struggle is doomed 
to fail and therefore appears pointless. The preservation of the past 
is impossible, and yet efforts are constantly being made to attain 
this goal. 
This brings to mind the myth of Sisyphus, King of Corinth, who 
pushes a great stone up a mountain; but then on reaching the top, 
the stone rolls down to the plain again. Sisyphus is the absurd hero, 
who toils in vain forever in the land of the dead as punishment 
for having once put Death in chains, that is precisely for trying 
to prevent impermanence. Happy or not, Sisyphus toils in sweat 
and dust, as he is compelled to do by Zeus the god (Camus 1942 
(French): 163ff; 2005 (English): 107ff). But why then do we human 
beings toil with the past, if it is all in vain? Are we toiling with 
a stone block that is getting bigger every year? Do we have the 
freedom to let the stone lie, or are we forced to continue? Do we 
have a choice?
Multiple meanings
At first glance, protecting and preserving the past for the future may 
seem to be both absurd and paradoxical in that those two pursuits 
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may be thought to be unreasonable and full of contradictions; but 
they are not meaningless in the sense of being without meaning. On 
the contrary, there is a plethora of ideas about why and how the 
past is actually protected and preserved – and how it can, should, 
or has to be protected and preserved. Indeed, the sheer quantity 
of perspectives, concepts, justifications, values,  interpretations, 
 explanations, and positions is overwhelming. 
Numerous terms appear in the debate about the meaning of the 
past. They refer to perspectives, disciplines, institutions, objects, and 
processes: history, historicise, historicism, historicity, historical con-
sciousness and use of history, archaeology, antiquity, artefact and 
ancient monument, memory, site of memory and politics of memory, 
monument, monumentalise and memorial, museum, musealisation 
and museology, heritage, heritagisation, use of  heritage, politics of 
heritage, and heritage process. 
Just as the terms are numerous, many reasons are quoted for 
studying, retelling, remembering, protecting, preserving, or using 
remains of the past. These reasons may be in the nature of argu-
ments for a particular perspective, for the existence of an academic 
discipline, or for the activities of an institution: Why the disciplines 
of history and archaeology? Why erect monuments and memori-
als? Why establish archives and museums? Why categories such as 
heritage and World Heritage? As a source of knowledge! To be able 
to tell! As a moral obligation! The reasons may also be in the nature 
of values that are emphasised. And the choice may be between 
telling and staying silent, between remembering and forgetting, and 
between preservation and destruction. 
Reasons for occupying oneself with the past are often formulated 
in specific situations that require a justification. A lengthy argument 
may then be reduced to rhetorical slogans, such as “The past for the 
future” and “Heritage is a resource”. Differences regarding interest 
in the past may also be subjected to critical analyses and accounted 
for in the light of ideological and economic trends in society. And 
the importance of the past can be understood against the back-
ground of more fundamental circumstances – either humans as 
creatures characterised by their historical self-consciousness or 
society as a phenomenon dependent on its history for its ability to 
function. In reasons, explanations, and understanding, we recognise 
the three timescales of the French Annales school – the event, the 
conjuncture, and the long-term structure. 
The field can display sharp contrasts between the rhetorical 
slogans for or against protection and preservation – via the critical 
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analyses of how the past has been or may, should, or will be used – 
to categorical statements to the effect that history, memory, and 
heritage are expressions of a society that is either rising or decaying. 
The Past is a Foreign Country (1985), by the historian and geogra-
pher David Lowenthal, became a classic soon after its  publication – 
a classic that has frequently been referred to and quoted. The Past 
is a Foreign Country thus belongs to the academic canon, has been 
called the “Bible” of heritage, and was crucial to the establishment 
of heritage studies as a separate field of research from the 1980s 
onwards. Three decades later, Lowenthal returned with a revised 
and expanded edition: The Past is a Foreign Country – Revisited 
(Lowenthal 2015). 
The Past is a Foreign Country begins by stating that “The past is 
everywhere” (Lowenthal 1985: xv; 2015: 1). Lowenthal then goes 
on to present, with example after example, quotation after quota-
tion, the overwhelmingly numerous and various ways in which the 
West, in particular, has viewed, related to, and used the past. The 
book hence gives the impression of being a great collage, more of a 
collection of examples than an analysis – a collage in which every-
one can find a perspective to be inspired by, or a concrete fragment 
to reuse.
The many examples and quotations blur the dividing line 
between what others have written or said – and think – and what-
ever view Lowenthal himself may hold. And Lowenthal explicitly 
says that he does not want to write a manifesto; that should be 
the preserve of prelates and politicians (Lowenthal 2015: 2). But 
The Past is a Foreign Country is in fact a long manifesto, held 
together by a nostalgic recurring theme. Because at the same time 
as Lowenthal reproaches others for making judgements about the 
past, he makes judgements himself, time and again, about how the 
past has been and is being put to use. Irrespective of his choice of 
perspective, or of examples of how the past has been used or how 
the present relates to the past, Lowenthal is consistently dissatisfied 
and  critical. There is too much of the past, and it is all wrong.
Here is a selection of examples and quotations to illustrate 
Lowenthal’s critical attitude. About anachronisms and modernisa-
tions of the past, he writes that these “ahistorical perversions are 
widely accepted by the general public”; the general public “knows 
less and less”; archaeological data are “elusive and slippery”, and 
preservation is “cramping creativity”; popularity leads to decay, 
wear and tear, destruction, restrictions, and screening; tourism is 
followed by the vulgarity of “constant cockneyfication”; and the 
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present is characterised by “historical illiteracy”, while wretched 
history “is no longer the privileged mode of access to the past [that] 
it used to be” (Lowenthal 2015: 21, 394, 422ff, 590, 596). Nostalgia 
is characterised by such words as “epidemic”, “modern malaise”, 
and “drug” (Lowenthal 1985: 4ff; 2015: 31ff). And with the aid of 
a quotation from the architect Rem Koolhaas, Lowenthal compares 
heritage with a “metastasizing cancer” (Lowenthal 2015: 588).
Lowenthal’s sweeping criticism of heritage is evident in his 
subsequent book, The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History 
(1997), which opens by stating that heritage is everywhere. Now 
the torrents of invective rain down on the reader. Heritage is not 
only good, but also “oppressive, defeatist, decadent”. Heritage is 
“hyped”, “nostalgic”, “its growth [is] also alarming”, it “causes 
chaos”, and it is “rubbish” and “a sacred cow” (Lowenthal 1997: 
ix, 5ff, 10ff). Lowenthal writes that “[w]orship of a bloated herit-
age invites passive reliance on received authority, imperils rational 
inquiry, replaces past realities with feel-good history and saps crea-
tive innovation” (Lowenthal 1997: 12). Heritage is “corrupted by 
being popularized, commoditized, and politicized” (Lowenthal 
1997: 87, also 88ff). History and heritage are described as mutually 
contradictory. “History seeks to convince by truth and succumbs 
to falsehood. Heritage exaggerates and omits, candidly invents and 
frankly forgets, and thrives on ignorance and error” (Lowenthal 
1997: 121). “Heritage is immune to critical reappraisal because it is 
not erudition but catechism; what counts is not checkable fact but 
credulous allegiance” (Lowenthal 1997: 121). “To vilify heritage as 
biased is thus futile: bias is the main point of heritage. Prejudiced 
pride in the past is not a sorry consequence of heritage; it is its 
essential purpose” (Lowenthal 1997: 122).
After having read both the original and the later edition of The 
Past is a Foreign Country as well as The Heritage Crusade and the 
Spoils of History, and having listened to several lectures given by 
Lowenthal, I wonder whether the canonical status of the books is, 
in fact, due to the criticism, or has come about in spite of the criti-
cism, or has perhaps evolved because many people have failed to go 
beyond the books’ titles and lists of contents. 
Lowenthal views not only the past but also his own period as 
if he were a tourist on a visit to a “foreign country”. He takes a 
distanced view of the present’s use of the past as something strange, 
without wanting to understand, without useful explanations, and 
without constructive proposals for improvements. There are only 
small and scattered attempts to understand or explain why the past 
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is protected, preserved, used, discovered, and created, and why it 
changes. And yet, more than anything else, all his examples and 
quotations actually do show, with overwhelming empirical support, 
that people’s relationship to the past is something essential. Without 
understanding or explanations, preservation becomes something 
absurd, something done for its own sake: “preservation has become 
a prime end in itself” (Lowenthal 2015: 592). 
Interspersed with the criticism are small attempts at explana-
tions. On the one hand, Lowenthal takes the view that modernisa-
tion has created anxiety and nostalgia, that the increasing tendency 
to tell, remember, and preserve is due to growing speed and vola-
tility (Lowenthal 1985: 399; 2015: 417, 596). The more change, 
then, the greater the need for the past. On the other hand, angst 
and nostalgia are also said to be due to doubts about progress and 
modernity (Lowenthal 1985: 11ff; also 1997: 1, 10f; 2015: 36ff, 
417). Consequently, Lowenthal considers that angst and nostalgia 
are caused by both modernism and postmodernism.
Modernism without faith is exactly what characterises post-
modernism, according to the journalist and art historian Robert 
Hewison,  who has also written critically about heritage: “Post-
modernism is modernism with the optimism taken out” (Hewison 
1987: 132). 
The debate about the past, history, memory, and heritage thus 
reveals deep disagreement about most matters: the concepts that 
are relevant, the motives or values that are important, the inter-
pretations or explanations that are valid, and also the attitudes 
that should prevail. There is also a debate about whether a newer 
age should be given priority ahead of an older one – for instance, 
whether the modern industrial heritage is more important than 
the Viking Age’s rune-stones or the Stone Age’s kitchen middens; 
about  whether preservation is a relatively new or old phenom-
enon; about whether the remains of the past should be protected 
and preserved, can be used or even consumed; about whether or 
not authenticity is crucial for heritage; and about whether heritage 
is a reality or a construction in the present. It is thus easy to become 
somewhat confused when confronted by the multiplicity of con-
cepts, justifications, values, and – not least – would-be authoritative 
analyses and attitudes that appear to conflict with one another. 
It is tempting to regard this multiplicity as an expression of the 
postmodern condition. This is a concept formulated by the phi-
losopher Jean-François Lyotard. The condition is supposed to be 
characterised by the dissolution of the great narratives. Religions, 
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ideologies, and science lose their credibility. Faith in progress and 
the modern project has expired. What is left is the singular, subjec-
tive and individual, the multicultural and eclectic (Lyotard 1979 
(French); 1984 (English)). 
In the face of the postmodern condition, my investigation might 
come to an end. There is no reason to search any further; satisfac-
tory answers already exist. The answers are multiple, complicated, 
and entangled in one another. And no answer is better than any 
other. So why look for more concepts, justifications, values, or theo-
ries? The world with its history, archaeology, memory, monuments, 
memorials, archives, museums, heritage, and World Heritage is too 
open and complex to be comprehensible. 
Multiplicity is undoubtedly a fact; but it is debatable whether our 
present age is actually in a postmodern condition. First, our time is 
not strikingly postmodern; rather, it is hypermodern. Second, if our 
age is or has recently become postmodern, previous ages have cer-
tainly presented the same symptoms of multiplicity and confusion. 
And, third, different parts of the world may be dissimilar, so it is not 
possible to generalise about a prevailing global condition. 
The present is not unequivocally postmodern. Consequently, 
the great narratives have by no means expired. It is possible that 
many people question faith in progress and modernity, particularly 
in the West, in other words in Europe and North America; but this 
faith is still gaining ground in other parts of the world, especially 
in Asia. The great global contexts are more important than ever; 
the economy and the climate are bringing people together around 
new common narratives; and religion is once more on the political 
agenda every day of the week. The postmodern condition is hence 
not dominant from a global perspective. 
The concept of the postmodern condition assumes that the 
modern period was somehow different, an organic “golden age” 
of great narratives, characterised by the universal, objective, and 
collective, the monocultural and coherent. Here, though, the post-
modern philosophers may have been seduced by the narrative 
of progress that they themselves criticise; or they are captives of 
their own rhetoric, which marks a distinction between the modern 
and the postmodern. For the narrative of progress gives history a 
direction, a direction where whatever deviates from its main line is 
not told, remembered, or preserved. Both the modern period and 
the early modern and pre-modern period possessed a multifarious 
abundance of small and great narratives. A canonisation of one 
line of development around progress closes off the alternative 
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 narratives, memories, and possibilities. All ages have been “post-
modern” if the simultaneous existence of many small narratives is a 
crucial criterion: we have always been postmodern. 
The present has always been characterised by a multiplicity 
of opinions, confusion, and uncertainty about the future. It is 
only when a distance has opened up to a period or epoch that a 
rounded narrative is put in place through a process of canonisa-
tion, in which something is selected as valuable ahead of some-
thing else. Something  is told, remembered, and preserved while 
something else remains unsaid, is forgotten, and disappears. At 
a distance, the past can be surveyed, simplified, and fitted into a 
greater canonical narrative, with a given direction, about what 
was typical of the period. But a deeper and broader examination of 
earlier periods uncovers a swarm of alternative views, metaphysics, 
religion, superstition, speculations, and errors that are not given a 
place in the textbook narratives about the progress of reason and 
science. It is the canonised hero of reason to whom memorials are 
devoted, and whose intellectual legacy is protected and preserved 
for posterity.
A first example that may be mentioned is the view taken of the 
past, artefacts, and ancient monuments in Denmark and Sweden 
in the seventeenth century, with names such as Ole Worm and 
Johannes Bureus. A close study of contemporaneous sources reveals 
that these views about the past were intimately related to religion 
and magic and were much more varied and full of contradictions 
than previously assumed (Svestad 1995: 75ff; Jensen 2002).
A second example is the mathematician and physicist Isaac 
Newton, who is often presented as a pioneer of modern science 
but was influenced by religious motives. Newton is famous for his 
revolutionary theories of universal gravitation, motion, light, and 
colour. But at the same time, he sought to combine what should, in 
a modern view, be kept separate, namely the magic and the exact, 
the occult and the rational. Throughout his life, he studied alchemy 
and theology alongside mathematics and physics. Newton thus 
employed several methods which he regarded as equivalent in his 
endeavour to reach the truth and the divine (Dobbs 1991). 
As a third example, the physicist Hans Christian Ørsted com-
bined religious ideas and Romantic natural philosophy with physi-
cal experiments. When Ørsted discovered electromagnetism, he was 
thus inspired by Romantic ideas about the unity of natural forces. In 
his view, he had made an experimental demonstration of the spirit of 
nature, which reflected the thoughts of God (Lindborg 1998). 
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Multiplicity and confusion around history, memory, and heritage 
may also be due to the actual volume and variation of the relevant 
phenomenon. The past is expressed in everything from doctoral 
theses to novels and role-playing games, from national archives to 
private photo albums, and from the Abu Simbel of antiquity (WHL 
88, 1979) to the modern Sydney Opera House (WHL 166rev, 
2007). The field is so large, and the questions are formulated so 
broadly, that the path lies open to many different and mutually 
contradictory replies. 
In addition, there is marked multiplicity in the division into disci-
plines and institutions, each with their own discourse or “conversa-
tion”; that is, each with its own professional language, circulation 
of ideas, questions, perspectives, methods, sources, practice, justifi-
cations, motives, and values. The past is illuminated by numerous 
subjects, each of which can be further divided into a number of sub-
specialities. In the same way, there are innumerable institutions such 
as archives, museums, libraries, visitor centres, research centres, 
and administrations displaying far-reaching internal specialisation. 
Multiplicity may also be based on quantitative growth. There are 
quite simply more trained historians, psychologists, archaeologists, 
heritage researchers, and other specialists than ever before, and 
therefore also more conflicting opinions (Kristiansen 1996; Evans 
1997: 171ff). 
This multiplicity is a double-edged phenomenon. On the one hand, 
it entails an enriching pluralism, in which reality is illuminated from 
several vantage points. On the other hand, it easily leads to confu-
sion and despondency. Understanding and explanation, the possibil-
ity of criticism and change disappear when numerous variations and 
details are allowed to dominate. Similarities and wider correlations 
go undetected. A unified view becomes an  unachievable utopia. 
However, two distinct attitudes to the traces of the past – two dia-
metrically different cultures – run right through all this  multiplicity 
and confusion. 
Two cultures
Two cultures are separated by a gap. One is science and the other 
is literature (or the humanities). They do not know each other and 
they cannot enter into a conversation. That was the claim made 
by the physicist and author C. P. Snow in a lecture in Cambridge 
in 1959 (Snow 1959). This gap originated from a division of 
the  scientific disciplines of the nineteenth century into analytical 
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and explanatory natural sciences on the one side and interpreta-
tive and understanding humanities on the other. And explanation 
and understanding are still two complementary ways of approach-
ing knowledge (cf. Wright 1971), so there is no concept that could 
unite explaining and understanding, unite causes and intentions. 
Snow’s idea about the two cultures had a great impact in an era 
in which the Cold War created a polarisation between West and 
East. At the same time, it is easy to see that the idea of the two 
cultures also sprang from Snow’s personal experience as both a 
physicist and an author. But even if Snow’s powerful pair of con-
cepts has long been outdated, I would submit that there is a current 
gap between the two cultures with respect to their view of history, 
memory, and heritage. Despite the comprehensive affiliation to 
the World Heritage Convention, there is still no consensus about 
 heritage or World Heritage.
The two cultures of heritage originate from different roles 
and therefore dissimilar perspectives – on the one hand antiquar-
ian “management” and on the other hand critical studies in the 
academy. But the cultures share a focus on threats, in the first to 
heritage and in the second from heritage. In addition, the division 
between the two cultures often, albeit not always, coincides with 
the division between essentialism on the one hand and constructiv-
ism on the other. The managers thus see the past and the heritage as 
really existing, whereas the critics view the past and heritage as con-
structions for negotiation. I refer to the first culture as Canonical 
Heritage; the other calls itself Heritage Studies or Critical Heritage.
The first, and canonical, culture of heritage is characteristic of the 
heritage managers. Resting on laws and conventions, it is supported 
by popular engagement. It is found at international institutions such 
as UNESCO, national institutions such as English Heritage/Historic 
England, the Swedish National Heritage Board, the Directorate for 
Cultural Heritage in Norway, and the Danish Agency for Culture 
and Palaces, and at archives, libraries, museums, foundations, and 
associations. A characteristic of the first culture is that heritage is 
regarded as being under threat, and that it ought to be defended 
and preserved for the future. Representatives of this culture describe 
developments as a constant struggle against time and impermanence 
for better documentation, protection, preservation, and use. A boom 
or an upturn for history, memory, and heritage is seen as a sign of 
health and as progress. Heritage is already, or should be, central as a 
destination in a growing experience economy. And heritage is associ-
ated with words such as  inheritance, memory, resource, knowledge, 
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values, democracy, multiplicity, and  sustainable  development, all 
meant in a favourable sense. 
We encounter the first culture in general works about institu-
tions, specialist disciplines, and heritage, in which it is possible to 
follow developments from the very first examples of history writing, 
archaeological excavations, or protection up to research, manage-
ment, and communication in our own age. The past, with its texts, 
images, objects, monuments, and landscapes, has been threatened 
through the ages by silence, oblivion, and destruction; but it can 
and should be salvaged for posterity. A consistent theme running 
through these narratives is threats to the heritage, and attempts to 
avert them. The salvage of the temples of Abu Simbel is a prime 
example in the first culture’s own history of successful campaigns 
for protection and preservation. History, monuments, and heritage 
are presented as being worth protecting, preserving, being aware of, 
and visiting. In particular, all the World Heritage sites are proudly 
presented on signs, on websites, in adverts, in brochures, in maga-
zines, and in abundantly illustrated works (e.g. whc.unesco.org; 
Lutyk 1987; Anker & Snitt 1997; Grundsten & Hanneberg 2000; 
Hanneberg 2012; The World’s Heritage 2018; worldheritageswe 
den.se). 
Heritage’s second, critical, culture is found especially among a 
number of academics active at universities or research centres, or 
as independent scholars. It is present at universities, where net-
works  are established around courses, journals, series of books, 
conferences, and centres with the word “critical” as their pivotal 
point, for example in the network called the “Association of Critical 
Heritage Studies” (criticalheritagestudies.org). The criticism appears 
across a broad scale – from criticism of the selection of heritage 
via criticism of how heritage is preserved and used to rejection of 
 heritage as an idea. 
One characteristic of the most radical criticism of heritage is 
the notion that the past is a burden and a menace to society. The 
unfavourable consequences of too much history, memory, or herit-
age are emphasised. Mass tourism to heritage destinations is a 
problem. An upturn for the past is thus seen as a symptom of 
disease and crisis. The upturn is described not as a boom, but as 
a mania. And history, memory, and heritage are associated with 
words such as myth, flight, therapy, trauma, spectacle, obsession, 
and inflation, madness and stress, taboo, totem and fetish, cult and 
crusade, industry and musealisation – all obviously intended in an 
 unfavourable sense. 
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Radical critics thus describe the past as a burden, a stone of 
Sisyphus, and a threat to society. Stored artefacts are described as 
“archaeological waste” and archive documents as “archival waste” 
(e.g. Beckman 1998: 36f). The widespread fixation with the past is 
diagnosed as neurotic and repressive, an expression of a sick con-
sciousness and fear of death (Brown 1959: 87ff). Culturalism with 
its notions of identity is described as an epidemic virus (Hylland 
Eriksen 1996). Heritage inflation is diagnosed as a narcissistic syn-
drome leading to either neurosis or madness (Choay 1992 (French): 
187ff; 2001 (English): 164ff). 
The analogy with disease is already to be found in the work of 
the philologist and philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. His “untimely 
meditation” Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für das Leben 
(On the Use and Abuse of History) was originally intended to 
appear under the title “The Historical Disease”. Nietzsche described 
his age’s preoccupation with the past as a “consumptive histori-
cal fever” that should be countered with poison, ointments, and 
medicines. Nietzsche took the view that history, which ought to 
serve and promote life, had become a burden and a drawback. 
With its ideals, the art and culture of antiquity was a “yoke of the 
past”. The present was described by Nietzsche as saturated with 
history, and it was to be cured by a diet of oblivion and art. For the 
past was hostile and dangerous. It weakened personality, fostered 
self- righteousness, impeded maturity, promoted epigonism, and 
developed both cynicism and egoism via self-irony (Nietzsche 1874 
(German): Vorwort, Chapter 8, 10; 2005 (English): Preface p. 3f, 
Chapter VIII 47ff, Chapter X 65ff). 
Another widespread analogy is with religion – also meant in 
an unfavourable sense. The whole sphere of history, memory, and 
heritage can be seen as a civil religion with relics and rituals, a 
religion that creates cohesion around the nation and a national 
identity. Museums are compared with temples or churches, the 
objects exhibited with relics, museum staff with priests, monuments 
with religious buildings, tourists with pilgrims, and mass cultural 
tourism with a World Church (e.g. MacCannell 1976: 42ff; Horne 
1984: 1ff; Choay 1992 (French): 101ff, 128f, 158ff, 186; 2001 
(English): 87ff, 111f, 139ff, 163; Beckman 1993a: 31f; 1998: 32ff; 
Duncan 1995: 7ff; Hylland Eriksen 1996: 85).
This criticism, in all its forms, is found in Lowenthal’s work. There 
is criticism to the effect that UNESCO defines heritage too narrowly 
according to a Western way of thinking, focusing on preservation of 
the material; that is, the intangible, which is of greater importance 
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in other cultures, is neglected (Lowenthal 1997:  20). Besides, the 
past is said to be merely preserved instead of being used creatively 
(Lowenthal 1985: xvii, 384; 2015: 413). There is general criticism, 
full of invective, of the past and heritage (Lowenthal 1985: 4ff, 64; 
1997: 5ff, 10ff, 87ff, 120f, 189; 2015: 31ff, 132). The analogies 
to both disease and religion are in evidence here. In The Past is 
a Foreign Country, nostalgia is described as an epidemic disease 
(Lowenthal 1985: 4ff; 2015: 31ff). And in The Heritage Crusade 
and the Spoils of History, heritage is compared with a new folk 
belief, a secular religion, and a crusade, just as heritage institutions 
are compared with the Church (Lowenthal 1997: 1f). 
But analogies with disease and religion hardly contribute to 
greater understanding of the importance of the past in the present. 
The analogies only mean that questions are given new labels, that 
the problem field is reformulated in new spheres which are at least 
as complicated or enigmatic. Then, instead, the question becomes: 
Why diseased? Why neurotic? Why pilgrimage? Why crusade? The 
purpose of the analogies appears as a rhetorical strategy, in which 
the choice of words is geared to demonstrating how negative or 
meaningless heritage is. It is about invective, not about understand-
ing or explanation.
If there is any doubt as to which of the two cultures of heritage 
one is encountering, the language can be revealing. While the first, 
canonical, culture talks about history, memory, and heritage with 
respect and reverence, as something elevated, the tone in the second 
culture may, as an antithesis, be surprisingly disrespectful, sarcastic, 
derisive, or directly contemptuous of both heritage and its manag-
ers. Although the defamatory tone can be traced back to the style of 
Nietzsche, Lowenthal’s books also seem to have set a standard here 
that several people with the same attitudes have striven to emulate 
(e.g. Beckman 1993a; 1998). 
However, a critical reckoning with both traditions of heritage is 
long overdue (cf. Winter 2013; Aronsson 2015: 168f). The tradi-
tions have developed into conformist, self-corroborating discourses 
without any mutual dialogue. A continued reckoning is needed with 
the managing canonical tradition, whose protection and preserva-
tion are uncritically regarded as part of the Enlightenment project 
and progress; so is a reckoning with the critical tradition when it 
gets stuck in non-constructive criticism and merely repeats itself by 
constantly providing new examples.
On the one side are those who evidently worship the past and 
the cultural heritage, and on the other side are those who are 
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 discontented with them both. But if we want to understand and 
explain the importance of the past in the present – that is, under-
stand and explain the importance of history, memory, and heritage – 
then the gap between these two cultures needs to be overcome. For 
an inquiry cannot focus solely on the arguments on one side – that 
is, either on all the good arguments for telling, remembering, and 
preserving, or on all the good arguments (or invective) to the con-
trary. My inquiry will try to bridge that gap and, if possible, fuse the 
canonical and the critical. In addition, greater conceptual, methodo-
logical, and empirical precision is required since, up to now, central 
concepts have been used in a somewhat haphazard fashion, various 
random examples being thrown into the debate one after another as 
ad-hoc arguments, and arguments often being replaced by rhetoric. 
Archimedean points
The ancient mathematician Archimedes is supposed to have said, 
“Give me a place to stand, and I will move the earth.” This wording 
has created the metaphor of the Archimedean Point as a name for 
an immoveable, secure, and certain fixed place. Now, however, the 
metaphor is generally used to assert that a fixed place of that kind 
no longer exists, insofar as it ever did. There is not supposed to be 
such a thing as a fixed place, a true, objective, or certain starting 
point. In the postmodern condition, an almost nihilistic relativism 
is unavoidable. 
But the need for an Archimedean point becomes evident when 
one confronts the debate about the past. For there is great confu-
sion here, produced by strange paradoxes, innumerable examples, 
multiple meanings, and conflicting explanations. So give me a fixed 
place where I can stand and therefore a viewpoint I can use, and 
then I can try to understand and explain why the past apparently 
turns up everywhere. 
Over the years, I have considered, planned, initiated, and then 
rejected (at least) three different starting points for an investiga-
tion. The first was the well-known and unique, while universally 
valid, archaeological discovery where we stand face to face with 
the person of the past: the mummified body of the Tollund man 
at Silkeborg Museum in Denmark. I then looked at musealisation, 
with its shifting trends, from a long-term perspective: the founding 
of museums in Scandinavia as a population covering the whole 
spectrum from the great national museums to the Hasse & Tage 
Museum in Tomelilla in Sweden, called the world’s smallest film 
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museum. And finally, the spectacular blasting of a heritage – and 
later World Heritage – site: the destruction of the Buddha statues in 
Bamiyan in Afghanistan in 2001 (WHL 208rev, 2003).
Where the field of the past is great and unbounded, I choose to 
focus on one out of several possible perspectives, namely on herit-
age, an area where David Lowenthal’s books, The Past is a Foreign 
Country (1985; 2015) and The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of 
History (1997), possess canonical status. But further precision is 
needed. 
Despite the influence of Lowenthal, studies of heritage are sur-
prisingly often restricted to individual sites, a region, or a nation, 
in the same way as international perspectives are often restricted to 
previous colonies. Both heritage’s canonical culture and heritage’s 
critical culture generally keep to a national discussion, as if the 
term heritage had undergone its own independent development 
within the borders of a state (e.g. Anshelm 1993). This geographi-
cally restricted scope may be due to a practical dependence on the 
respective area of responsibility and field of interest of institutions. 
It may also be due to connections with questions of identity and 
politics, both of which are often restricted to the national stage. 
And the national or colonial scope may be due to linguistic limita-
tions or convenience. But even if the nation is an important unit, it 
is neither natural nor unproblematic as a methodological bound-
ary, and it needs to be explored in a global context (cf. Smith 1983; 
Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002). Without a broader perspective 
that crosses borders and shatters the national “iron cage”, it is, 
in my opinion, not possible to understand or explain heritage as 
a phenomenon, let alone to account for the global expansion of 
heritage. 
In studies of both the past and the present, we often resort to per-
spectives that are characterised by dichotomies. As academic trends 
shift, either one or another perspective is given renewed attention: 
the special or particular as against the general or universal, the local 
as against the global, and the national as against the international. 
But in order to understand and explain heritage, it is necessary to 
unite these perspectives. Heritage as a phenomenon is both local 
and global – heritage is “glocal”. Developments at the local level are 
affected by global trends – and the global has to take a position in 
relation to the local (Robertson 1995). But where, then, is the start-
ing point that can shed light on heritage from a glocal perspective?
Abu Simbel in Egypt has several of the characteristics that an 
Archimedean point of heritage is required to possess. Thus the cliff 
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temples of Abu Simbel hold a central position in the debate about 
the protection, preservation, and use of heritage. Abu Simbel is 
a world-famous and popular destination, even though the Arab 
Spring and the subsequent conflicts have reduced the number of 
tourists. The temples were threatened by drowning and destruc-
tion on account of the erection of the Aswan High Dam, but after 
several years of discussions about principles and technical solu-
tions, the temples were salvaged in an extensive international cam-
paign under the leadership of UNESCO. And a few years later, Abu 
Simbel was elevated to World Heritage status along with other 
Nubian monuments. But instead of remaining at Abu Simbel, 
the temples can be used as a vehicle for engaging in an exchange 
between the local and the global, from Abu Simbel to all World 
Heritage Sites and back again. Therefore, instead of choosing one 
Archimedean point I choose many; that is, the apparent stability of 
a growing network of many sites. 
From a glocal perspective, heritage may be represented by World 
Heritage, which has found its way not only to Abu Simbel, but also 
to numerous monuments, buildings, places, and landscapes around 
the globe. The category of World Heritage is a growing international 
canon that is well defined and particularly well documented. World 
Heritage permits both a total overview and a focus on selected 
examples. World Heritage represents both the past and the present. 
The World Heritage sites are accompanied by various expressions 
defining their values, their proper use, and reasons for their status. 
World Heritage sites may be linked to questions related to canonisa-
tion, memory, and oblivion, crises and compensation, modernity, 
museums, and traditions. And World Heritage sites are relevant to 
current questions about economic development, politics, identity, 
rights, and conflicts (cf. Labadi & Long 2010). World Heritage sites, 
with Abu Simbel as an example, are also “good to think with” (Lévi-
Strauss 1962 (French): 128 “bonnes à penser”; 1963 (English): 89). 
World Heritage sites were chosen as the Archimedean points of 
the present investigation, partly because they can represent herit-
age both locally and globally and partly because they are readily 
accessible as empirical data, and therefore do not detract from 
the questions, perspectives, and debate. There is no need for time- 
consuming archive or storage studies or for demanding excavations, 
conservation, documentation, or digitalisation to make the material 
accessible and usable. 
While new methodological conditions were created for the writing 
of history with the art of printing in Europe from the  fifteenth 
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century, and for archaeology and history of art with the railway 
and mass production of images in the nineteenth century, aspects 
of modernity in the form of computer technology and the Internet 
are creating new conditions for heritage studies in the twenty-first 
century. Without exertion I am able, from my location in southern 
Sweden, to visit World Heritage sites all over the world with the 
aid of Google Earth, Google Street View, and UNESCO’s websites. 
Modernity is hence both a condition for my inquiry and part of the 
modernity that is to be investigated and discussed. 
The World Heritage sites are complex entities. On the one hand, 
World Heritage is a concept, a word with a well-defined meaning 
which refers to a carefully defined number of sites that can, in 
principle, increase without end. On the other hand, every single 
World Heritage is an individual, unique site with its own history 
and own set of physical circumstances. The World Heritage sites 
thus represent both an abstract idea and a concrete materiality, and 
they must therefore be investigated from several perspectives and 
using several different methods. Concepts can be confronted with 
the material both in order to inspire and in order to meet resistance. 
But do the World Heritage sites create or reflect a world? Is 
World Heritage something that exists and can therefore be discov-
ered? Or is it something that is constructed, and that creates a new 
reality? This is the same problem as in a discussion of whether facts 
are discovered or constructed in a laboratory (Latour & Woolgar 
1979; also Febvre 1949 (French): 239; 1973 (English): 36f), and 
whether a map reproduces or constructs the world (Wood 1993). 
Here the field of social sciences and humanities has been charac-
terised by constructivism since the 1980s; that is, the view that we 
construct the world with the aid of words and images. 
A World Heritage site can be discovered as a place, but it is 
constructed as a concept. And there is a compromise or a third 
standpoint between objectivism and constructivism, between dis-
covering and constructing facts. It is not a question of knowledge 
either existing or being created, but of the world’s being investi-
gated with the aid of human-made instruments. But heritage and 
World Heritage are not only about technical instruments; they also 
involve the senses and language.
The world may be observed and changed from innumerable 
angles that complement and enrich one another. The picture of 
the world varies as perspectives shift. Just as colours show part 
of the world, and just as the Hubble telescope shows light from 
the cosmos in a limited section of the spectrum, a map shows 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   28 25/01/2021   08:09
The past is everywhere 29
the world from one of an innumerable number of possible per-
spectives. The map is a model of the world that connects theory 
with reality: it is an idealised representation of the world. And 
since the world is infinite and constantly changing, the map can 
never be more than a methodological approximation of the world 
(Giere 2006). So the telescope and the map are – just like the pen, 
the book, and the computer – tools  that bridge the gap between 
objectivism and constructivism, between the world as it is and our 
view of the world. We do not experience the world as it is but as 
our instruments, senses, and experience permit us to perceive it 
(Eagleman 2016: 35). 
Questions concerning the importance of history, memory, and 
heritage cannot be answered with a clear yes or no. Nor can they 
be answered with a mathematical formula or a number. There are 
no definitive answers. Instead, we are dealing with an interlocking 
of understanding and explanation where the choice of perspective 
is pivotal to the shaping of the answers. 
Arche, archaeology, and order
The study of the past is split up among numerous subjects and 
institutions, each with its characteristic designation, its perspec-
tive, its methods, its source material, its period, or its preferred 
geographical area. And inside each subject or institution, there 
are discussions about objectives, boundaries, and identities, espe-
cially when the field is to be defined in relation to other fields. 
The universal, overarching, or common in relation to the past and 
the present is forced to give way to far-reaching antiquarian and 
academic Balkanisation. What is needed here is an amalgamation 
of that which has been divided, a fusion of canonical and critical 
perspectives. 
Linguistically, the first part of archaeology as a word may have 
its origins in pre-Socratic philosophy. The first person to have used 
archai or arche as a concept is said to have been the philosopher 
Anaximander. Arche was derived from the verb archo, which meant 
“to begin” or “to reign”. In philosophy, arche came to mean begin-
ning, origin, first principle, ultimate cause, first material, or axiom. 
Arche was a “substrate” – an underlying layer. Arche was the origin 
of everything, boundless, eternal, immortal, and divine (OED: 
I, 608; Malina & Vasícek 1990: 3ff; McKirahan 1998). 
In philosophy, archaiologi’a or archaeology then came to mean 
the study of a distant past, or speculation about events with regard 
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to which there was no proof. In its earliest meaning, archaeology 
is hence unbounded in relation to sources, periods, and geography. 
But when archaeology was disciplined into a field of inquiry and 
then became an academic subject in the nineteenth century, it was 
limited to the study of material culture with the aid of the methods 
of typology, stratigraphy, and analogy. And archaeology then came to 
be associated, first and foremost, with excavation (Malina & Vasícek 
1990: 3ff; Schnapp 1993 (French): 60ff, 275ff; 1996 (English): 60ff, 
275ff). 
Since its establishment as a subject, archaeology has itself become 
fragmented into a large number of subdisciplines or specialities. It 
was thus noted relatively recently that there are more than 100 
different archaeologies with their own designations, including my 
own specialities “historical archaeology” and “church archaeol-
ogy” (Rudebeck 2009: 18). But there is undoubtedly room for “a 
 thousand archaeologies” in the future.
Specialisation is encouraged by an academic dynamic, in which 
positions and capital are sought at the “forefront of research”. New 
perspectives are soon defined as their own specialities and, if pos-
sible, as their own subjects, which may generate a return in the form 
of appointments, money, and prestige. In addition, specialisation is 
an effective means of attaining knowledge; it may also be necessary 
as the quantity of methods and data increases. However, specialisa-
tion also means that we know more and more about less and less. 
The great questions, the overview and the syntheses, are impeded or 
prevented. 
The concept of archaeology is still used in philosophy and 
in other contexts as a metaphor for a particular method. The 
archaeologist has become a detective looking for hidden clues. 
Archaeology is associated with depth, excavation, and uncovering 
what is hidden under the surface, as well as with stratification, the 
uncertain, fragments, and documentation (e.g. Lowenthal 1985: 
251ff; 2015: 401ff; Ebeling & Altekamp 2004; Holtorf 2005: 
16ff). 
The passion that the physician Sigmund Freud had for archae-
ology and antiquity has attracted considerable attention, and his 
 psychoanalysis has been compared with an archaeological excava-
tion (Møller 1994; Thomas 2004: 149ff; Kuusamo 2011). Above 
Freud’s famous divan in Vienna there hung a gouache, a picture of 
Abu Simbel from 1907 (Pollock 2006: 2 with fig. 1.1, 8f). 
Another famous example is the philosopher and historian of 
ideas Michel Foucault, who called his own method for bringing out 
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knowledge hidden in the archives “archaeological” (cf. Foucault 
1966 (French); 1971 (English); 1969 (French); 1972 (English)). 
Metaphorical archaeology is tempting with its undisciplined 
freedom. But my method is perhaps the opposite of archaeology. 
Neither non-archaeology nor pseudo-archaeology, it is a kind of 
anti-archaeology. Because whereas archaeology digs deep and 
works with materiality in a long temporal perspective, I will look 
up from the ground to the sky in an attempt to form an overview, 
working with library books and the more transient world of the 
computer screen. 
My investigation may be an example of archaeosophy, archaeol-
ogy, historical archaeology, glocal archaeology, canonical or critical 
heritage studies, or some seventh pursuit. But in actual fact, aca-
demic designations and divisions into subjects are uninteresting 
when we think and write: it must be left to others, or to the future, 
to bring order to a writer’s identities, perspectives, and investiga-
tions (cf. Febvre 1949 (French): 231f; 1973 (English): 31; Foucault 
1969: 28 (French); 1972: 17 (English)). As a didactic device, I have 
nonetheless chosen to assign professional labels to individuals 
mentioned in this text, while their national identities have been 
deliberately omitted. 
If you follow your curiosity and conscience wherever that path 
may lead; formulate questions and seek answers irrespective of 
whether they belong to this or that discipline, culture, or tradi-
tion; freely seek enlightenment in the conviction that knowledge 
can bring about change; and try to cross the dividing line between 
knowledge, aesthetics, and ethics, as well as the dividing line between 
“is” and “ought” – well, then you are by necessity an engaged – and 
 troublesome – amateur (cf. Said 1994). 
The purpose of Heritopia: World Heritage and modernity is to 
try to understand and explain the importance of the past in the 
present by starting out from glocal examples of heritage, namely 
World Heritage sites. The background is my own and many others’ 
amazement in the face of a much-debated upturn that is observable 
across the field of history, memory, and heritage, albeit my inquiry 
chooses to focus on heritage and, within that area, on World 
Heritage sites in particular. 
In methodological terms, World Heritage sites will be included in 
the inquiry both as individual examples and as a statistical popula-
tion. Abu Simbel will turn up regularly. But otherwise attention is 
generally drawn to what is different, marginal, or border-crossing, 
which may indirectly shed light on normality: World Heritage sites 
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that are controversial, threatened, vandalised, or have simply been 
removed from the List; places that could be expected to be World 
Heritage sites but are nonetheless not on the List; and countries that 
still do not have any World Heritage, or have not even ratified the 
Convention.
To understand and explain the importance of the past, it is, in my 
view, necessary to bridge not only the gap between the two cultures 
of heritage, but also other trenches between different cultures, per-
spectives, and academic subjects that split up the field. Consequently, 
references will be made both to academic texts and to literary and 
cinematic fiction, to sciences, humanities, and social sciences – and 
use will be made of both qualitative interpretation and quantita-
tive analysis. Moreover, I consider that heritage and World Heritage 
cannot be examined in isolation from the more general develop-
ment of society. To be able to understand and explain heritage and 
World Heritage, we need to understand and  explain present-day 
developments. 
The main question addressed in this book may be briefly formu-
lated as follows: What is the relationship between World Heritage 
and modernity? In the light of the paradoxes of heritage, a number 
of subsidiary questions can then be formulated: Is preservation of 
World Heritage for the future possible? Is World Heritage changed 
when efforts are made to protect and preserve it? Is the protection 
and preservation of World Heritage offset by more destruction at 
other places? Are threats of destruction a precondition for World 
Heritage? Is World Heritage contrary to modernity and a part of it 
at the same time? Is World Heritage promoted by both more and 
less modernity? Is World Heritage border-crossing?
The present chapter, Chapter 1, “The past is everywhere”, con-
stitutes an introduction which presents the field of problems with 
its paradoxes, taking Abu Simbel as its starting point. Chapter 2, 
“Truth, beauty, and goodness”, considers reasons, motives, and 
values involved in preserving the past. Chapter 3, “Chronic nostal-
gia”, discusses (mis)use of the past and crisis theories, all of which 
have one feature in common: they regard interest in the past as 
a compensation for phenomena in the present. Chapter 4, “The 
faces of modernity”, analyses central concepts such as time, change, 
permanence, progress, and decay, and it presents a new perspective 
on modernity. Chapter 5, “Heritage in the present”, examines the 
growth of heritage as a concept and a field, and it looks at how the 
concept has expanded. Chapter 6, “Destination World Heritage”, 
examines the World Heritage Convention as a modern innovation; 
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the chapter discusses the list of outstanding and universal World 
Heritage sites as an example of canonisation and also as a reac-
tion against an ongoing inflation of heritage. Chapter 7, “World 
Heritage and modernity”, introduces the concept of Heritopia, 
and returns to Abu Simbel and other World Heritage sites in an 
attempt to understand and explain the seven paradoxes listed near 
the beginning of this introductory chapter.
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Truth, beauty, and goodness
Defence of the past
In the myth of Sisyphus, the King of Corinth pushes a great stone 
up a mountain, whereupon the stone rolls down to the plain again. 
To understand why Sisyphus apparently toils uselessly in the under-
world, we can interrogate Sisyphus himself. Why are you pushing 
this great stone? Or we can interrogate Death, who has imposed 
this task, in order to secure an answer. And if Sisyphus or Death 
wanted, and was able, to reply, and if we could understand their 
answer, we could conclude our search. 
Similarly, to understand the importance of history, memory, 
and heritage, why Ramses II’s cliff temples were moved, we could 
interrogate the participants themselves or look for their justifica-
tions. What is the point of this enormous operation to save some 
old temples? Why this fascination with the past? Why tell about, 
remember, and preserve traces of distant ages? The intention would 
then be to uncover the motives through the participants’ own 
justifications.
The justifications for the Nubian campaign were presented in 
1960 by the then Director-General of UNESCO, Vittorino Veronese. 
An appeal described the threats from the Aswan High Dam; the dif-
ficult choice between the heritage of the past and well-being in the 
present and between temples and crops; and the call by the govern-
ments of Egypt and the Sudan for help from UNESCO. It stressed 
the possibility of new discoveries for humanity, and in return for 
this help the relevant countries would be opened up for archaeo-
logical excavation, with the possibility for half of all finds, as well 
as monuments, to go to foreign museums. The appeal described a 
noble cause, outlined a new era for Egyptology, and regarded the 
operation as a chance to demonstrate international solidarity with 
countries that had been at the centre of many conflicts over the 
centuries (Veronese 1960: 7). 
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Veronese described heritage in a way that pointed towards both 
material and intangible world heritage: 
Wondrous structures, ranking among the most magnificent on earth, 
are in danger of disappearing beneath the waters. … These monuments, 
whose loss may be tragically near, do not belong solely to the countries 
who hold them in trust. The whole world has the right to see them 
endure. They are part of a common heritage which comprises Socrates’ 
message and the Ajanta frescoes, the walls of Uxmal and Beethoven’s 
symphonies. Treasures of universal value are entitled to universal 
protection. (Veronese 1960: 7)
Today, a reader will be struck by the contrast between the elevated 
rhetoric and the promise later in the same text: 
In return for the help the world gives them, the governments of Cairo 
and Khartoum will open the whole of their countries to archaeological 
excavation and will allow half of whatever works of art may be 
unearthed by science or by hazard to go to foreign museums. They 
will even agree to the transport, stone by stone, of certain monuments 
of Nubia. (Veronese 1960: 7)
The contrast is apparent half a century later, when questions con-
cerning the return of heritage to its original location constantly 
create debate and conflicts.
Justifications and motives depend on who is speaking or 
writing, where, and when. The justifications of a Director-General 
of UNESCO represent one perspective, while the motives of par-
ticipating governments, institutions and funds may be different, 
as may the motives of the people who actually carried out the 
work. Behind the wording about conflicts and solidarity, it is 
possible to sense the Suez crisis, when the UK, France, and Israel 
attacked Egypt after the nationalisation of the canal in 1956, a 
mere four years before. Of these three countries, only France – host 
to the headquarters of UNESCO – contributed to the campaign, 
and none of them subsequently accepted temples. And before the 
Director-General’s appeal, there were several years of contacts and 
initiatives between political and antiquarian actors, a minister of 
culture, a Deputy Director-General, an Egyptologist, and many 
others (Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 64ff; 1996: 59ff). 
Official justifications in rhetorical phrases, which are the result of 
a lengthy diplomatic process and have been negotiated to create a 
consensus that as many countries as possible can agree on, are only 
part of the background. And when the campaign was over, one of the 
central actors – the Egyptologist Torgny Säve-Söderbergh – was able, 
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on behalf of UNESCO, to supplement previous justifications with 
higher employment in the area, income from tourism, and contacts 
created through the transfer of antiquities and monuments to other 
countries (Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 137, 217f; 1996: 114).
An exploration of justifications and motives will quickly reveal 
that they are numerous, highly diverse, and dependent on the dis-
courses or conversations of which they form part. Justifications and 
motives are to be found across the whole field of history, memory, 
and heritage – from general humanities to individual disciplines 
or investigations. Justifications and motives may be directed out-
wards at society as a whole, or inwards in a definition of areas of 
responsibility or territories; both cases involve a fight for attention 
and resources. Historical overviews of shifting justifications are 
presented; or it is possible to read the author’s personal view of 
what are, can, or ought to be the right motives. Justifications and 
motives may glide from an account of why over to a methodologi-
cal discussion about how; that is, about whether useful results are 
best achieved through freedom or control, through basic research 
or applied research, and through the prioritisation of one field 
ahead of another. 
The usefulness of the humanities can be asserted in relation to 
economics, social science, medicine, natural science, and engineering. 
Motives can be discussed from a philosophy-of-history perspective, 
with analyses of how different periods viewed usefulness. Accounts 
of different motives can be presented in textbooks. Justifications that 
come across as rhetorical slogans for the already initiated may appear 
in an appeal or at the inauguration of a memorial, a new museum, or a 
new initiative: The past for the future! History, heritage, and memory 
as a resource! Democracy and dialogue! Justifications may also be 
given in formal decisions about archaeological investigations or the 
protection of buildings, and may then include references to legislation 
or conventions. But where the first and canonical culture of heritage is 
geared to expressing justifications using rhetoric, arguments, or statu-
tory provisions, the second and critical culture of heritage wants to 
put in question marks as an expression of scepticism. 
There is a long tradition of reflecting on what history is, can be, 
or should be, on the development of history, and on the history, 
perspectives, methods, and sources of the study of history itself. 
Many have argued for the usefulness of history or discussed the 
arguments of others. These reflections on history have been con-
ducted by historians, but also by philosophers and others under the 
heading “philosophy of history”.
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In the course of these discussions, many participants have been 
inspired by the philosopher and philologist Friedrich Nietzsche and 
his Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben (On the 
Use and Abuse of History). According to Nietzsche, the usefulness 
of history may be divided into three categories, the monumental, 
the antiquarian, and the critical. The monumental provides force 
for action through examples. The antiquarian admires, cultivates, 
and preserves the past with reverence. The critical shows the suf-
fering person the path to emancipation (Nietzsche 1874 (German): 
ch. 2–3; 2005 (English): ch. II 12ff, III 17ff). 
Nietzsche criticised the German society of his time, his opinion 
being that knowledge of past origins had come to exert an unhealthily 
great influence (cf. Latour 1991 (French): 93f; 1993 (English): 69). 
He was particularly critical of the antiquarian attitude in which all 
of the past was considered valuable. Nietzsche missed the balance 
in Ancient Greece between history and life, between knowledge 
and art. The three uses – the monumental, the antiquarian, and the 
 critical – needed to be balanced. 
Nietzsche’s trinity has been updated and supplemented by the 
economic historian Svante Beckman. Employing more contem-
porary terms, the monumental use might, according to Beckman, 
contribute to social order and collective identity; the antiquar-
ian use might contribute to knowledge and individual security; 
and the critical use might contribute to enlightenment and social 
development. Beckman then adds a fourth category, playful 
use, in which the  past  can contribute to individual experiences 
and entertainment. But as a typical representative of the critical 
culture of heritage, Beckman emphasises the unfavourable aspects: 
the monumental can also legitimise power and lies, assisting in 
repression; the antiquarian can contribute to escapism and afford 
false consolation;  the  critical can contribute to alienation and 
 trivialisation – and the playful can contribute to lies, escape, aes-
theticisation, and trivialisation. The new set of four categories is 
based on Beckman’s view that all actions can be explained with 
reference to norms (monumental), necessity (antiquarian), useful-
ness (critical), and entertainment (playful) (Beckman 1998: 39ff; 
2005: 335ff; cf. 1997). 
The uses of history can be identified through history itself, by 
exploring the justifications stated by historians themselves. Familiar 
and still relevant themes and motives turn up at an early stage, 
in Herodotus and Ibn Khaldûn, for instance: history is tremen-
dously popular across national borders, peoples, and social groups. 
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History has several purposes – gathering knowledge so as to be able 
to describe, understand, and explain both the past and the present, 
narrating so as to entertain and to counter oblivion. And history 
searches for truth, strives after beauty in its style, and possesses 
both ethical and philosophical dimensions. 
Herodotus, who has been called the “father of history”, thus 
began his work Histories from the fifth century bce with these 
words: 
What Herodotus the Halicarnassian has learnt by inquiry is here set 
forth: in order that so the memory of the past may not be blotted 
out from among men by time, and that great and marvellous deeds 
done by Greek and foreigners and especially the reason why they 
warred against each other may not lack renown. (Herodotus I: 1, 
p. 3)
The historian and politician Ibn Khaldûn supplied an insightful 
presentation of several purposes of history in his foreword to The 
Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History from 1377: 
HISTORY is a discipline widely cultivated among nations and races. 
It is eagerly sought after. The men in the street, the ordinary people, 
aspire to know it. Kings and leaders vie for it. Both the learned and 
the ignorant are able to understand it. For on the surface history is 
no more than information about political events, dynasties, and 
occurrences of the remote past, elegantly presented and spiced with 
proverbs. It serves to entertain large, crowded gatherings and brings 
to us an understanding of human affairs. [It shows] how changing 
conditions affected [human affairs], how certain dynasties came to 
occupy an ever wider space in the world, and how they settled the 
earth until they heard the call and their time was up. The inner 
meaning of history, on the other hand, involves speculation and an 
attempt to get at the truth, subtle explanation of the causes and 
origins of existing things, and deep knowledge of the how and why 
of events. [History,] therefore, is firmly rooted in philosophy. It deserves 
to be accounted a branch of [philosophy]. (Khaldûn 1958: vol. 1, 
Foreword, p. 6)
But history is full of varying justifications and motives. History and 
philosophy of history is such a broad field that there is room for a 
specialisation or a genre of literature that answers the question: Why 
history? (e.g. Southgate 1996; 2000; 2005; Evans 1997; Tosh 2008). 
The answers primarily reflect their time and place; but they are also 
an attempt to influence what direction the discipline should take in 
the future, and here the authors’ own positions become visible.
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   39 25/01/2021   08:09
40 Heritopia
In a surviving manuscript called Apologie pour l’histoire ou 
Métier de l’historien (The Historian’s Craft), the Annales histo-
rian Marc Bloch began by reporting a question: “Papa, explique-
moi donc à quoi sert l’histoire” (“Tell me, Daddy. What is the 
use  of history?”). Bloch was executed by the Gestapo as a 
member of the Resistance, so the book that was to be the answer 
was never completed. Even so, the answer is clear from the subse-
quently published manuscript. The purpose of history is to under-
stand the present through the past, and to understand the past 
through the present (Bloch 1949 (French): ix quotation, 11ff; 1992 
(English): 3 quotation, 32ff).) So history is justified by a need for 
historical understanding, in which the past and the present are 
entangled.
The time and place can be almost identical and yet perspectives 
may differ widely, as is seen from two historians who were of the 
same age, were both trained in Cambridge and were both active 
for periods in New York, and who both wrote about Europe in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: David Thomson and Eric 
Hobsbawm. While Thomson in The Aims of History stressed the 
importance of a historical attitude, of historical awareness and 
understanding for the intellectual enrichment of life (Thomson 
1969: 11, 99ff), Hobsbawm in his article “Looking Forward: 
History and the Future” wanted to use history to make predic-
tions or forecasts about the future, which he considered desirable, 
 possible, and  necessary (Hobsbawm 1981). 
Archaeology focuses on excavating, documenting, analysing, 
interpreting, and communicating material culture, on developing 
new methods, and on discussing theoretical perspectives; that is, 
questions about what and how. On the rare occasions when the 
“why” of archaeology is discussed in an introduction or in a section 
of a chapter, this is generally done with reference both to the value 
of a long temporal perspective and to the specific advantages of 
exploring the material dimension. In both cases, the legitimation is 
indirectly related to the subject of history, to which a more limited 
perspective is ascribed, covering a relatively short period of time 
and wholly dependent on texts. Even in authoritative textbooks, the 
use of the past may be dealt with in a few lines under the heading 
“What use is the past?” – lines about the importance of feeling and 
knowing that there is a past, as well as about the importance of the 
past for learning more about what it means to be a human being, 
accompanied by a phrase such as “without our roots we are lost” 
(Renfrew & Bahn 2016: 583f). 
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One of the few exceptions to this summary treatment is to be 
found in an article about history of ideas by the archaeologist Carl-
Axel Moberg. The article “Den nyttiga fornforskningen” (“Useful 
[research on] Antiquity”) (Moberg 1984; written in 1947, but 
updated) was produced after the Second World War as an explicit 
reaction to the previous (ab)use of archaeology, in Germany in par-
ticular. Moberg presented varying justifications for the study of the 
past, drawing on examples from Sweden and Denmark since the 
fifteenth century. The great majority reflect how the past has been 
of use in legitimising the state and its ideology. Native country and 
nation are thus the most commonly used concepts. Other central 
concepts are enlightenment, education, revolution, international 
solidarity – and, since the 1970s, entertainment and leisure activity. 
When archaeologists discuss motives, there is generally an ulte-
rior motive somewhere. When, for instance, Michael Shanks and 
Christopher Tilley illustrated connections between various jus-
tifications in Re-Constructing Archaeology, it was in an attempt 
to influence both theory and practice, and to establish a critical 
archaeology (Shanks & Tilley 1987: 25ff, with Fig. 1.1). And when, 
in From Stonehenge to Las Vegas, Cornelius Holtorf presents dif-
ferent meanings of the past, his intention is to show that meaning 
varies over time, that it varies for different people, and that all 
meanings are equally important (Holtorf 2005: 78ff, 92ff). In both 
instances, the presentation of motives is used to promote a relativist 
programme. 
Despite the multiple motivations and motives, it is possible 
to observe some expressions of concern that turn up at regular 
intervals in the debate – words such as threat, crisis, defence, and 
usefulness. The past is said to be threatened both from the outside 
and from the inside; consequently, the field is in crisis and needs to 
be defended, and this is then done with reference to its potential 
usefulness. 
What these expressions have in common is that threat is both 
a concrete reality and a rhetorical figure. The texts and images of 
history are threatened by impermanence, but they may be pre-
served for  posterity in archives and libraries. Memory is threatened 
by  oblivion when new generations grow up, unless it is passed 
on  by  means of narration or documented. And heritage is threat-
ened by decay and destruction and needs to be safeguarded. The cliff 
temples of Abu Simbel were threatened by flooding, but salvaged by 
being moved. New times mean new threats, which must be coun-
tered by new methods. Moreover, the whole field of humanities with 
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history, memory, and heritage is seen as threatened by inner decay, 
which has allegedly deprived the field of its credibility and thereby 
rendered it useless; this is often attributed to harmful influences from 
modernity, Marxism, postmodernism, or postcolonialism. 
Every time someone cries “crisis”, however, it is necessary to 
ask oneself what their intention – their explicit or hidden agenda – 
might be. For instance, when the humanities were said to be in 
crisis in 1970s Sweden, this was about a new generation wanting 
to reshape the field so as to make it more relevant to contempo-
rary society (e.g. Forser 1978). And now that the humanities are 
described as being in crisis four or five decades later, it has to do 
with some people’s contention that the criticism and influence from 
Marxism have gone too far (e.g. Nordin 2008). The word crisis is 
used to create attention, set a new agenda, redefine a field, and then 
 reprioritise resources. 
External and internal threats demand a defence. The past needs 
to be defended against threatening changes through archiving, docu-
mentation, conservation, restoration, relocations, or legislation. The 
past needs to be defended against threats from other competing fields 
according to which the past is of no use. Finally, the past needs to be 
defended against threats within the field which undermine its cred-
ibility. The defensive position is seen directly in book titles such as 
Apologie pour l’histoire … (The Historian’s Craft; Bloch 1949) and 
In Defense of History (Evans 1997). The fundamental point, in my 
view, is that the occurrence of numerous justifications and motives, 
as well as the febrile identification of values, actually constitutes a 
manifestation of the fact that history, memory, and heritage are, or 
are perceived as being, under attack on several flanks. 
The threats are met by going on the offensive and asserting the 
use of the humanities and the past. We thus see titles of articles 
and books that could easily have ended with exclamation marks: 
“Den nyttiga fornforskningen” (“Useful [research on] Antiquity”), 
Why History Matters, Why the Past Matters, Archaeology Matters, 
and The Value of the Humanities (Moberg 1984; Tosh 2008; Little 
2007; Sabloff 2008; Small 2013). 
In a time, at a place, and in a society in which C. P. Snow’s two 
cultures are again being marshalled against each other in the fight 
for limited resources, in which a distinction is made between what 
generates and what consumes resources, in which usefulness is 
associated with economics, social science, medicine, natural science, 
and engineering, whereas pleasure is associated with humanities, 
literature, and art, in which usefulness is fundamentally something 
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defined by economic growth as both a means and an end – in such 
a situation, the past with its history, memory, and heritage is also 
obliged to assert its use and value. 
The values of heritage
Heritage is priceless! Every time heritage is threatened or actually 
destroyed, it is pointed out that heritage is priceless. The Islamic 
State (IS, or Daesh) had books burned and statues smashed in 
Mosul and blew up the ruined city of Nimrud in the spring of 2015, 
while I was writing this, and these are just a few topical examples 
in a long historical series of related events. In this context, the word 
“priceless” is the strongest expression that can be used in defence 
of heritage, and it appears across a broad field from UNESCO 
to the media; priceless means of very great or infinite value. The 
idea behind the wording is that heritage, like that which is sacred, 
belongs to a sphere of its own, independent of the market and of 
economics. So heritage neither can nor should be valued in money, 
or indeed measured in relation to anything else at all.
And still, paradoxically, heritage is valued all the time – and 
converted into money. As a rule, heritage is preserved with refer-
ence to its values, and value is a concept drawn precisely from the 
economic sphere. Valuations and values are therefore crucial to the 
selection and management of heritage. And if heritage is put up for 
sale – as happens every day, legally or illegally, with antiquities and 
art – then supply and demand on the market will soon set a price 
for the priceless. The statues in Mosul would also have been given 
a price, higher if they were originals, lower if they were copies. The 
market knows no limits. 
Heritage’s reference to values differs from history, memory, and 
archaeology, where justifications are normal; but every value could, 
in principle, be reformulated as a justification. From the outset, 
the values of heritage have been adopted and developed to serve 
national administrations of ancient or cultural monuments, but 
now they are also discussed and defined globally, for example in 
UNESCO. Consequently, the values of heritage belong first and 
foremost to a bureaucratic discourse in the first, canonical, culture 
of heritage, even though they can be discussed more widely.
One point of reference regarding the values of heritage, and an 
important inspiration in heritage management, has been the trea-
tise by the art historian Alois Riegl, Der moderne Denkmalkultus, 
sein Wesen und seine Entstehung (Riegl 1903 (German); 1929 
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(German); 1982 (English); “The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its 
Character and Origin”; cf. Arrhenius 2003: 135ff; 2012: 92ff). 
Riegl’s treatise was written by way of preparation for new leg-
islation to protect monuments in the dual monarchy of Austria-
Hungary, a legislation that was, however, never implemented. 
Riegl perceived a historical development in the choice of values, 
took account of both feelings and reason, and distinguished 
between intentional and unintentional monuments (“gewollten 
wie […] ungewollten Denkmahlen”), i.e. between the manifest 
and the latent; everything could thus become a monument. Riegl 
emphasised five values, divided between the past and the present 
– three Commemorative Values (“Erinnerungswerte”), namely Age-
Value (“Alterswert”), Historical Value (“historischer Wert”) and 
Intentional Commemorative Value (“gewollte[r] Erinnerungswert”) 
– and two Present-Day Values (“Gegenwartswerte”), namely 
Use-Value (“Gebrauchswert”) and Art-Value (“Kunstwert”); 
the latter, Art-Value, was in its turn divided into Newness-Value 
(“Neuheitswert”) and Relative Art-Value (“relativer Kunstwert”). 
These values have to do with time, source value, intention, function, 
and aesthetics – art as new and in the present.
Riegl’s original intention was to find objective criteria for selecting 
what was worth preserving, but he came to the conclusion that the 
values were relative and might come into conflict with one another. 
There might be a conflict between commemorative and present-day 
values – between, for instance, Age-Value and Use-Value, Age-Value 
and Art-Value – and there could also be conflicts within one of the 
groups, that is to say, between Age-Value, Historical Value, and 
Intentional Commemorative Value. And the choice of restoration 
method will depend on which values are given priority. 
Values are therefore not something that can be discovered but 
something that must be constructed. Every period and culture must 
formulate its own values, just as they choose their own justifica-
tions and motives. Objective justifications, motives, and values are 
a logical impossibility. However, there are many initiatives whose 
purpose is to attain national or universal consensus on values – 
in, for example, national legislation and international conventions 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the 
World Heritage Convention (1972).
Ever since Riegl’s innovative treatise, there has been an exten-
sive and sustained debate about heritage values. This debate takes 
place within and between the two cultures of heritage. The debate 
is primarily driven by the need that public authorities and museums 
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have to be able to manage a constantly growing heritage in a both 
flexible and credible way in relation to other stakeholders in society. 
On the one hand, the criteria are expected to be so precise that 
they can be used in order to appraise and rank; on the other, they 
should be so open or so numerous that they can capture a con-
stantly expanding heritage. But the debate is also driven forward 
by the critical culture of heritage, which has put question marks 
against established values and often argues for alternative ones or 
other priorities.
The debate has cast light on the values of varying periods from a 
historical perspective and discussed them in relation to various the-
oretical points of departure. Historical and theoretical perspectives 
are frequently combined in attempts to develop heritage manage-
ment and produce selection and prioritisation criteria (e.g. Hygen 
1996; Carlie & Kretz 1998; Navrud & Ready 2002; Pettersson 
2003; Jensen 2010; Smith et al. 2010; Golinelli 2015). As a con-
sequence of management needs and heritage growth, a constantly 
rising number of criteria are defined in sophisticated value systems.
Heritage is often managed along with the environment, so the 
landscape’s cultural and natural environment can either comple-
ment each other or become integrated. And the wording according 
to which heritage is a resource, and thus has value as a kind of energy 
source, is taken from an environmental perspective. Explanations 
of the importance of heritage may hence refer to heritage being 
a resource without any real arguments or specific information. 
Heritage  as a resource functions as a silently accepted slogan to 
which additional positive words such as “active” or “democracy” 
can be added. Phrases that posit heritage as a resource appear along 
these lines in titles of books, reports, conferences, campaigns, and 
centres – and they even do so across the two cultures of heritage 
(e.g. Tunbridge & Ashworth 1996; Weissglas et al. 2002; Holtorf 
2005: 130ff; Liliequist 2005).
The opposite view is also abundantly represented – that heritage 
is a liability, a problem and an obstacle, or, in short, that heritage is 
of no value. This criticism was given its most forceful expression by 
David Lowenthal in the 1990s, with derogatory words about herit-
age such as oppressive, defeatist, decadent, hyped, nostalgic, alarm-
ing, causes chaos, rubbish, sacred cow, corrupted, popularised, 
commoditised, politicised, ignorance, error, and biased (Lowenthal 
1997: ix, 5ff, 10ff, 87ff, 121f). 
Heritage can also represent events or phenomena that are so 
controversial, unpleasant, or marginalised that dealing with them 
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can be problematic – there is often an association with politics, 
war, death, crime, or disease (cf. Tunbridge & Ashworth 1996; 
Meskell 2002; Jönsson & Svensson 2005; Logan & Reeves 2009; 
Macdonald 2009). In the case of Auschwitz-Birkenau, which 
became a World Heritage site in 1979, the choice that was made 
was to preserve and remember (WHL 31, 1979). But in other cases 
it may be better to choose not to tell, remember, or preserve. For 
example, the so-called “Führerbunker” in Berlin is not accessible; 
instead, it was intentionally destroyed and the site built on. And 
even if the bunker can be claimed to form unique (negative) evi-
dence of a cultural tradition and human history, it is not under 
consideration as World Heritage. 
Finally, antiquarians and archaeologists want to be able, in their 
everyday lives, to encounter politicians, entrepreneurs, journalists, 
and others who claim – from the edge of the excavation site or in 
the media – that ancient monuments are of no value, that excava-
tions and archaeologists are a financial liability, and that the traces 
of the past are an obstacle to progress. 
If calculations of the monetary value of “priceless” heritage are 
controversial, the value of heritage for tourism and economic devel-
opment is stressed in countless contexts. Heritage should be pro-
tected, preserved, and communicated to increase tourism; indeed, 
this is supposed to be the very raison d’être of heritage. And when a 
monument, a building, a site, or a landscape is inscribed as a World 
Heritage site, there are often great expectations of an increase in 
tourism and development; one example is when the southern part 
of the island of Öland in Sweden was so designated (WHL 968, 
2000). It is a fact that some of the world’s most important destina-
tions are actually World Heritage sites, but they were well known 
to tourists long before the establishment of World Heritage as a 
concept – Notre-Dame in Paris (WHL 600, 1991), the pyramids 
in Giza in Egypt (WHL 86, 1979), the Taj Mahal in India (WHL 
252, 1983), and the Statue of Liberty in New York (WHL 307, 
1984). Abu Simbel thus became a tourist destination back in the 
nineteenth century. 
Heritage tourism is an important part of a constantly growing 
tourist industry that boosts land, sea, and air transport and pro-
motes shops and hotels, museums, and visitor centres; it is therefore 
of importance for employment and the economy. Consequently, 
the literature about heritage tourism and the relationship between 
heritage, tourism, and the economy is extensive (e.g. Kirshenblatt-
Gimblett 1998; Graham et al. 2000: 129ff; Timothy 2011). 
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Sometimes the significance of heritage is reduced to its role in 
tourism. But to try to understand or explain the attraction of her-
itage by means of tourism merely amounts to reformulating the 
fundamental problem. What, then, are the justifications, motives, or 
values of the pilgrimage, the educational tour, or tourism? People 
from both the host country and abroad may visit heritage sites for 
several reasons (cf. MacCannell 1976; Löfgren et al. 1990; Urry 
1990; Grinder-Hansen 1992); they may, for instance, go there in 
order to increase their knowledge or to have a good experience, or 
perhaps out of a sense of duty. 
What can or should be heritage, how can or should the value of 
heritage be determined – and how is this to be carried out? Normally 
the whole process is handled by academically trained antiquarian 
experts, who work on heritage management at the local, regional, 
central government, or international level, on the basis of a number 
of qualitative criteria formulated for this specific purpose. 
Under the pressure of having to act in a society in which most 
values are determined in a market, and in which economic growth 
has high priority, attempts are made to bring out the values of 
heritage as clear and competitive. In this context, various tendencies 
are discernible. There are, for instance, attempts to systematise the 
actual process with well-defined (objective) value criteria that can be 
used in heritage management (e.g. Carlie & Kretz 1998; Unnerbäck 
2002). More rarely, attempts are made to convert cultural histori-
cal values into a (subjective) market price, in which valuation by 
consumers is given an influence (e.g. Almevik & Fridén 1996). 
In both instances, the idea is that it should be possible to measure 
and weigh heritage in relation to other interests, such as nature, 
roads, railways, bridges, tunnels, building development and indus-
try. The question is not whether heritage is valuable, but what is the 
right currency and amount for heritage. However, the calculation 
of the value of heritage using money as the metric is controversial 
within the canonical culture of management; it is fine for heritage 
to result in income, but not for it to be seen as an expense. The idea 
of the independence of the field must not be undermined. 
Heritage and democracy are words with several meanings. The 
concept of democratic heritage expresses the ambition of opening 
the field to the public, of engaging users, and of including those 
users in endeavours to set priorities regarding the traces of the past 
(e.g. Alzén & Aronsson 2006). The intention behind the European 
Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (2005), 
also called the Faro Convention, was thus to involve the public. But 
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this can also be a critical strategy for intentionally or unintention-
ally disarming management experts, when members of the public 
are themselves allowed to determine what is to be heritage and 
what is not. Here the dividing lines between the canonical and the 
critical may be blurred (e.g. Holtorf 2013b; Schofield 2014). 
In this context, democracy can mean another way of letting 
supply and demand in the market determine heritage values. The 
monetary market is replaced by a market of votes, under the encour-
agement or guidance of critical experts. But it is hardly the supply 
of “pastness” that governs the process, for then heritage from the 
very oldest periods – extremely little of which has been preserved – 
would be most attractive. The experience of relevance is more likely 
to be the decisive factor, and this brings contemporary heritage into 
focus along with nostalgic traces linked to people’s own childhood 
and youth.
Irrespective of how many, how detailed, or how sophisticated the 
accounts of various criteria in hierarchies and systems are, values 
still constitute an appraisal, however. And irrespective of all the 
governing documents, the criteria appear to be values that are open 
to interpretation and therefore, of necessity, subjective. They are 
values that a large number of experts have been able to agree on, 
based on a practice regarding the ways in which heritage has been 
assessed historically. But they remain values that express the view 
of a number of individuals at a particular time and in a particular 
place. 
Heritage values and the associated debate can easily be identi-
fied at Abu Simbel. Thus the temples of Abu Simbel have also been 
called priceless, for instance by the Egyptian Minister of Culture, 
Sarwat Okasha, who was one of the initiators of the Nubian 
salvage campaign (Desroches-Noblecourt & Gerster 1968: 9). At 
the same time, an exact price can be put on the preservation of 
the temples, just as their values as World Heritage have been laid 
down by UNESCO. The salvage campaign for the two temples at 
Abu Simbel alone cost about USD 40  million (Säve-Söderbergh 
1987: 104). 
Riegl’s systematisation of values is still relevant for an under-
standing of Abu Simbel as heritage: the more than 3000-year-old 
temples testify to the passage of time; they are sources for the reign 
of Ramses II in particular; they were constructed as monuments to 
communicate political and religious messages; they are now used 
as tourist attractions; and they also possess an aesthetic value, both 
when new and today.
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When a World Heritage site was established for “Nubian 
Monuments from Abu Simbel to Philae” in 1979, this was done on 
the grounds that it fulfilled three criteria: human creative genius, 
testimony to cultural tradition, and heritage associated with events 
of universal significance (WHL 88, 1979).
The temples were already visited by travellers in ancient times, 
as evidenced by Greek graffiti, and after their rediscovery in the 
nineteenth century they again became a tourist attraction. The 
European adventurers in the wake of Napoleon’s Egyptian cam-
paign opened the way for the mass tourism of later times. When the 
Nubian campaign was to be justified, one of the arguments during 
the process was that more tourism would entail economic benefits; 
and indeed Abu Simbel became a popular tourist destination (Säve-
Söderbergh 1987: 217f; 1996: 210). 
The temples of Abu Simbel were constructed to be seen, admired, 
and used – and that is also the case today. But both the material 
monuments and the human subjects have changed. The temples 
that are seen, admired, and used have been changed in some 
respects, just as the visitors who continuously see, admire, and use 
them are new; but there is no sharp distinction between then and 
now, between what is lasting and what has changed. By degrees, 
their development has been characterised by ruptures as well as by 
continuity. The past is both a foreign and a well-known country. 
Just as there is no lack of opinions about the past, there is thus 
no lack of justifications, motives or values, criteria or principles, 
either before or now. Far from it. The field is so diverse and so 
densely populated that an overview is needed, a new organising 
structure as an alternative to Nietzsche’s three perspectives. For 
Nietzsche’s trinity has been kept alive more by his famous name 
than by its current relevance. His trinity must be viewed against 
the background of the political left–right scale with its social and 
economic issues, which was on the agenda in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries but has had competition, for better and worse, 
in the twenty-first century from issues to do with religion, culture, 
and identity, issues that may require another way of viewing the 
past and the present. Nonetheless, I find the question of where 
society and I myself are going more relevant and interesting than 
the question of where society and I are supposed to have come 
from, or who society and I “are”.
Instead of formulating new arguments for the use of the past or 
defining new values, criteria, or principles to add to the existing 
stock, I am going to assert the reuse of a philosophical triad as a 
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means of surveying, understanding, and explaining the whole field 
of history, memory, and heritage. 
Truth, beauty, and goodness
Truth, beauty, and goodness are three perspectives that may serve 
as the starting point of three fundamental motives for understanding 
the meaning of the past. This triad, with roots in Western philos-
ophy and theology, is useful both in order to obtain an overview of 
the multiple justifications, motives, values, and  opinions about use-
fulness and in order to understand current conflicts around history, 
memory, and heritage. The triad of truth, beauty, and goodness is 
thus my alternative to Nietzsche’s trinity of uses – the monumental, 
the antiquarian, and the critical. 
Traditionally, the concepts of truth, beauty, and goodness are 
traced back through the history of philosophy to Plato. Three fields 
are then linked to the concepts – the fields of epistemology, aesthet-
ics, and ethics; that is, the theories of knowledge, art, and morality, 
respectively. And in popular terms, the triad of truth, beauty, and 
goodness has come to stand both for philosophy as a project and 
for classical, but never irrelevant, virtues (e.g. Gardner 2011). 
Truth, beauty, and goodness belong to the group of transcenden-
tal concepts. Medieval scholasticism developed a discussion about 
concepts said to transcend experience, concepts referred to as “the 
transcendentals” (transcendentalia). They included being (ens), 
one (unum), truth (verum), goodness (bonum), beauty (pulchrum), 
something (aliquid) and thing (res) (Gracia 1992). But just as truth, 
beauty, and goodness were not, in fact, treated as a distinct group of 
concepts by Plato – even though they are often presented as if they 
had been – scholasticism did not discuss them as a group either. The 
triad was only established as a distinct group when the Renaissance 
created a new synthesis between ancient pagan philosophy and 
medieval Christian theology. 
Truth, beauty, and goodness were defined as a distinct group of 
transcendentals by the philosopher and canon Marsilio Ficino. As 
a commission for Cosimo de Medici, the leading businessman and 
politician in Florence, Ficino translated Plato’s works from Greek to 
Latin for the first time, making them available in the West. Ficino’s 
translation, lectures, and printed comments were of great impor-
tance for Platonism in the Renaissance and later. It was here, in the 
comments on Plato’s dialogue Philebus (probably written in 1469, 
but only published in 1496), that the triad was established, and 
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it was here that it was given a clear hierarchical structure. Ficino 
outlined a Platonic theology with three levels, from the body via the 
soul up to the intelligence, to being – that is, to God. According to 
Ficino, intelligence understands in order to attain the true, desires 
in order to attain the good, and acts to attain the beautiful (Allen 
1975: 1ff, 48ff, 78f). 
Subsequently, the triad figured in many contexts, for instance 
in the work of the philosopher Immanuel Kant in his three “cri-
tique” books – critique of pure reason, critique of practical reason, 
and critique of judgement; that is, his inquiry into the conditions 
for knowledge (Kant 1781 (German); 1998 (English)), ethics 
(Kant 1785 (German); 1998 (English)), and aesthetics (Kant 1790 
(German); 2000 (English)). In the poet and theologist Esaias Tegnér, 
the concepts of the triad became the true, the right, and the beautiful 
in a poem entitled “Det Eviga” (“The Eternal”), which was written 
against the background of the Napoleonic Wars (Tegnér 1828: 
192f). A related triad also turns up in the work of the  philosopher 
Søren Kierkegaard in Stadier paa Livets Vei (Stages on Life’s Way): 
the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious (Kierkegaard 1845 
(Danish); 1940 (English)). Here the aesthetic involves enjoyment 
and experience and the ethical concerns duty, truth being replaced 
by the religious dimension. 
From Kant to the present, the concepts of the triad may be fol-
lowed like a theme with variations in German philosophy, sociol-
ogy, and history. In Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (The 
Theory of Communicative Action), a discussion of the theories of 
the sociologist Max Weber, the sociologist Jürgen Habermas thus 
asserts that the transition to modernity is characterised by the 
institutionalisation of three types of rationality, three spheres of 
knowledge or values – the cognitive, the aesthetic, and the norma-
tive. These three spheres are said to correspond, in turn, to science 
with its criteria for truth, art with aesthetic criticism, and politics 
and law with rules for ethical and legal matters. With this division, 
mutual tensions necessarily arose between the spheres (Habermas 
1981 (German): 1, 225ff, 233ff, 456; 1984 (English): 1, 157ff, 
163ff, 340). 
With a direct reference to Habermas, the historian Jörn Rüsen 
then identifies three dimensions of historical awareness, namely 
cognitive, aesthetic, and political values. These three are said to 
correspond to science, narrative, and power: reason, feeling, and 
will. Rüsen also stresses the possibility of tensions, imbalances, 
and hierarchies, perceiving them as arising between a cognitive 
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strategy for knowledge production, an aesthetic strategy for the 
rhetoric and poetics of presentation, and, finally, a political strat-
egy for  collective memory. But none of the dimensions could be 
reduced  to any one of the others (Rüsen 1994: 219ff; 2001: 49, 
64, 98). 
A related triad can be found in Föreställningar om det förflutna 
“Images of the Past”, an inquiry into archaeological reconstruc-
tions of Prehistory and the Middle Ages in Scandinavia. Here the 
archaeologist Bodil Petersson uses three perspectives, knowledge, 
adventure, and politics: knowledge through reconstructions, time 
travel as an adventure, and the political use of reconstructions 
(Petersson 2003: 15f). 
Truth, beauty, or goodness – the useful knowledge of the 
Enlightenment, therapeutic narratives for times of crisis, or a moral 
duty to remind and remember? These three perspectives and pos-
sible uses of the past often end up opposing one another, their 
internal ranking changing over time. I have myself employed this 
triad, and the categories derived from it, to understand the contem-
porary debate about the role of archaeology in society in the article 
“Agenda arkeologi – upplysning, terapi eller moral” (Wienberg 
2009; “Agenda archaeology – enlightenment, therapy, or moral”). 
Rhetorical phrases about renewing and democratising heritage and 
increasing its impact may hence, in actual fact, have to do with a 
desire to shift the perspective from the past to the present – and 
from knowledge to narrative and morality.
A polarising and totalitarian tendency can sometimes be seen 
to operate, with each of the perspectives wanting to dominate the 
debate: there is truth in the centre with a striving for knowledge, 
while beauty and goodness are subordinate. Or there is beauty 
with its narratives and entertainment in the centre; everything is 
narratives, and truth is not crucial. Then again, there is goodness 
with politics in the centre, whereas truth and beauty are subordi-
nate. In concrete terms, the conflict between these perspectives may 
manifest itself as a conflict between science, which is supposed to 
represent striving for truth and is apt to reward original research 
results; media and media users, who are seeking entertaining stories 
irrespective of whether they are fact or fiction, moving on if the 
story being told is not sufficiently diverting; and, finally, politicians, 
parties, government agencies, and others that expect or demand 
usefulness to society, which is likely to be a rhetorical rephrasing of 
a demand that the field be subordinated to their particular agenda, 
whatever it might be.
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The triad of truth, beauty, and goodness may, at first sight, be 
thought of as permanent or timeless; but it most certainly is not. The 
triad recurs constantly in philosophy, since the concepts are open 
to interpretation. In their concrete form, the concepts are transitory 
with a short durability; each time, and also each place, has had its 
own ideas about the true, the beautiful, and the good. It is precisely 
because of their ability to change, to adapt to new conditions, to let 
themselves be reused with new content, that the concepts appear 
to be eternal. The triad is an example of how spolia from the past, 
whether material or intangible, building blocks or concepts, can be 
put to use in the present, carrying new meanings. In Renaissance 
Italy, whose style was inspired by ancient architecture, Ficino used 
concepts from Plato for new philosophical needs. With a more 
up-to-date designation, the Renaissance rebirth of Antiquity was a 
matter of creative reuse. 
With the philologist and religious historian Georges Dumézil 
one can, if so inclined, identify a functional trinity in all Indo-
European societies (Dumézil 1958). The reason is that sets of 
three concepts that embody a fascination with the geometry of the 
number three occur everywhere in religion, science, and politics. We 
find Hinduism’s trimurti or trinity with the creator (Brahma), the 
preserver (Vishnu), and the destroyer (Shiva); the Christian Trinity 
with God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; the three holy 
kings Balthazar, Caspar,  and Melchior; Islam’s three holy cities 
Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem; rhetoric’s credibility (ethos), reason 
(logos), and emotion (pathos); the division into legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial power; the three kingdoms of nature – plants, 
animals, and minerals; the division of time into past, present, and 
future; the division of knowledge into reason, memory, and fantasy, 
or learning, experiencing, and reflecting; the archaeological system 
of three periods with the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron 
Age; and Nietzsche’s three uses – the monumental, the antiquarian, 
and the critical. 
It is tempting to look at the triad of truth, beauty, and goodness 
and read three social groups into it: the thinking intellectuals, the 
working and entertained masses of the people, and the politicians 
taking action (Fredengren 2012: 196ff). This reading is a reason-
able one since Plato, in his tract The Republic, divided citizens into 
three functional groups. The philosophers, like Plato himself, would 
govern; the artisans would work; and the soldiers would guard. 
According to Plato, these groups formed a hierarchy with the phil-
osophers at  the top and the artisans at the bottom. There was a 
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parallel in the three parts of the body and the soul – the head for 
wisdom, the breast for will, and the stomach for desire (Plato 1997: 
971ff). Plato’s ideal state is later reflected in the medieval estates 
of the realm or the three orders, a church ideology for a society 
with three social and functional groups – oratores, those who pray, 
laboratores, those who work, and bellatores, those who fight (Duby 
1978 (French); 1981 (English)). The Platonic triad also forms the 
basis of the trinity of thinking, willing, and judging that was dis-
cussed by the philosopher Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1981). But as all 
the examples demonstrate, there are many ways of interpreting the 
triad of truth, beauty, and goodness, which may also be seen either 
as a hierarchy or as virtues of equal standing. 
Do we need the past? In Behövs det förflutna? (“Is the past 
needed?”), the philosopher Sören Halldén found three functions 
that can also be derived from the triad of truth, beauty, and good-
ness: learning from the past about the multifariousness of life, 
thereby gaining insights that may be put to use in solving problems; 
enrichment of life, such as a tourist’s travels; and extension of expe-
rience, which can be used in making assessments. Halldén ends the 
book with the words, “this question opens up paths in different 
directions. It is a little like touching on the question ‘Why are you 
alive?’” (Halldén 1983: 14f, quotation on 135). 
No, it is more than a light touch on a fundamental question. 
For in order to give the past meaning, it is also necessary to give 
meaning to the present and the future. The past, the present, and the 
future flow into one another in an existential reflection: is the past 
needed – is the present needed – is the future needed? (cf. Wienberg 
1999: 192, 196).
Anyone who expects to be given a clear and unequivocal answer 
to the question of why the past is needed must of necessity be 
either disappointed or deceived, for that would be the same as 
expecting a clear and simple answer to the question of why the 
present and the future are needed. In my opinion, truth, beauty, 
and goodness represent perspectives that complement one another 
with regard to what it means to be human. Homo sapiens, Homo 
narrans, and Homo ethicus – the thinking human, the storytelling 
human, and the engaged human. 
Truth, beauty, and goodness complement one another without 
any internal ranking. No perspective is superior here, none can 
replace any other, and none can be dispensed with. Thus there is no 
hierarchy between the true, the beautiful, and the good, as was oth-
erwise asserted by Ficino, Kant, and Kierkegaard; no social order, 
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as in Plato or in the medieval notion of the estates of the realm. 
The true does not need to be beautiful or good; the beautiful does 
not need to be true or good; and the good does not need to be true 
or beautiful. Moreover, we are often confronted with the oppo-
site of the triad, namely the false, the ugly, and the evil. In addi-
tion, the triad cannot be reduced to a duality without the loss of 
 something significant. The truth, beauty, and goodness triad forms 
more than one complementarity, in which two parts complement 
one another. The three concepts constitute a “triplementarity”, in 
which the three parts lend greater depth to one another.
The truths of knowledge
Knowledge about the past is desirable, useful, and essential. We 
need knowledge about the past to be able to understand or explain 
the present and meet the future. The ideal is truth, enlightenment, 
and progress, with science as the method. New knowledge is 
 accumulated year by year. 
Knowing and ability, science and knowledge, are words with 
immediately favourable connotations, but they can point in all 
directions. Knowledge can be an advantage or a disadvantage; 
it can enlighten or darken. Knowledge may be liberating; it can 
also be used to exercise power, or in an exclusionary social game. 
Knowledge can be seen as something that requires education and 
methodical training, or as something that is immediately available to 
everyone. In itself, knowledge is neither good nor bad. Knowledge – 
like the past – can be used for everything. 
Knowledge is quite fundamental, however, and it is something that 
characterises human beings – Homo sapiens, the thinking and under-
standing human. It is sufficient to try to imagine how quickly present-
day society would break down without an enormous quantity  of 
sophisticated knowledge about how something works, is, and was. 
But perhaps all knowledge is not necessary? Or is some knowledge 
more important or more useful than other knowledge?
As a species, Homo sapiens is said to be characterised precisely by 
its will to knowledge. Homo sapiens uses knowledge to understand 
and explain its surroundings and to search for meaning. Humans 
try not only to gather knowledge, but also to find and interpret 
patterns, even in what may be quite fortuitous; they constantly 
endeavour to understand and explain. And this search for meaning 
is said to have given the species an evolutionary advantage ahead of 
others: the ability, will, or compulsion to constantly look for causes 
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and try to foresee what may come (Gärdenfors 2006). My own 
sense of wonderment about the meaning of history, memory, and 
heritage may thus be a typical example of a fundamental human 
character trait. 
Knowledge as both an end and a means to an end has frequently 
been linked to the idea of progress and the Enlightenment project 
since the late seventeenth century. Rational knowledge was to 
replace irrationality, superstition, and dogmas. Knowledge attained 
through observation and experiment was to replace ancient and 
medieval speculation. Here knowledge and science in the West form 
part of a clash with the Church, acquiring a secular character in 
the process. Light becomes a metaphor for what is new in the Age 
of Enlightenment. Knowledge is thought to liberate humans and 
create an ever better future. 
The ethos of the Age of Enlightenment was clearly formulated by 
the philosopher Immanuel Kant in the first lines of his contribution to 
a newspaper debate, “Beanwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” 
(“An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?”), lines that 
deserve to be quoted in full: 
Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschul-
deten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines 
Verstandes ohne Leitung eines andern zu bedienen. Selbstverschuldet 
ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel 
des Verstandes, sondern der Entschließung und des Muthes liegt, sich 
seiner ohne Leitung eines andern zu bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe 
Muth dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der 
Wahlspruch der Aufklärung. (Kant 1784 (German): 481) 
 Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred 
minority. Minority is inability to make use of one’s own understanding 
without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when 
its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution 
and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! 
Have courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the 
motto of enlightenment. (Kant 1996 (English): 17)
Science has knowledge as its goal, as is seen from the roots of the 
word in the Latin word scientia, meaning knowledge; science is the 
creation of knowledge. And even though this is not always formu-
lated as an evident goal, it is apparent from the practice of science, 
in which all disciplines are very careful about their methods; that 
is, how to move in a more or less systematic way from questions to 
answers, using recognised methods. Historical and archaeological 
source criticism is one such method that is intended to ensure that 
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the description of the past is founded only on sure facts. The pur-
pose of source criticism is to uncover the way things actually were. 
In the famous words of the historian Leopold Ranke (later von 
Ranke) from the foreword of Geschichte der romanischen und ger-
manischen Völker von 1494 bis 1514 (History of the Latin and 
Teutonic Nations (1494 to 1514)), history was neither to judge 
the past nor to be of benefit to the future, but only to show what 
actually happened: 
Man hat der Historie das Amt, die Vergangenheit zu richten, die 
Mitwelt zum Nutzen zukünftiger Jahre zu belehren, beygemessen: so 
hoher Aemter underwindet sich gegenwärtiger Versuch nicht: er will 
bloß sagen, wie es eigentlich gewesen. (Ranke 1824: Vf) 
 (To history has been assigned the office of judging the past, of 
instructing the present for the benefit of future ages. To such high 
offices this work does not aspire. It wants only to show what actually 
happened.)
But contrary to Ranke, explanations, motives, and values for his-
tory, memory, and heritage have generally been characterised by a 
historicist perspective since the nineteenth century. In historicism, 
at any rate in one of the ways in which the term is used, knowledge 
of the past is held to be crucial to the ability to understand and 
explain the present and shape the future. Historicism hence points 
both backwards and forwards in time. Historicism belongs together 
with modernity, which is said to be characterised by a historical 
awareness focusing on origins and development (e.g. Foucault 1966 
(French); 1971 (English)). 
The claim of historicism that the past can be used to shape the 
future has been criticised, though. In The Poverty of Historicism, 
which is a reckoning with the utopian ideologies of the 1920s and 
1930s, the philosopher Karl Popper rejected the notion that there 
can be laws governing the development of history or of society, and 
that it is therefore impossible to predict or shape the future (Popper 
1957). Popper’s arguments resemble the chaos theory formulated 
long afterwards in the natural sciences and known for its “butterfly 
effect”, in which decisive importance is ascribed to small varia-
tions and matters of chance. Both history and nature are chaotic 
or unstable systems sensitive to small differences, systems in which 
large changes do not need large explanations, and in which predic-
tions demand an awareness of the values of all the relevant variables 
(Reisch 1991; Gerding & Ingemark 1997). Therefore, tomorrow 
will always be different from what we had imagined or planned. 
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The idea of progress and the Enlightenment project with its opti-
mism have been criticised, and indeed heavily attacked, in recent 
years – as have knowledge and science. The Enlightenment idea of 
progress is reduced to just one of many ideologies. Michel Foucault 
and many others after him see the will to knowledge as a will to 
power (Foucault 1976 (French); 1990 (English)). Technological and 
organisational progress has a share in the responsibility for the 
worst genocide of the twentieth century, the Holocaust (Bauman 
1989). Knowledge, facts, and truth, in particular, are called into 
doubt as concepts, goals, and means. Knowledge is said to be a 
social construction that can be negotiated in a laboratory (Latour 
& Woolgar 1979). Enlightenment’s radical doubt has been directed 
against enlightenment itself, reopening the door to irrationality, 
superstition, and dogma. Once again, human beings enter a state 
of folly and Unmündigkeit (“not of age”, “incapacity”), to borrow 
Kant’s term. The light of the Enlightenment is threatened by the 
darkness of dissolution. 
Creating knowledge can either be a goal in itself or a means of 
attaining something else. When knowledge is a goal in itself, we 
can talk about knowledge as part of an educational project. When 
knowledge is a means of attaining something else, we can talk about 
an instrumental goal. However, the word instrumental is often used 
in a derogatory way in an implicit hierarchy, in which the elite’s 
education is superior to the majority’s practical knowledge. 
When general education is stressed, especially in humanities dis-
ciplines, it might be expected to involve a democratic enlightenment 
project: Knowledge is intended to liberate human beings from the 
Unmündigkeit imposed on them. But if anything, it seems to emerge 
in order to disavow what is useful, instrumental, and practical. 
Bildung is ranked above mere education. In this context, the term 
Bildung may be regarded as a relic of another time, a time when the 
elite was supposed to acquire a broad spectrum of knowledge and 
proficiencies, a cultural code, so as to be able to function in state 
offices and mix at a distance from the rest of the population. To 
quote from the film Monty Python & The Holy Grail (1975), when 
King Arthur manages to complicate a question about the air-speed 
velocity of an unladen swallow and is therefore free to cross the 
Bridge of Death: “Well, you have to know these things when you’re 
a king, you know!” In more academic terms and with a reference 
to the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, it could, instead, be said that 
redundant knowledge is used as symbolic capital in order to create 
social distance (cf. Bourdieu 1979 (French); 1984 (English)). 
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Knowledge about the past as both an end and a means to an 
end is widespread, despite all the debate, doubt, and criticism. It is 
often so obvious and so generally accepted that there is no need to 
formulate it directly. In this respect, there is no interest in knowl-
edge as a will to power or as a social marker, nor in science as an 
ideology. Instead, the whole focus is on how to attain knowledge. 
The past is narrated, remembered, preserved, excavated, recon-
structed, and brought to life as both an alluring and essential 
source of knowledge. 
The will to knowledge runs as an explicit or implicit theme 
though numerous examples: Herodotus, Ibn Khaldûn, Leopold 
Ranke, Friedrich Nietzsche, Marc Bloch, David Thomson, Eric 
Hobsbawm, and even Michel Foucault – they all pursued knowl-
edge, and they all assumed that knowledge could be attained. In the 
introduction to Histoire de la sexualité (The History of Sexuality), 
Foucault thus linked the search for truth and enlightenment to lib-
eration (Foucault 1976: 14 (French); 1990: 7 (English)); otherwise 
he, if anyone, represents a power-critical perspective on science and 
has inspired numerous postmodern relativists.
Returning to Abu Simbel, one motive for examining and sal-
vaging the temples by moving them would be to secure them as 
sources of knowledge. As monuments, the temples are sources for 
the reign of Pharaoh Ramses II, for the art, cosmology, and politics 
of that period. More specifically, the great temple with its images 
and texts is one of several sources for the Battle of Kadesh in 1274 
bce between Egypt under the leadership of Ramses II and the Hittite 
Empire under the leadership of Muwatalli II. This well-documented 
battle, which took place at Homs in present-day Syria and in which 
thousands of chariots were used, is depicted as a huge victory for the 
pharaoh, even though that was hardly the case. A peace treaty, the 
earliest one known, was then made in 1258 bce between the equally 
strong parties (Desroches Noblecourt 2007: 60ff, 134ff). So the 
depiction in the temple represents not the truth, but a partial truth, 
a pharaonic perspective on the past. Finally, the temples with their 
architecture, sculptures, images, and texts are also potential sources 
in a broader sense. Through the salvage campaign they have also 
been secured as sources in the future, sources to which scholars can 
return with new questions, perspectives, and methods. 
With knowledge, facts, or even truth about the past both as 
means and ends, the good and the beautiful, morality and narra-
tive, should be subordinate: it is irrelevant to truth how something 
is told, whether it is entertaining, or whether it is morally good or 
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evil. All that matters is what something was actually like. But when 
the truth of the Enlightenment is called into doubt as a legitimate 
motive, the beauty of the narrative and the ethical demands come 
into play instead. It is not apparent that an increased will to knowl-
edge is a major reason for greater present-day interest in the past. 
The beauties of narrative
Narratives about the past are desirable, useful, and essential. We 
need narratives about the past in order to understand and explain 
the present, meet the future, and create social cohesion. The ideal 
is the beautiful, captivating, and engaging narrative – a narrative 
that can enlighten, entertain, and perhaps also impose an obliga-
tion. A narrative can also be ugly, harrowing, and not attended by 
any obligations at all, and we still listen or read eagerly in order to 
inhabit another time, another country, for a while. 
A sense of alienation in periods of rapid economic upturn or 
falling expectations about the future during economic downturns 
can be compensated by a dose of nostalgic narrative from the 
country where “things were done differently”. Consequently, when 
the UK entered a period of deindustrialisation and unemployment 
in the 1970s and 1980s, factories that had closed down were trans-
formed into museums. “Real industry” was replaced by “heritage 
industry” (Hewison 1987). The unemployed were given work as 
uniformed guides, while others moved as time tourists through 
environments of Iron-Age settlements, trading places from the 
Viking era, medieval market towns, and Early Modern urban exist-
ence, all brought to life (Petersson 2003: 276ff). And at home we 
can be both enlightened and entertained by historical dramas such 
as Downton Abbey, about life on an English country estate in the 
decades after the loss of the Titanic. The past can offer a temporary 
refuge from the dreariness or problems of everyday life, and then it 
acts therapeutically. In narrative form, the past may contribute to 
health and reduce, or deflect attention from, the problems of the 
present (cf. Asplund Ingemark 2013). 
Narratives about the past, the present, and the future are by no 
means new; indeed, they are something fundamental that charac-
terises human beings – Homo narrans, the narrating and listening 
person (Niles 1999; Mankell & Vera 2000). People use narrative as 
a tool to transfer experience (Gärdenfors 2006: 109ff; Boyd 2009). 
Mixtures of fact and fiction, of what has actually happened with 
what might or ought to happen, are thus found in oral narratives, 
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in literary texts such as novels and short stories, in images such 
as rock carvings, paintings, photographs, and film, and in sculp-
tures ranging from the limestone figure of Venus of Willendorf to 
present-day memorials. Without narratives, life would undoubtedly 
be much poorer, and perhaps impossible.
Back in the nineteenth century, as scientific disciplines emerged 
with their special genre of publications, seminars, and confer-
ences, there was a parallel boom in historical narratives with an 
element of escapism. As part of the reaction of Romanticism to the 
Enlightenment project, the French Revolution, and the Napoleonic 
Wars, both science and art increased. Rational science was separated 
from speculative inquiry at the same time as there were  constant 
crossings of borders. 
Artists have interpreted the past, and scholars have written about 
it in literary modes. As examples of border-crossings between fact 
and fiction, between scholarship and art, and between two cultures, 
I select a pair of personal favourites from my bookshelf. On one side 
is the semioticist Umberto Eco, who was able to communicate his 
knowledge about semiotics, philosophy, literature, and the Middle 
Ages in his historical detective novel Il nome della rosa (Eco 1980 
(Italian); 1983 (English), The Name of the Rose). And on the other 
side is the journalist and author Thorkild Hansen with Det lykke-
lige Arabien (Hansen 1962 (Danish); 1964 (English), Arabia Felix), 
who created a historical documentary novel and existential narra-
tive about a Danish expedition to Yemen in the eighteenth century, 
which was at that time regarded as the happy “foreign country”; 
here Hansen was able to use his personal experience of the Nubian 
campaign. But many more names and works could obviously be 
mentioned. 
Counterfactual history forms a popular genre of its own which 
crosses the border between fact and fiction. It is no longer a matter 
of what “actually happened” but of what could or perhaps ought 
to have happened, if events had taken another course. What if? 
Here historians and others can make creative forays beyond the 
confines of their disciplines and examine alternative histories. Early 
examples are known from the seventeenth century, but the genre 
has had an upturn since the 1990s. It often examines whether an 
alternative political or military development could have taken place 
after a certain point in time if something had been different. Here 
details, individuals, incidents, events, and the weather are given key 
roles. One source of inspiration is chaos theory, and the intention is 
to methodically examine possible explanations – and  undoubtedly 
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also to entertain (Ferguson 1997; Andersson & Zander 1999; 
Evans 2014). 
But what if the shape of Cleopatra’s nose had been different, 
Duke William had been defeated at Hastings in 1066, Queen 
Kristina had not abdicated in 1654, Napoleon had been victorious 
at Waterloo in 1815, Gavrilo Princip had missed in 1914, Günter 
Schabowski had replied differently in 1989, and Donald Trump had 
not won the Electoral College in 2016? Or what if Pharaoh Ramses 
II had been defeated at the Battle of Kadesh in 1274 bce? Then the 
history of Egypt would have taken another turning, the pharaoh 
would have left a completely different legacy, and the temples of 
Abu Simbel would never have been built. 
The border-crossings are numerous; but something new made 
its appearance with the postmodern criticism of the Enlightenment 
project, rational science, and “grand” narratives. There is a con-
scious shift from truth to beauty, from science to narrative, from 
fact to fiction, from grand to the small narratives, and from enlight-
enment to entertainment. More experiments are being made now 
than ever before with the form and content of history, memory, and 
heritage. And sometimes form is becoming more important than 
content. 
The reckoning with the Enlightenment and rational science 
was accompanied by a “demasking” of the rhetorical character of 
research and communication. The texts of scholarship were viewed 
as a genre that could be subjected to textual analysis, as literary 
texts could. There has thus been an extensive debate about differ-
ences and similarities between fact and fiction, about what stories 
are told about the past, and about how the past can be (re)narrated 
(e.g. Solli 1996). 
The historian Hayden White’s Metahistory has attracted great 
attention with his inquiries into the rhetorical forms of history-
writing, undertaken without White’s regarding himself as a post-
modernist or relativist. White claimed that history-writing was 
shaped by the literary templates of the nineteenth century – the 
romance, the comedy, the tragedy, and the satire. The romance, 
with metaphor as its expression, represents anarchy; the comedy, 
with metonymy, represents conservatism; the tragedy, with synec-
doche, represents radicalism; and the satire, with irony, represents 
liberalism. History-writing is hence said to be steered by a funda-
mental poetics linked to political categories in which romance liber-
ates while tragedy brings ruin, comedy reconciliation, and satire 
 imprisonment (White 1973). 
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A focus on narrative has also gained a foothold in archaeology 
and heritage studies. This is most clearly manifest in the work of 
the archaeologist Cornelius Holtorf, who in From Stonehenge to 
Las Vegas moves the focus from the past, and archaeology as a 
means of gaining knowledge of the past, to the present, archae-
ology and archaeologists becoming means of having experiences. 
According to this view, the meaning of archaeology is, first and 
foremost, located in its popularity as a metaphor for treasure 
hunting, adventurous fieldwork, and detective work. Furthermore, 
the narratives of science are no truer than other narratives about 
astrology, mysticism, or sacred geometry. Here and in other texts, 
Holtorf pushes a relativist and Enlightenment-critical line inspired 
by the philosopher Paul Feyerabend and his anarchist (or neolib-
eral) programme (Holtorf 2000; 2005; 2010). Feyerabend argued 
for a consistent “political relativism”; but in contrast to Holtorf, 
he explicitly rejected “philosophical relativism”, which is the view 
that all traditions, theories, and ideas are equivalent (Feyerabend 
1978: 82f).
Archaeology becomes part of a borderless popular culture in 
which people make a virtue of necessity or a virtue of a choice of 
political path. It is “tittytainment”, a mixture of (breast) feeding and 
entertainment, bread and circuses, for the great mass of the popula-
tion, who will not be needed in the world economy of the future; 
the term is said to have been coined by the sociologist and politician 
Zbigniew Brzezinski in a debate about the global economy of the 
future in San Francisco in 1995 between politicians, economists, 
and business leaders (cf. Martin & Schumann 1996: 13f (German); 
1997: 4f (English)). 
Popular culture requires no truths; nor does it require a distinc-
tion between science and literature, between history and myth, or 
between fact and fiction. For experience and for entertainment, it 
does not matter whether Bosnia has pyramids, whether Stonehenge 
was built by Druids, whether King Arthur existed, whether the 
trelleborgs were radio stations rather than Viking-age fortresses, 
whether the Holy Grail is hidden on Bornholm or in Scotland or 
Jordan, whether the Kensington Runestone is from the fourteenth 
or the nineteenth century, or whether Indiana Jones was actually a 
living person or is a fictional character (cf. Wienberg 2004; Fagan 
2006). 
To go back once more to Abu Simbel, one of the motives for 
examining and salvaging the temples was that it would be possible 
to have a fantastic experience (roughly) at the site in future, too. The 
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temples were to continue to be a tourist destination. But ever since 
its construction, Abu Simbel has been a starting point for narratives. 
Ramses II had the great temple decorated with images showing how 
he defeated the Hittites at the Battle of Kadesh. The truth is that the 
battle was a draw – or even a defeat for the Egyptians. So the first 
narrative is a case of “alternative facts” – a propaganda lie. The 
temples are also the starting point for narratives about Ramses II as 
a powerful king with a desire to build, and about the religious ideas 
of the period (e.g. MacQuitty 1965). In Agatha Christie’s crime 
novel Death on the Nile (Christie 1937), Abu Simbel is a back-
drop to an intricate plot at the same time as the novel depicts the 
cruise of affluent Western tourists on the Nile, from Cairo and the 
 pyramids in the north to the temples in the south. 
A new narrative has been added since the salvage campaign of 
the 1960s, a narrative that focuses on the international operation 
and the technological achievements in moving and rebuilding the 
temples (e.g. Desroches-Noblecourt & Gerster 1968). And then, 
every visitor, every tourist, can create their own narrative in their 
meeting with the temples. Even if the temples had not been sal-
vaged, but had drowned when the Aswan High Dam was erected, 
the narratives would not have ceased. They would simply have been 
given a different and probably more nostalgic character. 
But copies and films can also form starting points for narra-
tives. The Crystal Palace in London, the main building in the first 
World Exhibition, housed a replica, erected in 1854, of the largest 
temple at Abu Simbel; the replica was destroyed in a fire in 1936 
(Ossian 2007). Later, copies of varying sizes have been erected 
in many places – Pattaya in Thailand, Shenzhen in China, in the 
Luxor Hotel in Las Vegas in the US, and in Legoland at Billund in 
Denmark. The Italian amusement park Gardaland has an attraction 
called “Ramses: Il risveglio” (“Ramses: Awakening”), whose main 
entrance is designed as the great temple at Abu Simbel in half-scale 
(www.gardaland.it; cf. Melotti 2011: 81ff). In Portugal in 2011, the 
engineer and sculptor Hany Mustafa built a travelling exhibition 
called “Museo del templo Abu Simbel”, which contained a glass 
fibre copy so that people would be able to experience the temple 
without needing to travel to an Egypt in turmoil. Finally, it is also 
possible to make a virtual visit to Abu Simbel.
The salvage campaign at the temples of Abu Simbel was also 
used in the film Erinnerungen an die Zukunft (Reinl 1970; Chariots 
of the Gods), a film based on books in which the author Erich von 
Däniken maintained that extraterrestrials had made visits to the 
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earth in ancient times. In view of the enormous operation, with 
participants from many countries, that was necessary to move 
the temple in the modern period, von Däniken argued that the 
Egyptians could not have been capable of moving stones and doing 
construction work 3000 years previously. It must have been aliens 
from space, visits by “Gods” (cf. von Däniken 1973 (German): 60, 
Figs. 118–119; 1976 (English): 53f, Fig. 111a). 
When beauty and fiction about the past are both means and 
ends, truth and goodness – knowledge and morality – must assume 
a subordinate position. For beauty and narrative it is generally, 
but not necessarily always, irrelevant whether something actually 
happened, existed, or is authentic, and also whether something 
is morally good or evil. All that matters is that the narrative is 
entertaining or serviceable. The truth is replaced by probabilities 
and possibilities. However, when the truth of the Enlightenment 
is doubted as a legitimate motive, and beauty and narrative are 
regarded as secondary, all that is left is the ethical demand.
Ethical demands
It may also be an ethical duty to protect and preserve the past from 
decay. We ought to preserve narratives about the past, preserve 
people’s memories, and preserve the material and intangible traces 
of heritage. We are under an ethical demand to work actively so 
that history, memory, and heritage are not given lower priority, 
forgotten, or destroyed. 
Ethics (or morality) is something fundamental that character-
ises humans – Homo ethicus, the engaged human, who enters into 
social ties with other people (e.g. Prozesky 2014). The concept of 
ethics comes from the Greek word ethikos, which is about manners 
or customs, whereas morality comes from the Latin word moralis, 
which is about customs or practices. Ethics and morality hence have 
the same core meaning, and they are often used interchangeably, 
even though ethics is normally defined as the theoretical or abstract 
starting point for the more practical or concrete sphere of morality. 
Irrespective of the choice of term, both concern people’s endeavours 
to think, express, and do what is right – in other words, about 
people’s striving towards that which is good. 
But what, then, are the right and the good? The question opens 
up a limitless field of thoughts, recommendations, orders, statutes, 
and penalties. Ethics can have its starting point in religion, politics, 
philosophy, and culture. Ethics can be divided up into normative 
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ethics and consequence-based ethics, or into virtues and duties. 
Ethics can form its own academic field of knowledge with spe-
cialists, who often come from philosophy, theology, or medicine. 
Among the mass of philosophers, I opt for three names and bodies 
of work that represent different viewpoints.
My first choice is Immanuel Kant as a representative of duty-
based ethics grounded in reason. In Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals), Kant 
formulates two imperatives: first, the categorical imperative; 
that is, the absolutely necessary, in which an act is a good end in 
itself – and, second, the hypothetical imperative; that is, the pos-
sible, in which an act is a means of achieving the good (Kant 1785 
(German):  51; 1998 (English): 25f). The categorical imperative 
says: “handle nach der Maxime, die sich selbst zugleich zum allge-
meinen Gesetze machen kann”; “act only in accordance with that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become 
a universal law” (Kant 1785 (German): 81; 1998 (English): 31).
The second choice is Peter Singer as a representative of 
 consequence-based ethics. Singer’s starting point is utilitarianism. 
He argues that acts are to be judged as good when they satisfy 
the greatest possible number, and that no interests may be given 
precedence before any others. And in line with this, he argues – in 
One World Now (2016) – that in a globalised world, where ques-
tions concerning climate, economics, legislation, and politics cross 
national borders, there is also a need for a global ethics.
My third choice is Martha Nussbaum as a representative of 
virtue ethics, and her paper “Non-Relative Virtues – An Aristotelian 
Approach”. Nussbaum draws her inspiration from ancient litera-
ture, and her point of departure is human existence. Human beings 
strive after the good life, using their own feelings and internal ideas 
to achieve this goal. Nussbaum defines the good on the basis of 
some common human experiences (mortality, body, pleasure and 
pain, cognition, reason, the child’s development, attachment, and 
humour) in order to go beyond the local and relative (Nussbaum 
1988; 1993). Nussbaum’s virtues, formulated with the assistance of 
Aristotle, recall various attempts to define transcendentals such as 
the true, the beautiful, and the good. 
In response to the ethical demand, it could be argued that there is 
no firm foundation to stand on; there is no fixed, common  starting 
point, no Archimedes Point or Arche. Where is the starting point 
for the right or the good in a world of religious, political, philo-
sophical, and cultural plurality? Previously, God was perhaps an 
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indisputable Archimedes point. But then I can ask: Which God 
or which gods – and in which interpretation? For Kant’s reason, 
Singer’s interests and Nussbaum’s feelings and experiences also 
open up to plurality and need to be interpreted in practice. Which 
reason, which interests, which feelings, which experiences – and 
how? The right and the good are and remain relative and therefore 
problematic, as the right and the good often come with a universal 
ambition. Without a fixed starting point, the ethical demand risks 
being transformed into an individual responsibility (cf. Bauman 
1993). Then the ethical is easily reduced to a non-binding slogan. 
Of course we ought to be ethical; but why, and how? 
Inspired by Kant’s imperatives, I would, however, like to try to 
formulate two moral rules. The first is categorical: treat the past as 
you want yourself and others to treat the present. Or, more specifi-
cally: protect, preserve, and use the past, as you want to protect, 
preserve, and use the present. The rule is relevant, as the traces of 
the past are very much part of the present. The second is hypo-
thetical: act so that the past is a means of achieving the true, the 
beautiful, and the good. But the “you” and “others” do not need 
to represent a global consensus. Different individuals and groups – 
social, political, cultural, religious, ethnic – may have different ideas 
about the true, the beautiful, and the good. So morality remains 
contextual and therefore relative. 
The ethical demand encounters the past with history, memory, 
and heritage in several ways. First and foremost, ethics appears 
as rhetoric – the past ought to be preserved! Here ethics acts as a 
slogan that would implicitly make further argumentation super-
fluous. It appeals to common values and to a sense of collective 
responsibility. Heritage is elevated to an ethical sphere, being 
 presented as priceless. 
Ethics also appears as a canonical professional ethic. In view of 
the unethical ways in which the past was treated before our time, 
professional organisations have formulated rules for what is right 
and proper. It is stressed that there is a professional responsibility 
for acting in the right way. This is seen particularly clearly in the 
archaeological management of heritage, and it is found at both 
national and international level. Still, the ethical discussion can 
also be more (self-)critical and reflective (e.g. Vitelli 1996; Karlsson 
2004; Sandis 2014; Ireland & Schofield 2015). 
One example of a canonical ethics is the International Council 
on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) whose statutes, the Charter 
for the Protection and Management of the Archaeological Heritage, 
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describe the archaeological heritage as a moral duty for every human 
being (1990: Article 3, “The protection of the archaeological herit-
age should be considered as a moral obligation upon all human 
beings”; www.icomos.org). Here ethics becomes a professional 
duty formalised in statute paragraphs. But it is noteworthy that a 
“salvage campaign” such as that at Abu Simbel must be regarded 
as mistaken according to ICOMOS, since preservation ought to 
take place in situ: “Any transfer of elements of the heritage to new 
locations represents a violation of the principle of preserving the 
heritage in its original context” (1990: Article 6; www.icomos.org). 
There is an extensive ethical debate, a debate about the right and 
the good, regarding the question of whether the past has been (ab)
used, generally by “others” before us or far away in the country 
where “things were done differently”. A constantly topical ques-
tion here is who has the (property) right to the heritage concerned 
(cf. Gillman 2010). Should heritage in the form of archaeological 
finds, books, art, or monuments be returned to the places from 
which they once came? Should the Parthenon frieze (or the Elgin 
Marbles) be transferred from the British Museum in London to the 
new Acropolis Museum in Athens (Greenfield 1996: 42ff; Bring 
2015: 69ff)? But the ethical debate becomes most intensive when 
it approaches human beings and the human body. Nothing can 
generate debate like the handling of the dead – graves, crania, 
skeletons, mummies, and bog bodies (cf. Nilsson Stutz 2008). 
Graves have been and are of central importance as expressions 
of collective identity. A source as early as Herodotus recounts a 
conversation in around 513–512 bce in which Idanthyrus, King 
of the Scythians, is supposed to have said that he wanted to fight 
against the Persians for “our forefathers’ graves”. “But if nothing 
will serve you but fighting straightway, we have the graves of our 
fathers; come, find these and essay to destroy them; then shall you 
know whether we will fight you for those graves or no” (Herodotus, 
IV: 127, pp. 328f; cf. Kristiansen 2001: 148; 2004).
An ethical argument about graves appears in Sweden in the 
middle of the sixteenth century. The exiled Archbishop Olaus 
Magnus asserted that old monuments should be preserved as they 
had been erected with the intention of conferring immortality, just 
as he condemned the disturbing of graves as outrageous and a sin. 
The view that the graves of the dead should not be disturbed also 
turns up in directives and deliberations from the 1630s and up until 
the nineteenth century in Sweden (Olaus Magnus 1555 (Latin): I 
cap. xxx, pp. 49f; xvi cap. xlv–xlvi, pp. 564ff; 1982 (Swedish): 1, 
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Chapter 30, p. 66ff; 16, Chapters 45–46, p. 759ff; cf. Jensen 2010: 
153f). In several other religions, such as Judaism and Islam, the 
view is still that graves should be left in peace. 
A discussion across the centuries setting out justifications, motives, 
and values gradually leads up to the present situation, in which 
most countries have legislation that protects traces of the past to 
varying degrees. And as a consequence of legislation and the expan-
sion of heritage, there is now also “heritage crime” as a separate 
concept and a growing academic field (e.g. Grove & Thomas 2014). 
The ethical perspective has been given a prominent role since 
the Second World War. In that context, special attention has been 
paid to the difficult handling of the Holocaust with Auschwitz-
Birkenau as the iconic example, where genocide culminated in an 
industrial complex. Auschwitz-Birkenau became a World Heritage 
site at a relatively early stage (WHL 31, 1979). But many other 
places and situations characterised by evil and human beings as 
victims raise ethical issues. How can and should victims and execu-
tioners be remembered in texts, images, memorials, and museums? 
Understand or explain, tell or stay silent, remember or forget, pre-
serve or destroy – everything is tested here, including relativism 
(e.g. Wyschogrod 1998; Macdonald 2009). It is also more generally 
observed that people in the present have a responsibility for the 
dead (cf. Southgate 2005: 53ff).
In Temps et récit (Time and Narrative), the philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur linked ethics with the narrative about the past. Here we 
encounter the view that every story about the past is a moral 
statement. The historian gives the victims of the past a voice. The 
victims deserve not to be forgotten, not to be trivialised or hidden 
by the history-writing of the victors (Ricoeur 1983–1985 (French); 
1984–1988 (English)). 
Ought the temples of Abu Simbel to have been salvaged from 
drowning, as actually happened – was it an ethical duty? In 1960, 
when the Director-General of UNESCO, Vittorino Veronese, was 
going to justify the Nubian campaign as a reaction to the flood-
ing that would be caused by the Aswan High Dam, he did not 
use the concepts of ethics or morality. But Veronese did describe a 
difficult choice, a choice that would be “between a heritage of the 
past and the present well-being of a people”, “between temples and 
crops”. This was exactly why Egypt and Sudan sought international 
support (Veronese 1960: 7). 
The same problem turned up again when the campaign was over 
and had to be justified once more. Then the Egyptologist Torgny 
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Säve-Söderbergh wrote that those involved might ask “whether it 
was morally acceptable to collect millions of dollars for such a 
purpose in a world where millions of its inhabitants starve and 
innumerable children die of hunger or have no expectation of even 
a marginally decent standard of life” (Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 217f). 
Now, afterwards, we can conclude that the outcome was heritage, 
temples, crops, and electricity, but hardly welfare; that the temples 
were saved, but that many people continued to have relatively low 
living standards. 
But neither Kant’s, Singer’s, nor Nussbaum’s ethical deliberations 
provide any immediate guidance as to whether the temples of Abu 
Simbel ought to have been saved. Can their salvage be elevated 
to a general rule? Does their salvage satisfy as many interests as 
possible? Can their salvage contribute to a good life? In all three 
instances, the field is open to interpretation. “Salvage” of heritage 
can mean many things – on-site preservation, a relocation, docu-
mentation in  text and photographs, and these days also digital 
documentation. Were the temples salvaged at all, considering the 
consequences of the move for their authenticity? Which group 
interests should be weighed against one another, and how? Who 
counts in this context? People living around Abu Simbel, in the 
Nile valley, or in Egypt; tourists, including all potential tourists; 
everyone in the world, including people who will live in the future? 
And what is the good life, and who should be allowed to have an 
influence on it? Without an absolute starting point, an Archimedes 
Point, Arche or God, ethics is just a finer but volatile word for doxa; 
that is, for attitudes and positions. 
By way of thanks for their assistance in the Nubian campaign, 
several countries received temples – Debod came to Parque del 
Oeste in Madrid in Spain, Taffa to Rijksmuseum van Oudheden in 
Leiden in the Netherlands, Dendur to the Metropolitan Museum of 
Art in New York in the US, and Ellesiya to Museo Egizio in Turin in 
Italy. Ought these temples to be returned to Egypt in a postcolonial 
spirit, even though their move was completely legal and Egypt was 
not and is not a colony? With Kant, return would be a general rule. 
If any heritage is to be moved back, then all heritage ought to be 
moved back. With Singer, interests would be weighed against one 
another: Where can the greatest number of persons benefit from 
the presence of the monuments, in Nubia or in the urban centres 
of the West? Well, the greater number of people undoubtedly visit 
Madrid, Leiden, New York, and Turin (cf. Melotti 2011: 81ff). But 
is the context in the West meaningful, or have the temples become 
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“places of forgetting”? Debod’s temple, for instance, stands with no 
justification whatsoever in a park laid out in the 1890s; it used to 
be a rubbish dump, and it was the site of a massacre in the civil war 
in 1936. Or where do the monuments contribute most to the good 
life? The answers are not obvious.
With the ethical perspective, knowledge is probably a precondi-
tion, but narrative is subordinate. Truth and beauty have to serve 
goodness. To act in the right way, knowledge is needed; but the way 
in which it is conveyed may not be so very important.
The ethical demand is necessary, but it is problematic at the same 
time, both in theory and in practice. Discussion is made more dif-
ficult by a rhetoric in which ethics itself has become a watchword 
which is meant to make argument superfluous. 
Of the three – truth, beauty, and goodness – the last is the most 
difficult to pin down. Even so, considering my deliberate choice 
of three virtues, my sympathies are with Nussbaum. The ethical 
demand must be determined from example to example, from situ-
ation to situation; virtues are relative. The canonical culture of 
heritage needs statutes, guidelines, values, and interests that can be 
measured and weighed. But moral rules for handling the history, 
memory, and heritage of the past cannot be discovered as some-
thing essentially existing. They need to be adopted through deci-
sions made by communities, in groups, in nations, or globally; that 
is the only possible route to take. 
The ideas of the time
We can ask Sisyphus why he is pushing a huge stone up a hill, 
why he is toiling uselessly. But supposing we get a reply, is it a 
credible one? Perhaps Sisyphus does not know why he is rolling 
the stone, or he has forgotten the reason. Sisyphus may reply stat-
ing what he  thinks the reason ought to be, or what he believes 
that we would like to hear. Sisyphus may assert one reason, but 
act according to another. Or he can lie, and lead us on to a false 
trail. So we cannot be sure of our ability to uncover an actor’s 
motives by listening to his own account of them. But irrespective of 
whether the stated motives are true or mendacious, they can reveal 
the ideas about the past and heritage that are current at a certain 
point in time. 
The fact that we choose to interrogate Sisyphus at all is indica-
tive of our own doubts about the meaningfulness of rolling a stone 
that keeps falling down again. We already have a preconceived 
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opinion that Sisyphus’s labour is futile. A “Sisyphean task” is in fact 
an expression used about an effort that is strenuous, but without 
any hope or result.
Wondering and asking why the past is recounted, remembered, 
and preserved, why history, memory, and heritage are having 
an upturn, may be a sign of crisis. For that which is obviously 
legitimate does not need any justifications. So when the past 
in  conjunction with the humanities field – that is, the second 
culture for C. P. Snow – constantly needs to justify itself and face 
expectations to be useful, this may be a sign that the field is mar-
ginalised and on the defensive. The past must be defended both 
against concrete threats of destruction and against other priorities 
in society. 
But questions about usefulness are nothing new. For example, 
the naturalist Carl Linnaeus (later ennobled as von Linné) defended 
his studies against the many who believed that his science was only 
about curiosity and a pastime for the idle: Hwartill duger det? [What 
use is it?] (Cui bono?) (Linnaeus 1752 (Latin); 1753 (Swedish)). 
Linnaeus argued that God had not created anything in vain, that 
nothing was without a use. With numerous examples, ranging from 
flies to grass, he demonstrated how something could be of use as, 
for instance, food, medicine, or building materials, either directly 
or indirectly. The question, which tormented Linnaeus, contains a 
fundamental doubt and a demand for justification current in the 
period, a demand rooted in the assumption that everything must be 
serviceable, be of use. 
There are many kinds of usefulness, and as Linnaeus demon-
strated, nothing is without a use. But when usefulness is demanded 
of the past and of the humanities, this amounts to an insistence that 
the  field be justified within the premises of the predominant dis-
course of the period. Consequently, when the concepts “usefulness” 
and “benefit to society” are employed in the present-day debate, 
they mostly function as a political mantra that provides cover for 
a demand for profitability from something that present-day society 
just does not want to give priority; it is known that the question of 
benefit or profit will put the field on the defensive. The fact is that 
the defence of the past has to be formulated at a time, at a place, 
and in a society in which a distinction is made between what gener-
ates and what consumes resources, in which usefulness is contrasted 
with amusement, and in which use is often associated with econom-
ics, social science, medicine, natural science, and engineering, while 
amusement is associated with the humanities and literature. 
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What is the past good for? One recurring theme is the topicality 
and relevance of the past, and therefore also its usefulness, in rela-
tion to the agenda of the present, but also in relation to future needs; 
something can be of use now or in the longer term. Justifications, 
motives, and values have constantly been updated or modernised so 
as to be geared to the great or burning issues of the time. To obtain 
legitimacy, there has been a conscious or unconscious appeal to 
what is well known, accepted, and relevant to the present, qualities 
that necessarily vary over time. 
The classifications of motives and practices bear the stamp of 
the agenda of the present. Friedrich Nietzsche’s three categories 
stemmed from the political tendencies of his own time – the monu-
mental, which actively orientates itself backwards to a golden age; 
the antiquarian, which passively preserves; and the critical, which 
actively seeks the golden age in the future. In simplified terms, the 
categories represent a reactionary, a conservative, and a revolution-
ary perspective – or three social and political groups that belong to 
Nietzsche’s time: the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie, and the workers. 
By contrast, Svante Beckman’s division into four categories com-
prising norms and necessity, usefulness and entertainment, forms a 
mirror image of sectors in the modern welfare state, in which time 
is divided up between external demands and personal needs, as well 
as between work and leisure. And my own triple categorisation 
into truth, beauty, and goodness can be seen as a positioning in the 
present debate, bridging the two cultures of heritage – a positioning 
legitimised by a reuse of philosophical concepts that can point out 
a direction, but whose content is constantly renewed. Consequently, 
we are unavoidably entangled in our own time.
To obtain funds for a salvage action at Abu Simbel, it was neces-
sary for Vittorino Veronese and UNESCO to employ rhetorically 
persuasive expressions which were able to engender widespread 
comprehension in their own period. Herodotus, Ibn Khaldûn, 
Leopold Ranke, Alois Riegl, Marc Bloch, Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, 
David Thomson, Eric Hobsbawm, Michael Shanks, Christopher 
Tilley, and Cornelius Holtorf – all have argued in line with or against 
their own period. And Carl-Axel Moberg’s overview, in terms of the 
history of ideas, of justifications for archaeological research is very 
much a catalogue of varying current “uses” – from evidence of the 
relevant country’s greatness to a mere pastime (cf. Moberg 1984). 
Views of what usefulness amounts to have varied over time; 
but these days it is usually defined in terms of economic growth as 
both the means and the end, surrounded by a number of  secondary 
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themes that may be either prerequisites for or consequences of 
growth. The past in its wide-ranging sense, encompassing history, 
memory, and heritage, is thus regarded as a resource for expe-
riences, recreation, and travel – a resource that is of growing 
economic importance. The designation of Abu Simbel and other 
sites as World Heritage sites is expected to promote the influx of 
tourists, thereby contributing to income and jobs, even though the 
development of cultural tourism is not without its problems (cf. 
Bourdeau et al. 2015). 
But history, memory, and heritage are a resource comprising 
knowledge, narratives, and experience of broader relevance. It is 
thus relatively easy to find current examples in which archaeolo-
gists and others wish to activate knowledge about the past in order 
to contribute to solving the great issues of our time; that is, issues 
involving sustainable development, climate change, population 
growth, poverty, migration, diversity, human rights, political trust, 
community, and peace (e.g. Silverman & Fairchild Ruggles 2007; 
Sabloff 2008; Little 2009; Westman & Tunón 2010; Fredengren 
2012; Högberg 2013; Aronsson 2015; Räkna med kulturarvet 
[“Count on heritage”], 2017; Schiffer 2017). The narratives, finds, 
and sites of the past already play a central role in a cultural tourism 
that is able to entertain as well as enlighten. However, heritage can 
be used in many other contexts as well, including issues involving 
identity, good health, and ethics. In short, heritage can contribute to 
a better world (cf. Aronsson 2009). 
At the same time, it must be said that if the humanities – the 
study of the past, history, memory, and heritage – were to focus 
wholly on usefulness for the present or on the great issues, if there 
were no place for free basic research, curiosity, and unrestricted 
exploration, this would amount to losing the unexpected, which 
has turned out to be of crucial importance from a historical point of 
view. Even the study of the past needs its serendipity, the fortuitous 
discovery of something in the past other than the very thing that 
was being looked for – something unexpected and “strange”. 
The past has had meaning and value for thousands of years 
and has therefore already proved its sustainability or usefulness in 
varying conditions, but each period has understood or explained 
this in its own way. The justifications, motives, and values have 
varied, just as the arguments for scholarly and scientific pursuits 
have varied over time (cf. Sundin 1996). The crucial point is 
whether we are in Cairo in 1813, in Basel in 1874, in Paris in 1960, 
or in Lund in 2020, and what matters is whether it is the sheik, the 
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philosopher, the director-general, or the archaeologist who is 
 supplying the justifications and making the assessments. The ques-
tion of who is to be persuaded is equally crucial: is it the president, 
the engineer, the tourist manager, the sceptical  taxpayer – or the 
writer personally? 
What is seen as meaningful depends on the context – on who 
is writing or speaking and who is expected to read or listen. The 
words have varied along with what someone could, ought to, or 
wanted to express in that period, at that place, or in that situation. 
Hence meaning is created within or in relation to a discourse. We 
say what we can, ought to, or want to when speaking to power, our 
colleagues, the public, and perhaps our own conscience. 
What is the meaning of the past, of history, memory, and herit-
age? We must now conclude that the method of uncovering meaning 
through the actors’ own justifications, through motives and values, 
leads to new questions, since the multifarious replies are bound up 
with the leading ideas and practices of the period. Does that mean 
that the ideas of the period are a mental prison that determines what 
can be said, or do the ideas of the period create new  opportunities? 
Is the episteme restricting or liberating?
In Les mots et les choses (The Order of Things) (1966 (French); 
1971 (English)) and L’archéologie du savoir (The Archaeology of 
Knowledge) (1969 (French); 1972 (English)), Michel Foucault used 
the concept of the episteme, from the Greek word meaning knowl-
edge, about how and therefore also what it was possible to think, 
write, and say during a particular historical period. This would mean 
that the classical and the modern epochs are each characterised by 
their own episteme or their own discursive formation. It is, however, 
something of a contradiction that – also according to Foucault – 
there can be several epistemes at the same time. Here the episteme 
approaches other concepts such as mentality, paradigm, and dis-
course. Foucault himself thus used the concept of discourse in a way 
that is difficult or impossible to differentiate from the episteme. 
It is tempting to reuse the concepts of episteme and discourse 
when trying to establish how the past acquires meaning. As a 
concept, the episteme can be useful in understanding how history, 
memory, and heritage are subordinated – at an initial, fundamental 
level – to a requirement of usefulness: everything must self-evidently 
be of use in relation to its own period. Thereafter, discourse as a 
concept may be employed at the next level in order to understand 
how expressions concerning the usefulness of the past vary with 
and within the demands of the period. 
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Here conflicts may arise between different discourses, between 
canonical and critical heritage, between representatives of different 
research traditions, and in the prioritisation of either the true, the 
beautiful, or the good. These conflicts are manifested in a polarised 
debate about the right heritage policy, a debate in which each dis-
tinct tradition attempts to define the field in its own way. In relation 
to that debate, political parties try to define heritage so that it fits 
their specific agenda – heritage as something enduring or something 
changeable, something delimited, national, or universal. 
The episteme’s requirement of use is seen in both cultures of 
heritage. For both the canonical and the critical culture can agree 
that the past ought to be of use, but they coalesce around different 
discourses and therefore have completely different ideas concerning 
what is of use. Not unexpectedly, the canonical culture is most 
visible in the defence of the usefulness of the past, supplying justifi-
cations, motives, and values, whereas the critical culture dominates 
the debate about (ab)use. The starting point of my own inquiry is 
also subordinated to the episteme. Because asking about the impor-
tance of the past entails looking for what is of use, even if the 
pursuit also includes curiosity allied to a sense of wonder. 
Still, the concepts of episteme and discourse can easily become a 
philosophical straitjacket. There is an absence of a dynamics that 
allows for individuality, variation, and change, permitting move-
ments across the constructed time limits of the episteme and the 
enforced roles of the discourse. Human beings are denied the ability 
to use their imagination to think beyond their own present and 
situation  – think in the past and the future, in other periods, at 
other places, and from other perspectives. The episteme and the 
discourse do not allow human beings any freedom – and therefore 
no responsibility for their actions either, neither as individuals nor 
as collectives. 
Justifications, motives, and values may be something different 
from, and more than, a mechanical and enforced reflection of the 
ideas and roles of a period. This is, first, because human beings 
do not discover the meaning of the past, but create its meaning 
in dialogue with their present. With new justifications, motives, 
and values, the past is given a meaning that it did not previously 
possess. Meaning is therefore in constant change, constantly fluid. 
And, second, because new justifications, motives, and values open 
the way to fresh perspectives on the past which are different from 
those already known. So the past is a resource that can constantly 
be  reused in new and unexpected ways. As the time, place, and 
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 situation change, new possibilities arise of making creative use of 
the past – as a source of knowledge, and as a starting point for nar-
ratives or ethical deliberations. The recurring theme, the relevance 
of the past, is an expression not of weakness but of strength: the 
past possesses the very ability to be relevant and sustaining as a 
resource in varying circumstances. 
It is meaningful to ask Sisyphus why he is pushing a great stone 
up a hill, even though the stone rolls down to the plain again, 
because justifications, motives, and values create meaning and help 
to shape the actions of the future. Let us now take a closer look 
at how Sisyphus affects the stone and the stone affects Sisyphus. 
What meaning does, can, or should the past have, if practices are 
examined? What is it that actually happens to the past? 
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Figure 3 The Forbidden City in Beijing. Photo © Jes Wienberg, 1982. 




When focus shifts from justifications, motives, and values to prac-
tice, or from proclamations, purposes, and assessments to how 
history, memory, and heritage have actually been used and thereby 
been given meaning, the horizon darkens. Where the first, canonical 
culture of heritage sees resources to use, the second, critical culture 
of heritage sees a series of abuses. “À qui profite le crime?” (“who 
profits from the crime?”), as the archaeologist Alain Schnapp put 
it in the foreword to La conquête du passé, an overview of the 
history of archaeology (Schnapp 1993: 11). His critical title with 
military connotations, “The conquest of the past”, was, however, 
transformed in the English edition into a curiosity-driven adven-
ture, The Discovery of the Past, and the question about the crime 
disappeared (Schnapp 1996). 
In the 1970s, two archaeologists initiated a wave of criticism of 
the use of the past and of heritage. Senake Bandaranayake published 
the article “Imperialism and Archaeology” (Bandaranayake 1974) 
under the pseudonym of “A. Gidtri”. Bandaranayake wrote that 
in order to be able to conquer the present, colonialists also had to 
conquer the past. The Rosetta Stone and a statue of Ramses II, both in 
the British Museum in London, were stated as examples of plunder. 
Bandaranayake took the view that colonialists destroyed more than 
they preserved, and he praised the revolutionary collective of archae-
ologists in China that did not permit any outside interference. His 
article represented a postcolonial criticism that found inspiration 
in the China of the Cultural Revolution, even though that revolu-
tion entailed an extensive vandalising of remains from the country’s 
past.
Bandaranayake was apparently spurred to voice this criti-
cism on encountering the blockbuster exhibition Treasures of 
Tutankhamun at the British Museum in 1972 (Bandaranayake 
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1974: 431). In 1972–1981 the exhibition was on tour to the UK, 
the USSR, the US, Canada, and West Germany. This exhibition 
helped to finance the relocation of the temples on Philae to the 
nearby island of Agilkia (Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 168; 1996: 142f; 
Hassan 2007: 87). 
Tutankhamun, with his well-preserved tomb and gold mask, is 
one of the best-known archaeological finds of the twentieth century. 
His tomb was discovered in 1922, in adventurous circumstances, 
by Howard Carter in the Valley of the Kings, Wadi el-Muluk. The 
expedition was financed by George Herbert, Earl of Carnarvon, 
the owner of Highclere Castle, the real Downton Abbey. The dis-
covery is enveloped in popular speculation about the curse of the 
mummy, which is supposed to have struck the participants. I visited 
the tomb in the form of replicas at a travelling exhibition named 
 Tutankhamun – his tomb and his treasures when it came to Malmö 
in Sweden in 2013. 
The archaeologist Brian M. Fagan also used Egyptology as his 
starting point, directing harsh criticism against the colonial looting 
of the past in The Rape of the Nile (Fagan 1975). But despite his 
criticism, Fagan’s main interest seems to have been the telling of 
the fascinating story of the exploration of the pharaohs’ Egypt, 
from Napoleon’s expedition in 1798 to Carter’s discovery of 
 Tutankhamun’s tomb – to a great extent a race between the colonial 
powers France and the UK. 
The temples of Abu Simbel are a well-known tourist destina-
tion in Egypt along with the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities in 
Cairo where Tutankhamun and his tomb have been on display, 
the pyramids at Giza, Luxor with Karnak, and the Valley of the 
Kings. Exotic trips along the Nile described by authors such as 
Amelia B. Edwards and Agatha Christie paved the way for the mass 
tourism of recent years. The tourist industry is important to the 
Egyptian economy, but it has been hit by several blows. The attack 
on tourists, guards, and a guide near Luxor in 1997 was thus both 
a strategic attack on the country’s economy and an attack on the 
worship of what was seen as a non-Islamic past; there is a similarity 
here to the destruction by the Taliban and IS of monuments from 
ancient times. Then the number of tourists fell markedly with the 
disturbances that followed the Arab Spring in 2011. 
Abu Simbel, with the colossal statues of Ramses II, is not only a 
tourist destination; it also serves as a set of props in Pharaonism, 
which constitutes a homage to pre-Islamic Egypt. Pharaonism is a 
national ideology which emerged in the interwar years, assigning a 
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crucial role to Egyptology and to Tutankhamun’s tomb in particu-
lar (Reid 2002; 2015). According to Pharaonism, Egypt is primarily 
a country with its own period of greatness and identity – and only 
after that period did it become an Ottoman or Arab country. After 
the transfer of power in 1952, however, Pharaonism was of less 
importance: Egypt was now presented as a leading Arab country. 
But a continued focus on the pharaohs, Ramses II being the most 
powerful, also suited the republic with its presidents, most of whom 
had a background in the military. The Islamic opposition notably 
compared the president to a pharaoh, in a derogatory sense.
Abu Simbel also touches on the debate about the removal of 
treasures and the demand for their return. As a reward for their 
efforts in the Nubian campaign and the salvage of the temples of 
Abu Simbel, the contributing countries were offered the possibil-
ity of retaining part of the resulting finds, as well as of receiving 
entire temples as “new ambassadors extraordinary”. Debod went to 
Madrid, Taffa to Leiden, Dendur to New York, and Ellesiya to Turin, 
and some frescoes from the Cathedral in Faras went to Warsaw 
(Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 137ff; 1996: 114f). This gift policy was sub-
sequently criticised both for plundering the heritage of Egypt and 
the Sudan and for entailing a division and dispersal of collections 
(Hassan 2007: 80, 90ff; 2009).
The criticism expressed by Bandaranayake and Fagan in the 
1970s must be seen as part of a broad reckoning with the West. 
It is voiced against the background of decolonialisation after the 
Second World War, the criticism of US warfare in Vietnam and other 
countries, and the young people’s revolt against their parents and 
authorities. A crucial point in this development was reached with 
the oil crises in 1973–1974 and again in 1978–1980, the first being 
triggered by the West’s support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War, or 
October War, in 1973 between Israel, Egypt, and Syria. 
Bandaranayake and Fagan were early critics. The subsequent 
decades saw a flood of critical debate articles and academic studies 
about the West’s view of the “other” in time and space – a criticism 
formulated both outside and in the West. It includes Orientalism 
(1978) by the literary scholar Edward W. Said, a work that contains 
criticism of literary representations in which the “Orient” is pre-
sented as unchanging, alien, and incomprehensible – or the opposite 
of the West, the Occident, which is said to represent the changeable, 
familiar, and comprehensible.
Bandaranayake, Fagan, and Said in the 1970s were followed in 
the ensuing decades by numerous studies that examined, and often 
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also criticised, the way in which the past – history and archaeol-
ogy in particular – had been interpreted and used through the ages 
(e.g. Trigger 1984; 1989; Hedeager & Schousboe 1989; Gathercole 
& Lowenthal 1990; Hylland Eriksen 1996; Meskell 1998; Kane 
2003; Diaz-Andreu 2007). David Lowenthal’s works – The Past is 
a Foreign Country (1985; 2015) and The Heritage Crusade and the 
Spoils of History (1997) – must be included as an important part of 
this wave of criticism. 
The criticism recapitulated above led to the establishment of 
both (critical) use of history and critical heritage as academic fields 
for research and teaching, from the 1990s onwards with their own 
conferences, journals, series, textbooks, networks, centres, and edu-
cation programmes (e.g. International Journal of Heritage Studies 
1994ff; cf. Aronsson 2004; Nielsen 2010; Harrison 2013). In more 
general terms, a great deal of attention shifted from the past in itself 
to the past in the present and therefore from source criticism to 
perspective criticism. Even so, this criticism may itself be seen as a 
new way of using of the past in the present. 
This criticism has often focused on how the past has been used by 
nationalism, colonialism, imperialism, tourism, and other “isms”: 
how selection, interpretation, and mediation have been shaped 
according to the needs of the present; how the past has been used 
to legitimise a political or military agenda – in the colonisation of 
Africa, in the reuse of the Roman Empire by Italian fascism, in the 
conduct of Nazi Germany in Eastern Europe, in Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq, and in the construction of a common Europe; how heritage 
has deliberately been destroyed to weaken identities in war zones in 
the Balkans, Afghanistan, Mali, and Syria; how treasures have been 
moved from the periphery of the colonies to central museums in 
the West; and how the past is used commercially and is being worn 
down by mass tourism. The list could be made much longer. 
Motives, justifications, and values, what is spoken and written, 
must needs be supplemented by studies of practice in order to 
understand and explain the meanings of the past. And naturally, 
both purposes and practice must be subjected to critical assess-
ment. It may, for instance, be useful to be reminded of how Gustaf 
Kossinna, Hans Reinerth, and other German archaeologists used 
the past as an argument in the context of German expansion – 
useful now that archaeology is once more brought to bear on issues 
of nationalism and identity (cf. Arnold 1990; 1998). 
But this kind of criticism can easily come close to being banal and 
harmless. This happens, for instance, when the criticism condemns 
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obvious abuse placed long ago in the poison cupboard of history. 
Moreover, criticism that is directed at the “other”, who decided, 
researched, or wrote at another time and in a “foreign country”, is 
seldom directed inwards as self-criticism. Criticism along such lines is 
not intended to enlighten; it functions primarily as a self-confirming 
social narrative. A display of criticism serves to demonstrate member-
ship of the critical collective, confirming the existence of that com-
munity. Ethical reflection is reduced to identity-creating moralising.
Use – use and abuse – use or abuse – or only abuse? Abuse is use 
that someone else, later, in another place or as belonging to another 
tradition, regards as incorrect and therefore chooses to criticise. 
The use is seen as untrue, ugly, or evil. The criticism thus raises 
questions as to whether motives, values, use, and interpretation can 
be separated at all; as to whether use is unavoidable or ought to be 
avoided; and as to where to draw the line between use and abuse, 
between the true and the mendacious, the beautiful and the ugly, the 
good and the evil. 
The word abuse carries connotations of distancing in terms of 
time or geography. The abuse of the past took place in the past – or 
somewhere else. Consequently, characterising a use as abuse often 
makes an unconscious assumption of either a developmental per-
spective or an ethnocentric attitude. We are wiser now, or we know 
better here. But do we have any right to judge the past, to drag the 
dead before an academic court without any possibility of defending 
themselves, to hold a day of judgement over the dead in the absence 
of God; that is, to pass judgement in the absence of Archimedean 
points for what is true, beautiful, and good? Convincing arguments 
are needed in each specific case. The true, the beautiful, and the 
good are goals to strive after; but they are not easy to achieve. 
Criticism of the past is itself an example of use of the past; criti-
cism is itself a narrative to examine, just as criticism of politics is 
political. Therefore, the question is what the intention is, or what is 
revealed in practice when others’ use of the past is criticised. What 
is the agenda of the criticism? Its purpose may be to bring out what 
is untrue, ugly, or evil, so as to be able to regain the true, the beauti-
ful, and the good. That is honourable. But criticism can also be an 
end in itself, serve in the creation of an identity, or be formulated 
in order to legitimise new perspectives or a new practice. So the 
criticism of the past is not only about interpreting the past, but also 
about the present and the future. 
“Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the 
present controls the past” was the Party’s slogan. The words from 
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the dystopian science fiction novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (Orwell 
1949: 37, 249 quotation) by the journalist and author Eric Arthur 
Blair, who wrote under the pseudonym George Orwell, are well 
known and perhaps hackneyed, but they are nonetheless accurate. 
The point of trying to control the past is to control the present and 
therefore also the future, even if all efforts to control the future must 
be in vain. The slogan is not that far from the thoughts expressed by 
the historian Marc Bloch at the same time: The point of history is to 
understand the present through the past, and to understand the past 
through the present (Bloch 1949 (French): 11ff; 1992 (English): 
32ff). However, Bloch refrained from planning to understand, let 
alone control, the future. 
An alternative to analysing motives, justifications, and values, or 
criticising practice – that is, an alternative to looking backwards – 
can be to work towards new goals. An archaeological activism and 
a reorientation, in which the public is a co-creator, emerges as a 
constructive counter-reaction to the intense criticism of the 1980s 
and 1990s. New goals are set so that the past can be of use. 
Other and darker motives and values appear immediately when 
practice is examined. Lies and manipulation are hidden behind the 
ideal of truth; the ugly is to be found behind the ideal of beauty; 
an evil reality is revealed behind the ideal of goodness. The past 
has been filled with lies, looted, and raped. It has been used for 
treasure hunts, escapism, pastimes, and profit. The past has served 
all needs, nationalism, colonialism, imperialism, and tourism; it has 
served religion, ideology, and capital. True, beautiful, and good – or, 
conversely, false, ugly, and evil – and in both instances the triad’s 
categorisation remains relevant. For there is not necessarily such 
a great distance between motives, justifications, and values on the 
one hand and the criticised practice on the other. That which is now 
criticised as abuse might have been perceived as useful in its time or 
its place. And that which is seen as useful today may be regarded as 
abuse in the future.
The concepts of criticism and crisis are related, their Greek roots 
being kritikos, meaning capable of judging, and krisis, meaning a 
decision or judgement. So is it the case, as many have claimed, that 
the use of the past increases in periods of crisis? 
Crisis and the heritage industry
I believe that a civilisation which tends towards conservatism is a 
declining civilisation because it is afraid to go forward and ascribes 
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more importance to its memories than to its future. Strong, expanding 
civilisations have no memory: they reject, they forget the past. They 
feel strong enough to be destructive because they know they can 
replace what has been destroyed. (Boulez 1976: 33)
These words were spoken by the composer and conductor Pierre 
Boulez in a radio interview as a comment on the tendency, in evi-
dence from the late nineteenth century onwards, to revive older 
musical works. Boulez’s statement was clear and unambiguous, but 
far from unique. A broad spectrum of intellectuals have asserted, 
and continue to assert, that a society that preserves is a society in 
crisis. The context comprises everything from theoretical consid-
erations to empirical examinations, from global perspectives to 
selected examples. But often the crisis and the consequences of the 
crisis are simply presented as facts for which no argument need be 
made. For everyone seems to know that society was, or soon will 
be, in a state of crisis for one reason or another, and that there 
is a self-evident connection between the crisis and the expansion 
of history, memory, and – especially – heritage. In times of crisis, 
therapeutic consolation is sought in the past. 
As the major change, modernity is supposed to be the crucial 
reason why society finds itself in a state of crisis. That modernity 
leads to a greater focus on the past is thus a widely held standpoint. 
Modernity creates alienation, unrest, and anxiety that need to be 
compensated for or balanced by narratives from the country of the 
past. The reaction to modernity is said to be nostalgia as people 
react to having modernity imposed on them by recalling a lost 
time, the “wild strawberries” of their youth. And relics of the past 
that get in the way of modernity are moved to temporal reserves, to 
archives, libraries, or museums, where they are allowed to survive.
Or is it the other way round, nostalgia growing when modernity 
finds itself in a state of crisis? Ever since the 1980s, there has been 
a widely held view to the effect that the increased focus on the past 
was caused by the decline or end of modernity. Modernity has been 
succeeded by postmodernity, economic growth by decline, indus-
trialisation by deindustrialisation, and belief in progress by belief 
in a bygone golden age. The closed-down factory is transformed 
into  a museum, where former employees find work as guides. 
Others visit reconstructed environments from the past – Iron-Age 
settlements, trading places from the Viking Age, medieval market 
towns, or Early Modern industries. And at home, people can be 
entertained by the adventures of archaeologists on TV. The crisis 
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of modernity creates a yearning to escape to an apparently secure 
past.
In The Past is a Foreign Country, David Lowenthal was in no 
doubt that the heritage boom of the 1980s was caused by a crisis. 
And the numerous quotations in the book include a slight rewriting 
of Pierre Boulez’s words: “A civilization which tends to conserve is a 
civilization in decline” (Lowenthal 1985: 384; 2015: 413). In a later 
lecture, in which Lowenthal is looking back, he refers to the back-
ground of the boom in the 1970s as a decade of unfulfilled promises, 
economic collapse, the closure of the Suez Canal  (1967–1975), oil 
crises, inflation, postmodern doubt, and a revolt against modernism 
and the idea of progress (Lowenthal 2011 YouTube; cf. Lowenthal 
2015: 36).
But in his books, Lowenthal has been unclear about the relation-
ship between the crisis and the boom. The Past is a Foreign Country 
thus contains statements that point in several directions: he wrote 
that we should preserve because modernity, with its swift changes 
and developments, affects identity and well-being (Lowenthal 
1985: xxiv). But he also wrote that nostalgia has replaced belief in 
progress and modernity (Lowenthal 1985: 11f; 2015: 36f). In other 
words, Lowenthal is inconsistent in identifying both modernity and 
postmodernity as being responsible for developments. 
Here and there in The Past is a Foreign Country and its succes-
sor The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, Lowenthal 
mentioned a wide range of reasons why nostalgia had crowded out 
belief in progress and development: increasing technological inno-
vation, radical changes, disruptions, volatility, social decline and 
isolation, revolutions, immigration and industrialisation, genocide 
and  iconoclasm, greater perishability on account of mass tourism, 
plus pollution, political, military, and biological disasters, longer 
life expectancy, and technophobia. The growth of heritage is thus 
regarded as reflecting traumatic losses and changes as well as fear of 
the future, but apparently also better living conditions, as expressed 
in longer life expectancy (Lowenthal 1985: 8ff, 121f, 394ff; 1997: 
5ff; 2015: 36ff, 202f, 416ff). 
The cultural historian Patrick Wright was clearer when he 
claimed in On Living in an Old Country that the past, tradition, 
and the nation would be invoked in periods of decline. The identity 
of the UK was said to have collapsed after the Second World War, 
when the Empire disintegrated and urban renewal led to anxiety 
and disorientation. Faced with the country’s social and economic 
crisis in the 1970s, Margaret Thatcher’s government was able to 
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offer a rallying around national symbols. Consequently, the recov-
ery of Henry VIII’s flagship Mary Rose and the Falklands War, both 
in 1982, should be seen as two sides of the same project. Wright’s 
view was that history should instead be geared towards the future. 
History can and must be created in the present and should not 
focus on lost fragments. A society in development ought, according 
to Wright’s way of thinking, to be able to let an old wreck rest in 
peace (Wright 1985). 
In his review of Wright’s book, the architect Colin Ward pio-
neered the term “heritage industry” (Ward 1985, cf. Wright 2009: 
xxiii, 258, note 36). Intended to be pejorative, the term was 
undoubtedly inspired by the philosophers Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor W. Adorno, of the Frankfurt School, who formulated the 
concept “culture industry” in the 1940s. Horkheimer and Adorno 
used it about American popular culture with its films, radio, and 
magazines, which they viewed as solely profit-seeking; according 
to them, these manifestations of popular culture were standardised, 
commercial, conformist, and banal, and they manipulated and pas-
sivised the masses (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947 (German): 144ff; 
2002 (English): 94ff; cf. Adorno 1967 (German); 1979 (English)). 
A couple of years after that review, another well-written book 
established “heritage industry” as a general term within the frame-
work of what was to become the critical tradition of heritage. In The 
Heritage Industry, the cultural historian Robert Hewison delivered 
a vigorous attack on the eponymous phenomenon. Hewison criti-
cised the tendency to establish ever more museums, historical theme 
parks, and visitor centres. He claimed that heritage had become a 
nostalgic escape in a time of decline and uncertainty. The UK had, 
he said, been in crisis ever since the 1960s, beset by pessimism, 
devaluation, and oil crises. Modernisation had been replaced by 
deindustrialisation and unemployment. Industrial premises had 
become museums. Instead of goods, they produced superficial 
heritage. In Hewison’s view, the heritage industry was stifling con-
temporary culture, and its inertia was impeding necessary renewal. 
What he wished to see was not more heritage and bringing to life 
but critical history, “real” industry, and “real” jobs (Hewison 1987).
Similarly drastic criticism was formulated by the philosopher 
Agnes Heller in her article “Europe – An Epilogue”. From an 
American perspective, Heller observed a Europe in decline ever 
since the First World War, characterised by barbarity and totali-
tarianism. Worn out, Europe had turned away from progress and 
modernity that were, according to Heller, the essence of European 
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culture. Instead, Europe was looking towards a nostalgic culture. 
Now Europe was searching for meaning in the past, as the present 
had nothing to offer. Its preoccupation with the past was seen as a 
symptom of its decline. “Old cities are rebuilt, ancient castles are 
refurbished, old artefacts are exhibited, old books are  republished – 
Europeans tiptoe in their cities as museums because they are 
museums” (Heller 1988: 155; italics in the original). 
This view was repeated, but now from an Eastern perspective, 
by Chinese state media after the vote on Brexit in 2016: “East Asia 
has witnessed decades of high-speed growth and prosperity. Europe 
stays where it was, becoming the world’s center of museums and 
tourist destinations” (Global Times 25 June 2016).
Radical criticism was also presented by the historian Françoise 
Choay in L’allégorie du patrimoine (The Invention of the Historic 
Monument). Choay saw the culture industry, with its inflation 
of heritage and museums, as a reaction against the electronic era 
that had emerged since the late 1950s. In her view, a hegemonic 
technological network had liberated humanity from its natural and 
cultural restrictions, such as seasonal change. Artificial memory, 
greater mobility, and global communication had destabilised iden-
tity. The present was therefore characterised by repressed conflicts, 
anxiety, helplessness, and crisis. And Choay issued a warning about 
the new prosthetic human being, homo sapiens prostheticus, on the 
threshold of a new century (Choay 1992 (French): 158ff, 187ff; 
2001 (English): 138ff, 164ff; italics in the original).
Similar ideas occur in Twilight Memories by the literary historian 
Andreas Huyssen. As a reaction to accelerating technological devel-
opment and a crisis for modernity’s faith in the future, he claimed 
that a “museum mania” had arisen since the 1980s. It transformed 
the museum from an institution for the elite into a popular mass 
medium. The revolution in the sphere of information had made the 
present chaotic, fragmentary, and liquid. Digital media spearheaded 
by television had blurred the difference between then and now – 
and between fact and fiction. The authentic materiality and contem-
plation offered by museums could, Huyssen suggested, compensate 
for the speed and superficiality of the media (Huyssen 1995: 14, 
20, 25ff). 
The sociologist Frank Füredi has described his own time as char-
acterised by social anxiety. In Mythical Past, Elusive Future, Füredi 
thus claimed that the history and nostalgia of the 1980s was an 
expression of the decline of the West and its fear of the future. 
He saw the West as being characterised by economic stagnation, 
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 pessimism, and ideological emptiness after the end of the Cold War. 
The West had turned towards the past, with roots and tradition, to 
create new identities and contexts. Füredi viewed this development 
as a crisis of modernity, comparing his own present to the “fin de 
siècle” of the 1890s. He also criticised the use of the past as creating 
identities that are more about who people are than who they can 
become. Füredi wanted to see historical thinking rather than his-
torical narrative, change rather than continuity, reason rather than 
roots, forward-looking progress rather than backward-looking 
conservatism (Füredi 1992). 
In Füredi’s opinion, decline and anxiety had meant a boom 
for the past; but at the same time, the French Revolution and the 
Napoleonic Wars had generated historical thinking, that is, an 
awareness that humans are able to shape their own future. And a 
romantic view of history had emerged in the nineteenth century as a 
conservative reaction against the Enlightenment’s belief in progress 
and against the French Revolution (Füredi 1992: 72ff, 192ff). 
The crisis and the critical jargon have also made their way to 
Scandinavia, even though references to the international debate 
may be absent. In the project “Modernisation and heritage”, which 
resulted in the edited volume Modernisering och Kulturarv, the 
 economic historian Svante Beckman wrote that the increased impor-
tance of heritage was a manifestation of the third, or perhaps the 
fourth, crisis of modernisation. These crises are linked to uncer-
tainty about the future around the turns of centuries – 1800, 1900, 
and now 2000. Beckman also compared the fin de siècle of the 
1890s to the end of the twentieth century: the same uncertainty, 
the same cultural shift, the same reaction to  modernisation – 
and the same  nostalgia (Beckman 1993a; 1993b).
Crisis is a common denominator of the explanations of increased 
interest in history, memory, and – especially – heritage. We witness 
a “crisis discourse” which, like a black hole, attracts and swallows 
all other interpretations. But crisis is an unclear concept, and it 
is rarely the result of an analysis. “Crisis” is used to designate a situ-
ation or change as being unfortunate or bad. But anything at all can 
be seen as a crisis by someone – and as unproblematic by someone 
else. When the word crisis crops up in a text, there is an explicit or 
veiled purpose. The concept is used as a rhetorical tool in shaping a 
narrative (cf. Magnusson Staaf 2013). 
Society is in crisis; but when, how, and why? Heller saw a crisis 
since the First World War, Choay since the 1950s, Hewison since 
the 1960s, Lowenthal and Wright in the 1970s, Huyssen and Füredi 
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in the 1980s, Beckman perhaps in the 1990s. Some write about a 
crisis in Europe, others in the UK, France, or – perhaps implicitly – 
in the West as a whole. And the crisis can be blamed on modernity, 
on postmodernity, or on something else again. 
Another common feature is criticism directed against the increased 
importance of the past, against history, memory, and – especially – 
heritage. One example is the critique of tradition by the modernist 
Boulez. But it also includes criticism of heritage specifically, whereas 
traditional or critical history is commended. Lowenthal and Hewison 
thus drew a sharp distinction between history and heritage. They 
wanted to see more traditional or critical history, not narratives or 
superficial or false heritage. Lowenthal linked history to a search for 
truth and authenticity, but heritage to faith, fables, and construction; 
history could be tested, but heritage could not, a view pithily sum-
marised in the heading “Historical fact, heritage faith” (Lowenthal 
1997: 1, 119ff with heading, 250; cf. also Füredi 1992: 268). Or, 
as Hewison put it: “Heritage, for all its seductive delights, is bogus 
history” (Hewison 1987: 10, 139, 144 quotation). 
This criticism is yet another example of widespread elitist con-
tempt for the popular, perhaps spiced with a dash of envy, and 
it forms a repetition of the Frankfurt School’s sceptical view of 
modernity with its commercial development; it may also be a con-
sequence of the attitude of many text-centred historians to material 
remains, which are researched by archaeologists and ethnologists. 
Even though it is not formulated directly, it is clear that this criti-
cism adheres to familiar hierarchical fault lines between the elite 
and the people, high and low culture, the academy and the general 
public, education and entertainment, fact and fiction. A reaction 
against elitist criticism was presented as early as the 1990s (e.g. 
Samuel 1994: 259ff; also Wright 2009: xiiff); but it is still relevant, 
since the views live on.
The concept of the heritage industry, which is inspired by 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s cultural industry, is intended to be 
derogatory; “industry” is supposed to evoke associations to some-
thing bad. Yet paradoxically, in his criticism of the heritage industry, 
Hewison is actually calling for more traditional industry. So when 
industry expanded into the cultural sphere in the 1940s, this was a 
bad thing; and later on, when there was deindustrialisation in the 
1970s, that was bad too. 
A compensatory linkage is generally claimed between the crisis 
and the emergence of or increase in history, memory, and herit-
age. Even so, the notion that there is a causal connection here 
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has the character of a postulate. A temporal conjunction between 
different trends is pointed out without any further examination. 
Alternatively, selected examples are put forward as arguments or 
“evidence”. But the arbitrary nature of the choice of examples and 
interpretations becomes apparent when the recovery of the Mary 
Rose was used by Wright as an example of a nationalist application 
of the past and a nostalgic backward glance in a period of decline 
for the UK. A sidelong glance reveals that the Swedish warship Vasa 
from the seventeenth century was raised in 1961 (www.vasamuseet.
se), while the five Viking ships from Skuldelev in Denmark were 
raised in 1962 (www.vikingeskibsmuseet.dk) – in both cases at a 
point in time when modernity, industrialisation, and the economy 
were making advances in Scandinavia. 
However, the connections between crisis, society, and heritage 
can be turned around. The postulated cause and effect can be made 
to change places. It is the increased interest in heritage that makes 
the critics perceive a crisis in society. The actual “crisis” is not 
modernity, the decline of modernity, or deindustrialisation, but the 
emergence and existence of what is derogatorily described as a her-
itage industry. Then, depending on which concrete phenomenon is 
being discussed, critics arrive at somewhat dissimilar  explanations 
and crises.
For the critics generally have a problem with heritage. They 
offer an unfavourable account of their own present, in which her-
itage is expanding. Things were better before the 1990s, 1980s, 
1970s, 1960s, 1950s or the First World War, before the spread of 
the commercial, the popular, and the material. It is not so much the 
increased interest in the past that is the problem; the trouble lies 
in the popular expressions of this interest and the focus applied at 
any one time. What arouses distaste is the new role of the museums 
as a mass medium, the bringing to life of a reconstructed past, the 
shift in emphasis from education to entertainment and consump-
tion, from the elevated to the everyday, from texts to images and 
materiality, from the authentic to replicas, and from older periods 
to modernity, the present, and the future. It can also be noted 
that whereas museums are perceived as a sign of crisis, archives 
and libraries hardly ever are, even though they also protect and 
preserve remains of the past. 
Clearly, then, the crisis stems not from society, but from heritage. 
And the criticism is nostalgic. The expansion of heritage has caused 
a nostalgic reaction among a large number of intellectuals. Thus the 
fierce and sometimes sarcastic criticism is itself a reaction to crisis. 
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Progress and musealisation
Decline and postmodernity are not the sole explanation of the 
rising interest in the past or the emergence of a heritage industry. 
On the contrary, the debate about museums and archaeology also 
features a widespread view that progress and modernisation are 
the very reason for it. The past is thought to possess greater sig-
nificance in periods of development and economic growth. History, 
memory, and heritage are resources that are expected to be able to 
 compensate for the unfavourable consequences of progress. 
The need to compensate for progress has been expressed most 
clearly in Germany, where a compensation theory has spread from 
philosophy to other disciplines. The theory was first formulated 
by the philosopher Joachim Ritter, who led the seminar called 
“Collegium Philosophicum” in Münster and after whom the Ritter 
School was named. The theory was developed further by Ritter’s 
pupils Odo Marquard and Hermann Lübbe. It sees progress, with 
its technical and economic developments, as either essential or 
desirable. But to attain balance in society, the harmful effects of 
progress must be limited. 
Ritter discussed the same phenomena as C. P. Snow, namely 
science and the humanities (or literature) (cf. Snow 1959). But 
while Snow lectured about the gap between the analytical and 
explanatory natural sciences on the one hand and the interpretative 
and understanding of the humanities on the other, Ritter wanted to 
demonstrate their dependence on each other. He asserted that the 
humanities were established in the nineteenth century as an existen-
tial response to the natural sciences and modernisation. Abstraction, 
ahistoricity, and discontinuity, which were seen as characterising 
modern bourgeois industrial society, were compensated for by the 
Bildung, history, language, art, literature, and philosophy of the 
humanities. In more concrete terms, modernisation was said to 
banish the “historical” to the museums (Ritter 1961). 
Extending Ritter’s line of thought, the philosopher Odo 
Marquard took the view that the modern world lacks meaning. The 
alienation and destructive elements inherent in modernity need to 
be compensated for by traditions, narratives, museums, and pres-
ervation. The ahistoricity of natural science is compensated for by 
humanities scholarship, which re-enchants the world with its nar-
ratives. Museums provide a refuge for what has been crowded out 
by progress. So modernity has two sides: both a culture of progress 
and a compensatory culture of memory, increasing at the same 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   92 25/01/2021   08:09
Chronic nostalgia 93
pace. The more modernity, the greater the need for humanities 
scholarship. And the more modernity, the greater the number of 
museums. He also argued that the modern idea of progress and the 
first museums had arisen at the same time, shortly after 1750, and 
that the natural sciences were established before the humanities. 
The concepts of compensation and “Homo compensator” kept 
recurring in Marquard’s philosophy (Marquard 1986: 98ff; 2000: 
11ff, 30ff, 50ff). 
Like Marquard, the philosopher and political scientist Hermann 
Lübbe discussed progress and its consequences in numerous arti-
cles and books. As a general thesis, he asserted that the constantly 
increasing speed of progress causes the present to “shrink”. The 
destruction and alienation inherent in progress lead to a nostalgic 
yearning to escape. People turn to history and museums in order 
to regain familiarity with their present. The main function of the 
museum, and of preservation, is thus to compensate for the loss 
of familiarity and identity resulting from the exponential dynamic 
of innovation in society. This is a trend that, according to Lübbe, 
cannot continue forever (e.g. Lübbe 1982; 1983: 9ff; 1996; also 
Rosa 2005 (German); 2013 (English); 2012 (German)). 
In his lecture Der Fortschritt und das Museum (“Progress and 
the Museum”), Lübbe discussed the role of progress for musealisa-
tion. Using statistics and examples from the then West Germany, 
he demonstrated how musealisation had increased dramatically 
during the twentieth century. Lübbe explained this trend on the 
basis of the museum’s core task of salvaging what had been made 
redundant by progress. Progress has now become so rapid that 
all kinds of products lose their function ever more rapidly. Hence 
the quantity of relics fit for museums keeps growing. According to 
Lübbe, musealisation increases at the same accelerating tempo as 
modernisation so as to be able to compensate for the destruction. 
Something recognisable and familiar is needed for people’s identity 
when everything else is in a state of rapid change (Lübbe 1982; 
cf. also Latour 1991 (French): 93f; 1993 (English): 69). 
The role of museums in the development of society was recently 
discussed in a European research project called EUNAMUS, or 
European National Museums; while there is no reference to com-
pensation theory, the word “balance” appears frequently. The 
project regards national museums, in their capacity of institutions, as 
“agents of change” and places where society can “negotiate” about 
changes. Museums use, or ought to use, culture to balance continuity 
and change, stability and dynamism. Museums thus have a role in 
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 creating social stability, where culture can work together with poli-
tics (Aronsson 2015; www.ep.liu.se/eunamus). The role of museums 
for establishing a balance is fully in line with the Ritter School. 
This balance, however, may either be the project’s demonstra-
tion of an actual function or – as is more likely – an attempt to 
formulate a topical and legitimate meaning for national museums 
in Europe; that is, a formula for both the present and the future. 
The relationship between change and preservation is clear in 
archaeology when ancient monuments are excavated and docu-
mented in order to “salvage” the past. When a new settlement or 
a new industry, motorway, railway, or gas pipeline is to be con-
structed, the legislation may require archaeological investigations. 
Remains from the past that would otherwise have been destroyed 
are then examined and documented. In principle, this context may 
entail a correlation between the extent of modernisation and the 
archaeological work involved. The past is threatened and is then 
salvaged by an archaeology that is known by several names, such as 
rescue archaeology, salvage archaeology, contract archaeology, and 
commercial archaeology. But salvaging here means investigating, 
documenting, and removing, as the development of society has the 
highest priority (Rosén 2007). 
Even so, the relationship between modernisation and archaeol-
ogy is complicated. The existence and design of legislation regu-
lating archaeology will vary between countries, just as there are 
differences with regard to how the legislation is applied in practice. 
Despite strong legislation, a balance will always be struck between 
different needs in each instance. Nor can a simple correlation be 
expected between economic cycles and the scale of excavations. 
In boom periods, archaeology may be extensive, since many new 
homes and industries are built at such times. But in a recession, 
archaeology may be extensive too, since the government chooses 
to invest in infrastructure to create employment – or even initiate 
archaeological investigations for the same reason. 
The idea of salvaging ancient monuments under threat either 
by giving them protection or by moving them to a museum is an 
idea as old as archaeological and antiquarian practice; in Sweden, 
for instance, it can be traced back to the middle of the seventeenth 
century (Jensen 2002: 266ff, 325ff; 2004). The main argument 
for the operation at Abu Simbel and along the Nile in Nubia was 
precisely to save the past – it was a salvage operation (Desroches-
Noblecourt & Gerster 1968; The Salvage of the Abu Simbel 
Temples, 1971; Säve-Söderbergh 1987; 1996).
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In his eulogy at the start of the Nubian campaign in 1960, the 
French Minister of Culture André Malraux thus described the cam-
paign as a way of overcoming death: “Il n’est qu’un acte sur lequel 
ne prévalent ni l’indifférence des constellations ni le murmure 
éternel des fleuves: c’est l’acte par lequel l’homme arrache quelque 
chose à la mort” (Malraux 1960 (French/English): 11; “there is only 
one action over which indifferent stars and unchanging, murmur-
ous rivers have no sway; it is the action of a man who snatches 
something from the death” [sic]).
Salvage is a flexible concept, though. In his youth, the author 
Malraux had seen it as a salvage operation when, as a leader of 
an expedition, he unlawfully removed reliefs from the abandoned 
temple of Banteay-Srei at Angkor in Cambodia in 1923 – an act 
for which he was subsequently convicted (Greenfield 1996: 6, 
282ff). The removal of the Parthenon frieze, the “Elgin Marbles”, 
has also been described as a salvage operation since the sculptures 
might otherwise have been vandalised or destroyed by air pollution 
(Greenfield 1996: 63; Bring 2015: 90, 97f). 
Eric Hobsbawm turned the concepts of renewal and tradition 
around in a creative manner by showing that changes can create 
traditions. As is seen from the anthology The Invention of Tradition, 
Hobsbawm took the view that traditions can be constructions. 
When rapid change in society weakens or destroys social patterns, 
newly formed traditions become a way of showing that part of 
the modern world is unchanged (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983: 1ff; 
also Connerton 1989: 51f, 63f, 103). Invented ritual traditions are 
intended to create a feeling of continuity in the midst of discontinu-
ity, irrespective of whether changes can be described as progress or 
as decline. 
A compensation theory was formulated for the first time by 
the doctor and psychologist Alfred Adler (1908 (German); 2002 
(English)): neurotic behaviour and the need to compensate, or even 
over-compensate, were due to inferiority complexes. Marquard, 
however, followed his own theory back to the theodicy problem; 
that is, the problem of being able to combine faith in an almighty 
God with the existence of evil. Just as God was said to compensate 
for the evil in the world, the humanities were able to compensate for 
modernity and natural science (Marquard 2000: 15ff). Others have, 
by contrast, viewed compensation theory as a political project. 
With its combination of belief in both progress and tradition, the 
Ritter or Münster School has been characterised as a conservative 
political philosophy. The members of the group have been classed 
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along with other liberal-conservative or culturally conservative 
intellectuals from the Cold War era who accepted modern tech-
nological civilisation, but observed unfortunate consequences that 
needed to be compensated for (cf. Hacke 2006). Critics linked to 
the Frankfurt School have even described it as neoconservative 
(Habermas 1985 (German): 86ff; 1990 (English): 69ff). 
The view that change needs to be balanced by permanence, 
renewal by tradition, is characteristic of a conservative policy. But 
when a “neo” is added in a rhetorical manner, the idea is to mark 
distance, and it is intended as an insult. And it can be noted that 
critics inspired by the Frankfurt School join the Marxist Hobsbawm 
in applying compensation theory in their interpretations.
David Lowenthal, Patrick Wright, and Robert Hewison are 
against the decline in modernity, against postmodernity, and 
against the way in which the decline is compensated for. Joachim 
Ritter, Odo Marquard, and Hermann Lübbe accept both modern 
development and compensation. Points they have in common are 
that they  all perceive an increase in history, memory, and herit-
age, and that they see it as a compensatory reaction. However, 
they have completely different views of the “crisis”. And whether 
anything at all can be viewed as a crisis depends entirely on the 
perspective chosen. 
However, the attaching of political labels to theories or  debaters 
cannot determine if progress or decline, renewal or tradition, 
modernity or postmodernity are concepts of relevance for under-
standing and explaining the “heritage industry” and musealisation. 
Other strategies are needed: there is a need both to clarify the con-
cepts used and to conduct a concrete examination of chronological 
sequences and geographical connections. How are the concepts 
related to one another? And can correlations be observed in time 
and space between changes and traditions, in this case between 
modernity and World Heritage? Does nostalgia thus arise in 
periods of radical change, irrespective of whether the changes are 
 experienced as progress or as decline? 
Chronic nostalgia
In the film Nostalghia, the poet Andrei Gorchakov wanders around 
in a Tuscany full of ruins and decaying buildings. He is pathologi-
cally affected by his longing for his family and home in Russia. But 
after a symbolic act, when he succeeds in carrying a lit candle across 
a mineral pool in Bagno Vignoni, redemption becomes possible, 
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and he dies. In the last images of the film, Gorchakov is sitting in 
front of his Russian home, which is placed inside the ruins of the 
Italian Abbey of San Galgano. Gorchakov is finally at home in both 
worlds, at home both there and here (Tarkovsky 1983 film). 
Nostalghia, directed by Andrei Tarkovsky, is one of many artistic 
works, films, novels, poems, musical works, and images that express 
yearning for what has disappeared. Tarkovsky depicted a bleak exist-
ence abroad at a time when he was himself entering exile. Nostalgia 
is about being cut off from a time and a place, often from a child-
hood home. And the longing is so strong that it becomes unhealthy. 
The concept of nostalgia appears for the first time in a 
medical dissertation: Dissertatio medica de Nostalgia, Oder 
Heimwehe (Medical Dissertation on Nostalgia), by the physician 
Johannes Hofer (1688 (Latin); 1934 (English)). Here, the concept 
 “nostalgia”  – from the Greek words nostos and algos, meaning 
“journey home” and “pain” – is used as a new term for homesick-
ness, that is, for a melancholy and pathological longing for home. 
Hofer used a Swiss mercenary who lived abroad as an example. 
And through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nostalgia was 
used as a medical diagnosis, especially for soldiers longing to go 
home (Davis 1979: 1ff; Boym 2001: 3ff; Johannisson 2001: 15ff, 
51ff; Fuentenebro de Diego & Valiente Ots 2014). 
Gradually, the meaning of the nostalgia concept shifted from 
a lost place to a lost time. It was Immanuel Kant – in a revolu-
tionary decade and at an advanced age – who was first to link 
homesickness not to a place but to a lost time. According to Kant, 
the homesickness of the Swiss soldier was to do with the notion 
of a carefree and sociable childhood, a longing for the simple joys 
of life, which could only be disappointed on a subsequent visit 
when everything had changed. For, as Kant noted, youth cannot 
be recreated (Kant 1798 (German): 87, § 24; 2006 (English): 71f, 
§ 32). For his own part, Kant remained faithful to his native town, 
Königsberg (since 1946 Kaliningrad) in East Prussia. Kant stayed at 
home, without needing to travel, instead having the world come to 
his market town, a place that he found well suited to studies (Kant 
1798 (German): viii note; 2006 (English): 4, note a).
The new interpretation of the concept of nostalgia has been 
explained by the emergence of a new view of time in around 1800. 
When an older, static, cyclical or cosmological view of time was 
replaced by a linear and secular view of time, the past was separated 
from the present and the future. And the past became desirable as 
the time lost forever (e.g. Boym 2001: 8ff; Johannisson 2001: 22f). 
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However, a shift from place to time in the meaning of the nos-
talgia concept is debatable. First, it is a simplification to say that 
time changed character from being pre-modern to being modern in 
around 1800. Views of time are dependent on the actual situation, 
so there can be several different time perspectives at the same time. 
Second, the time and place of nostalgia are not easily separated; 
that is, yearning either for a time or for a place. The Swiss soldier 
longed to go home – or longed for the time when he would be at 
home again. When elderly people are nostalgic, they long for a lost 
childhood country such as Finnish Karelia; German East Prussia; 
East Germany, as in “ostalgia”; or Yugoslavia in “yugo-nostalgia”: it 
is to do with something that has disappeared in both time and space, 
both a lost epoch and a partly changed landscape. Something has 
become different and alien, while something else remains unchanged 
and familiar. In other words, nostalgia is a selective feeling. 
With the nineteenth-century idea of progress and modernisa-
tion, nostalgia evolved into a general social diagnosis, an irrational 
feeling. Nostalgia became a sign of weakness in a person unable 
to adapt to the modern at a time when it was possible to travel by 
steamship and railway. A nostalgic became a derogatory term for a 
person who flees from the present and the modern, someone who 
dreams backwards in time (Lowenthal 1985: 4ff; 2015: 31ff; Boym 
2001: 16ff; Johannisson 2001: 127ff). 
In the critical tradition of heritage, nostalgia is a derogatory term 
for people’s interest in the past, and calling someone a nostalgic is 
insulting. Being preoccupied with the past becomes a symptom and 
a social diagnosis. As Lowenthal writes, “no term better expresses 
modern malaise” (Lowenthal 1985: xxiv, 4 quotation, 4ff; 1997: 1, 
5ff, 88ff; 2015: 31ff). In line with this, I myself previously formu-
lated the ambiguous term “chronic nostalgia” to characterise an 
unhealthy and painful yearning for remains of the past (Wienberg 
1999: 184ff; also Boym 2001: 290). 
In The Future of Nostalgia, the literary historian and artist 
Svetlana Boym expressed the view that the present is characterised 
by a “global epidemic of nostalgia” (Boym 2001: xiv). Boym’s diag-
nosis was quoted two decades later by the productive sociologist 
Zygmunt Bauman in his final and somewhat disillusioned book 
Retrotopia (2017: 4 quotation). Bauman regretted the nostalgia of 
his time and its inability to construct utopias for the future. 
The choice of the term nostalgia is no accident. Rhetorically, 
nostalgia is intended to bring trauma, disease, weakness, and senti-
mentality to mind; the implication being that a strong and healthy 
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person has no need of nostalgia. Paradoxically, though, the critical 
tradition of heritage uses modernity’s view of nostalgia as a social 
diagnosis at the same time as it is apt to reject modernity as an ideal. 
Nostalgia improves and embellishes the past. Things were not as 
pleasant in the Stone Age, the Viking Age, the Middle Ages, before 
the First World War, or in the 1950s as people imagine. The good 
old times were not as good as people like to think. Probably few 
people would like to swap a life today for a life in an earlier epoch – 
or only providing they were allowed to keep their life expectancy, 
doctor, dentist, washing machine, and smartphone. 
But nostalgia can be a force for good. Nostalgia may be a 
resource that is activated in order to deal with existential threats, 
destruction, and death. Nostalgia is important for the individual’s 
identity and meaning when facing discontinuities; that is, in phases 
of radical change (Sedikides et al. 2004). 
In Yearning for Yesterday (1979), the sociologist Fred Davis 
described his American present as an “orgy of nostalgia” with 
Disneyland as a “nostalgia industry”. He regarded this nostalgia as a 
reaction to the social and political turbulence of the 1960s. However, 
despite his choice of term, Davis saw nostalgia as something both 
useful and essential. This was because, in his view, nostalgia pro-
vided relief in the transition between phases of life and in periods of 
change characterised by anxiety, worry, and uncertainty. Nostalgia 
contributes to the creation of a collective identity for generations 
that need to come to terms with political murders, war, depression, 
and natural disasters. In a modern society characterised by constant 
change and increasing speed, in which identities are threatened by 
discontinuity, nostalgia may contribute to a re-enchantment of the 
world. Nostalgia filters, selects, arranges, constructs, and recon-
structs the past. It is the capacity of nostalgia to find an attractive 
past, its freedom from pain, that makes recovery possible (Davis 
1979: 31ff, 97ff, 118ff).
Nostalgia may also be an expression of active opposition to 
developments. With the dominance of West Germany and a rapid 
deindustrialisation, “ostalgia” is a conscious re-selection of the old 
East Germany and its way of life and goods (Berdahl 1999). 
Nostalgia is a way of choosing an elevating perspective on both 
past and present, the good and the beautiful ranking more highly 
than the true. The therapeutic – and thus healing – capacity of 
nostalgia derives precisely from its selective memory. As aptly put 
by the journalist Herb(ert) Caen, “Nostalgia is memory with the 
pain removed” (Davis 1979: 37). Consequently, nostalgia can mean 
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returning home both with and without the concept’s suffix of pain, 
both with and without algos.
Pierre Boulez took the view that a conservative, preserving civili-
sation is a civilisation in decline (Boulez 1976: 32f). And Lowenthal 
asserted in The Past is a Foreign Country that a society will preserve 
when it is incapable of making creative use of the past (Lowenthal 
1985: xxiv, 384, 406; 2015: 413). But with the aid of specific exam-
ples of radical changes, it is possible to show that preservation 
and creativity are not mutually contradictory, and that the yearning 
inherent in nostalgia is not sufficient to understand and explain a 
greater interest in the past. 
The French Revolution of 1789 and the subsequent wars up 
until the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 have been identified as being of 
crucial importance for the emergence of a modern historical aware-
ness, with museums, monuments, memorials, historicising styles of 
architecture, and historical novels. For instance, the historian Peter 
Fritzsche asserted in Stranded in the Present (2004) that the nos-
talgia of Romanticism arose in the wake of the revolution and the 
wars, which created a dramatic discontinuity and mobility in both 
Europe and America. History offered the only possible escape from 
the present. Drawing on examples from literature, letters, diaries, 
and memoirs, Fritzsche showed how the past became associated 
with feelings of loss and melancholy. Ruins were transformed 
from manifestations of nature and impermanence to evidence of 
the greatness of the past in a nascent nationalism. The past was 
separated from the present and therefore became an object of study 
worth protecting and preserving.
The French Revolution itself became the archetype of radical 
social change. It started in 1789 with the capture and demolition 
of the Bastille in Paris. In that same year, a decision was made to 
confiscate Church property. This was followed by wave upon wave 
of destruction of symbols representing the old regime – quickly 
followed by decrees forbidding this destruction. As early as 1790, 
the new concept of “historic monument” (monument historique) 
was used about palaces, churches, and abbeys; and church art was 
gathered in a depot in the Petits-Augustins Convent, while other 
objects went to the Palais du Louvre, a royal residence that was 
converted into the Musée Central des Arts in 1793. Then, in 1794, 
the rhetorical word “vandalism” was used to prevent further dev-
astation at the same time as a term was established for what was 
to be protected, un héritage commun, a common heritage. And in 
1795  the depot was converted into a museum for fragments of 
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architecture and sculpture, the Musée des Monuments Français 
(“Museum of French Monuments”). But when the monarchy was 
restored in 1815, the museum was closed and church property was 
returned (Choay 1992 (French): 76ff; 2001 (English): 63ff; Poulot 
1995; 1997; Gamboni 1997: 31ff, 329ff; also Arrhenius 2003: 51ff, 
161ff; 2012: 14ff, 138ff; Schildgen 2008: 121ff). 
Another example of how radical change was followed by a new 
museum can be found in Copenhagen of the same period. There, 
the Oldnordisk Museum, the Old Nordic Museum (from 1892 the 
National Museum of Denmark), was founded in 1807 as a reac-
tion to Denmark’s defeat in the Napoleonic Wars, the theft of the 
Golden Horns, the bombardment of Copenhagen, and the loss of 
the fleet, developments that culminated in state bankruptcy in 1813. 
The idea was that the past would strengthen the absolute monarchy 
and national identity in a time of crisis (Kristiansen 1981: 22; 1989 
(Danish): 207; 1993 (English): 23). 
But the museums founded after the upheavals in Paris and 
Copenhagen were not nostalgic; they showed no longing for the 
past. On the contrary, they transformed the past into something 
new and useful in the present. For instance, the nationalised build-
ings in Paris that had not been destroyed could be given new func-
tions, while other symbols of the monarchy and Church could be 
transferred to museums and be given a national and secular impor-
tance there as both sources and art. In other words, destruction 
and preservation can be two sides of a process in which the past 
is invested with new meanings (Choay 1992 (French): 76ff; 2001 
(English): 63ff; Poulot 1995; 1997; Gamboni 1997: 31ff, 329ff; 
also Arrhenius 2003: 51ff, 161ff; 2012: 14ff, 138ff). 
Historicising architecture displays the same tendency. On the face 
of it, the neo-Gothic style, which became popular from the 1820s, 
may appear to be yet another example of a nostalgic and roman-
tic retrospective, modelled on the Middle Ages in this case (Clark 
1928). But historicising style is not a Romantic invention from the 
nineteenth century. Both medieval Romanesque architecture and 
Renaissance architecture had ancient Rome as a model, while the 
ideal of Neoclassicism from the middle of the eighteenth century 
was Ancient Greece. And while neo-Gothicism, which imitated the 
medieval Gothic style, was indeed widespread in the nineteenth 
century, it had begun back in the middle of the eighteenth century 
(cf. Clark 1928). 
Style was chosen with attention to different functions; the Italian 
Renaissance style was hence deemed suitable for palatial new bank 
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offices. And historical forms were combined with the most modern 
technology for specific needs, Romanticism being integrated with 
modernity. For instance, the architect Helgo Zettervall used iron 
and concrete in his restorations of medieval cathedrals in Sweden, 
but the new materials remained hidden from view. A roof struc-
ture of iron from the 1870s lies concealed above the vaults of 
Lund Cathedral, invisible to visitors (Weibull 1953: 88). As a style, 
neo-Gothic was thus more Gothic than medieval Gothic had ever 
been. 
In the meeting between past and present, something new is 
created. Developments after the French Revolution may be taken as 
examples: museums and monuments transformed political propa-
ganda into sources or art; neo-Gothic combined old forms with 
new technology; and historical novels used the past in order to shed 
light on topical issues. 
Nostalgia’s way of reusing selected portions of the past may be 
reminiscent of “creative anachronism”, within whose framework 
the European Middle Ages and Renaissance are explored and 
brought to life and in which the focus is on experiences and narra-
tives, not on traditional authenticity. Past and present are deliber-
ately mixed as a method (e.g. www.sca.org; Petersson 2017). And 
nostalgia can be compared with the use made by the Middle Ages of 
spolia; that is, the reuse of selected older, generally ancient, building 
components in medieval buildings. 
Spolia from different buildings were recycled in new contexts 
and given new meanings, generally as part of a political or religious 
process of legitimation. Spolia evinced both breaks and continuity 
with the past – breaks through their fragmentation and continuity 
through renewed use (Fabricius Hansen 2003). One well-known 
example is the palace chapel of Charlemagne at Aachen (WHL 3bis, 
1978, 2013), to which ideas, architectural forms, marble, columns, 
and sculptures were brought from both Ravenna and Rome so as to 
create a manifestation of the power of the emperor, pointing both 
backward to tradition and forward to something new (Fabricius 
Hansen 2003: 157ff; Tekippe 2004). 
A newer example is when the balcony of the Berlin City Palace 
(Berliner Stadtschloss), from which Karl Liebknecht had declared 
the formation of the Free Socialist German Republic in 1918, was 
incorporated in the State Council Building (Staatsratsgebäude) in 
East Berlin in 1963. The City Palace, which was blown up as a 
Prussian symbol in 1950, has been under reconstruction since 2013 
(www.historisches-stadtschloss.de). Three of four facades are being 
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reconstructed, but the fourth is completely new, as is everything 
inside. That, then, is a modern example of historicising architecture 
that combines old and new, but without suggesting any nostalgic 
yearning for imperial Germany. The building will also have a new 
name – the Humboldt Forum (www.humboldtforum.com).
The French Revolution began a period of radical changes, but 
it is by no means the only revolution. In a global perspective, there 
are many other well-known political, economic, social, religious, 
technological, and scientific revolutions, just as there have been 
notable counter-revolutions and radical changes that have not been 
classed as revolutions. And revolutions and other upheavals do not 
necessarily generate nostalgic feelings. 
Nostalgia’s longing for a different time or place does not need to 
arise if the change or break brings liberation. If the past or the place 
one came from was painful, there is no point in missing it; and if 
the development or relocation is experienced as progress, there is no 
loss involved and nothing to compensate for. 
Hence, nostalgia does not suffice to understand and explain 
the multifaceted relationship of the present to the past. Nostalgia 
becomes attached to the beautiful perspective with its therapeutic 
narratives. But historical consciousness, museums, monuments, 
architecture, and novels are about things other and more than 
beauty, and the same applies to tourism. Enlightenment knowledge 
and the ethical demand constitute motives, too, particularly in the 
emergence of museums and canonisation of monuments.
When Fritzsche wrote that history was the only possible escape 
in a turbulent present (Fritzsche 2004: 10), he was not convinc-
ing. First, people could physically escape to other places, that is 
emigrate, as many were forced to do during the French Revolution, 
a point that Fritzsche himself noted (Fritzsche 2004: 33ff). Second, 
people could move in their imagination, not only to the past but 
also to fictional places in the present or the future. Today, many are 
able – provided they have the necessary resources (passport, visa, 
and money) – to travel in both time and space, both in reality and 
in their imagination. But not all journeys are nostalgic or involve an 
escape. At the same time, more people than ever before are forced 
to flee on account of war, poverty, and oppression. 
When tourists travel to Abu Simbel, this has nothing to do with 
nostalgia, with an unhealthy or socially determined longing for a 
distant age; it has to do with an enchanted place. The Egypt of the 
pharaohs is a foreign time in a foreign country. Here the attrac-
tion is the meeting with what is different, with the exotic. Tourism 
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permits a temporary move to another place that may surprise, 
instruct, attract, and provide food for thought. 
Amelia B. Edwards thus described how she felt that time stood 
still at Abu Simbel, how time could be traversed: 
It is a wonderful place to be alone in – a place in which the very 
darkness and silence are old, and in which Time himself seems to 
have fallen asleep. Wandering to and fro among these sculptured 
halls, like a shade among shadows, one seems to have left the world 
behind; to have done with the teachings of the present; to belong 
one’s self to the past. (Edwards 1877: 444f)
Secularisation and immortality
The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (1997) is David 
Lowenthal’s follow-up to The Past is a Foreign Country (1985). In 
the new book, Lowenthal described heritage as a popular faith and 
a secular religion, just as heritage institutions were compared with 
the Church. Lowenthal compared the expansion of heritage with a 
medieval crusade, at the same time as the book itself was a crusade 
against the spread of heritage at the expense of history (Lowenthal 
1997: 1f). Lowenthal is, however, by no means alone in comparing 
the handling of history, memory, and heritage to expressions of 
religion. 
Another example is the political scientist Donald Horne, whose 
book The Great Museum: The Re-Presentation of History (1984) 
presents a critical, ironic, and moralising account of heritage 
tourism in Europe. Horne compares modern museums, exhibition 
objects, and tourists to medieval churches, relics, and pilgrims. 
Modern souvenirs and postcards are like medieval pilgrim badges. 
Photography has replaced participation in Mass. Graves of and 
monuments to national heroes are worshipped with rituals and 
devoutness as if they were secular saints. One example is Vladimir 
Lenin in the Lenin Mausoleum in Moscow, part – since 1990 – of 
World Heritage along with the Kremlin and the Red Square (WHL 
545, 1990). Horne found the background to heritage tourism in 
industrialism and modernity. For him, those two phenomena had 
created a crisis in and nervousness about the perception of reality, a 
state that could be diverted in a hunt for the authentic. The pilgrim-
age to the past thus becomes an escape from the disturbances of 
industrial society (Horne 1984: 1ff, 21ff).
Many other commentators have compared museums with 
temples or churches, the objects exhibited with relics, museum staff 
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with priests, monuments with sacred reliquaries, tourists with pil-
grims, and mass cultural tourism with a World Church and history 
in general with a religion (e.g. MacCannell 1976: 42ff; Choay 1992 
(French): 101ff, 128f, 159ff, 186; 2001 (English): 87ff, 111f, 139ff, 
163); Beckman 1993a: 31f; 1998: 32ff; Duncan 1995: 7ff; Hylland 
Eriksen 1996: 85.  
What is common to Lowenthal, Horne, and others who have 
compared heritage and museums with a religion is that the analogy 
is meant to be a pejorative one. As researchers and authors in a 
secular age, they are making comparisons with something assumed 
to arouse unfavourable connotations. If we step back to a time 
when the Church still had a central religious and ideological role 
in the West, we find the same analogy in use, but at that time its 
connotations were favourable, the analogy being employed as an 
argument for heritage and museums. The analogy is thus used not 
for analysis, understanding, or explanation, but as a rhetorical 
argument adapted to the expectations and values of the time. 
When, in 1806, the philologist Rasmus Nyerup drew inspiration 
from the Museum of French Monuments in Paris to argue for the 
foundation of a new national museum in Denmark – a museum that 
was initially called the Old Nordic Museum – he was hence able to 
describe it both as an “asylum for the otherwise increasingly disap-
pearing old national memorials” and as “a temple for the remains 
of the spirit, and the language, art, and power of the past” (Nyerup 
1806: VIII). 
Finally, mention may be made of the art historian Alois Riegl, 
whose Der moderne Denkmalkultus, sein Wesen und seine 
Entstehung (“The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and 
Its Origin”) reported the emergence in the nineteenth century of 
a cult, the worship of historical memorials, that had elements in 
common with a religious experience (Riegl 1903 (German): 18; 
1929 (German): 157; 1982 (English): 29). 
The analogy extends further, as is sometimes seen from the loca-
tion and architecture of museums. New museums might be given a 
central place in the townscape, a location reminiscent of the place 
of the cathedral. Museums were located in or alongside the halls 
of power. The Old Nordic Museum in Copenhagen was located 
first in, and then close to, the royal palace of Christiansborg, 
which is now the Danish Parliament, just as the Museum Island in 
Berlin (WHL 896, 1999) is beside the cathedral and royal palace. 
Museums could also take over buildings from which power had 
previously been exercised, such as the Louvre in Paris (WHL 600, 
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1991; www.louvre.fr) and the Forbidden City in Beijing (WHL 
439bis, 2004). And the architecture of a museum might assume 
the shape of a classical temple, such as the British Museum (www.
britishmuseum.org), or of a medieval cathedral, for instance the 
Natural History Museum (www.nhm.ac.uk), both in London.
It can be concluded that the analogy between heritage and 
museums on the one hand and religion and churches on the other 
is, first and foremost, a rhetorical strategy, the meaning of the 
analogy varying with the context. Next, a subtext can be sensed 
in the sharp criticism of the expansion of heritage. It is a subtext 
about historians wanting to defend their field of research, regarding 
a focus on textual analysis and on critical use as a matter of greater 
importance than materiality and experiences. Similarly, an elitist 
perspective may be discerned behind the harsh criticism of mass 
tourism, a criticism that contains poorly concealed contempt for the 
popular and for mass travel. The problem is the social context and 
the intrusive quantity. There is certainly prestige in travelling along 
the trails of the peregrinations, or Grand Tours, of the past, but not 
in travelling like the great majority of people: nothing against a visit 
to Venice, but not as one of millions of tourists each year. A distance 
from the common folk is called for. 
During the period when some critics used the analogy between 
heritage and religion as derogatory rhetoric, others actually wanted 
to see a linkage that was not fortuitous. The idea is that a gradual 
secularisation, or religion becoming less important, caused a greater 
need for heritage. The decline in faith in God owing to seculari-
sation needs to be compensated for. An apparently constant need 
for community, meaning, and security means that an older reli-
gious narrative is replaced by a new one, woven around the nation 
and  the history of the people. History, memory, and heritage are 
linked up with a nationalised past. 
The demographer and historian Philippe Ariès, who was associ-
ated with the French Annales School, did not discuss the emergence 
of heritage, monuments, and museums in his Western Attitudes 
toward Death. With a broad brush, however, he outlined a connec-
tion between Romanticism’s cult of the grave and worship of the 
nation’s dead heroes. In Ariès’s view, this striving for immortality 
emerged from the end of the eighteenth century onwards along 
with secularisation, industrialisation, and urbanisation (Ariès 1974: 
55ff). 
In Mortality, Immortality and Other Life Strategies (1992), 
Zygmunt Bauman asserted that human beings are defined by their 
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awareness of death. Fear of death and the endeavour to achieve 
immortality are fundamental to human existence. In order to 
master their mortality, human beings try to ensure a continuation of 
life beyond physical death. Christianity and several other religions 
promise an eternal life. With modernity, human beings must instead 
seek a place in the memory of their survivors. Individual historical 
immortality was the prerogative of an elite, small in number, while 
the masses had to make do with immortality as a collective, as the 
people of the nation. 
As an extension of Ariès and Bauman, the archaeologist Ola 
W.  Jensen has shown in concrete terms how this striving after 
immortality for the nation’s dead was manifested in a cult linked 
to graves, statues, monuments, and museums. Heritage became a 
material expression of the soul of the nation. The preservation of 
heritage therefore had an existential explanation (e.g. Jensen 1998; 
also Grundberg 2004: 13). 
Death as a threat and the striving after immortality have a 
central role in myths, religion, psychology, and philosophy. Death, 
or the awareness of death, is something that needs to be overcome 
or compensated for. The hero tries to combat or outwit death.
King Sisyphus was punished precisely for having tried to over-
come death. To obtain water for his palace in Corinth, Sisyphus 
had told Asopos, the river god, that Zeus had kidnapped his daugh-
ter Aegina. Zeus then sent Thanatos, the god of death, to chain 
Sisyphus in the underworld; but Sisyphus managed to imprison 
Death. Thanatos was subsequently freed by Ares, the god of war, 
who was annoyed that no warriors died. Sisyphus ended up with 
Hades in the land of the dead; but when he was allowed to visit the 
earth and his wife, he did not return. Sisyphus was then collected by 
Hermes. He would only be set free again if he succeeded in rolling 
a great stone up a hill, but the stone always rolled all the way back 
down again. His effort was in vain (cf. Camus 1942 (French): 163ff; 
2005 (English): 107ff). 
In philosophy, death may be identified as being essential 
to human beings. In Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) by the 
 philos opher Martin Heidegger, death was thus obscurely described 
as an existential condition that constitutes the wholeness of 
life. Life was characterised both by a flight from death and by 
a constant  decline  until  death. The threat of individual death 
with its  loneliness and emptiness evokes a fundamental anxiety 
(Heidegger 1927 (German): §§46–53: 235ff; 1996 (English): 
§§46–53: 219ff). 
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Cognitive research also holds that human beings are unique 
in being aware of their own mortality. The dream of eternal life 
is therefore something distinctive only of human beings; and 
so is reflection, in a spirit of wonder, about the meaning of life 
(Gärdenfors 2006: 33ff). 
In Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Civilization and its 
Discontents),  physician and psychologist Sigmund Freud held 
that human beings possess two fundamental drives that are both 
restricted by civilisation: on the one hand an erotic and creative 
drive and on the other the destructive death drive. However, sup-
pression of the death drive and aggression leads to neuroses, guilt 
feelings, angst, and discomfort (Freud 1930 (German): 89ff; 2004 
(English): 68ff). 
In a reinterpretation of psychoanalysis in his Life against Death, 
the historian Norman O. Brown asserted that human beings are 
imprisoned by the past, just as hysterical patients cannot break 
free from the past. In his view, the bond of all cultures to heritage 
is neurotic. And the background to the human preoccupation with 
the past (and the future) is a fundamental fear of death, which 
separates human beings from animals. Civilisation and monuments 
are attempts to overcome death, to create immortality. Brown’s 
purpose was to free human beings from the burden of history, the 
dead hand of the past (Brown 1959: 11ff, 87ff, 283ff). 
Inspired by the psychoanalysis of Adler and Freud, but with a 
more encouraging approach, the psychologist Rollo May inter-
preted artistic and scientific creativity in The Courage to Create as 
a reaction to human mortality; that is, as a rebellion against death 
or the gods. The creative person is a rebel in his or her longing for 
immortality (May 1975: 25ff, 36ff).
We can only accept that death may play a central role, that death 
anxiety can occur, and that people can daydream about immortality, 
but not always and everywhere. Depicting life as a journey towards 
death, and creativity as a question of compensation and neuroses, 
is reductive. Freud asserted both a life drive and a death drive, both 
Eros and Thanatos. Consequently, death is not everything in life, 
even though death has the last word for each individual.
History, memory, and culture do, of course, have several motives, 
values, and potential uses. The past has multiple meanings, mean-
ings that reach beyond a reductive and compensatory mechanics.
To be specific, gradual secularisation may be questioned as an 
explanation of death anxiety and the striving after immortality, or of 
cults based on graves, statues, monuments, museums, and  heritage. 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   108 25/01/2021   08:09
Chronic nostalgia 109
For these phenomena are not new, and they are found across cultural 
and religious borders. This once again brings to mind the temples of 
Ramses II at Abu Simbel more than 3200 years ago. 
Materialised memories
The temples at Abu Simbel are striking monuments. Their dating is 
certain – around 1260 bce. And their originator is well known: the 
Egyptian Pharaoh Ramses II, also called the Great (e.g. MacQuitty 
1965; Desroches Noblecourt 2007: 116ff). But why were they 
erected?
Monuments are an attempt to lay down enduring memories 
that are readily visible and generally “monumental”, that is, of 
an imposing size; they are intended to make an impression. But 
the key point about a monument is precisely the memory, as indi-
cated by the word itself. “Monument” comes from the Latin words 
monumentum/monere, meaning to remind or exhort. But remem-
bering may assume many forms – thinking, carrying out ritual acts, 
or using aids such as images and script. To create a monument is to 
give memories material form. And to ensure the permanence of the 
monument, preferably for an envisaged eternity, it is often created 
in durable materials such as earth, stone, or metal. 
The temples at Abu Simbel are typical monuments: they are 
monumental and materialised in stone, carved directly out of the 
sandstone cliffs. And the temples mediate narratives about the past 
by means of hieroglyphs, painted images, and sculptures. 
Dolmens, barrows, pyramids, temples, menhirs, runic stones, and 
churches have attracted attention by virtue of their visibility in the 
landscape. They also form starting points for mythical popular tales 
about gods, giants, and powerful individuals (cf. Burström et  al. 
1997; Gazin-Schwartz & Holtorf 1999). Then, when archaeology 
emerged as a method and a scholarly discipline, the monuments in 
the landscape became a source of knowledge for all to see. And the 
collective term is precisely “monument” – the monumental. 
There has been a great deal of research about materialised 
memories since the transformation of Eastern Europe and the 
USSR as of 1989, which was followed by extensive iconoclasm; 
but the research started earlier. In theoretical terms, there has been 
an interest in collective memories; that is, how groups in a society 
or a nation create and maintain common memories (cf. Halbwachs 
1992). Specifically, there has been an interest in surveying and 
describing national memorials from the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries. The research has been carried out by ethnologists and 
historians and the collective term has generally been “memorial”, 
the marking of a memory (e.g. Gillis 1994; Frykman & Ehn 2007; 
Adriansen 2010). 
As terms, “monument” and “memorial” have essentially the 
same origin and meaning, and they are often used in a somewhat 
haphazard manner. However, the choice of term may be seen to 
define two distinct discourses. On the one hand, archaeologists have 
studied prehistoric and ancient monuments; on the other, historians 
and ethnologists have studied historical memorials. The history of 
art has taken an interest in both monuments and memorials, apply-
ing an aesthetic perspective. And with a long-term perspective, a 
few archaeologists have also gone beyond the chronology of the 
discourses (e.g. Holtorf 1997; Wienberg 2007: 241).
The anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss divided societies into 
two universal and contrasting types: “cold” primitive societies and 
“hot” modern ones. Cold societies were also called mechanical 
and were compared with clockwork, whereas hot modern socie-
ties were referred to as thermodynamic and compared with steam 
engines. Primitive societies remained in their original state, but 
they were egalitarian and in harmony with themselves and nature. 
Their social order was maintained with the aid of tradition. The 
“wisdom” of primitive societies excludes history, and they therefore 
seem to be ahistorical. But the primitive societies that Lévi-Strauss 
was thinking of were societies of hunters and gatherers that were 
thought to be under threat in his time, and that he clearly idealised. 
Warm, modern, or civilised societies came into being as a result of 
the introduction of agriculture; they are dynamic and therefore in 
imbalance. Modern societies such as the Mediterranean city states 
or the industrialised states of the nineteenth century extract energy 
from social differences. That causes disorder or entropy between 
people, but recreates order as culture. According to Lévi-Strauss, 
modern societies make slaves of people in order to create progress; 
and they use history as a motor in their development (Charbonnier 
1961 (French): 37ff; 1969 (English): 32ff; Lévi-Strauss 1966: 121f).
Ramses II’s Egypt could be characterised as a hot and civilised 
agricultural society to whose development social differences and 
history contributed. In its simple form, however, the dichotomy 
does not lead to greater understanding or a better explanation of 
the pharaoh’s constructional zeal.
The notion of the “primitive society” had a fundamental posi-
tion in anthropology for a long time. But the classification made 
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by Claude Lévi-Strauss and others into primitive societies and 
 civilisations, cold and hot societies, can be characterised as an illu-
sion bound up with evolutionism and colonialism. The primitive 
cold society has never existed as an initial state; it was a conse-
quence of colonisation. The primitive and apparently ahistorical 
societies made up the periphery of a world system in which only 
the centre was in possession of civilisation and history. The primi-
tive society was constructed as the “other”, as an antithesis or an 
inverted mirror image of the anthropologists’ own modern Western 
society (Kuper 1988; Friedman 1994: 4f, 23f).
The idea that there is a linkage between power and monuments 
is not new. Ibn Khaldûn thus took the view that monuments – large 
construction works – were proportionate to the original power of a 
dynasty. Consequently, the monument was intended to demonstrate 
the strength of a dynasty (Khaldûn 1958: vol. 1, Chapter III, §16, 
pp. 356f). 
At the same time as criticism of the (ab)use of the past appeared 
in the 1970s, concepts such as power, manipulation, and legitima-
tion also became central to archaeology’s interpretation of the 
past. The purpose of building monuments was thus to show and 
legitimise power – just as monuments were used to legitimise social 
and mental changes (Trigger 1990: 124ff). Monuments were then 
linked either to the establishment and consolidation of new elites 
and ideas or to a situation in which established elites and ideas were 
being challenged. 
The erection of monuments has also more generally been linked 
to periods of crisis. A society under stress or in imbalance, threat-
ened from within or without, would therefore be characterised by 
megalomaniac building. The monuments were precisely monumen-
tal, large and if possible enduring, so as to influence the landscape 
and memory for a long time to come; and they became connected 
to collective rituals. The monuments were intended to counter or 
conceal conflicts. From such a perspective, monuments do not testify 
to power and pride; rather, they should be viewed in relation to 
attempts at compensation when a collapse seems imminent. The 
monuments were intended as material communication, the use of 
signs increasing in periods of “social stress”. The greater the monu-
ments, the greater the desperation; or the more monuments, the closer 
the society is to collapse (e.g. Gren 1994). But just as the popularity 
of heritage may be used to postulate a crisis, the very existence of 
monuments can make archaeologists and others assert the existence 
of a crisis. Cause and effect may be turned around again. 
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The French project Les Lieux de mémoire (Realms of Memory), 
led by the historian Pierre Nora, has had a great influence on the 
study of memorials. In an introduction entitled “Entre mémoire et 
histoire” (“Between Memory and History”), Nora differentiated 
between memory and history, and he asserted that sites of memory 
are put in place when memory is threatened. The term “sites of 
memory” is used broadly about museums, archives, churches, 
anniversaries, memorials, and other entities intended to stop time 
and immortalise. The living and genuine memory or tradition is 
replaced by a constructed history – a development characterised as 
a secularisation. The sites of memory are thus seen as being linked 
to modernity, which breeds oblivion and where a break with the 
past is the prerequisite for nostalgia. Nora saw loss and oblivion 
when industrialisation brought about the disappearance of agrarian 
culture at the end of the nineteenth century (Nora 1984 (French); 
1989 (English); 1996 (English)). 
The temples of Abu Simbel were undoubtedly a manifesta-
tion of power. But when the temples were constructed, Ramses II 
was not actually a pharaoh who needed to legitimise his power. 
He had ruled for around 30 years, was the third pharaoh of the 
19th Dynasty, and was himself the son of a pharaoh. Nor was 
he threatened by outer or inner enemies; a peace treaty had been 
concluded with the Hittite Empire at the time of the construction 
of the temples. It is hard to postulate a situation of “social stress”, 
secularisation, or modernity, and there was no threat of collapse. 
The temples were constructed at the border to Nubia, so it can 
be claimed that there was a need to mark power and legitimacy 
in relation to potentially hostile neighbours. At the same time, 
however, Ramses II had numerous other construction works built 
along the Nile, far from the border. Still, the temples can certainly 
be described as sites of memory, since they were full of accounts of 
events during Ramses’ reign. 
With the turn in archaeology away from social and economic 
explanations to symbolism and cosmology, monuments have been 
interpreted in new ways. Monuments are nowadays related to cos-
mological ideas about time and space. The importance of rituals 
is stressed, as is the fact that monuments were constantly being 
reshaped according to new needs (e.g. Bradley 1993).
Cosmology is also relevant to a discussion of Abu Simbel. The 
great temple with its four colossal statues presents Ramses II as the 
ruler of both Upper and Lower Egypt and as the gods Re-en-Hekau, 
Heka-Taw, Mery-Amun, and Mery-Atum (Desroches-Noblecourt 
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& Gerster 1968: 19f). Politics and ritual were combined in the 
pharaoh. 
Was Abu Simbel an expression of nostalgia, a yearning for a lost 
age? No; Ramses II was not likely to think with nostalgia of the 
Battle of Kadesh, which was depicted in the interior of the great 
temple. But a visitor will soon discover that the battle is represented 
as a great victory for the warrior pharaoh, which is not in fact 
correct. The battle ended as a kind of draw. The Egyptians had to 
withdraw, and a peace treaty was concluded later on (cf. MacQuitty 
1965: 107ff; Desroches Noblecourt 2007: 60ff, 153ff). Abu Simbel 
as a monument thus had the purpose of mediating a doctored 
memory, “alternative facts” – or, put more clearly, a propaganda lie. 
The monument was intended to manipulate the visitor. 
Abu Simbel is not about secularisation, and nor is it about fear 
of death. Even so, the centrality of death was a characteristic of 
Ancient Egypt. It was crucial to enter the land of the dead in the 
right way, to embalm the body, to provide the necessary posses-
sions, and to take effective measures against grave plunderers. Here 
the word “stress” may well be used. But Abu Simbel was not a 
burial site. Ramses II was buried further down the Nile in the Valley 
of the Kings, where the burial chamber was subject to flooding, 
and his mummy was moved several times before it could finally be 
exhibited in Cairo. 
A feature shared by both monuments and memorials is that, 
without recurrent rituals that can keep the memory alive, they 
soon become places of oblivion (e.g. Connerton 1989). Irrespective 
of whether the purpose is to remember, legitimise, or manipulate, 
the original message is soon forgotten. In spite of their durable 
materials, monuments and memorials change, are reinterpreted, 
or fall into decay. As the author Robert Musil puts it in the essay 
“Denkmale”: “Es gibt nichts auf der Welt, was so unsichtbar wäre 
wie Denkmäler” (“There is nothing in this world as invisible as 
a monument”) (Musil 1936 (German): 87; 2006 (English): 64). 
And as a closing reply to the question why memorials are then 
raised to commemorate great men, Musil wrote: “Es scheint 
eine ganz ausgesuchte Bosheit zu sein. Da man ihnen im Leben 
nicht mehr  schaden  kann, stürzt man sie gleichsam mit einem 
Gedenkstein um den Hals, ins Meer des Vergessens” (“This seems 
to be a carefully calculated insult. Since we can do them no more 
harm in life, we thrust them with a memorial stone hung around 
their neck into the sea of oblivion”) (Musil 1936 (German): 92f; 
2006 (English): 68). 
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From this, it is no great leap to assert that the real function of a 
monument and memorial is to allow us to forget. The monument 
and memorial can relieve traumatic memories. And if forgetting 
was not the explicit purpose, it was the unintended consequence 
(e.g. Rowlands 1999).
Every monument or memorial therefore comes into conflict with 
its own paradoxical capacity to foster forgetting. New forms for 
creating permanence are constantly being tested. One such example 
is the Holocaust monument “Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden 
Europas” (“Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe”) in central 
Berlin, based on a drawing by the architect Peter Eisenman and 
inaugurated in 2005. With its 2177 concrete blocks of varying sizes 
and an associated underground information centre, the monument 
is not easy to ignore. A completely different example is the artist 
Gunter Demnig’s Stolpersteine (“stumbling stones”), which are 
intended to be reminders of individual victims of the Holocaust in 
the pavement in front of their last address (www.stolpersteine.eu). 
Ramses II’s intention in constructing the temples of Abu Simbel 
was not that he and his achievements should be forgotten; quite the 
contrary. However, Abu Simbel was damaged in an earthquake just 
a few years after its inauguration. The head of one of the colossal 
figures at the great temple fell off. The constantly shifting sands 
gradually covered the front of the temples, and their stories about 
Ramses II and the Battle of Kadesh were forgotten. To be sure, 
the temples remained visible and familiar to local people, but their 
entrances sanded up so that their interior became inaccessible. 
The temples were only reopened when they were discovered by 
European adventurers, Johann Ludwig Burckhardt and Giovanni 
Battista Belzoni, early in the nineteenth century. 
But here, again, Ramses II and his temples at Abu Simbel depart 
from expectations. For Ramses II actually did succeed in main-
taining the memory of himself as a great pharaoh. His mummy is 
preserved in Cairo. The temples have been given a new function 
as a tourist destination and World Heritage site. The temples with 
their texts, images, and sculptures are mediated in numerous ways – 
through visits to the site or in reconstructions, in books and films, 
and on the Internet. 
Sisyphus has been mentioned several times, and he will be men-
tioned again. The stone he is rolling may be viewed as a metaphor 
for the attempt to establish a memory, to place a memory stone at 
the top of the hill – something that constantly fails, with Ramses II 
as a rare exception. However, Sisyphus rolling a stone in vain may 
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also bring to mind the many attempts made to understand and 
explain heritage. New perspectives, interpretations, and examples 
are constantly thrown into the discussion; but every single time, 
there is something that does not add up. The interpretative models 
so far have either encompassed internal contradictions, or Abu 
Simbel and other examples have not fitted them. 
Community and meaning
It is easy to be overwhelmed, confused, or surprised in the face 
of the multiplicity of views, perspectives, arguments, and exam-
ples that characterise the debate about history, memory, and 
heritage. Conflicting positions are often uncompromising and 
uncomprehending about one another. But it is possible to detect (or 
construct) patterns in the debate that make the different positions 
comprehensible. 
This multiplicity can be divided into two sides on the basis of the 
two cultures of heritage. On one side is the canonical tradition that 
perceives heritage as a resource to protect, preserve, document, and 
mediate. On the other side is the critical tradition that sees herit-
age as something to redefine, an obstacle, something that should 
be limited and, if possible, overcome. Where the canonical tradi-
tion perceives possibilities for development, the critical tradition 
sees symptoms of crisis and needs for compensation. The marked 
contrast between the positions may be an expression of different 
social discourses that may themselves be rooted in education and 
 employment – “antiquarians” with the task of managing the herit-
age and “critics” free to comment. But that is obviously a simplifica-
tion. For even if “heritage lovers” are seen among the managers and 
“heritage iconoclasts” among the critics, attitudes can be placed 
on a scale with many nuances. And individuals may move between 
different positions in the field, adopting dissimilar standpoints in 
the process. 
The multiplicity can also be divided between theoretical intentions 
and practical realities. Here the contrast appears to run between all 
the justifications, motives, values, and uses on the one hand and an 
extensive criticism of concrete (ab)use and various crisis or com-
pensation theories on the other. Once again, though, it is not quite 
that simple. For irrespective of whether it conveys praise or criti-
cism, speaking or writing is also an act – an act whose purpose and 
outcome may in fact be that of creating new realities. And there are 
theoretical perspectives across the whole field, implicit or explicit.
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Finally, the multiplicity may also be divided according to the 
triad of the true, the beautiful, and the good; that is, according to 
knowledge, aesthetics, and ethics. Different priorities that are not 
always explicit appear in the debate – priorities to the effect that 
new knowledge, entertaining narratives, or ethical duties already 
are, or ought to be, decisive in relation to the past. These perspec-
tives extend across the other divisions and across discourses about 
intention versus practice. The triad is hence also relevant to the 
debate about (ab)use, since the true or false, beautiful or ugly, and 
good or evil can be combined in many ways. 
My experience of applying the triad’s perspectives to the debate 
about history, memory, and heritage has ended in the conclusion 
that nothing is obvious or indisputable. It is all a matter of making 
choices, of justifying priorities, where it is not possible to rely on 
rules that have been established once and for all. Every attempt 
to specifically assert one justification, one motive, one value, one 
use, one position, or one theory for the whole of the field, with all 
of its variation across time and space, must therefore be met with 
 scepticism – including my own attempts. 
In the debate, dividing lines appear between left and right that 
may be linked to academic environments in Frankfurt and Münster 
in Germany, respectively. Classic positions concerning the relation-
ship between high and popular culture, and between theoretical 
education and practical experience, come to the fore as well. And 
the hard rhetoric, the slogans, the crisis, and the comparison with 
religion are comprehensible when it is understood that it is all really 
about politics, specifically the politics of heritage. The challenge is 
to be persuasive.
Nor can it come as any surprise, when faced with choices, priori-
ties, and politics, that the present makes its mark on the debate about 
the past. Justifications, motives, values, uses, criticism, and theories 
have both senders and recipients in the present. Ideas about the 
past are ideas in the present. This is particularly clear in the debate 
about (ab)use as well as about crisis and compensation theory. Even 
though the subject is the past, a radical criticism of the present 
appears, irrespective of whether the present is regarded as modern, 
postmodern, or something else again. History, memory, and heritage 
are used as a pretext for criticism of society. The growing popularity 
of heritage becomes a reason to shout “crisis!”. But despite criticism 
of nostalgia as a phenomenon, the criticism itself, paradoxically, fre-
quently bears the unambiguous stamp of nostalgia. Everything was 
better before – even when it comes to the use of the past. 
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One after another, a whole series of critical commentators 
appear to have experienced a deterioration – Boulez and Wright 
from a focus on the future to one on the past; Lowenthal from 
the familiar to the foreign, from change to preservation, and from 
history to heritage; Horkheimer and Adorno from (high) culture 
to popular culture; Hewison from industry to heritage industry; 
Heller from progress to nostalgia; Choay from the natural to the 
artificial; Huyssen from fact to fiction; Füredi from thinking to 
narrating; Beckman from security to uncertainty; Marquard from 
meaning to meaninglessness; Lübbe from identity to lack of iden-
tity; Hobsbawm from continuity to discontinuity; Tarkovsky and 
Hofer from home to exile; Kant from childhood to adult life; Horne 
from harmony to nervousness; Bauman and Jensen from faith to 
doubt; Freud and Brown from nature to culture or civilisation; 
Lévi-Strauss from the primitive society to civilisation; and Nora 
from memory to history: a multiplicity of “falls” at different points 
in time, like pearls on a string. 
Norman W. Brown concluded that society was neurotic and sick. 
The roots of its neurosis were civilisation, money, the city, and capital-
ism, which were repressive. He characterised his present as a “tragic 
crisis” in which human beings, with their death instinct and weapons 
of mass destruction, were threatened by ruin and disaster (Brown 
1959: x, 234ff). 
Both Donald Horne and Agnes Heller regarded Europe as a 
museum – and that was not meant as praise. As onlookers from 
the New World, Horne from Australia and Heller from the US, they 
observed a European continent sunk in its own past. Heller wrote 
a funeral address for Europe – the museum that she herself had 
left: weakened creativity, acquired idiocy and narrow-mindedness, 
loss of meaning and cultural masochism. She wanted to see a “new 
European culture”, a dream of an authentic culture characterised by 
virtues, taste, reason, education, urbanity, joy, nobility, and dignity, 
as well as love of nature, poetry, music, drama, painting, piety, and 
erotic culture (Horne 1984: 1, 21; Heller 1988: 154, 158f). 
This kind of criticism can be exposed as an example of pessimis-
tic cultural philosophy, an activity in which intellectuals look at and 
criticise their present in a spirit of anxiety and nostalgia (cf. Nordin 
1989). The developments leading up to the crisis-ridden present are 
set forth as a typical tragic narrative (cf. White 1973: 191ff). 
Criticism along these lines is characterised as follows in the unfin-
ished Das Passagen-Werk (The Arcades Project) by the  philosopher 
and literary critic Walter Benjamin: 
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Es hat keine Epoche gegeben, die sich nicht im exzentrischen Sinne 
“modern” fühlte und unmittelbar vor einem Abgrund zu stehen glaubte. 
Das verzweifelt helle Bewußtsein, inmitten einer entscheidenden Krisis 
zu stehen, ist in der Menschheit chronisch. Jede Zeit erscheint sich 
ausweglos neuzeitig. Das “Moderne” aber ist genau in dem Sinne 
verschieden wie die verschiedenen Aspekte ein und desselben Kalei-
doskops. (Benjamin 1983 (German): II, 677) 
 There has never been an epoch that did not feel itself to be “modern” 
in the sense of eccentric, and did not believe itself to be standing 
directly before an abyss. The desperately clear consciousness of being 
in the middle of a crisis is something chronic in humanity. Every age 
unavoidably seems to itself a new age. The “modern”, however, is 
as varied in its meaning as the different aspects of one and the same 
kaleidoscope. (Benjamin 1999 (English): 545)
The kaleidoscope displays an ever-changing succession of attractive 
images – social, economic, political, ideological, religious, or exis-
tential crises. Either there is too much modernity or too little. There 
is always something to be worried about, always a change that can 
be regarded as being for the worse. The crisis is chronic. 
It is not hard to understand that crisis theory is popular, but its 
explanatory capacity is an illusion. Whenever crisis theory seems to 
be able to explain most things or make them comprehensible, this is 
due to the complex ambiguity of the theory with its open concepts, 
uncertain chronology, hand-picked or absent empirical data, and, 
at times, obscure language. There may be reason to be sceptical 
of theories that employ metaphors and analogies and cannot be 
tested (cf. Sokal & Bricmont 1998: 8ff, 59). Nor is there a single 
crisis theory; there are many, they are various, and time and again 
they contradict one another. All they have in common is crisis as a 
concept and, of course, criticism. 
Crisis theory as a critical perspective is itself open to criticism. As 
a perspective, however, it cannot in fact be falsified and is therefore 
unscientific in the sense formulated by the philosopher Karl Popper 
(Popper 1935 (German); 1959 (English)). And the same accusation 
could be levelled at compensation theory. 
But even if crisis theory is criticised and referred to as unscien-
tific, it will not go away, as it satisfies ideological and psychological 
needs for criticism of the present. Instead of a possibly vain struggle 
against the paradoxical claims of the theory, alternative perspec-
tives are called for. The criticism of the criticism must be supple-
mented by something constructive and concrete that opens the way 
to further inquiry and debate. 
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So far, the debate about history, memory, and heritage has focused 
wholly on events and phenomena since the end of the  eighteenth 
century. The debate has been about revolution, Romanticism, 
nationalism, secularisation, and modernity – and about the estab-
lishment of academic disciplines, memorials, museums, and leg-
islation pertaining to the protection and preservation of ancient 
monuments. Its geographical focus is the industrialised Western 
world. But history, memory, and heritage are neither a relatively 
new nor an exclusively Western phenomenon. 
When Abu Simbel is so often highlighted in this inquiry, it is 
because the place represents both the past and the present, both 
heritage and modernity, and is outside Europe. At Abu Simbel there 
is a time depth of thousands of years, which can supplement or 
correct the focus on the West in the debate. Moreover, the texts of 
Herodotus and Ibn Khaldûn form a simple reminder that people 
thought about the past long ago, too, and in other cultures. 
The multiplicity of views, perspectives, arguments, and examples 
that characterises the debate about history, memory, and herit-
age can no longer come as a surprise. It is possible to explain and 
understand the variation that prevails in justifications, motives, 
values, uses, criticism, and theories. But what remains is a sense of 
wonder at the importance of the past in a changing present and, 
more specifically, puzzlement regarding the relationship between 
World Heritage and modernity. Is it possible to perceive a general 
pattern after all?
Research about human evolution can be combined with spolia 
from my inquiry; the answer will therefore be of a fundamental 
but also very general nature. I find three observations, in particular, 
useful as spolia: 1) presentism; that is, the view that opinions, per-
spectives, and arguments are generally conditioned by their present; 
2)  the connections between nationalism and collective memory, 
where the past has been used in the construction of identities; that 
is, who a person is seen as being by themselves or by others; 3) 
the similarity between heritage and museums on the one hand 
and religious institutions and rituals on the other, but without an 
implication that the analogy is somehow unfavourable. Key words 
are therefore currency, identity, and analogy. The inspiration comes 
from studies of social evolution: the past is used in order to create 
meaning in the present. Meaning is about who we are, have been, 
or are striving to become. And the similarity between heritage and 
museums on the one hand and religion on the other is due to the 
fact that they can all contribute to defining a social community.
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In human evolution, culture is one of several possible aids in 
creating and maintaining a social community. Everything that has 
strengthened the community has provided an evolutionary advan-
tage. Culture is an advantage for the survival of groups; it is one of 
several factors in selection and hence a precondition for the human 
conquest of the world (Boyd 2009; Wilson, E. O. 2012). The knowl-
edge, narratives, and rules of heritage are means in the construc-
tion of social ties and in establishing cooperation. The true, the 
beautiful, and the good are all useful in evolution. History, memory, 
and heritage have a function in creating and maintaining communi-
ties. This is why the past has been so useful in both religion and 
nationalism.
Religious communities are built up around mythical narra-
tives and texts; holy places, persons, monuments, and relics; and 
offices  and ceremonies linked to a historical tradition. Common 
religious ideas play their part in strengthening social cohesion; they 
foster cooperation and therefore the potential for survival. Religion 
creates meaning and therefore motivation for both individuals and 
groups, and religion is an advantage in competition between groups 
(Wilson, D. S. 2002; Wilson, E. O. 2012: 255ff; cf. Gärdenfors 2006: 
133ff). Consequently, the analogy between heritage and religion is 
no coincidence. But instead of employing the analogy as an element 
in derogatory rhetoric, it can be used to understand and explain the 
importance of heritage. 
Similarly, ideas about the nation are built up around myths or 
narratives about a common past; a common country with canoni-
cal places, monuments, and events; and a common material or 
intangible culture mediated not least in print. Nationalism creates 
the nation. And nations may, to use the words of the social anthro-
pologist Benedict Anderson, be described as “imagined communi-
ties” since not all members are able to know one another. Anderson 
ascribed particular significance to censuses, maps, and museums 
for the idea of the nation (Anderson 1991). Nationalism was and 
is a modern ideology for countering social disruption in industrial 
societies, and as such it may supplement or replace religious com-
munities (Gellner 1983). 
History, memory, and heritage are tools for creating and main-
taining communities at all levels from the immediate family to 
humanity. But the starting points do not need to be true in a sci-
entific sense, beautiful in an aesthetic sense, or good in an ethical 
sense. The common history, memory, and heritage may be magical, 
mythological, mendacious, unauthentic, invented, imagined, 
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 illusory, nostalgic, or creative. All that matters is its usefulness in 
 creating meaning and cohesion. 
Heritage is used creatively in order to generate meaning. Human 
beings are searchers for meaning, Homo opinans. Meaning can be 
found in knowledge, narratives, and rules that link up with the 
past. Selected parts – those that are useful – are drawn from the 
past;  these are spolia. And in the encounter between past and 
present, between fragments of past and current needs, something 
new is created. The remains of the past are transformed and given 
new meaning. In this way, all use of the past is creative in the sense 
of making something that did not exist before. 
With the evolutionary perspective, history, memory, and herit-
age become a fundamental human practice. Meanings have then 
been added by existentially thinking human beings. Practice goes 
before justifications and values. And the multiple meanings and 
manifold critical theories are an expression of the human search 
for understanding and explanation. Meanings are not discovered, 
but created. 
Before we open the door to the laboratory where theories and 
concepts can be confronted with concrete specifics, it is necessary 
to explain the central concepts and history-of-ideas context of crisis 
theory. What is meant by progress, modern, modernisation, mod-
ernism, modernity, and postmodernity? Is there still progress, but 
without belief in the future? Is the present modern, postmodern, 
or hypermodern? And what is the relationship between the phases 
of modernity and the many expressions of nostalgia? Is nostalgia a 
reaction to modernity or itself part of modernity? In short, we are 
going to be looking at time and perceptions of time. 
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Figure 4 Easter Island statues. Photo © Lars Larsson, 2012. 
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The faces of modernity 
Time, change, and permanence
Time is an enigma. Indeed, there is but one truly serious existen-
tial problem, and that is time. To determine what time means is to 
answer the fundamental question of existence. But in what does the 
enigma of time consist?
Time escapes definition; for it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to 
define time without including time as a category from the outset. Time 
can be defined as the distance between two events, that is, the dis-
tance between two changes; but what is an event without the concept 
of time? 
Time opens up a number of questions where the meaning of the 
words determines the answers. Does the concept of time combine 
both change and permanence? If time is change, what does it mean 
that time changes? And if time is permanence, what does it mean 
that time is unchanged? Is time absolute or relative? Does time have 
a beginning and an end? Why does the arrow of time point specifi-
cally towards the future? Is time travel possible to the past or to the 
future? Is time itself changeable over time? Finally, does time exist, 
or is it just an illusion? 
There is no consensus about the concept of time. There are 
varying views about what time is – whether time is to be seen 
as a dimension, as something that flows or as a direction away 
from the beginning of the universe; whether time is independent of 
human existence; whether time can be perceived by human beings 
with their senses, words, and mathematics; and whether it is at all 
meaningful to ask what time “is” (e.g. Bardon 2013; Rovelli 2017 
(Italian); 2019 (English)). 
The associations of time with change, impermanence, greater 
disorder (entropy), and death also give the concept a fateful ring: 
“Är du beredd?” (“Are you prepared?”) asks Death in the film Det 
sjunde inseglet (The Seventh Seal) by the director Ingmar Bergman. 
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The knight Antonius Block tried to cheat Death while the plague 
was raging; by playing chess with Death, Antonius managed to 
gain time and save his friends Jof and Mia along with their son 
Mikael (Bergman 1957 film). The film with its iconic representation 
of Death on the beach was intended, and was apparently also able, 
to help Bergman come to terms with his own death anxiety. 
We can play with time in fiction, too. Thus readers of the novel 
Einstein’s Dreams, by the physicist and author Alan Lightman, can 
imagine what life would have been like in Berne in 1905 if time 
had behaved differently than expected; here theories about time 
can be applied in practice. We can dream about a time that repeats 
itself, stands still, and goes backwards, a time without events, a time 
that changes speed, varies locally, or jumps (cf. Lightman 1993). 
The film Lola rennt (English Run Lola Run), by the director Tom 
Tykwer, explores the counterfactual branches of time. Three times 
Lola has to run through Berlin, and each time a detail of her start-
ing point is changed with fatal consequences. Lola has 20 minutes; 
but it is only during her final attempt that she manages to save both 
her friend’s life and her own (Tykwer 1998 film). 
On the one hand, there is the human experience of temporal 
change, the future being transformed into the present and then into 
the past. The tripartition of time with expectation, existence, and 
memory is crucial to the way in which human beings experience 
and understand the world. On the other hand, there is the stable 
spacetime of natural science, which explains the world without nec-
essarily accepting temporal change. This contrast between human 
experience and the logical reality of physics, between change and 
permanence, has not (yet) been resolved. Instead of asking “What is 
time?”, we are recommended to ask “What does time do?” (Bardon 
2013: 79ff, 173ff). But with the question “What does time do?”, 
every archaeologist or historian is securely back in their own field. 
Time may be enigmatic, and yet time is used in a relatively 
unproblematic way in countless contexts as a concept, a perspec-
tive, and, especially, a unit of measurement. Without the concept of 
time there would be no history to tell, nothing to remember, and no 
heritage to examine and preserve. 
Time is a prerequisite for archaeology, irrespective of whether it 
is associated with origins, arche; whether it is seen as the study of a 
distant past; or whether it is linked to excavation, in which different 
layers of time are examined stratigraphically. As an academic disci-
pline, archaeology devotes a great deal of care to establishing times 
specifically in the form of datings, chronologies, and periods. For 
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without a temporal context, it is difficult to use artefacts as sources 
of knowledge. And without time, there will not be any narratives 
about the past, nor any discoveries to reflect on.
Time is crucial for connecting events, a once-in-the-past with a 
now-in-the-present and a once-in-the-future, a here-in-one-place 
with a there-in-another-place. Time is a necessary condition of 
narratives, irrespective of whether they are tales of facts, counter-
factuals, or fiction, and irrespective of whether they are science or 
literature (Wright 1971: 42ff, 103ff; Ricoeur 1984–1985 (French); 
1984–1988 (English)). Time is hence a prerequisite for the ability to 
create meaning – at the same time as it is difficult to give time itself 
a meaning.
The philosopher Henri Bergson asserted that time cannot be 
reduced to moments that follow on from one another, to points on 
a line, or to successive spaces. Time is real, and it is characterised 
by permanence, by continuance. Experienced time is a movement, a 
continuing constant change. What is new in that change is depend-
ent on the past that shaped us. And as a result of the uninterrupted 
growth of the new in the present, ever more past is accumulated. So 
the past is constantly present in a transient now, as a growing quan-
tity of memory and matter (Bergson 1889 (French); 2001 (English)).
Paradoxically, Bergson’s view of time was formulated at the 
point in time when film was invented. A film sequence by the 
photographer Louis Le Prince from Roundhay Garden in Leeds in 
1888 is the first known film (Roundhay Garden Scene, 1888 film). 
Bergson’s view contrasts with the idea and technology of film, in 
which every single moment is brought together in the form of a 
series of static photographs on a roll of film so as to create the 
 illusion of movement. 
With a reference to Bergson, the archaeologist Laurent Olivier 
has emphasised that every present is multi-temporal. The present is 
composed of accumulated matter from previous epochs, matter that 
is of differing duration. But when Olivier viewed his surroundings 
from his window in a farmhouse in France, he saw buildings from 
the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, whereas the 
twentieth century was only visible in details; and everything that 
was supposed to be typical of his own present in the 1990s was 
invisible. The past with its weighty matter is therefore seen as domi-
nating the present (Olivier 1999; cf. 2008 (French); 2011 (English); 
also Latour 1991 (French): 101ff; 1993 (English): 74ff). 
From my window in Lund in Sweden, I also look out over a 
mosaic of times that is, at a first glance, characterised by older 
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periods. Archaeologicum, the building I work in, was built in 1853 
and was originally the Anatomy Department of Lund University. 
From here I look out over Universitetsplatsen, the open space in 
front of the main University building, and Lundagård, with runic 
stones from the Viking period, busts of dead scholars, and buildings 
from the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries in particular. Most centuries since the founda-
tion of the city are represented. So the past is everywhere, but it is 
neither foreign nor distant. The past is familiar and present in my 
everyday life. 
The architecture of Universitetsplatsen can easily be recognised 
in old pictures where the great changes of recent times have not yet 
taken place: an academic campus that wants to assert tradition and 
continuity in the midst of the renewal, modernity, and growth that 
characterise the city and the region. But the immediate experience 
of tradition and continuity is a double illusion. 
First, the view is a piece of historical stagecraft. In several cases, 
the architecture is historicised and refers to the styles of previous 
periods. The barrow with runic stones is a memorial from 1868; 
the runic stones used to stand in completely different locations. 
The Academic Society’s medieval castle is from 1850–1851; the 
cathedral’s “Romanesque” towers were erected in 1869–1876; 
Kungshuset (the King’s House) from the sixteenth century was 
greatly altered in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. And 
life both in front of and behind the facades is characterised by 
hurry  and change. Passing through the area are pedestrians, 
bicycles, and the occasional car, all bearing the stamp of prevail-
ing  fashions. On the  grass and benches are students with the 
newest smartphones and laptops connected to wireless networks. 
Behind their facades,  the buildings are constantly being modern-
ised in accordance with current needs and the latest technological 
options. All parts of this view are in constant change at different 
speeds. 
Second, the view described above is a memory. My workplace 
has now been moved to LUX, a faculty campus consisting of build-
ings from 1917, 1961, and 2014. And the view is no longer of 
Universitetsplatsen and Lundagård but of the university hospital’s 
high-rise “central block”, opened in 1968, and of the accident and 
emergency department from 2004, where people and ambulances 
rush in and out. 
In cosmological terms, the elements of matter originate from 
supernova explosions billions of years ago. And the matter of the 
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past may be accumulated everywhere in me and in the view from 
my window, but a continuing past does not dominate my experi-
ence of the present; far from it. The present with its changes is 
extremely familiar and manifest.
Where Bergson with his “flowing” time formulated a concept 
of time that combined change and permanence, concepts such as 
heritage and modernity presuppose a separation and contrast, as do 
the canonical and critical traditions of heritage. Heritage refers to 
culture that is inherited or passed on over time; that is, to something 
that lasts despite changes. The concept of heritage thus emphasises 
continuity with the past, whereas modernity suggests discontinu-
ity. The concept of modernity refers to the new that is created in 
time; that is, to something that forms a break with that which lasts. 
Modernity carries connotations of change, progress, and the future, 
while heritage has associations with the old that has survived into 
the present, with permanence. 
Consequently, we rediscover the abstract question of the relation-
ship between change and permanence in the relationship between 
modernity and heritage. Here modernity is seen as representing 
change and the forward-looking and accelerating time, whereas 
heritage is regarded as representing permanence, stasis, and the 
backward-looking. This dichotomy runs through the entire field of 
heritage, across the canonical and critical traditions of heritage and 
across justifications, motives, values, and crisis theories. 
In the book Zeit und Tradition (English Time and Tradition), the 
literary scholar Aleida Assmann sets up time in the sense of change 
against tradition in the sense of permanence. In line with crisis 
theories, Assmann sees traditions as a cultural strategy for creating 
permanence; that is, a compensatory strategy (Assmann 1999).
But are change and permanence, modernity and heritage, neces-
sarily opposites? Can change be a precondition for permanence and 
permanence a precondition for change? An examination should 
be made as to whether modernity and heritage might not also be 
 inextricably entangled. 
Irrespective of whether our purpose is to describe time from 
a psychological, mechanical, or cosmological perspective, we are 
obliged to employ metaphors that refer to geometrical forms, 
to human beings, and movement. The pictures used in the 
 metaphors – pictures that are recognisable, but nevertheless absurd 
in the relevant context – are intended to establish a pattern in 
the enigmatic, make the incomprehensible comprehensible, and 
give time a meaning that we can understand (cf. Gärdenfors 2006: 
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105ff): Time is a point, is linear, circular, or an arrow; it is short 
or long, light or dark, foreign or familiar. Time stands still, walks, 
runs or flows, shrinks or accelerates. Time means steps forward or 
backward, rise or fall. 
The Past is a Foreign Country by David Lowenthal had a broad 
impact with its anthropological look at the past. As the title sug-
gests, and as the content of the book confirms, the idea is that the 
present has been alienated from the past. The past has become dif-
ferent, remote, and exotic – a “foreign country” (Lowenthal 1985: 
xvi, 406; 2015: 3f, 8ff, 358ff). 
Lowenthal’s title was taken from the author L. P. Hartley’s novel 
The Go-Between, whose opening sentence is, “The past is a foreign 
country: they do things differently there” (Lowenthal 1985: xvi; 
2015: 3; Hartley 1953: 9). In the novel an older Leo Colston relives, 
with the aid of his diary, the summer of 1900 when, as a boy, he 
was a guest at Brandham Hall. Colston revisits the place and the 
persons. But his memory and visit are paradoxically characterised 
by both yearning and rejection, both nostalgia and loathing. The 
past has become foreign to him. The foreign element in the past 
has to do both with the innocent and almost naive period before 
puberty, when the world of adults was unknown or incomprehen-
sible, and with a British class society that met its downfall with the 
First World War. 
The people of the past are supposed not to have been like us; 
they were different. They thought differently, and they lived and 
died differently. The past becomes an enchanted time zone, dis-
tinct from the present where the people of the past become “the 
others”. The rise of modernity is supposed to be what has created 
a radical, alienating, and disenchanting break with the past. Then 
we can try to travel to the country of the past to attain knowledge 
about other forms of life, travel nostalgically in a flight from our 
own time, or visit the past in order to honour the dead and their 
memorials. 
But the past cannot be described as either foreign or familiar, 
as either progress or decline, any more than the Middle Ages as an 
epoch can be described as either dark or light. What the past was, 
what the present is, and what the future will be depends entirely on 
the choice of perspective. For every change or permanence can be 
experienced differently. Time, change, and permanence are experi-
enced differently depending on the perspective applied; that is, by 
who is looking and from where, when they are doing it, and how. 
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Progress and decay
There are two fundamental and mutually opposing conceptions of 
the changes wrought by time, one being characterised by optimism 
and the other by pessimism. Changes can either be viewed as pro-
gress, an improvement in relation to the past, a development – or 
as decline, a downturn, decay, or a fall. Irrespective of whether this 
division is incorrect, misleading, or irrelevant, it forms the starting 
point of two distinct traditions of thought about time (cf. Toulmin 
& Goodfield 1965: 106ff; Frängsmyr 1980). 
The idea of progress is the notion that it is possible to improve 
human life and society. The conception of progress as both a pos-
sibility and a reality emerged gradually in Europe. It entailed a lib-
eration from a previous, more static view of time laid down by the 
Church and Christianity with a predetermined development from 
creation, ingeniously dated at 4004 bce, up until the expected return 
of Christ. The idea of progress was promoted by the Enlightenment 
from the seventeenth century onwards, gained new importance 
with the discovery of the great depths of the past in the eighteenth 
century, and culminated in the middle of the nineteenth century with 
the formulation of the theory of evolution by Charles Darwin and 
Alfred Russel Wallace (Toulmin & Goodfield 1965).
With the idea of progress, the past becomes something unsatis-
factory, something to leave behind, “dark” Middle Ages or a “primi-
tive” Stone Age (cf. Mommsen 1942; Kuper 1988). The present also 
runs a risk of rapidly becoming old and unmodern. The ideas and 
technology of the present must constantly be ready to be “updated” 
to the latest version – click here to download the new 2.0! 
A number of intangible and material innovations serve as icons 
of progress. The intangible icons of progress are such liberal notions 
as reason, freedom, democracy, and equality, notions with a long 
history in which philosophers and politicians are agents. They gain 
new relevance with the Enlightenment starting in the seventeenth 
century, see a political breakthrough at the time of the American 
and French Revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century, and 
are, in some cases, affirmed as human rights in conventions in 
the twentieth century, albeit constantly disputed (e.g. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948; Bring 2011). 
The material icons of progress are to do with new, cross-border 
technologies in which inventors and engineers are agents. They 
are technologies that have widened the horizon and increased 
the range and speed of human beings. They include lenses used 
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in spectacles, telescopes, and microscopes. They also comprise the 
development from the astronomer Galileo Galilei’s first telescope 
to present-day satellite telescopes that have gradually permitted 
humanity to gaze into space, and therefore backwards in time. 
The material icons of progress include modes of transport such 
as the sailing ship, the steamship, the train, the car, the aircraft, 
and the rocket. They encompass forms of communication that join 
the world together, such as the telegraph, telephone, radio, TV, 
and the Internet. And they include technologies that permit the 
construction of ever-higher buildings, which are erected in a spirit 
of competition between states and major cities and appear to run 
counter to the laws of nature. 
In Utopia, progress and its icons are projected into a fantastic 
future. The picture of an ideal society to strive towards is outlined. 
Utopia means “no place” and goes back to the Renaissance, when 
the politician and author Thomas More introduced the concept. 
More had to reformulate his political criticism away from the con-
temporaneous society to a distant and foreign place, a non-existent 
island called Utopia (Moro/More 1516 (Latin); 2012 (English); cf. 
Claeys 2011). Utopia is thus related to L. P. Hartley’s and David 
Lowenthal’s “foreign country”, where they do things differently. 
The most extreme expression of the idea of progress came in 
Futurism, which aimed to create a new future liberated from the 
past but was soon compromised by its link to Fascism. Futurism, 
with roots in anarchism, arose in a northern Italy characterised 
by rapid industrialisation. In 1909, the author Filippo Tommaso 
Marinetti formulated a manifesto that entailed a radical reckoning 
with the past. The Manifesto of Futurism praised the future, speed, 
technology, war, masculinity, the masses, and the big city, whereas 
the institutions of the past were to be destroyed. Futurism also 
observed a division into two cultures, praising forward-looking 
technology but rejecting backward-looking humanities: 
Nous déclarons que la splendeur du monde s’est enrichie d’une beauté 
nouvelle: la beauté de la vitesse. … Nous voulons démolir les musées, 
les bibliothèques, combattre le moralisme, le féminisme et toutes les 
lâchetés opportunistes et utilitaires. … C’est en Italie que nous lançons 
ce manifeste de violence culbutante et incendiaire, par lequel 
nous  fondons aujourd’hui le Futurisme, parce que nous voulons 
délivrer l’Italie de sa gangrène de professeurs, d’archéologues, de 
cicérones et d’antiquaires. (Marinetti 1909 (French)) 
 We affirm that the world’s magnificence has been enriched by a 
new beauty: the beauty of speed. … We will destroy the museums, 
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libraries, academies of every kind, will fight moralism, feminism, 
every opportunistic or utilitarian cowardice. … It is from Italy that 
we launch through the world this violently upsetting incendiary 
manifesto of ours. With it, today, we establish Futurism, because we 
want to free this land from its smelly gangrene of professors, archaeolo-
gists, ciceroni, and antiquarians. (Marinetti 1973 (English): 21f)
Progress was given metaphorical expression by Walter Benjamin. 
A refugee at the time, Benjamin described progress as a disastrous 
storm from Paradise, a storm that creates ruins. In his final essay, 
“Über den Begriff der Geschichte” (“Theses on the Philosophy of 
History”), he commented on a picture by the artist Paul Klee called 
“Angelus Novus”: 
Der Engel der Geschichte muß so aussehen. Er hat das Antlitz der 
Vergangenheit zugewendet. Wo eine Kette von Begebenheiten vor 
uns erscheint, da sieht er eine einzige Katastrophe, die unablässig 
Trümmer auf Trümmer häuft und sie ihm vor die Füße schleudert. 
Er möchte wohl verweilen, die Toten wecken und das Zerschlagene 
zusammenfügen. Aber ein Sturm weht vom Paradiese her, der sich 
in seinen Flügeln verfangen hat und so stark ist, daß der Engel sie 
nicht mehr schließen kann. Dieser Sturm treibt ihn unaufhaltsam in 
die Zukunft, der er den Rücken kehrt, während der Trümmerhaufen 
vor ihm zum Himmel wächst. Das, was wir den Fortschritt nennen, 
ist dieser Sturm. (Benjamin 1980 (German): 697f) 
 This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned 
towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one 
single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and 
hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the 
dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing 
from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that 
the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels 
him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of 
debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress. 
(Benjamin 1970 (English): 259f)
Destruction was also of central importance to the economist Joseph 
A. Schumpeter, who developed the paradoxical concept of “crea-
tive destruction”. According to Schumpeter, industrial development 
is both creative and destructive. Innovations mean that old modes 
of production are laid waste (Schumpeter 1942: 81ff). Of necessity, 
progress thus leaves both ideas and buildings as ruins. 
While the idea of progress is about development and improve-
ments, the idea of decay is about liquidation and deterioration. The 
idea of decay places its utopia in the past, as a lost paradise, an idyllic 
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Arcadia, a lost golden age, or a past period of greatness (Frängsmyr 
1980; Lowenthal 1985: 23ff; 2015: 66ff). Previously, peace, hap-
piness, and plenty reigned; now the rulers are war, disaster, and 
poverty. Once we lived in paradise, but we were expelled as in the 
Christian story of creation. Once, the region of Arcadia in Greece 
was a pristine idyll. Once, long ago, there was a golden age; but now 
we are seen as living in an Iron Age, as in ancient conceptions. Once 
the country was great and rich, but now it is diminished and poor, 
as in several national narratives. Once people lived in harmony with 
one another and with nature, but now the balance has been broken; 
or society and the climate are in crisis, as in the current debate. 
There are several ways of applying a perspective of decay: the 
past can be admired with the eyes of Romanticism on ruins from 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages; people can use time travel to make 
their way back to the golden age in an escapist manner, the past 
serving as a nostalgic refuge, which is reconstructed and brought 
to life; the present can be brought back, along reactionary lines, 
to that magnificent state of things that was said to have existed 
once, before things got worse: “Make America Great Again!” There 
are attempts to recreate a belief, a policy, a territory, a position of 
power, or an organisation that has never existed in that way. The 
allegation of a crisis in the present and a nostalgic picture of the 
past pave the way for a reshaping of the present and the future. 
The present can also be dismissed as decadent or in crisis, and 
with an added element of anxiety the future can be expected to be 
disastrous. The future then becomes a dystopia – an anti-utopia 
characterised by a breakdown of civilisation, famine, and either a 
nuclear winter or rising temperatures and floods. Where the Futurist 
wanted to pursue the speed of progress, survivalists or preppers 
want to prepare for the disaster by digging themselves into bunkers 
along with their supplies. 
The relationship between progress and decay, between optimism 
and pessimism, has created its own genre, a genre that discusses 
the rise and fall of civilisations. The reason is that people who 
live  in “civilisations” have been, and continue to be, fascinated 
by the development of other civilisations that have gone under. 
The genre covers everything from examinations of a single civi-
lisation to global syntheses and prophetic statements about what 
is to be expected in the coming years. Several general theories 
of the development of civilisations have been formulated with 
phases of rise, stagnation, decline, and fall, paying attention to 
the importance of, for instance, religion, culture, the economy, the 
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 environment, values, and institutions (e.g. Kennedy 1987; Tainter 
1988; Diamond 2005; Acemoglu & Robinson 2012). 
How and why could once powerful civilisations collapse? 
Examples that have exerted fascination include Ancient Rome, 
the Maya in Central America, Angkor in Cambodia, the Norse 
settlements on Greenland, Easter Island, the British Empire, and 
the USSR. In our own time, there is a discussion about whether the 
US is entering a phase of decline and fall. Will China be the new 
superpower instead? 
Ruins and wrecks are material icons of decline and decay. The 
sinking of the Atlantic steamer the Titanic in 1912 was a shock 
that called technological progress into question. The accident at 
the nuclear power station in Chernobyl in 1986 was a warning of 
the collapse of the USSR – after its collapse. And to the sociolo-
gist Immanuel Wallerstein, the collapse of the Twin Towers in New 
York after the attack in 2001 was an image of the decline of the US 
(Wallerstein 2003: 193ff, 198f, 202). 
The genre of decay with its civilisation theories assumes that 
there is something that can be called civilised, in contrast to the 
uncivilised, savage, or barbarian. It also assumes that changes in 
civilisations can be described in stages of rise, stagnation, decline, 
and fall. Both these assumptions are dubious. Moreover, every 
period seems to be able to offer its own narrative as to why civili-
sations decayed and disappeared, its interpretation reflecting that 
which characterises the agenda of its own present: faith, culture, 
the economy, the climate, or the ability to change. Then criticism 
can be – and has, of course, been – levelled against the concrete 
interpretations (e.g. McAnany & Yoffee 2009). 
Like the longing for a lost age or country, the genre of decay is 
an example of the use of the past to learn, to entertain, and also 
to reflect: Consider Forum Romanum (WHL 91ter, 1980, 1990, 
2015), Chichén-Itza (WHL 483, 1988), Angkor (WHL 668, 1992), 
Hvalsey Church on Greenland, Rapa Nui/Easter Island’s “moai” 
(WHL 715, 1995)! Consider the UK! Consider the USSR! Consider 
the US! Consider what happened to the others! Consider and learn, 
so that we or you do not need to follow the same path! Or with 
malicious pleasure, be prepared for disaster! As a narrative, rise 
and fall can assume all the well-known forms – romance, tragedy, 
comedy, and satire.
The use of spolia in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages shows that 
there was an awareness about the past. Even so, ruins as fragmented 
buildings only became visible – and therefore depicted – from the 
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Italian Renaissance (Fabricius Hansen 1999: 146, 161ff). But the 
ruins had multiple meanings. On seeing the ruins of Rome in 1341, 
the poet Petrarch (Francesco Petrarca), the first to conceptualise 
a dark Middle Ages, thus thought of the greatness of Rome; con-
versely, on seeing the same sight in 1764, the historian Edward 
Gibbon, known for his theory of the decline and fall of the Roman 
Empire, saw evidence of the decadence of Rome (Petrarca 1934: 
II, 93; Mommsen 1942: 232f; Gibbon 1966: 136 with note 7). 
Where high speed and height are expressions of progress, station-
ary ruins have often been used as an icon of decay, impermanence, 
and death. Romanticism in the nineteenth century adored the ruins 
of Antiquity or the Middle Ages, which were reminders of the 
greatness of the past. Through their very existence, the ruins might 
encourage glorious deeds or humility (Roth et al. 1997; Woodward 
2001; Eriksen 2014: 64ff). 
The deindustrialisation of the West in recent decades has left a 
landscape of ruins that is speedily being redefined as heritage and 
becoming its own field of research – industrial heritage. The ruins 
of industrial society may be regarded as something unpleasant, dis-
figuring, and frightening that should simply be demolished, or as 
premises that provide possibilities of alternative activities – or as a 
heritage worthy of admiration, protection, and preservation. 
The transformation of a factory into heritage and the reuse of 
premises with new functions such as arts centres, museums, offices, 
or housing have attracted attention in many studies, with World 
Heritage sites such as Ironbridge Gorge in England (WHL 371, 
1986) and Zollverein in Germany (WHL 975, 2001) as already 
classic examples (e.g. Storm 2008; Willim 2008; also Alzén 1996). 
This is a narrative of the successful transition from the industrial to 
the post-industrial society – a narrative of success, in which defeat 
is transformed into victory. 
Alternatively, abandoned and dilapidated concrete structures, 
factories, rusty machinery and cars, and statues are presented in 
numerous picture books, on websites, and in projects that are char-
acterised by melancholy aesthetics, existential reflection, or criti-
cism of the present time; urban decay places us at the edge of the 
abyss (e.g. Burström 2004; Edensor 2005; Burström et al. 2011; 
Jörnmark & Hausswolff 2011; Olsen & Pétrusdóttir 2014). One 
clear and early example here is Detroit in Michigan, an epicentre of 
the American dream, whose development from rise and expansion 
to decay and ruin has followed the cycles of car production (e.g. 
www.camilojosevergara.com). 
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Here the concrete remains of Benjamin’s “storm” and Schumpeter’s 
“creative destruction” are used as moral reminders of the failures of 
progress, of the impermanence of modernity and ideologies, and of 
the consequences of capitalism and neoliberalism. This field with its 
doom-laden book titles demonstrates a neo-Romantic fascination 
with decay which is quite as intense as the romantic notions about 
ruins that were rife in the nineteenth century. And at the heart of 
the field there is an ambiguous nostalgic exoticism, a fascination 
with a lost epoch and a “foreign country”, even though neither the 
nostalgia nor the exoticism is acknowledged.
Benjamin saw wreckage in the wake of the storm of progress. 
But all change can create ruins as a consequence of the creative 
destruction inherent in development. Ruins arose not only in the 
Reformation, the French Revolution, the industrial revolution, 
or the Chinese cultural revolution, but every time something has 
been replaced by something new. Existing expressions of ideas and 
technology change or are rejected, left behind, or destroyed when 
something new and – one hopes – better turns up. So progress and 
decay are inextricably linked, like two different narratives about 
the same shift. 
Ruins are remains of the past which may be icons for both pro-
gress and decay. Ruins may be employed in the service of the true, 
the beautiful, and the good – of knowledge, narratives, and moral-
ity. They can be admired, feared, or despised. And paradoxically, 
ruins represent both dimensions of time: both change and perma-
nence. Ruins are a consequence of constant change; but they are, at 
the same time, an expression of permanence; that is, something that 
has survived the renewal. 
Abu Simbel is one such expression of the paradoxical duality of 
time. As temple ruins from the Egypt of the pharaohs, Abu Simbel 
was first made redundant by developments and forgotten in the 
sand dunes when dynasties fell and religious faiths changed. Later, 
though, it was rediscovered and drawn into a Western discourse 
about the Orient. Then, when the temples of Abu Simbel stood 
in the way of progress, their permanence was ensured through a 
radical change, a modernisation of heritage.
The faces of modernity
Words such as modern, modernisation, modernism, and moder-
nity occur everywhere in narratives of human development. They 
deal with the triumph of progress, enlightenment, rationality, and 
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science, the triumph of individualism, capitalism, urbanisation, 
industrialisation, and globalisation. But these narratives have been 
criticised for as long as they have been put forward, and their critics 
have stressed the dark and destructive reverse side of modernity – 
alienation, disenchantment, colonialism, genocide, environmental 
pollution, and climate change. And they are accounts that have 
been declared dead by postmodernists since the 1970s. 
Essentially, modernity may be described as a grand narrative of 
origins and development, a narrative that is, like other narratives, 
intended to create meaning and identity in the present. Modernity 
is the narrative about what is seen as characterising the West, unlike 
other parts of the world, and the narrative about an epoch in the 
same way as the Middle Ages. Modernity thus creates a space 
in time that is thought to be marked by renewal. But open ques-
tions remain about what is central to modernity; how it should be 
defined as a period or in terms of geography; whether modernity 
is something favourable or unfavourable; and whether modernity 
ever existed in the first place. 
Modernity has many faces. For on closer examination the grand 
narrative of modernity can be broken up into a number of smaller sub-
narratives, each of which gives an account of the growth, impact, and 
consequences of modernity in a particular field. Depending on the per-
spective applied, different meanings – and hence varying  durations – 
may be ascribed to modernity. Historians of ideas may stress the 
importance of science, school education, and religion; historians of 
technology will speak about the steam engine, railways, and elec-
tricity; physicists about the theories of relativity; sociologists about 
rationality, bureaucracy, and social acceleration; economists about 
the market economy; historians of architecture, art, literature, or 
music about experiments with form; human ecologists about the 
relationship between humans and nature; historians about historical 
thinking; and archaeologists about the use of tools and images.
In the Western history of ideas, modernity or the modern age is 
generally defined as beginning in the decades around 1800; that is, 
the period of the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic 
Wars. In the work of the influential historian of ideas and philoso-
pher Michel Foucault, we thus find a division between the classical 
and the modern epoch around 1800, but no explanations for the 
transition. In Les mots et les choses (English: The Order of Things), 
Foucault described a shift in which each epoch or episteme imposed 
limits on what could be thought and how. This shift meant that God 
was replaced by history as the interpretative framework, and the 
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Church and the clergy were succeeded as the shepherding power 
by the State’s new control institutions, the police and the sciences 
(Foucault 1966 (French); 1971 (English)). 
Modernity is also divided up into phases in order to bring out its 
origins and gradual development since the Renaissance. For instance, 
the literary historian Marshall Berman has divided modernity into 
three phases: from the beginning of the sixteenth century to around 
1790; from around 1790 to around 1900; and the period after 
around 1900 (Berman 1982: 16f; cf. also Toulmin 1990). 
The changing perspectives make modernity bewilderingly ambig-
uous both as a phenomenon and as an epoch. For some, modernity 
is thus something that made its appearance thousands of years ago; 
for others, it emerged some centuries ago. All epochs can have been 
modern, modernity can be a finished period in history, or modernity 
never existed. 
Thus modernity has been used since the 1980s to define the 
emergence of Homo sapiens in the Palaeolithic Age; that is, to 
distinguish modern humans from previous species. Concepts such 
as “biological modernity” and “behavioural modernity” are used 
in this context (e.g. Klein 1989; Nowell 2010). Then the debate 
is about criteria, times, and places pertaining to the emergence of 
modern humans, but not about whether “modern” is a relevant 
designation. 
Several commentators have undermined the idea of modernity 
as an epoch of its own. For example, the poet Charles Baudelaire 
wrote that there has been a modernity for painters of every period 
(Baudelaire 1863 (French); 1964 (English): 13). And Walter 
Benjamin described in Das Passagen-Werk (The Arcades Project) 
how every period has seen itself as being characterised by unique 
change and therefore believed that it was modern in its own way 
(Benjamin 1983 (German): II, 677; 1999 (English): 545). Here 
modernity is not a period, but a feeling and self-perception of living 
in a constant crisis caused by change. 
When the philosopher Jean-François Lyotard launched the expres-
sion “the postmodern condition” in the eponymous book, it had a 
great impact on the debate in the 1980s and 1990s (Lyotard 1979 
(French); 1984 (English); cf. Anderson 1998). Belief in progress and 
the modern project had expired. Postmodernity or postmodernism 
was thought to entail the demise of the grand narratives and therefore 
also the death of the narrative of modernity. Postmodern architecture, 
art, literature, and history evolved – as did postmodern archaeology, 
the latter under the name of post-processual archaeology. 
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One indication that modernity was dead – or was felt to be better 
dead, or was at least considered to be enfeebled – is that it began to 
turn up in museum-related and archaeological contexts as a phenom-
enon and period for critical study (e.g. Prior 2002; Thomas 2004; 
Ersgård 2007; Lihammer & Nordin 2010). Yet, at the same time, 
there is little talk about postmodernism or postmodernity these days. 
The terms have long since lost their news value, become unfash-
ionable, and been filed away among all the other historical “isms”. 
Instead, modernity has experienced a renaissance in the debate. 
A curiosity worth mentioning is that, in an often-quoted book 
about tourism, the landscape architect Dean MacCannell has sur-
prisingly defined modernity as something that arises when indus-
trialisation declines. MacCannell regards post-industrial society as 
modern – and musealised (MacCannell 1976: 36, 57f, 182). Here 
the term modernity is being used about what most scholars would 
call postmodernity. 
Finally, the sociologist of science Bruno Latour claims in a book 
of the same name that Nous n’avons jamais été modernes (English: 
We Have Never Been Modern). For modernity is said never to have 
succeeded in achieving that which was supposed to be characteristic 
of it, namely the ability to distinguish between nature and culture, 
science and society, the non-human and the human, and things and 
signs (Latour 1991 (French); 1993 (English)).
Modernity’s narrative of the West has thus been challenged both 
from the inside and from the outside – from the inside as unwanted 
and from the outside by other competing narratives. 
All that is solid melts
The word “modern” is not itself modern. The first occurrence of 
modernus in the sense of “new” or “newer” is in late Antiquity, 
in the writings of the prefect and author Flavius Cassiodorus in 
the sixth century CE, in a period that reused material spolia from 
Antiquity in new buildings (Le Goff 1988 (French): 68f; 1992 
(English): 27; Fabricius Hansen 2003: 228f). The word “modern” 
is used rhetorically to stress the new at the expense of the old. The 
modern distinguishes past from present and introduces a movement 
forward, a progress. And the concept “modernity” in the sense of 
“the present” occurs in the early Enlightenment in seventeenth- 
century England (OED: IX, 947ff; Calinescu 1987: 41ff).
With the idea of progress in the nineteenth century, “modernity” 
is transformed into a term for the new society that emerges, either 
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as a reality already in existence or as a future utopia, desirable or 
(often) undesirable. In the essay “Le Peintre de la vie moderne” 
(“The Painter of Modern Life”), Charles Baudelaire thus charac-
terised modernity as the fleeting and the transient, something that 
is continually transforming itself, the opposite of the eternal and 
immovable (Baudelaire 1863 (French); 1964 (English); cf. Calinescu 
1987: 41ff; Boym 2001: 19ff). For Baudelaire, modernity was that 
which was typical of the time and which changes – the opposite of 
that which endures.
Diagnoses of the present often appear in the debate. New terms 
are used not only to describe the present, but also to set an agenda 
and thereby to influence both the present and the future. Since the 
1980s, sociologists, and also anthropologists and historians, in 
Germany, the UK, and France have launched new concepts in order 
to designate and analyse the state of the world. Modernity is again 
central; but something new has been added to mark what is typical 
of the period.
Ulrich Beck described his present as a “risk society” that was 
entering a “second modernity”. New dangers and risks required 
reflection, and Beck therefore formulated the concept of “reflex-
ive modernity” (Beck 1986 (German); 1992 (English)). Anthony 
Giddens stresses similar themes such as security, danger, trust, and 
risk; but he describes the period as “radicalised” or “late moder-
nity” (Giddens 1990). Zygmunt Bauman took the view that the 
present was insecure, did not permit consolidation, and therefore 
required flexibility. Bauman used the term “liquid modernity” 
(Bauman 2000; 2007). 
Marc Augé has used the term “surmodernité” (English: “super-
modernity”) in an examination of what he sees as non-places. These 
non-places are said to be characterised by movement or travel, 
examples being airports, bus terminals, hotels, and motorways 
(Augé 1992 (French); 1995 (English)). Gilles Lipovetsky uses the 
terms “hypermodern” and “ultra-modern” instead. His view is that 
the present is characterised by a focus on the now, on movement, 
changeability, flexibility, greater acceleration, and uncertainty. The 
past is mobilised as a reaction, with its museums, traditions, herit-
age, and religious and ethnic identities (Lipovetsky 2004 (French); 
2005 (English)). 
Speed and acceleration are also central to the work of Hartmut 
Rosa, who claims that the modernity of the present is characterised 
by a social and technological acceleration that creates devastation 
and alienation. This acceleration is described as pathological and 
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totalitarian. Rosa perceives a rising tempo over time from pre-moder-
nity and early modernity via classical modernity to the present late 
modernity (Rosa 2005 (German); 2012 (German); 2013 (English)).
A specific theme runs through the debate on modernity: it is the 
importance and consequences of speed. This theme is common to 
both those who confirm modernity and those who reject it. The 
theme runs from the nineteenth-century critics of modernity via 
the twentieth-century Futurists to present-day diagnoses. Where 
Baudelaire writes about the fleeting and the transient as well as 
about constant transformation, Beck, Giddens, Bauman, Augé, 
Lipovetsky, and Rosa have all regarded the present as being char-
acterised by speed and flexibility, two phenomena that transform 
people and society, nature and culture. For them, then, there is more 
modernity around these days than ever before. 
Speed and its consequences have attracted attention as a social 
problem and become a separate field of research (e.g. Virilio 1977 
(French); 1986 (English); cf. Sokal & Bricmont 1998: 159ff; 
Tomlinson 2007). And a whole genre of literature has sprung up to 
describe and reflect on the acceleration of time (e.g. Gleick 1999; 
Hylland Eriksen 2001). This genre may encourage opposition to the 
tyranny of time, advise individuals about strategies for economis-
ing their time, or present slowness and the unchanging as a virtue. 
Global anthropogenic changes are now so extensive that they have 
named a new geological period after humanity – the Anthropocene – 
a concept that dissolves the boundary between nature and culture 
(e.g. Hylland Eriksen 2016; Sörlin 2017).
All the sociologists, anthropologists, and historians who describe 
and analyse the state of the present in the decades around 2000 
are critical of modernity. They generally stress the unfavourable 
consequences of modernity; here the current debate is part of a 
long tradition of criticism of the present. Transience, acceleration, 
and the Anthropocene may be a reality; but there is an unmistak-
ably nostalgic tone in the descriptions of modernity ever since the 
mid-nineteenth century. In earlier times, the present must have been 
slower, less mobile, fixed. Benjamin’s words about the way in which 
different periods regard themselves as standing at the abyss come 
back to mind. 
It is necessary to have the right diagnosis of the present; but this 
is not sufficient to understand, explain, and possibly also influence 
developments. That also requires a theoretical model for the ways 
in which different phenomena may be interconnected. 
Irrespective of how we choose to describe the present, it is appar-
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ently characterised by movement and greater speed. The present 
is modern, and more modern than ever before. The Manifesto of 
Futurism with its worship of speed, a controversial utopia a century 
ago, has now become a reality to confirm or regret. Greater speed 
is a fact that is easy to prove empirically, especially with the aid 
of information technology. But why transience and acceleration? 
Several attempts to understand and explain transience and accel-
eration point to the market economy, which drives developments 
in the  direction of constantly higher speed, efficiency, and profit 
maximisation. 
A few years before Baudelaire’s romantic description of the tran-
sience of the present, the philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels wrote about the consequences of modern industrial pro-
duction in Manifest der kommunistichen Partei (English: The 
Communist Manifesto): “Alles Ständische und Stehende verdampft, 
alles Heilige wird entweiht” (1848: 5; English: “All that is solid 
melts into air, all that is holy is profaned”, 1964: 63). This quota-
tion was used as the title of Marshall Berman’s examination of the 
literature of modernity, All That is Solid Melts into Air (1982).
Modernity and the market economy, as well as a phenomenon 
such as World Heritage with its international convention, are easy 
to associate with globalisation – that is, how countries are inter-
connected in economic, cultural, and political terms. But globalisa-
tion itself is not a modern phenomenon (e.g. Frank & Gills 1993; 
Andrén 2011). 
Concepts such as progress, modernity, the West, and capital-
ism are linked up in world-systems theory. The idea of a global 
system was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein in the trilogy The 
Modern World-System (1974–1989). Wallerstein described an eco-
nomic development in which centres, with capital accumulation 
and production, were surrounded by a dependent semi-periphery 
and periphery both of which supplied raw materials. He regarded 
historical development as being characterised by cyclical periods 
in which centres have succeeded one another according to a set 
deterministic pattern. As a result of competition and rising costs, 
 production – and therefore capital accumulation – moves to new 
rising centres while the old ones decline or collapse. Capital is 
decentralised and  production moved, so there is a deindustrialisa-
tion of the previously dominant centres. In his view, the historical 
process of changing world-systems can be observed in successive 
empires and hegemonies since the sixteenth century: Spain, the 
Netherlands, the UK, and the US. 
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Inspired by and in opposition to Wallerstein, the social anthro-
pologist Jonathan Friedman has developed a more general model 
of world-systems, a model that includes the dichotomy modernity 
versus tradition. This model has been extended backwards in time in 
order to explain developments since the Bronze Age or even earlier. 
Friedman’s global model is presented in detail in the  anthology 
Cultural Identity and Global Process (Friedman 1994). 
According to Friedman, modernity can be linked to the rise and 
culmination of the centres, whereas postmodernity and tradition 
are seen as characterising their decline. As the Western, that is to say 
American, hegemony over the world economy decreased from the 
mid-1970s onwards, belief in progress and modernity ceased. When 
the hegemony decayed, modernity – which was the central identity 
of the hegemony – “imploded”. A West in economic and political 
decline instead saw the spread of disorder, postmodern relativism and 
fragmentation, ethnification, and traditionalism. Dehegemonisation 
meant dehomogenisation. And traditionalism signified a nostalgic 
yearning for roots. To quote Friedman, “Modernity moves East, 
leaving postmodernity in its wake” (Friedman 1994: 15ff, 37ff, 190 
quote; 1995; 2005; 2007).
But Friedman’s world-systems and view of cycles in the rela-
tionship between rise and decline, modernity and tradition, cannot 
be taken on board without scepticism. For it is remarkable that 
the nineteenth-century belief in progress and industrial expan-
sion coincided with historicised architecture, the establishment 
of museums, and a reappearance of traditions. The relationship 
between  modernity and tradition is not a simple dichotomy. 
Between modernity and tradition
“You can be a museum, or you can be modern, but you can’t be 
both” (Mellow 1968). The author and art collector Gertrude Stein 
succinctly formulated a contrast between the modern and the 
museum. The original context is uncertain; but the words were said 
either as a critical comment on MoMA, the Museum of Modern Art, 
in Manhattan in New York, which wanted to take over her collec-
tion, or as a justification for why Pablo Picasso’s portrait of her went 
to the nearby Met, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, instead. But are 
modernity and the museum really mutually exclusive? 
Perhaps Stein was inspired by the sociologist Lewis Mumford, 
who formulated a similar contrast between the modern and the 
monument: “The notion of a modern monument is veritable [sic] 
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a contradiction in terms: if it is a monument, it is not modern, and 
if it is modern, it cannot be a monument” (Mumford 1938: 438).
On the one side stands modernity with its connotations of future, 
speed, and acceleration; on the other side stand the museum and the 
monument with their associations to the past, slowness, and stasis. 
These opposites also occur in criticism of modern society: on the one 
side, we find the alienation resulting from capitalism, the rational 
society with great cities characterised by speed, a lack of rules, root-
lessness, and disenchantment, whereas the other side shows us the 
lost intimacy, community, and enchantment of feudalism, and small 
towns characterised by slowness, rules, and roots. The contrasts 
go back to the division of time into change and permanence; but 
here they are subsumed in nostalgic narratives about how things 
were better in the old days. The renewals of modernity are critically 
contrasted with the traditions of the old society. Changes in time 
are contrasted with the permanence of time. 
Crisis theories also contain a patent opposition between moder-
nity and various expressions of the non-modern. Either they interpret 
the museum, the monument, preservation, in fact the whole heritage 
sector, including archaeology, as a compensatory and therapeutic 
reaction to modernity; or they interpret the museum, the monu-
ment, preservation, and the heritage sector, including archaeology, 
as a compensatory and therapeutic reaction to the decline of moder-
nity. In both instances, a dichotomy between modernity and non- 
modernity is a core premise for the interpretation of developments. 
Like the Ritter School, the first, canonical, culture of heritage 
works towards a compromise, pursuing a balance between renewal 
and preservation. The second, critical, culture of heritage lines up, 
in its more extreme forms, with revolutionaries, Futurists, and 
entrepreneurs in giving the renewal of modernity priority ahead 
of preservation. Indeed, heritage is an obstacle that has to be con-
fronted and, if possible, overcome. But both cultures presuppose an 
opposition between modernity and tradition, just as they both pre-
suppose that modernity always means change and tradition always 
means permanence. 
Critics of modernity have usually stressed that modernity is (or 
was) illogical, inconsistent, and contradictory (e.g. Compagnon 
1990 (French); 1994 (English); Latour 1991 (French): 84ff; 1993 
(English): 55ff; Thomas 2004: 42ff). Modernity claims one thing, 
but does the opposite. Modernity is guided by historicism; the idea 
of progress is followed by a reappearance of the past. The utopia 
of modernity is built like a medieval cathedral (cf. Källström 2000). 
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Several scholars have found it odd that modernity, of all things, 
has been so focused on the past. For instance, the ethnologist 
Agneta Lilja views modernity’s remarkable interest in tradition as 
a “paradox of modernity” (Lilja 1996: 37). And the archaeologist 
Cornelius Holtorf finds it ironic that modernism is so obsessed with 
preserving the past unchanged (Holtorf 2006: 102).
But there does not need to be an opposition between moder-
nity on the one hand and history, memory, and heritage, museums, 
monuments or traditions on the other. These spheres, with their 
concepts, are entangled in one another. Modernity can include the 
apparently non-modern or even anti-modern. It depends on how 
concepts and phenomena are defined – or not defined, being kept 
ambiguously open. 
When modernity and the museum, modernisation and museali-
sation, are often set up as mutually contradictory, this is due to our 
images of modernity as an expression of speed and change – and 
the museum as an expression of, or the very emblem of, slowness 
and immutability. On the one hand, urban bustle, density, and 
clamour; on the other, the peace, space, and quiet of the museum. 
But it can also be the other way round, depending on the point in 
time, the place, and – not least – what exhibition is being visited. 
When posters announce blockbusters such as Monet, Van Gogh, 
or Picasso – or Tutankhamun – the museum and its exhibition are 
indisputably part of hectic urban modernity.
On the face of it, the concept of the museum, from the Greek 
word museion meaning “temple”, does not contain anything that 
conflicts with modernity. Museums are built using the architec-
ture current in their time. Walter Benjamin thus described the 
museum as the dream architecture of his time (Benjamin 1983 
(German), 1: 511ff; 1999 (English): 407ff). Nor does the museum 
as an institution, with its different definitions and practices as a 
place for collections and exhibitions, exclude the modern. The 
museum is filled with objects that are not only relics from a lost 
world but also represent a modern present. Modern art came into 
museums  when  modernism was alive, even during Stein’s life-
time. Museums were founded early on specifically to collect and 
show the new – an example being MoMA, which opened in 1929 
(www.moma.org), and Moderna Museet in Stockholm from 1958 
(www.modernamu seet.se). And now that modernism has long 
been a canonised part of the history of art, the modern has also 
become a central part of the collections and exhibitions of most 
art museums. 
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Museologists and archaeologists have maintained that modernity 
is a necessary precondition for the museum as an institution and 
for archaeology as a discipline – indeed for the whole of rational 
science. Inspired by Michel Foucault, they describe the museum as 
an institution that disciplines knowledge, just as prisons, hospitals, 
factories, and schools are said to discipline people (e.g. Hooper-
Greenhill 1992; Olsen & Svestad 1994; Bennett 1995: 95f; Svestad 
1995; Prior 2002; Thomas 2004: 52ff). Donald Horne also linked 
the museum to modern society, but without comparing it to a 
prison. To him, a tourist visit to a museum – with its timetable, 
planned route, and focus on the material – reflected the values of 
industrial society (Horne 1984: 115f). 
In line with Foucault’s thought, the archaeologists Bjørnar Olsen 
and Asgeir Svestad interpreted the foundation of the Old Nordic 
Museum in Copenhagen, and the establishment of archaeology as a 
practice and a discipline in the course of the nineteenth century, as 
an opportunity that opened with the breakdown of the classical epis-
teme. They regard the breakdown of the classical episteme in around 
1800, with its Genesis narrative and biblical chronology, as meaning 
that the past was transformed into a fog or darkness which the 
museum and archaeology, with their ancient objects, could fill with 
new knowledge. The “modern episteme” with its focus on origins 
and change thus enabled the growth of museums and archaeology 
(Olsen & Svestad 1994; Svestad 1995).
Modernity and archaeology are entangled in each other. 
However, archaeology as excavation and studies of the past existed 
long before the modern era. But the background of the development 
of archaeology as an academic discipline is the opening of prehis-
tory; that is, a period before the history of texts. Archaeology uses 
modern technologies in its methods. Field archaeology is in itself 
a form of engineering to ensure the expansion of modern society 
(cf. Rosén 2007). And now, in the twenty-first century, modernity 
has become a field of research for archaeologists to explore (e.g. 
Ersgård 2007; Lihammer & Nordin 2010; Anthony 2016). 
In principle, this argument may be repeated for monuments, as 
there is not necessarily any conflict between modernity and monu-
ments. Monuments have all once been “modern” in the sense of 
“new”; they may be designed in a modern style, and they may 
serve as reminders not only of something in the past, but also of 
phenomena in the present or even the future. Temporary monu-
ments may celebrate modern speed, as at the Goodwood Festival 
of Speed, held in the UK since 1993 (www.goodwood.com). 
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And monuments can be (re)created using modern light, as has 
happened at the World Trade Center in Manhattan, New York, 
and with the Buddha statues in Bamiyan in Afghanistan, which 
were both destroyed in 2001 (cf.  Melotti 2011: 121ff, 134ff). 
“Tribute in Light” using searchlights pointing up into the sky is 
thus intended as an annual commemoration of the terror attack on 
the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001 (www.mas.org/programs/
tributeinlight); and the  lost Buddha  statues were recreated for a 
short time in a 3D light  projection in 2015 (www.youtube.com/
watch?v=JDEk9rjM39c). 
Modernity and tradition are often presented as a contrast. 
Modernity may afford associations to capitalism, industrialism, 
urbanisation, movement, and change, while tradition may carry 
connotations of feudalism, crafts, rural areas, and stasis. Tradition 
refers to what survives from one generation to the next, to inherit-
ance, security, repetition, and continuity; to that which endures. In 
crisis theories, tradition is a reaction to modernity. Conversely, too 
much tradition can also have a restrictive effect and bring about 
a need for renewal, for modernity. But modernity and tradition 
are not mutually contradictory or complementary in the sense of 
both necessary and incompatible. Innumerable threads run between 
modernity and tradition, linking them. The concepts are there-
fore inextricably entangled. Paradoxically, too, tradition can be a 
modern construction.
The idea that tradition is part of modernity was the influential 
thesis advocated by the historian Eric Hobsbawm. In his introduc-
tion to the collected volume The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm 
argued that new symbolic rituals intended to show continuity with 
the past are particularly apt to be established when rapid change 
in society weakens or destroys social patterns. Traditions are pre-
sented as being extremely old; but they are modern, and they may 
even be part of modernisation itself (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983: 
1ff; Prickett 2009). 
One often cited, albeit contested, example from Hobsbawm’s 
anthology is the kilt, an icon for the Scottish and Highland clans. 
The kilt is said to be an innovation from around 1730 by an English 
manufacturer (Trevor-Roper 1983). Another example is ceremonies 
in the British Royal Family that are intended as evidence of con-
sensus, stability, and community even though – or just because – 
society is undergoing powerful change; many of these ceremonies 
were in fact invented in the period between the 1870s and the First 
World War (Cannadine 1983). 
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Since the publication of The Invention of Tradition, the view 
that not only traditions but also museums and heritage are part of 
modernity has had a great impact in the cultural and social sciences. 
Modernity is said to have created traditions, museums, and heritage 
in a way that had never existed before. Similarly, urbanisation is 
said to have led to a new perception of rural areas, industrialisa-
tion to a new image of pre-industrial society, and literacy to an 
interest in oral culture. At the same time, complex society is said 
to have created a primitive counter-image and civilisation to have 
defined its own boundaries in relation to barbarity (e.g. Kuper 
1988; Malina & Vasícek 1990: 218; Bausinger 1991; Eriksen 1993; 
Giddens 1999). So the central point is not the opposition, but the 
connections between modernity and a number of other phenomena. 
However, modernity is not only many-faced and transient; it 
also has weight like a black hole. For modernity swallows other 
grand narratives or phenomena such as capitalism, industrialism, 
urbanisation, and secularisation – just as it swallows criticism and 
compensation. Paradoxically, then, reactions to modernity may 
themselves also be modern – museums, monuments,  archaeology, 
traditions, and heritage. The core premise of crisis theories, the 
notion of a dichotomy between modernity and a number of nos-
talgic or therapeutic reactions, turns out to be false. Both Stein 
and Mumford were wrong when they contrasted the museum and 
the monument with the modern. Without a contrast, the paradox 
of modernity dissolves. The characterisation of modernity as ironic 
is mistaken as well.
Returning to the debate about heritage, it is possible to uncover a 
political and history-of-ideas context for the two cultures of heritage 
and to systematise different individuals and their positions. There 
are those who confirm modernity, those who want to see modernity, 
those who accept it because they must, and those who reject it. These 
positions may, if one so wishes, be discussed in  relation to a political 
scale. 
We meet eager modernists verging on Futurism in the shape of 
Pierre Boulez, who was all for destroying the past in order to move 
forward (Boulez 1976: 33), and of Cornelius Holtorf, who uses 
varying arguments and examples to advance the thesis that remains 
from the past do not need to be preserved and may instead be con-
sumed, renewed, or replaced (e.g. Holtorf 2005: 130ff; 2006; 2018). 
Several scholars have given vent to a feeling that modernity has 
been lost and that this is a thing to be regretted. In doing so, they 
have indicated where their sympathies lie. Agnes Heller, for instance, 
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argued that Europe has abandoned its true identity, which she saw as 
progress and modernity (Heller 1988: 155). Robert Hewison wanted 
to see real industry doing real work (Hewison 1987). Patrick Wright 
wanted developments to be orientated towards the future (Wright 
1985), and Frank Füredi claimed that the crises of modernity had 
resulted in stagnation, pessimism, and emptiness (Füredi 1992). 
The Ritter School, with Joachim Ritter, Herman Lübbe, and Odo 
Marquard, noted the unfavourable consequences of progress and 
modernity, but accepted this development as a fact or a necessary 
evil (cf. Ritter 1961; Lübbe 1982; 1983; 1996; Marquard 1986; 
2000). They perceived a task for the humanities, history, memory, 
and heritage in warding off the worst consequences of progress and 
modernity and trying to save what could be saved for the future. 
Many have seen the unfavourable aspects of modernity and 
turned away from it, some by adopting postmodernity when it 
appeared. Norman W. Brown thought that his own present was in 
a state of sickness on account of civilisation, money, urbanisation, 
and capitalism (Brown 1959: 234ff). Claude Lévi-Strauss took the 
view that modern society creates social classes and human exploi-
tation (Lévi-Strauss 1966: 121f). Fred Davis described modern 
society as characterised by discontinuity and problems (Davis 1979: 
97ff). Donald Horne took the view that modernity had caused a 
crisis (Horne 1984: 21ff). Andreas Huyssen criticised the media 
and described his present as chaotic, fragmentary, and free-floating 
(Huyssen 1995: 25ff). And considering Françoise Choay’s vigorous 
condemnation of the electronic technology of our time, she can be 
classified as an anti-modernist and a neo-Luddite (cf. Choay 1992 
(French): 187ff; 2001 (English): 164ff). 
Once more, David Lowenthal makes up a category of his own. 
Lowenthal concluded that modernity was succeeded by postmo-
dernity and regarded both with irony and criticism. If Lowenthal’s 
view of the “isms” is unclear, he was all the clearer in his assess-
ment of the present, which he described as being characterised by 
traumatic losses and changes and by fear of the future (Lowenthal 
1985: 8ff, 394ff; 1997: 1, 5ff; 2015: 31ff, 413ff).
However, Laurent Olivier is, if possible, even more dystopic. 
Olivier sees the wreck of the Age of Enlightenment since the 
twentieth century in a series of disasters – the two world wars, 
the Holocaust, Hamburg, Hiroshima, Chernobyl, the World Trade 
Center. With references to Benjamin, Heidegger, and Adorno, 
he looks on the industrialisation of war, the mass production of 
goods by machines, and the crisis for European civilisation; and 
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he concludes: “There is no Future” (Olivier 2008 (French): 119ff, 
 quotation 120; 2011 (English): 75ff, quotation 76). 
To sum up, the canonical tradition of heritage may be positioned 
close to the Ritter School’s conservatism or liberal pragmatism, 
whereas the critical tradition of heritage spreads to both sides – to 
the right and, especially, to the left on a traditional political scale. 
But modernity is so controversial as a concept and phenomenon 
that a debate easily runs aground. On the one extreme wing are 
modernists, revolutionaries, and Futurists, who need the past with 
its museums, monuments, ancient monuments, traditions, and 
heritage as a rhetorical counter-image. On the other extreme wing 
are the opponents of modernity, anti-modernists, reactionaries, 
and nostalgists, who have a rhetorical urge to defame progress, 
the present, and utopias. On the one side is the first culture of 
heritage, where modernity is seen as a threat that must be averted 
or balanced. On the other side of the gap is the second culture of 
heritage, in which remains of the past and antiquarian institutions 
are perceived as a threat. 
The disputed position of modernity leads to scepticism when phe-
nomena such as museums, monuments, ancient remains, traditions, 
and heritage apparently change sides, when they become part of the 
modern. Despite its many opponents, modernity continues to have a 
positive ring to it. Does the change of sides represent a new insight 
about the greater range of modernity? Or is it rather an attempt to 
win sympathy for something that risks being left behind as ruins 
after the storm of progress? To make sure that the whole field of 
history, memory, and heritage is not left behind as something that 
belongs in a museum, but is also part of the narrative of progress 
and the future? To make a virtue of necessity? The past must become 
modern to have a chance. So the past has always been modern.
If, however, modernity is not in conflict with history, memory, 
and heritage – in conflict with museums, monuments, archaeology, 
traditions, and nostalgia – then the relationship between modernity 
and World Heritage may be more complicated than first assumed. 
Modernity, with the Aswan High Dam and the need for electricity, 
was initially seen as a threat to the ancient temples of Abu Simbel. 
Clearly, then, things are not necessarily that simple.
The opponents of modernity
The film Modern Times by Charlie Chaplin, who was both direc-
tor and actor, depicts the US of the 1930s (Chaplin 1936 film). It 
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associates the modern with industrial society, with that society’s 
increasing speed at factory assembly lines, and with unemployment 
and social unrest. The film communicated a criticism of modernity 
that was typical of its time, but it did so in a humorous way. 
For as long as modernity has been around, it has been fash-
ionable to be critical of it; anti-modern people have always been 
modern. That massive criticism has been levelled against modernity 
itself as well as against a number of phenomena interwoven with 
it – progress, enlightenment, technology, industrialisation, capital-
ism, urbanisation, and secularisation. This criticism can be defiantly 
offensive or melancholically resigned. At best, it may contribute 
additional perspectives on what modernity has been, is, or ought to 
be. At worst, though, it may contribute to creating pessimistic myths 
about modernity, myths that liquidate human hope (cf. Tallis 1997). 
Consequently, Romanticism and historicism in the nineteenth 
century may be interpreted as a reaction against the Enlightenment 
and the radical new elements of belief, science, art, and politics that 
culminated in the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and 
the subsequent Napoleonic Wars. In Europe, what was modern at 
that time was opposed both by the melancholy contemplation of 
ruins, along with backward-looking architecture, and by a politi-
cal reaction that reasserted the Church and the authority of the 
monarchy. 
When Charles Baudelaire insightfully characterised modernity as 
the fleeting and the transient, something that is continually trans-
forming itself, as the change of time, this was a view formulated 
precisely by a melancholy and nostalgic Romantic (Baudelaire 
1863 (French); 1964 (English)). And despite differences, Baudelaire 
was completely in line with other social critics in his time in this 
respect. 
Modernity, with its changing significance, has been criticised for 
leading to loss of meaning and alienation, to social and spiritual 
poverty, and to the disintegration of communities. We meet this 
criticism first in the UK, Germany, France, and the US, and then in 
Scandinavia – that is, in countries where industrialisation roared 
forward in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The critics are 
philosophers such as Karl Marx, Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, 
Theodor W. Adorno, Martin Heidegger, and Georg Henrik von 
Wright, sociologists such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Émile Durkheim, 
Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Zygmunt Bauman, and Hartmut Rosa, 
and the human ecologist Alf Hornborg. This array is then joined 
by the philosophers Joachim Ritter, Odo Marquard, and Hermann 
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Lübbe, the historian and geographer David Lowenthal, the  historian 
Françoise Choay, and the literary historian Andreas Huyssen. These 
names represent widely different personalities, perspectives, and 
positions, everything from left to right on the political scale, and 
everything from analysis to agitation; still, these critics are united in 
a deep distrust of modernity in their own present. 
In philosophy and sociology, several now classic concepts and 
perspectives are reused – and some new ones minted – in order to 
characterise the unfortunate consequences of modernity or phe-
nomena linked to modernity: the concept of alienation (German 
Entfremdung) was used by Karl Marx in his “Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts” of 1844 to describe the consequences of 
capitalism for workers in relation to their work, other people, and 
nature (Marx 1968 (German); 1975 (English)). Ferdinand Tönnies 
described the development from the pre-modern community 
(German Gemeinschaft) characterised by the family to the modern, 
rational society (German Gesellschaft) (Tönnies 1887 (German); 
2001 (English)). Émile Durkheim used the concept “anomie”, the 
absence of norms, that could arise in both economic growth and 
decline. Great social changes and imbalances cause a crisis in society, 
leading to more suicides (Durkheim 1897 (French); 1951 (English)). 
Later, Georg Simmel described how people in the modern metropo-
lis were affected by the division of labour and the money economy. 
While life in small towns was slow and characterised by personal 
contacts, the metropolis was characterised by continuous rapid 
transformations and impersonal contacts. Rootlessness threatened 
in the metropolis (Simmel 1903 (German); 1950 (English)). Max 
Weber employed the concept Entzauberung (“disenchantment”) 
in his lecture “Wissenschaft als Beruf” (“Science as Vocation”), 
delivered to German students in Munich in 1917. The science of 
the West, with its intellectualisation and rationalisation, meant a 
disenchantment and secularisation of the world that weakened the 
magic, mystic, and  religious (Weber 1922 (German): 554; 1991 
(English): 155). And in the 1940s, Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
W. Adorno formulated the concept of the culture industry (German 
Kulturindustrie) as part of their criticism of modern mass society 
and its entertainment industry (Horkheimer & Adorno 1947 
(German): 144ff; 2002 (English): 94ff; Adorno 1967 (German); 
1979 (English)). 
Walter Benjamin’s image of progress as a storm was meant in a 
derogatory sense. The angel of history, Angelus Novus, saw a disas-
trous storm that created ruins on its way from Paradise (Benjamin 
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1970 (English): 259f; 1980 (German): 687f). And Benjamin associ-
ated modernity with standing at an abyss and with a chronic crisis 
(Benjamin 1983 (German): II, 677; 1999 (English): 545), which is 
not remarkable, given his own vulnerable situation as a refugee. 
Zygmunt Bauman formulated a weighty but controversial cri-
tique of modernity in Modernity and the Holocaust (1989). Here, 
Bauman related modernity to the European trauma, the Holocaust 
genocide that culminated in the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex (WHL 
31, 1979). According to Bauman, the technology and rationality 
of modernity, its science and bureaucracy, were prerequisites for 
implementing a genocide on an industrial scale (also Horkheimer & 
Adorno 1947 (German): 235ff; 2002 (English): 165ff). In his view, 
then, the Holocaust represented yet another face of modernity. 
However, Bauman failed to recognise the irrationality of Nazism 
and how, for the most part, the Holocaust was not in fact imple-
mented rationally or industrially, even at Auschwitz, but constituted 
a mass murder by traditional means in a society marked by political 
and administrative anarchy (cf. Snyder 2015; Cannon 2016).
An environmentalist line of thought that is critical of technology 
can be mapped from the late eighteenth century up to present-day 
notions about sustainable development. This is a line whose advo-
cates have wanted to see progress and growth, but insisted they 
should not have unfortunate consequences. 
Actual attacks on the new technology manifested themselves in 
early industrialism in England, where new textile machines were 
seen as a threat to the old crafts. In the 1810s, Luddites – named 
after their fictional leader Ned Ludd – thus sabotaged textile 
machines and factories in violent actions, threatening the lives of 
the owners if they offered resistance (Jones 2006). 
A more abstract critique of technology was advanced by Martin 
Heidegger. In his essay “Die Frage nach der Technik” (“The 
Question Concerning Technology”), Heidegger asserts – once again 
in obscure words – that technology and its essence might be a threat 
to human beings’ pursuit of truth (Heidegger 1954 (German); 1977 
(English)). 
In recent decades, progress and modernity, with the utopia of 
boundless growth, have been criticised from many directions as 
being responsible for destruction of the environment and as a 
cause of global climate change. Georg Henrik von Wright became 
a leading figure of the environmentally critical movement against 
progress and economic growth with his Myten om framsteget 
“The Myth of Progress”. He described progress as a myth that 
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would not survive the crisis of modernity in his present. Von Wright 
was critical of human beings’ unrestrained search for knowledge, 
 critical of the ability of natural science and technology to solve 
the problems they themselves create, critical of growing quantifica-
tion, and critical of the distortion of traditional patterns of life by 
industrialisation and what he called quasi-democracy. Instead, von 
Wright praised the classic modernity of the eighteenth century, the 
Age of Enlightenment, and the pre-industrial age, when, in his view, 
technology was useful and sensible (Wright 1993). 
Most recently, Alf Hornborg has criticised the central element 
of progress, modernity, and industrialisation, namely the machine, 
which he regards as a fetish. According to Hornborg, the idea that 
machines save time is a myth. What machines actually do is redis-
tribute resources, human time and labour, from the periphery to the 
centre of the economic world system. Hornborg also claims that 
industrialisation as we know it in the West is coming to an end. For 
industrialisation builds on oil and other fossil fuels, and the supply 
of oil is supposed to have peaked already. And in his view, a transi-
tion to other, more sustainable, forms of energy is not realistic (e.g. 
Hornborg 2001; 2010). 
Clearly, then, an enormous importance has been ascribed to 
modernity as a global force that has reshaped human beings, 
nature, culture, and society. For there appears to be no end to all 
the things that modernity is thought to have caused. Masses of 
phenomena and “isms” have been viewed either as a consequence 
of or as a reaction to modernity: unemployment, social unrest, 
alienation, anxiety, stress, secularisation, disenchantment, fascism, 
Nazism, Islamism, the Holocaust, totalitarianism, fundamental-
ism, terrorism,  environmental pollution, and climate change. It 
looks as if everything bad or wicked in the world is projected onto 
modernity. Moreover,  Romanticism, nostalgia, modernism, and 
postmodernism are believed to form a reaction to modernity, as are 
history, memory, and heritage. Modernity with its many faces must 
apparently bear the responsibility for both the bad and the good 
in a development in which each time and place has its own needs, 
traumas, and crises. Modernity is made a scapegoat for whatever 
breeds discontent in life. 
Indirectly, the criticism recapitulated above outlines a picture 
of  human beings, nature, culture, and society before modernity. 
Pre-modernity was apparently a golden age characterised by use-
fulness, reason, employment, order, closeness, community, security, 
balance, sufficient time, belief, and mystery. There was no fascism 
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or Nazism, no Holocaust and no totalitarianism, fundamentalism, 
terrorism, environmental pollution, or climate change. Judging by 
the criticism, the arrival of modernity must therefore have meant 
an epoch-making break with the past – or, more poetically, a brutal 
expulsion from Paradise. Things were better in the old days!
Pre-modernity is constructed as a lost paradise or a lost “foreign 
country”. The criticism is clearly a nostalgic reaction which may 
be counted among modernity’s numerous other consequences and 
counter-reactions. But the question now is whether the criticism of 
modernity, with its consequences and counter-reactions, has not 
itself been absorbed by modernity and come to be part of it? 
In Modern Times, Chaplin made use of a modern mass medium, 
film, to ridicule modern society. Chaplin made use of the very cul-
tural industry centred on Hollywood that Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor W. Adorno rejected, even though they lived in Pacific 
Palisades, just a half-hour trip by car from the Hollywood they criti-
cised. But paradoxically, Chaplin’s Modern Times was unmodern in 
that it was Hollywood’s last great silent film, speech only appearing 
in carefully selected sections. Modern and unmodern technology 
were thus freely united in Modern Times and its entertaining criti-
cism of modernity. 
Enlightened modernity
Modernity has many faces. Modernity is something that began 
thousands of years ago, or a couple of centuries ago; or it is some-
thing that has not yet happened. Modernity is something that is 
over and done with, something that is still ongoing, or something 
waiting to happen in the future. Modernity can mean one thing 
and then another, depending on the perspective applied. To deepen 
the confusion, the concepts modern, modernisation, modernism, 
and modernity are often used randomly without clear distinctions. 
Moreover, modernity is linked with emphatic opinions as being 
either a good thing that should be promoted or something bad that 
we ought to reject. Modernity is thus both an ambiguous and a 
contested concept.
In linguistic terms the concept of modernity has to do with 
renewal, with modernising, and it is not restricted to a given field or 
a certain period or part of the world. Modernity is closely related 
to progress, which is generally to do with improvement through 
change, by doing something new. Only human ingenuity and the 
resources available set limits for what can be renewed and improved. 
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The metaphorical openness of modernity in terms of both its char-
acteristics and its consequences is hence something we must accept. 
Modernity is characterised by transience; and it is itself a transient 
concept which escapes definition.
The goal of renewal or modernisation is modernity. But as a goal 
in constant movement, modernity remains a utopia, because there 
is always something that can be modernised, either for the first 
time or once again. The goal is constantly being moved forward. 
It is possible to strive for new goals, new utopias. In this sense, to 
be modern is to be constantly on the way to a new time and a new 
place.
Modernity has been put to use and given a central role in the 
narrative of the West and progress. This is a basic narrative about 
the origins and development of human beings and of society, a story 
whose details may vary as required. Each field can contribute its 
own small part of the grand narrative. The pluralism of perspectives 
creates a common, but somewhat blurred, picture of modernity. 
Agreement may be reached both on this and that being expressions 
of modernity, even though, strictly speaking, the views in question 
are internally opposed. Modernity as a diffuse concept that is, on 
closer examination, often found to be full of contradictions helps 
enable different groups to nevertheless agree on a common way 
forward. 
As in many other situations, the purpose of the narrative is to 
contribute to social cohesion. With its knowledge, form, and reflec-
tion, the narrative creates identity. The narrative is about who we 
are, where we come from, and where we are going. The narrative 
of modernity creates meaning and identity in an always chaotic 
present. It can be used to impose a meaning-creating structure both 
on the past and on the present and the future. But the “we” of iden-
tity presupposes the existence of “the others”. Hence the narrative 
of modernity is both inclusive and exclusive.
Modernity is part of the grand narrative of the development of 
the West, “the West” being another ambiguous concept. Originating 
in the Latin word for sunset, occidens, as opposed to sunrise, 
oriens, “the West” has, in practice, come to mean Europe and 
North America with their allies, countries seen as having market 
economies, representative democracy, and civil rights and freedoms. 
Despite all the differences – and there are many – it is felt that 
there are some common features that differentiate the West today 
from earlier periods, or differentiate the West from other areas. 
So modernity excludes both what happened in earlier times and 
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those “others” who are held to not yet have attained modernity. 
But modernity as a narrative can, in principle, be all-inclusive, even 
though it is generally only about a selected part of humanity: the 
West. 
In principle, modernity stands for an apparently innocent 
endeavour to improve the world. But the occasionally favourable 
but mostly unfavourable upshot is that modernity has landed in 
an infected debate about the unfortunate aspects of progress, the 
Enlightenment, technology, industrialisation, capitalism, urbani-
sation, and secularisation. In the West’s criticism of itself – and 
in others’ criticism of the West – the narrative of modernity has 
become a tragedy. Here the criticism forgets that modernity has 
many faces that complement one another. 
Just like the Enlightenment, modernity has both a “hard” and a 
“soft” side (cf. Liedman 1997: 26ff) – or it displays two cultures, 
in line with C. P. Snow. Modernity is thus both a question of the 
humanities, and among them especially philosophy and the history 
of ideas, and natural science, technology, and economics. Modernity 
can be linked to ideas, concepts, and values – and to experiments, 
machines, and capital. Moreover, these perspectives are inextricably 
entangled with one another. 
The Age of Enlightenment brought new ideas about the categories 
of the triad – the true, the beautiful, and the good – all of which are 
imbued with a universal ambition. Modernity is thus characterised 
by a new faith in the true, where knowledge is attained by reason 
and rational scientific methods. Here modernity is often related to 
the emergence of a new natural science, characterised by experi-
ments since the seventeenth century, and to technological inventions; 
but modernity may equally be linked to new knowledge in the inter-
pretative humanities. The central point is that the new knowledge 
lays the foundations for developments (e.g. Toulmin 1990; Liedman 
1997). 
Modernism is a collection of experimental movements in 
architecture, art, literature, and music since the end of the nine-
teenth century, a set of movements that questioned tradition and 
constantly sought the new. Modernism is normally regarded as a 
past phenomenon, but the duration of the period depends on what 
expression is being studied, and a febrile search for new forms of 
expression has continued. Moreover, according to the literary critic 
Matei Calinescu, modernity includes not only modernism, but also 
avant-garde, decadence, kitsch, and postmodernism (OED: IX 
948f; Calinescu 1987).
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Finally, new values have gradually been established from the 
seventeenth century onwards. They include universal ideas about 
political and religious freedom and legal, social, and gender equal-
ity as well as democracy – the idea that people should be able to 
elect their leaders (Liedman 1997; Bring 2011). The idea of human 
rights is a concrete example of conceptual innovation that has been 
given official status with the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948). Another concrete example that might be adduced is 
the global reporting of the degree of personal, civil, and economic 
freedom, which is measured in the annual Human Freedom Index 
(www.cato.org/human-freedom-index). 
The Age of Enlightenment also brought developments in natural 
science, medicine, technology, and economics, where there are 
many statistical possibilities of measuring results or consequences: 
statistics pertaining to infant mortality, life expectancy, urbanisa-
tion, energy consumption, gross domestic product (GDP), the 
Human Development Index, capital accumulation, the distribution 
of patents, and the spread of mobile phones or the Internet.
For both the hard and the soft side of modern global develop-
ment, facts will show a generally favourable trend which contradicts 
the chronic pessimism of crisis theories (cf. Pinker 2018; Rosling 
et al. 2018). In my view, the hard and the soft side of modernity meet 
in both concrete and metaphorical terms as light is shed on them. 
Light as a guide can overcome the gap between different mate-
rial and intangible perspectives on modernity. Light is associated 
with speed and transience, with Enlightenment and illumination. 
In physics, light is connected with time and matter and represents 
the highest attainable speed, the speed of light. On the one hand, 
light can be linked to the ideals of the Age of Enlightenment and is 
a prerequisite for reading; on the other hand, light can be followed 
in the culture of everyday life. Light is thus both a concept to think 
with and something transient that can be measured.
Light can be viewed as an idea-intensive concrete technology, 
with the development of light sources, windows, window glass, bra-
ziers, lamps, paraffin lamps, gas lamps, electricity, light bulbs (now 
low-energy bulbs), fittings, cables, fuses, transformers, generators 
in power stations, and solar cells (e.g. Brox 2010; Garnert 2016). 
It has been shown that global economic production broadly cor-
responds to night-sky brightness as seen from a satellite. The con-
trast shows up clearly between, for instance, dark North Korea and 
shining South Korea. It is also thought that night-sky brightness 
may provide a more correct picture of economic activity than the 
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traditional measuring of GDP. This is both because calculations of 
GDP may be uncertain and because there may be political reasons 
for over- or understating its size. It is, quite simply, hard to obtain 
credible global figures for economic activity. Night-sky brightness 
also permits analyses of regions across or within states (Henderson 
et al. 2009; cf. Croft 1978). The study of night-sky brightness 
recently advanced to the stage where it is possible to gauge the 
brightness of individual countries around the globe (Falchi et al. 
2016).
The light in cities has been seen as a metaphorical expression 
of modernity, whereas darkness was taken as an expression of the 
past, the unmodern (Schlör 1991 (German); 1998 (English)). Indeed, 
several scholars have chosen global night-sky brightness as a con-
crete expression of modernity, since the quantity of light depends on 
energy conversion; that is, on the economy or the “technomass”, the 
quantity of machines (e.g. Hornborg 2010; Wienberg 2010). 
My immediate reaction is that the picture of night-time bright-
ness is beautiful, like an earthly firmament. But night brightness can 
also be viewed either as light pollution, an environmental problem 
(Bogard 2013; www.lightpollution.it/dmsp/index.html), or as 
a concrete expression of the uneven exchange of goods between 
the centre and the periphery and therefore as an expression of the 
skewed distribution of capital (Hornborg 2010: 1, 39, 150, 173f). 
In the conflicting perceptions of night-time brightness, we there-
fore again find the debate about developments as either progress or 
decline in the wake of modernity.
Many have expected that the dissemination of Western market 
economy and technology would mean that “soft” Western values 
would also spread globally. The clearest example is the political 
philosopher Francis Fukuyama, who optimistically wrote the essay 
“The End of History?” (1989) in the year that saw the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Fukuyama concluded that Western market economy 
and democracy had won and that history had ended; but he also felt 
nostalgic, since the ideological and conflict-filled post-war period 
had now been replaced by a boring post-historical future. 
A few years later, the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington 
was berated for the prediction made in his essay “The Clash of 
Civilisations?” (1993) regarding conflicts along cultural bounda-
ries. According to Huntington, several non-Western countries have 
had a strategy “to modernize but not to Westernize” (Huntington 
1993: 41, quotation 49); that is, to choose the technological and 
economic part of modernity without including the values of the 
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West. But Fukuyama was mistaken – and Huntington turned out 
to be right. 
History continued indefatigably and unpredictably. China’s 
growth shows that the market economy and technology are one 
thing, but that politics and values are something else: state-directed 
capitalism also works. A rising centre in the world-system is striv-
ing after modernity when it comes to technology and the economy, 
but without necessarily accepting Western values into the bargain. 
Other examples are Al-Qaeda, which used aircraft in its terror 
attack on the US in 2001 (Gray 2001), and IS, which has employed 
the Internet in its propaganda. The Islamic movements are happy to 
utilise the West’s modern technology, but are opposed to the world-
system of the US and to modern Western values in general. The 
West’s own critics of modernity have normally associated moder-
nity with technology and the economy as well as with unfortunate 
consequences; in doing so, they have forgotten other aspects. 
The market and modernity are able to exist in symbiosis. 
Capitalism is able to use modernity as an ideology and a legitima-
tion of an economic system. Economic development is assumed to 
help enable everyone to be better off, contributing to progress and 
growth. But modernity is not identical to or completely dependent 
on capitalism. For renewal can be justified and take place in differ-
ent types of societies, that is, in widely different cultural, religious, 
political, and economic circumstances. So a society can accept tech-
nological and economic renewal, but oppose religious or political 
change. This means that the renewal of modernity does not need to 
be a goal in all areas. Modernity may also have existed before capi-
talism, and it may continue to exist even if capitalism disappears.
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Figure 5 Buddha-statue in Bamiyan before its destruction in 2001. 
Photo © Jens Vellev, 1969.
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Heritage in the present
Heritage is everywhere
David Lowenthal’s classic The Past is a Foreign Country opens 
with the sentence “The past is everywhere”, and he used exactly 
the same words three decades later when he revisited that  country 
(Lowenthal 1985: xv; 2015: 1). The Heritage Crusade and the 
Spoils of History begins in much the same way, but here the past 
has been limited to heritage: “ALL AT ONCE HERITAGE IS 
EVERYWHERE – in the news, in the movies, in the  marketplace – 
in everything from galaxies to genes” (Lowenthal 1997: ix). The 
phrase “Heritage everywhere” is later used as the title of the 
introductory chapter of Rodney Harrison’s Heritage: Critical 
Approaches (Harrison 2013: 1). 
Lowenthal was not alone in concluding that the past, with its 
history, memory, and heritage, was intruding on the present. That 
same observation turns up on a broad front in the West in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The sense that there was an inflation of the past triggered 
a wave of critical reflections on this development: Agnes Heller found 
an increased focus on museums in Europe after the First World War 
(Heller 1988); Hermann Lübbe noted an increase in musealisation in 
Switzerland and Germany over the twentieth century (Lübbe 1982); 
Robert Hewison observed an increase in the number of museums, 
theme parks, and visitor centres in England since the 1960s and 
launched the concept “Heritage Industry” (Hewison 1987: 83ff); 
Françoise Choay perceived an inflation in heritage since the 1960s, 
reacting particularly strongly against the establishment of industrial 
monuments and increased heritage tourism (Choay 1992 (French): 
158ff; 2001 (English): 138ff); and Andreas Huyssen observed a 
“relentless museummania” in the 1980s (Huyssen 1995: 14, 20, 
25ff). In Sweden, Svante Beckman noted rapid growth in aesthetic 
and entertainment use of history and heritage, with an ever-larger 
number of museums and antique markets (Beckman 1993a: 28f). 
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Referring to the rising number of countries that had ratified the 
World Heritage Convention and the increasing number of World 
Heritage sites, Thordis Arrhenius concluded that “[t]he inflation 
of heritage is today a fact” (Arrhenius 2003: 162). And Rodney 
Harrison discusses a “heritage boom” and “crisis of accumulation” 
in late modernity (Harrison 2013: 68ff, 166). 
In The Past is a Foreign Country (1985; 2015), Lowenthal mainly 
gathered, presented, and commented on examples in a collage, 
but he was all the more explicit in his criticism of heritage in The 
Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (1997). Other debaters 
in the 1980s and 1990s were also particularly critical. The back-
ground of the development and establishment of “critical heritage” 
as a separate field of research and education can be sought precisely 
in the experience that the past, and especially heritage, were occu-
pying more than their fair share of space in the present. This infla-
tion had to be examined and, if necessary, also opposed. But with 
the gradual maturing of the field, the harsh initial criticism has been 
toned down and is being replaced by more balanced analysis and 
reflection (e.g. Harrison 2013: 204ff; Aronsson & Elgenius 2015). 
At this time, however, there are many questions to consider. Is 
heritage actually everywhere? Which cultures are involved in the 
handling of heritage? When, how, and why does heritage arise and 
develop as a concept? What characterises heritage? What role do 
threats and vandalism play for heritage? What is the relationship 
between heritage and modernity? And what role does, or can, 
 heritage have in the present?
To begin with the first question, is heritage everywhere? On an 
anecdotal plane, at any rate, it may be noted that David Lowenthal 
and the old or new edition of his book The Past is a Foreign Country 
turn up everywhere in the debate about the past, history, memory, 
and heritage. And over three decades, his book has increased in size 
from 489 to 660 pages. 
It can also be noted that the concepts of cultural and natural her-
itage are well established in present-day legislation, management, 
and debate. The globalisation of heritage is seen in the establishment 
of UNESCO’s Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972). Between 1978 and 2019, 
the number of World Heritage sites increased from 12 in seven 
countries to 1121 in 167 countries (The World’s Heritage 2018; 
WHL, July 2019). And at the national level, heritage is included in 
the names of a number of institutions, one example being English 
Heritage (www.english-heritage.org.uk). 
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Since the 1980s, “critical heritage” has also gradually become 
established as a field in its own right. Its establishment is demon-
strated by the many universities that conduct some form of educa-
tion and research concerning heritage, manifested in the appearance 
of special networks, centres or departments, conferences, journals, 
textbooks, and theses. Examples are the International Journal 
of Heritage Studies (since 1994) and the Association of Critical 
Heritage Studies (since 2010; www.criticalheritagestudies.org).
One manifestation of the popularity of the heritage concept is its 
continual division into sub-categories according to type, period, or 
geography: cultural heritage and natural heritage, critical heritage, 
experimental heritage, applied heritage, digital heritage, biological 
heritage, heritage of war, architectural heritage, maritime heritage, 
intangible heritage, difficult heritage, classical heritage, heritage of 
modernity, heritage of the future, English heritage, African heritage, 
and many more. 
Another expression of the popularity of heritage is seen in the 
way that the concept is constantly becoming relevant to new areas 
or seeping into closely related fields: heritage is combined with 
such words as archaeology, art, canon, church, colonialism, com-
mercialism, conservation, criminality, democracy, development, 
development-assistance policy, economics, education, environ-
ment, ethics, forests, future, globalisation, politics of memory, 
history, human rights, identity, identity policy, landscape, legisla-
tion, management, memory, modernity(!), museums, nationalism, 
peace-building, politics, quality of life, religion, religious services, 
school, science, settlement, society, sustainable development, 
tourism, use, use of history, values, and world. 
And as has happened with “history”, “historicise”, and “histori-
sation”, as well as with “museum”, “musealise”, and “musealisa-
tion”, new words have been formed from “heritage” – words that 
mark a process and suggest a new disciplinary designation: “her-
itagisation” and “heritology” (e.g. Walsh 1992: 135ff; Sola 2005). 
The thesis according to which there has been an inflation in 
heritage largely rests on an impressionistic experience that calls for 
concretisation and confirmation by evidence. Harrison thus sub-
stantiates a boom with statistics from the UK – National Trust mem-
bership (1895–2007 for England, Wales, and Northern Ireland) and 
annual visitor figures for Stonehenge (1925–2008) as well as for 
the British Museum (1760–2010); from the US – Colonial National 
Historical Park (1932–2010), Chao Culture National Historical 
Park (1925–2010), Yosemite National Park (1906–2010), and the 
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Smithsonian Museum (1970–2010); and globally from a number of 
World Heritage Sites in Danger (1978–2011) (Harrison 2013: 68ff 
with Figs 4: 1–8). 
Harrison claims to identify a boom from around 1970, but 
his graphs do not show any uniform trend, apart from a gradual 
increase over a long period of time with breaks for the First and 
Second World Wars and some temporary deviations. The increase 
can be demonstrated from the nineteenth century (British Museum) 
and from the 1920s (Stonehenge, Yosemite), the 1940s (Colonial), 
and the 1950s (Chao). World Heritage Sites in Danger demon-
strates growth since the 1970s, when the list came into being. Only 
National Trust membership displays a clear steep rise from 1970 
onwards, but this growth followed a period of reorganisation and 
reorientation away from the previous focus on the country houses of 
the elite (www.nationaltrust.org.uk/lists/our-history-1945–2000).
Harrison’s statistics may be supplemented by overviews from 
other areas: the establishment of national museums in Europe, 
which is bound up with nationalism and the establishment of nation 
states, the consequence being that the phenomenon culminates in 
the nineteenth century (Elgenius 2015); and the establishment of 
state and state-recognised museums in Denmark (1770–1997), 
which shows a relative increase over the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (Floris & Vasström 1999: 387ff). In contrast, both the 
establishment of reconstructions and sites with reconstructions in 
Scandinavia and the creation of archaeological open-air museums 
in Europe show a marked increase since the 1960s (Petersson 2003: 
399ff; Paardekooper 2011: 79 Fig. 5). 
In addition, the relationship between different concepts in the 
public debate can be illustrated from a long-term perspective with 
the aid of media archaeology, or “digging” in an archive. The occur-
rence of the words “history” (Swedish historia) and “[cultural] 
heritage” (Swedish kulturarv) can thus be followed in the Swedish 
newspaper Svenska Dagbladet with the aid of a digital archive 
from the founding of the paper in 1884 until the present (January 
2020); Svenska Dagbladet is a morning paper, orientated towards 
the capital, with a conservative profile.
The word “history” appears in all these years with a stead-
ily increasing number of pages; the highest, 4764 pages, occurs in 
1994 (Appendix 3). By contrast, the expression “cultural heritage” 
appears for the first time in 1903; it then reappears regularly, but 
to a relatively limited extent, before increasing from the end of the 
1970s onwards, the biggest number – 261 pages – being recorded for 
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the year 2000. The expression “natural heritage” (Swedish  naturarv) 
appears for the first time in 1923 and then makes highly sporadic 
appearances until the 1990s, when the concept occurs slightly more 
frequently, peaking in 1999 with seven newspaper pages.
It is notable that the word “history” dominates completely in 
every single year. The ratio between the expressions “history” and 
“cultural heritage” presents a clear pattern, the ratio of cultural 
heritage to history increasing gradually but steadily from 0.1 % in 
1903 to its peak of 6.1 % in 2016. In the 1980s and 1990s, decades 
said to have witnessed an inflation or a boom, “cultural heritage” 
never rises above a ratio of 3.5 %.
The relative importance of the concepts “history”, “memory”, 
and “heritage” is also revealed by a Google search for the words as 
a quantitative hierarchy, with “history” at the top and “herit-
age”  at the bottom: “history” 12,990 million, “memory” 2,360 
million, and “heritage” 1,740 million; “archaeology” with 308 
million comes in far below “heritage” (www.google.com; observed 
on 1 January 2020).
A fresh look at the statistical examples results in a new picture. 
The past and heritage were not suddenly everywhere. Instead, we 
observe a gradual increase in museums, museum visits, and herit-
age tourism that follows on from a general trend in the West with 
the  establishment of nation states, population growth, and more 
leisure and motorised travel. There has not been a boom, in the 
sense of something unexpected or sudden; nor has there been any 
inflation, in the sense of something having ballooned. There has 
been a general and gradual numerical increase over a very long 
period, which cannot come as a surprise; and history has  maintained 
its leading position. 
The sense that there has been a boom and an inflation with 
regard to heritage since the 1980s is due to two factors: first, new 
themes and periods claimed space as the industrial heritage of 
modernity; second, there was a shift to new forms of mediation, 
such as reconstructions and re-enactment. The texts of history had 
to make room for more material expressions such as images, envi-
ronments, and acts; and more room was demanded for heritage, 
with its monuments, buildings, sites, and landscapes. 
It is the critics of heritage who sound warnings about a boom and 
an inflation, even though the shift appears to be relatively modest. 
The critics would prefer to see an orientation towards traditional 
text-orientated history, traditional exhibitions, and pre-modern 
themes. The same internal opposition has been  encountered by 
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 antiquarian practice and disciplines such as history and archaeology 
when their focus has gradually shifted from exclusive concentration 
on Antiquity and the Middle Ages so that there is also coverage of 
the Early Modern and Modern periods, not to mention the present 
and the future.
But the reaction is exaggerated and partly misleading, since 
traditional text-based history still dominates completely, as does 
the museum with its exhibitions. However, once a boom has been 
described, it becomes a fact that is repeated in an unthinking 
manner. Both opponents and adherents may have an interest in 
claiming that heritage has expanded.
There is also a rhetorical rivalry that can be seen from the per-
spectives chosen: everything is history, everything is memory, or 
everything is heritage. Each of them wants its particular discourse 
and concepts to cover the whole field of interest in the past. That 
the concept of heritage also wants to assert its place is apparently 
regarded as a provocation. 
So what is heritage? When, how, and why does heritage arise and 
develop, both as a practice and as a concept? Does heritage have 
its own essence or is it an expression of a transient process? An 
approach to these questions encounters two traditions, two groups 
of narratives or discourses, each of which sets out its own version 
of an answer, supplying two answers that may complement each 
other – the canonical and the critical.
Canonical heritage
Canon comes from the Greek word kano’n meaning “reed” or 
“guiding principle”; it may also mean “ruler”, “measuring stick”, 
“rule”, or “model”. Canonical scriptures are the genuine or authen-
tic texts in the Bible. Canon law is Roman Catholic legislation that 
has special status. And saints are canonised, that is, recognised by 
the Church. 
The literary critic Harold Bloom attracted attention and gener-
ated debate when, in his book The Western Canon (1994), he identi-
fied a number of authors and their works as canonical masterpieces, 
centring on William Shakespeare. Universal or national canonical 
lists assumed fresh relevance as a reaction against the relativism of 
postmodernism and a postcolonial criticism of Western values, after 
having been undeclared and part of general education in earlier 
times. One example of a formalised hierarchy may be seen in the 
Danish “Culture Canon” (Danish Kulturkanon, 2006), which arose 
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from a political initiative but was compiled by experts. This canon, 
which was later followed by several others, selected 96 phenomena 
in seven areas – architecture, visual arts, design and crafts, film, 
literature, music, and performing arts – of which all Danes ought 
to be aware. 
Canonical lists are not a new phenomenon. For example, the 
Seven Wonders of the World from Antiquity constitutes a list of 
outstanding buildings of that period (Klynne 2019). But there is 
a constant selection of what is considered worth telling about, 
remembering, or preserving for the future, while other things are 
consigned to silence, oblivion, or destruction (Assmann 1992 
(German): 87ff, 167ff; 2011 (English): 70ff, 147ff). The temples 
of Abu Simbel represent a monumental canon that communicates 
an arranged image of Pharaoh Ramses II and the Battle of Kadesh. 
Canonical lists are written down in a deliberate attempt to 
create and maintain hierarchies of values, in which something is 
considered more valuable than something else. They are written 
down when there is a need to do so; that is, when something is 
being threatened by silence, oblivion, or destruction – or is being 
threatened by alternative priorities. Bloom’s canon was produced 
because he explicitly considered that the Western literary canon was 
under threat (Bloom 1994: 8). Irrespective of their justifications and 
motives, then, canons and canonisation are ultimately about power 
over the discourse. 
Heritage represents one such canon. Heritage is used as a concept 
denoting that part of our inheritance that needs to be protected and 
preserved for the future. Something is selected as being heritage and 
given priority, whereas other things are allowed to disappear. 
Canonical heritage may stand for an endeavour to protect and 
preserve selected remains from the past. Canonical heritage is char-
acterised by the notion that the relevant heritage is threatened, but 
worth protecting and preserving for the future. Canonical heritage 
is therefore engaged in justifying protection and preservation, in 
setting criteria for the selection of heritage, and in developing new 
methods. Canonical heritage brings together individuals, groups, 
associations, management units, and institutions. Both legislation 
and a bureaucratic management culture have evolved around work 
on heritage.
There is extensive literature on the evolution of protection and 
preservation of remains from the past. This literature is a set of narra-
tives that describe the gradual evolution of protection and preserva-
tion, from sporadic initiatives to the present national or international 
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law and conventions. These narratives supply a forward-looking 
outline of the fight against the threats of various periods. They 
comprise accounts of the first examples of preservation; of heroic 
pioneers and their contributions; of government initiatives that were 
gradually extended to embrace additional categories, periods of 
time, and countries; and of the establishment of laws and manage-
ment associated with them. The narratives take us from Antiquity 
up to the present, often culminating in UNESCO’s World Heritage 
Convention (1972) and the subsequent first national examples of 
World Heritage sites, which are proudly presented. If the narratives 
take us any further ahead in time, they will also mention intangible 
heritage (e.g. Chamberlin 1979; Nielsen 1987; Cowell 2008). 
The narratives about the emergence of the protection and pres-
ervation of cultural and natural heritage form their own histori-
cal genre. They deal with the successful dissemination of heritage 
preservation as an idea and a practice, even though the concept of 
heritage makes its appearance relatively late in this development. 
This is a typical piece of legitimising Whig history-writing (e.g. 
Southgate 1996: 110f), in which the management practices, laws, 
and conventions of today are the self-evident aims of an essentially 
progressive development.
A few scenes from the narratives of the history of preservation 
are presented here, as examples representing the main lines of that 
history’s development. Taken together, they yield a pattern showing 
a close connection between destruction – or threats of destruction – 
and preservation: one causes the other. Alternatively, though, the 
same actors may both destroy and preserve.
In Memphis, Pharaoh Ramses II’s son the priest Khaemwaset 
saved a statue of Prince Kawab (Schnapp 1993 (French): 328; 1996 
(English): 328). Early paradoxical examples of preservation can 
also be documented in the Roman Empire. For instance, attempts 
were made in the fourth and fifth centuries to regulate the use of 
monuments as quarries for spolia; this serves as evidence that exten-
sive destruction occurred. The Ostrogoth king Theodoric regretted 
the destruction in Rome, but he himself imported spolia for his 
construction projects in Ravenna in around the year 500 (Schnapp 
1993 (French): 83f; 1996 (English): 83; Fabricius Hansen 2003: 
108ff, 157, 238f). 
In 1162, the Roman Senate laid down the death penalty and loss 
of property for anyone who damaged Emperor Trajan’s column: 
“Nous voulons qu’elle demeure intacte, sans corruption, tant que 
le monde durera” (Schnapp 1993 (French): 94; 1996 (English): 94, 
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“We wish it to remain intact, without decay, as long as the world 
shall last”). Pope Pius II prohibited the use of Roman ruins as a 
quarry in 1462, but the same pope caused Octavian’s colonnade in 
Rome to be destroyed (Schnapp 1993 (French): 338f; 1996 (English): 
339f). The Danish King Hans provides an early Scandinavian 
example of building conservation: in 1508, he proposed renovating 
the Romanesque crypt at Lund Cathedral (Nielsen 1987: 30f). In 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, states such as Denmark, 
Sweden, and England took numerous initiatives to make inventories 
of, document, and protect monuments that could shed lustre on the 
history of their realms. In 1666, Sweden was the first to take two 
initiatives: first, a law called “Signs and decrees on old monuments 
and antiquities” (“Placat och Påbudh Om Gamble Monumenter och 
Antiquiteter”) and, second, nationwide “Inventories for antiquities” 
(“Rannsakningar efter antikviteter”) (Jensen 2002: 325ff). 
The French Revolution, the subsequent Napoleonic Wars, and 
the Romantic movement brought a new focus on the past, with 
worship of both Antiquity and the Middle Ages. It is in this period 
that the museum emerges as an institution, that disciplines such as 
archaeology, history of art, and history are established, and that the 
first legislation on protection is enacted. In the midst of the turbu-
lence of the revolution in 1790, the concept “historic monument” 
was used for the first time by the antiquary Aubin-Louis Millin de 
Grandmaison as a designation for palaces, churches, and abbeys 
which could show the history of the country and which therefore 
needed to be protected from destruction (Choay 1992 (French): 
76ff; 2001 (English): 63ff). 
It was also during the French Revolution that two new rhetorical 
concepts, “vandalism” and “heritage”, were established as two sides 
of the same events. In 1794 the Bishop of Blois, Henri Grégoire, 
employed the term “vandalism” as a piece of invective to describe 
the destruction of libraries and religious art. At the same time, he 
used the words “un héritage commun”, a common heritage, about 
what needed to be protected (Choay 1992 (French): 76ff; 2001 
(English): 63ff; Gamboni 1997: 17ff; Schildgen 2008: 121ff). 
As the art historian Derek Gillman has pointed out, Grégoire 
must have been inspired by the politician and philosopher Edmund 
Burke, who had written the following in Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (1790: 47): 
You will observe, that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of 
Right [sic], it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to 
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claim and assert our liberties, as an ‘entailed inheritance’ derived to 
us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity; as 
an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom without 
any reference whatever to any other more general or prior right.
The book was translated into French, and then “inheritance” 
became “heritage” (Gillman 2010: 82ff). 
These preservation endeavours were intensified with industrial-
ism and nationalism, especially from around 1870 to the First World 
War, also known as the period of “The Invention of Tradition”. 
To name some examples, Japan’s first legislation on preservation 
came in the 1870s, when the country started a vigorous process of 
modernisation. Germany began the documentation of monuments 
at the same time as the country was undergoing a rapid industriali-
sation. The US was, by contrast, first to have nature conservation, 
with the national park in Yellowstone in 1872, the Niagara Falls 
in 1885, and the Grand Canyon in 1919. And the first systematic 
criteria for the protection of memorials were developed by Alois 
Riegl in Austria-Hungary after 1900 (Riegl 1903 (German); 1929 
(German); 1982 (English)). 
Critical heritage
The word “criticism” comes from the Greek word kritike, which 
refers to the art of making judgements. It is related to the word 
“crisis”, which is also of Greek origin, kri’sis meaning “decision” 
or “judgement”. In everyday language, the “criticism” is attended 
by unfavourable connotations since it is, in practice, often a 
matter of finding faults and defects; but its application does not 
rule out a neutral or even favourable appraisal. Since the Age of 
Enlightenment, criticism has also been the name of a distinct genre 
of reviews whose purpose is to communicate, describe, interpret, 
and assess fictional and non-fictional texts, art, music, theatre, and 
film. Ideally, the aim is to enhance the understanding and experi-
ence of the works; but reviews may become stuck in the derogatory 
and dismissive aspect of criticism. 
The development of critical heritage as a separate field may, in 
my view, be divided into three chronological phases: the 1980s, the 
1990s, and the twenty-first century. In each phase, Lowenthal has 
a patent impact through his publications. But first, an account will 
be provided of the history-of-ideas-related, historical, and political 
conditions that obtain in this field. 
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The background in the history of ideas of the emergence of criti-
cal heritage is formed by various influences that are not necessarily 
compatible. Chief among them are the Frankfurt School and critical 
theory, with names such as Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, 
and later Jürgen Habermas. Here, bourgeois society and its institu-
tions and values are criticised from the left of the political spectrum. 
It is a criticism that regards traditions, museums, and heritage as 
conservative phenomena geared to preserving the existing society. 
According to this line of thought, society should not merely be 
described; it should be changed as well. Post-structuralism’s power-
and-discourse criticism follows, with Michel Foucault as the central 
name. Finally, mention should be made of postcolonialism’s reckon-
ing with a Western perspective on the world; one important work 
here is Edward Said’s book Orientalism (1978). 
Critical theory, poststructuralism, and postcolonialism come 
together in the critical study of the uses of the past and “the others” 
that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Scholars who belong to this 
orientation ask what past is examined and mediated, how, where, 
and when this happens, who does it, and for whom – and ultimately 
why the past is being examined and mediated at all. Besides the 
essay “Imperialism and Archaeology” (Bandaranayake 1974) and 
the book The Rape of the Nile (Fagan 1975), many were inspired 
by the anthology The Invention of Tradition (Hobsbawm & Ranger 
1983), which showed how history was not only used but also 
invented. Moreover, inspiration for the critical study of memory, 
monuments, and memorials came from Pierre Nora’s project Les 
Lieux de mémoire (1984 (French); 1989 (English), Realms of 
Memory). 
The social, economic, and political developments of the 1970s 
and 1980s formed a direct precondition for the emergence of criti-
cal heritage. Those were turbulent decades during which countries 
in the West were affected by a lack of belief in progress as well as 
by oil crises, deindustrialisation, and neoliberalism. There was also 
a shift in the use of the past from knowledge to experience and 
 reflection – and a shift to new forms of mediation. 
Lowenthal had already formulated the basis for critical herit-
age in the anthology Our Past Before Us (Lowenthal & Binney 
1981), which summarised a symposium held in London in 1979. In 
the introduction, Lowenthal noted that “[s]aving historic sites and 
objects has become a widely popular cause. Although pollution, 
neglect, and the bulldozer still take a heavy toll, more and more 
is now being rescued. The growth of the preservation  movement 
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is one of the major social phenomena of our time” (1981: 9). And 
Lowenthal specifically wanted to see a critical analysis: “As a self-
conscious movement, preservation is still too new to have attracted 
much critical analysis” (1981: 10). He also includes an early variant 
of later statements about the past and heritage being everywhere: 
“Remnants of our past lie all around us, some whole, some decayed, 
some in shreds and tatters, some to be discerned only in traces” 
(1981: 10).
Critical heritage had a breakthrough in the mid-1980s with the 
publication of three now “canonical” books that generated attention 
and debate (cf. Sørensen & Carman 2009: 17ff; Harrison 2013: 
98ff): David Lowenthal’s The Past is a Foreign Country (1985), 
Patrick Wright’s On Living in an Old Country (1985), and Robert 
Hewison’s The Heritage Industry (1987). Two of the key works sup-
plied Lowenthal’s own extensive reply to the wonderment expressed 
in his introduction, where nostalgia came in for especially harsh 
criticism; Wright’s criticism of the use of history as a diversion-
ary political manoeuvre in the present; and Hewison’s devastating 
 criticism of the heritage industry as a new sector of the economy. 
It should be pointed out that these three books all represented 
Western self-criticism originating in personal experience from the 
UK and the US. The next point to note is that this first phase of 
criticism was itself nostalgic, polemic, and very critical in a negative 
sense. 
The 1990s then saw a broadening of the field, widely dissimilar 
disciplines being inspired by Lowenthal’s book in particular. Now 
there was a gradual “academicisation”, in which heritage emerged 
as a research field in its own right. The periodical International 
Journal of Heritage Studies (1994ff) was founded in this period. 
In Sweden, a research project was completed and published in 
the anthology Modernisering och Kulturarv (“Modernisation and 
Heritage”, Anshelm 1993). And Lowenthal himself published The 
Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History (1997), which was 
hypercritical of the whole phenomenon of heritage. 
The final establishment of critical heritage as an academic field 
in its own right has come in the twenty-first century. This is when 
teaching and research are established at centres and departments 
whose scholars focus on heritage. The first real textbooks have been 
published during this period, for instance The Heritage Reader 
(Fairclough et al. 2009) and Heritage Studies (Sørensen & Carman 
2009). Cooperation between academics at universities in Australia, 
Sweden, and the UK has led to the formation of the Association of 
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Critical Heritage Studies (since 2010; www.criticalheritagestudies.
org). Mention may also be made of the textbook Heritage: Critical 
Approaches (Harrison 2013). There was a reprint of Wright’s On 
Living in an Old Country in 2009, and Lowenthal has revised his 
standard work in The Past is a Foreign Country – Revisited (2015). 
But there has not been a new impression of Hewison’s The Heritage 
Industry.
As with criticism more generally, it should be possible to regard 
critical heritage as an endeavour to mediate, describe, interpret, 
and assess the protection, preservation, and use of heritage. Ideally, 
the purpose would be to increase the understanding of heritage in 
the context of impending change. Critical heritage may therefore 
be concerned with what heritage is protected, preserved, and used; 
how, where, and when this happens; and who it is done by and for 
whom – and also why heritage is protected, preserved, and used in 
the first place. 
My description or definition of critical heritage as typical genre 
criticism is fairly open. The reason is that in practice, critical herit-
age displays great breadth, not least in terms of perspectives and 
attitudes. 
The first and most radical form of criticism is aimed against herit-
age itself as an idea. It rejects the view that the past with its history, 
memory, and heritage is in any way a good or necessary thing. 
Strikingly often, though, rhetoric and invective take the place of 
arguments, heritage being linked to threats, disease, and religion – or 
interest in heritage being viewed unfavourably as a “heritage indus-
try”. This is how critical heritage is introduced by David Lowenthal, 
Patrick Wright, and Robert Hewison; but similar attitudes are voiced 
by many others, among them Norman O. Brown, Pierre Boulez, 
Donald Horne, Agnes Heller, Françoise Choay, Andreas Huyssen, 
Frank Füredi, and Svante Beckman. However, this radical criti-
cism appears to belong chiefly to the 1980s and 1990s as an initial 
 reaction against a perceived expansion of heritage. 
The second form of criticism focuses on the use, in the sense 
of consumption, of heritage, taking the view that protection and 
preservation should not prevent continued use or new modes of 
use, even if heritage is affected in the process. In the choice between 
preservation and destruction, the argument is that destruction is 
acceptable or even preferable. For instance, archaeologist Cornelius 
Holtorf maintains that heritage may be allowed to be consumed, or 
worn out, since new heritage is always at hand; he views heritage as 
an enduring resource (Holtorf 2005: 130ff). Even though heritage 
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is not rejected in principle, this attitude is, in practice, reminiscent 
of the first radical criticism in that it consistently argues that a spe-
cific piece of heritage may be allowed to disappear for some reason. 
The third, and now most widespread, criticism is concerned with 
the choice of heritage – the point being that the existing heritage 
has been too narrowly defined. The established heritage adminis-
tered by institutions such as UNESCO and ICOMOS is regarded 
as being too traditional, as bearing the imprint of Western think-
ing, and as being dominated by material culture and monuments 
linked precisely to the West. This criticism wants to see an extension 
of heritage in both theoretical and practical terms. The material 
therefore needs to be supplemented by the intangible, so that more 
people around the world can have their heritage – and therefore 
their identity – recognised. To be specific, more representation of 
heritage is needed in relation to neglected subjects, periods, geo-
graphical areas and, especially, groups in society with respect to 
class, gender, and ethnicity. The selection of heritage should not be 
directed from above, but should be carried out locally (e.g. Smith 
2006; Meskell 2018). 
One unambiguous example of the third form of criticism is a 
manifesto formulated for the Association of Critical Heritage 
Studies at a conference in Gothenburg in Sweden in 2012 and 
signed by the archaeologist Laurajane Smith: it is a postcolonial 
programme for change, in which “ruthless criticism of everything 
existing” is considered necessary in order to rebuild heritage studies 
from scratch. Smith’s onslaught on the existing is indeed ruthless: 
“The old way of looking at heritage – the Authorised Heritage 
Discourse – privileges old, grand, prestigious, expert approved sites, 
buildings, and artefacts that sustain Western narratives of nation, 
class and science” (www.criticalheritagestudies.org/history).
As a consequence of the third form of criticism, a large number of 
attempts are under way both to update and to democratise heritage 
in the present. Such endeavours may involve activating the heritage 
in relation to issues of sustainable development and human rights, 
as well as creating a dialogue with the public and local engagement 
for heritage (e.g. Alzén & Aronsson 2006; Harrison 2013: 140ff, 
204ff; Högberg 2013).
The name “critical heritage” embodies a hint that there is an 
established alternative, namely something that might be referred to 
as “uncritical heritage”. That this is actually held to be the case is 
stated clearly in the 2012 manifesto. It was formulated in explicit 
opposition to the established, which is described as the “Authorized 
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Heritage Discourse”, abbreviated as AHD (Smith 2006: 85ff). The 
manifesto’s desire to be “ruthless” and to build something new from 
scratch is revolutionary and iconoclastic. Paradoxically, though, it 
is Western academic experts on heritage who are formulating the 
criticism.
Even so, the rhetoric cannot conceal the fact that critical her-
itage has been in the making for three decades. Critical heritage 
is established and has networks, centres, departments, teaching 
programmes, academic staff, conferences, journals, textbooks – 
and a manifesto. Representatives of critical heritage act as estab-
lished experts and “gatekeepers”. Consequently, an ACHD – the 
“Authorized Critical Heritage Discourse” – now also exists. 
At the same time, the disparagingly named “Authorized Heritage 
Discourse”, and UNESCO especially, have been extremely alert to 
issues involving representation, topicality, and dialogue. Hence, 
the distinction between old and new, between established and 
 revolutionary, is not as great as the rhetoric wants to claim.
Even if the differences between canonical and critical heritage 
become blurred over time, there is still a distinct difference when 
it comes to defining cultural and natural heritage, as well as in 
 relation to such themes as decay and vandalism, and modernity. 
Heritage and authenticities
The origin of the word heritage is the Old French word herit-
age or eritage with the verb heriter, “to inherit”, which comes 
from the Latin heriditare; so the word “heritage” may be a lin-
guistic legacy from both the Norman invasion and the Roman 
Empire. “Heritage” is explained as “[p]roperty that is or may 
be  inherited”. “Heritage” is also used as an antiquarian term 
about “[v]alued objects and qualities such as historic buildings 
and cultural traditions that have been passed down from previ-
ous generations” (OED: VII, 167). Consequently, the meaning of 
“heritage” is closely associated with the concept of “tradition”, 
which is used about that which is passed on.
As a wide-ranging and ambiguous concept, “heritage” may form 
part of numerous contexts, for instance The Heritage Foundation, a 
conservative think tank in the US. “Heritage” may also be the name 
of a film, a novel, or a political party, and it may even be used as a 
surname. 
The antiquarian concept of “heritage” may be specified as either 
cultural heritage or natural heritage. In the Nordic languages, 
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however, “heritage” is often translated as kulturarv, corresponding 
lexically to “cultural heritage”, which does not cover the entire 
field. And despite the French origin of the word “heritage”, the term 
patrimoine, “paternal inheritance”, is used in France instead. 
In antiquarian contexts, as well as in everyday speech, heritage 
serves as a name for valuable remains of the past. Heritage is then 
used both as an explanation why something is actually being pro-
tected and preserved for the future – well, it is heritage – and as a 
slogan, raising a call to action: this is heritage, so it needs protec-
tion and preservation. Employing the concept is likely to be a good 
choice in that it creates favourable connotations around the past in a 
present where the public debate is dominated by economic priorities. 
And if there is a tendency towards specialisation and fragmentation 
in research, management, and mediation, “heritage” is able to gather 
different phenomena under a single umbrella. For like history and 
memory, heritage covers an extensive field of remains from the past. 
In order to be able to explain and understand the emergence 
of the heritage concept, we can follow the development of what 
is designated by the concept; that is, both thinking and practice 
concerning the need to protect and preserve remains from the past 
for the future. The history of preservation from Antiquity to the 
present is very clearly set out in narratives intended to legitimise 
current antiquarian legislation and institutions. 
Over time, changing concepts have been used to designate what 
is to be protected and preserved: antiquities, historic monuments, 
and heritage. In From Antiquities to Heritage (2014), the cultural 
historian Anne Eriksen has linked the varying concepts to differ-
ent “regimes of historicity”, drawing inspiration from the historian 
François Hartog, who is, in turn, inspired by several other scholars, 
including Michel Foucault with his concept of the episteme (Hartog 
2003 (French); 2015 (English)). 
Both Hartog and Eriksen want to connect the heritage concept 
with “presentism”, or the current preoccupation of the present. 
Heritage is used as a concept referring to everything from the past 
that someone will inherit and therefore assume responsibility for as 
an exclusive resource. The concept is also linked to the development 
of individualism and liberalism (Hartog 2003 (French): 113ff, 163ff; 
2015 (English): 97ff, 149ff; Eriksen 2014: 132ff, 149ff). Heritage is 
hence directly bound up with questions of identity and identity policy. 
But once again, as in crisis theories, one may suspect that heritage as 
a contested concept and practice is entangled with topical political 
phenomena in the present about which the authors are sceptical. 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   176 25/01/2021   08:09
Heritage in the present 177
The formal and actual breakthrough of heritage as a central 
antiquarian, but also popular, concept came with the adoption of 
UNESCO’s Convention Concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972). But even then, the concept 
had been around for quite a long time. For instance, “cultural 
heritage” has a prominent place in the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(1954, Chapter 1, Article 1). 
Consequently, it is not wholly convincing when Patrick Wright 
claims – with reference to Hannah Arendt and others – that the 
heritage concept was regarded in an unfavourable light before 
the 1980s (cf. Wright 2009: xff). Even so, heritage may have con-
veyed unfortunate associations with the German word Ahnenerbe 
(“ancestral heritage”), which was the name of a research institute 
within the SS, the Schutzstaffel, 1933–1945 (Pringle 2006). And 
generally speaking, the heritage concept may have been viewed as 
non- progressive by those who were striving for modernisation. 
In Sweden, the breakthrough for the use of the heritage concept 
has been dated as having occurred in the late 1980s and interpreted 
as part of a realignment of cultural policy (Pettersson 2003: 9, 56ff, 
93, 157). Sweden ratified the World Heritage Convention in 1985 
(Annex 1; whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/se). In 1887, however, 
the concept kulturarf (“heritage”, in the old Swedish spelling) 
appears for the first time in Sweden in a lecture by the author Viktor 
Rydberg on the Middle Ages and what the “Romano-Gauls” had 
taken over from Antiquity (Rydberg 1905: 582). After that, the 
heritage concept was often referred to in public debate, the media, 
and book titles throughout the twentieth century. So even if the 
1980s and 1990s brought a political and economic realignment, 
the question is whether heritage might not once more be identi-
fied by critics as a scapegoat for a development they did not wish 
to see. 
With the establishment of heritage as a central concept, numer-
ous definitions appear, that is, attempts to specify just what herit-
age is. To begin with, heritage actually describes something limited, 
a situation where something is worth protecting and preserving, 
worth canonising, while something else can be omitted from the 
list of priorities. But heritage was given a relatively broad definition 
early on, and since that time it has been expanded even further. 
A strikingly broad definition of cultural heritage as an over-
arching concept is found in the Hague Convention, even though 
 “cultural property” is the main concept here: 
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movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural 
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or 
history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of 
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; 
works of art; manuscripts, books, and other objects of artistic, historical 
or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections, and important 
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property 
defined above. (Hague Convention, 1954, Chapter 1, Article 1a)
A long-term tendency may be observed regarding what may or 
should be heritage, that is, what is heritable. It tends to gradually 
move closer in time, cover more categories, and be globally dissemi-
nated: from Antiquity via the Middle Ages to the Early Modern and 
Modern period, all the way to the present; from single monuments 
and buildings to whole environments or landscapes; and from indi-
vidual countries to the whole world.
The widening of heritage has entailed the inclusion of a number 
of expressions that refer specifically to the modern period and 
modernity. The physical movements of modernity by way of trains, 
cars, planes, rockets, and laser beams; railways, roads, airports, 
launchpads, and power stations – all become of interest as heritage 
to explore, protect, and preserve for the future. One monumental 
example is controversial nuclear power stations such as Barsebäck 
in Sweden and Ignalina in Lithuania (Storm 2010; 2014: 69ff, 94ff). 
Human exploration of space offers another example of cutting-
edge heritage conceptions (O’Leary & Capelotti 2014). 
An expansion also took place when material or tangible heritage 
was supplemented by immaterial or intangible heritage, the dual 
intention being to represent the diversity of heritage more ade-
quately and to make sustainable development possible. The relevant 
principles were laid down in the Convention for the Safeguarding 
of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003; cf. Smith & Akagawa 
2009). Antiquarian management transforms the intangible cultural 
heritage so that it actually becomes tangible (cf. Baxter 2012). 
One example of a broad definition was supplied by English Heritage 
in 2008: “All inherited resources which people value for reasons beyond 
mere utility” (Conservation Principles, English Heritage, 2008; the 
definition no longer appears on the English Heritage website, but it is 
quoted on the Historic England website under Heritage Definitions, 
https://historicengland.org.uk/advice/hpg/hpr-definitions). The defini-
tion is so general that what is regarded as heritage under it cannot 
be differentiated from, or will include, the religious sphere with its 
notions of what is sacred. 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   178 25/01/2021   08:09
Heritage in the present 179
An extension of the concept is also visible in official texts from 
the Swedish National Heritage Board. In 2017, the Board defined 
heritage as, in principle, everything created or influenced by human 
beings: “Heritage refers to all material and intangible expressions 
of human influence – for instance traces, remains, objects, con-
structions, environments, systems, structures, activities, traditions, 
naming customs, knowledge, etc.” (www.raa.se/kulturarv/definition-
av-kulturarv-och-kulturmiljo; cf. Räkna med kulturarvet (“Count 
on heritage”), 2017: 7). Here, heritage has been transformed from a 
broad yet defined concept to something boundless, indeed potentially 
to everything in the present. As Harrison puts it, “almost  anything 
can be perceived to be ‘heritage’” (Harrison 2013: 3).
The tendency to extend definitions of heritage has been criti-
cised. For instance, the lawyer Jeanette Greenfield points out in 
The Return of Cultural Treasures that the term cultural heritage is 
used in such arbitrary, inexact, broad, and general ways that it is, 
in point of fact, useless and ineffective. In addition, she criticises 
UNESCO for producing rhetoric without practical significance 
(Greenfield 1996: 254f, 258). 
When “almost anything can be perceived to be ‘heritage’”, the 
canonical model, in which the very best and finest is selected, must 
be replaced by a more representative model (Harrison 2013: 3 quo-
tation, 18). And in line with this extension, a new view of heritage 
has developed. On the one hand, there is a traditional essential 
perspective that is concerned with the existence of a tangible and 
intangible heritage which has survived from the past until today. 
This heritage needs to be identified and assessed in relation to set 
criteria, so that it may then be protected and preserved for the 
future. On the other hand, there is a constructivist perspective in 
which heritage is a category created in the present in negotiations 
between different actors and interests; to quote from Laurajane 
Smith, “There is, really, no such thing as heritage” (Smith 2006: 11). 
Here, heritage is something that is defined in what is called a 
 heritage process.
With the widening of heritage and a constructivist perspective, 
heritage is now, in the twenty-first century, emphasised as something 
dynamic that is changed and recreated along with the world we live 
in, and as a process in itself (e.g. Convention for the Safeguarding, 
2003: Article 2; Aronsson & Hillström 2005; Harrison 2013: 10; 
Högberg 2013; Schofield 2015). 
Heritage as a concept is on the move, just like the world around 
us. Heritage is modernised. Heritage has become part of an 
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 adaptable modernity, constantly restless and heading towards new 
goals. Or, to put it differently: heritage and modernity, permanence 
and change, have become so entangled with one another that they 
have in effect coalesced into one. 
The crucial value of heritage is often claimed to be its authentic-
ity, from the adjective authentic, which comes from the Latin word 
authenticus and the Greek word authen’tia for principal or genuine 
(OED I, 1989: 795ff). The authentic can be seen as the original, 
that which was there at the beginning, and then it approaches the 
meaning of the arche concept. “Authenticity” is a set heading imme-
diately after the criteria in the presentation of individual World 
Heritage sites in the UNESCO list (whc.unesco.org/en/list). 
Heritage is expected by definition to be a genuine or true trace 
of the past, irrespective of whether heritage is defined narrowly 
or broadly, tangibly or intangibly. But authenticity is a contested 
quality. There is thus no single way of understanding authenticity; 
there are many ways. The concept should therefore be presented in 
the plural as authenticities. 
It is supposedly the authenticity of heritage, its closeness to the 
true past, the past in itself, that creates the foundation for heritage 
tourism (MacCannell 1976: 2f, 91ff, 145ff; Horne 1984: 16f). A 
need for authenticity has also been said to account for an upturn for 
heritage and museums; this need is regarded as a reaction against 
the electronic, the technological, and the artificial in the present 
(Choay 1992 (French): 158ff, 187ff; 2001 (English): 138ff, 164ff). 
And more generally, the wish for authenticity has been interpreted 
as an expression of a modern loss of belief and meaning, that is, 
as yet another example of a reaction to modernity (e.g. Lindholm 
2008; Jones 2010: 186ff). 
Many scholars have pointed to analogies between heritage and 
religion. Remains from the past may be compared with church 
relics, museums with temples, antiquarians with priests, and 
tourism with pilgrimage (e.g. MacCannell 1976; 1999; Horne 
1984; Wangefelt Ström 2006). Heritage is selected in a process 
that is reminiscent of canonisation; and it may be described as a 
phenomenon that satisfies a craving for enchantment where secu-
larisation is gaining ground. 
The fundamental common feature here may be the special 
quality called “sacred” in the religious sphere and “authentic” in the 
antiquarian sphere. The sacredness of religion and the values of her-
itage are one of several expressions of the much-discussed division 
into sacred and profane. With regard to that debate, I want to align 
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myself with the interpretation offered by the historian of religion 
Mircea Eliade in Das Heilige und das Profane (The Sacred and the 
Profane): “daß das Heilige und das Profane zwei Weisen des In-der-
Welt-Seins bilden, zwei existentielle Situationen, die der Mensch im 
Lauf seiner Geschichte ausgebildet hat” (Eliade 1957 (German): 10, 
“that sacred and profane are two modes of being in the world, two 
existential situations assumed by man in the course of his history”; 
1987 (English): 14). These are, however, two perspectives that are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, and the boundary between them 
may shift and slide. 
Even so, “sacred” and “profane” are intangible qualities whose 
status can only be maintained by distancing. Both sacredness and 
authenticity are dependent on authoritative contexts, the existence 
of religious or antiquarian experts who provide confirmation. And 
on close inspection both sacredness and authenticity melt into air, 
as does every tangible or intangible thing – heritage included – that 
encounters the force of modernity. 
The Western view of authenticity has been supplemented by 
an “Asian” view. What has happened is that an essential inter-
pretation of authenticity as permanence on the part of the mate-
rial has been  supplemented by a more constructivist approach. 
That approach emphasises continuity in ideas, forms, and craft 
 traditions – more intangible qualities, in other words. 
According to the Nara Conference in Japan in 1994, authenticity 
should not be interpreted according to set criteria: “heritage prop-
erties must be considered and judged within the cultural contexts to 
which they belong”. The intention is to show respect for the global 
diversity of cultures and heritages, which may be both tangible 
and intangible (The Nara Document on Authenticity, 1994: 11). 
The well-known examples here are stupas, Buddhist buildings for 
relics, and Japanese temples that have been renewed time and again 
but are still perceived as old and well preserved, since the underly-
ing ideas are unchanged (Byrne 1995; Larsen 1995). From 2005 
onwards, the view of the Conference that authenticity depends on 
the cultural context also came to cover World Heritage sites (e.g. 
Operational, 2019: §79ff). 
The critics rightly want to remind us that the authenticity of 
heritage is not always decisive; that it can often be difficult to 
determine what is old or new; and that heritage may consist of 
parts from different periods, or be completely replaced by copies or 
reconstructions. In the words of Cornelius Holtorf, “pastness” is a 
characteristic that can be constructed (Holtorf 2005: 113f; 2013a). 
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Authenticity as a quality therefore depends not only on which 
type of heritage – cultural or natural – is in focus, or on whether the 
heritage is tangible or intangible, but also on the choice of perspec-
tive. The meaning of authenticity depends on the purpose of the 
protection, preservation, and use – whether it is knowledge of truth, 
a narrative of beauty, or the ethics of goodness. If the purpose  is 
to experience the past, the truth of authenticity may therefore be 
subordinate to the narrative’s own inner “truth”. 
“Pastness” constructed with a view to reducing the wear-and-tear 
on the authentic past may be exemplified by the copy of the cave 
at Lascaux in France (WHL 85, 1979). And “pastness” created for 
mediation can be exemplified by the copies of Abu Simbel and by the 
exhibition with Tutankhamun’s tomb that is touring the world. But 
in the case of investments in art, fakes are destroyed when revealed. 
So just as authenticity may vary, the stance adopted in relation to 
authenticity – or its absence – may shift, depending on perspective and 
context. 
At Abu Simbel, it is possible to discuss what is authentic 
and  whether it is a crucial value: seen from a distance, the loca-
tion  and architecture can be described as authentic, but at close 
range they cannot. For the temples stand beside the Nile, but not 
in their original location, even though their orientation in relation 
to the sun is unchanged; they have, after all, been moved. And from 
a distance, the rock and architecture seem authentic; but at close 
hand and in comparison with older pictures, it is revealed that they 
have been cut up, moved, and resited in a modern structure. Nor can 
the monuments as tourist attractions be described as “authentic” 
in the sense of “original” with their present lighting to enhance the 
experience, with walkways and ventilation as protection and for 
the comfort of visitors. Abu Simbel thus has both authentic and 
 non-authentic parts, representing both tradition and modernity, 
and  the visitor is not always made aware of where the bounda-
ries are. And for anyone who is unable to make the trip to Abu 
Simbel, copies or representations in words, images, and film may be 
a  perfectly satisfactory way of learning, experiencing, and assessing.
Ambivalent vandalism
Pierre Boulez praised vigorous, expanding civilisations without 
memory or monuments and continued, “our Western civilization 
would need Red Guards to get rid of a good number of statues or 
even decapitate them. The French Revolution decapitated statues in 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   182 25/01/2021   08:09
Heritage in the present 183
churches; one may regret this now, but it was proof of a civilisation on 
the march” (Boulez 1976: 33; originally to Der Spiegel, 25 September 
1967). Boulez thus wanted assistance from Mao Zedong’s Red Guards, 
who were active in the Chinese Cultural Revolution in 1966–1976. 
His statement was made in the second year of the Cultural Revolution 
and printed in the year when the Revolution ended.
Boulez’s wish had been fulfilled a couple of years earlier, in 1965, 
but at that point the West was able to cope without Red Guards. As 
part of an international campaign under the leadership of UNESCO, 
Pharaoh Ramses II’s faces were sawn off and removed, just like the 
rest of his colossal statues and temples of Abu Simbel. But it hardly 
happened the way Boulez had imagined. For in 1968, the recon-
structed temples with the statues of Ramses II could be reopened at 
new sites, where the rising waters of the Nile no longer threatened 
them. 
Still, Boulez’s wish has been granted on many other occasions. 
Through the ages, history is attended by the deliberate destruction 
of monuments, buildings, sites, and landscapes, both tangible and 
intangible heritage; this is especially so in the last century with 
its world wars, civil wars, and terror. Since 2000 alone, episodes 
of destruction in Bamiyan (WHL 208rev, 2003), Timbuktu (WHL 
119rev, 1988), Aleppo (WHL 21, 1986), and Palmyra (WHL 23bis, 
1980) have shocked the world. 
Understandably, these instances of destruction have generated 
extensive debate and literature across the two cultures of herit-
age, both about specific localities and what can, must, or ought to 
happen to them, and, more generally, about destruction through 
the ages (e.g. Lambourne 2001; Kramer 2007; Boldrick et al. 2013; 
Noyes 2013; Kolrud & Prusac 2014; Bevan 2016). 
The events that have taken place after the turn of the new mil-
lennium raise both specific questions and issues of principle con-
cerning motives and values; protection, preservation, and continued 
use; and possible restoration or reconstruction. The events leave no 
doubt that the remains of the past do, in fact, play a central role in 
the present, for otherwise there would be no reason to deliberately 
destroy these remains or to subsequently endeavour to recreate 
them. But interest in these events may also border on an ambivalent 
fascination with violence, destruction, and death.
The events may be described in neutral terms as a deliberate 
change; but they are more apt to be designated in derogatory 
terms such as damage, destruction, iconoclasm, or vandalism. 
Alternatively, the actors themselves and their adherents want to be 
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able to describe the events as a cleansing or clean-up, in which the 
world is liberated from something unseemly and unwanted. 
“Iconoclasm” means “the breaking or destruction of images”. 
“Iconoclasm” comes from the Greek word eikonokla’stes, eiko’n 
for “a likeness or image” and kla’o for “breaking” (OED: VII, 609). 
The iconoclasm concept is used to describe the deliberate destruc-
tion of images that function as collective symbols. This process may 
involve religious images and monuments which are attacked as part 
of a reformation or revolution. During the invasion of Iraq, for 
instance, the taking down and humiliation of a statue of President 
Saddam Hussein in Paradise Square in Baghdad in 2003 was seen as 
a symbolic demonstration of the capture of the capital and the shift 
of political power (e.g. Bevan 2016: 120ff).
“Vandalism” is another term that is used more generally about 
aggressive and reprehensible destruction. The term refers to the 
sacking of Rome by the Vandals in 455 and was used by Henri 
Grégoire in 1794 – at the same time as the establishment of the her-
itage concept (OED: XIX, 425; Choay 1992 (French): 76ff; 2001 
(English): 63ff; Gamboni 1997: 17ff; Schildgen 2008: 121ff). 
In the rhetoric surrounding the destruction and removal of 
ancient monuments and antiquities from their original archaeologi-
cal sites, those acts are occasionally referred to as rape; that is, they 
are metaphorically equated with a violent sexual assault (e.g. Fagan 
1975; Amery & Cruickshank 1975; Romer & Romer 1993). Rape 
is germane to war situations as the social order is being dissolved. 
Both canonical and critical heritage focus on the destruction of her-
itage, but there is a distinct difference of attitude between the cultures. 
While canonical heritage wants to argue for preserving, protecting, 
and defending heritage, critical heritage – at any rate as encountered 
in its more extreme variants – argues along various lines for not 
preserving, protecting, or defending. The difference in attitudes is so 
marked that it can be claimed to define the two cultures. 
Threats and destruction play a crucial part in canonical heritage 
when it comes to legitimising the need for protection and preserva-
tion. The fact that threats and destruction have and have had an 
important role, both rhetorically and in reality, is clear from the 
field’s own narratives about the ways in which preservation, anti-
quarian institutions, legislation, conventions, and management have 
evolved. The story told by these narratives keeps emphasising threats 
against remains from the past which it was necessary to avert. 
Here mention may be made of the returning fascination with the 
salvage of iconic World Heritage sites that are under very visible 
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threat  – Abu Simbel threatened by the Aswan High Dam (WHL 
88, 1979), the Tower of Pisa threatened by gravity (WHL 395bis, 
1987, 2007), and Venice threatened by both rising waters and tourists 
(WHL 394, 1987). In the specific case of World Heritage sites there is 
a special List of World Heritage in Danger, which is updated annually 
(Convention 1972: Article 11.4; also Operational 2019: §§177–191).
Critical heritage has also been fascinated by threats and destruc-
tion; but for several reasons, it has been sceptical about defending, 
protecting, and preserving heritage. The argument may be that it is 
not that important to preserve an example of heritage that is being 
considered at a particular time; something else is or will be more 
relevant or representative. The argument may also be that vandalism 
is part of the history of heritage, so there is no point in trying to 
prevent it; graffiti may become part of the monument’s biography. 
Moreover, the argument may be that heritage destroyed can be of 
greater  importance or value than heritage preserved; more people are 
engaged in the memory of a lost monument than in one that is still 
in place. In addition, the responsibility is sometimes assigned not to 
the agents but to the antiquarian authorities; the claim made in such 
contexts is that the vandalism would never have happened if the site 
had not had heritage or even World Heritage status. By elevating a site 
to World Heritage, UNESCO is seen as creating a “soft target”; World 
Heritage sites attract threats, risk destruction, and can contribute to 
ongoing conflicts (e.g. Gamboni 2001; Flood 2002; Meskell 2018: 
172ff). The argument has points in common with the blaming of a 
rape victim on the grounds of “provocative” behaviour or clothing. 
In this context, Cornelius Holtorf has reused the concept of crea-
tive destruction in order to stress that the destruction of heritage is 
not necessarily a bad thing. As an example, he mentions the Berlin 
Wall, fragments of which were spread all over the world as relics 
(Holtorf 2005: 144f). 
But nowhere have the canonical and critical arguments been as 
clear as in respect of the blasting of the two sixth-century Buddha 
statues in Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan in 2001. Defenders regard 
the statues as valuable, viewing the event as an example of cul-
tural terrorism and an infringement of international law, holding 
the Taliban responsible (Francioni & Lenzerini 2003). Critics, by 
contrast, put the blame on the West. The Buddha statues are not 
considered to have been valuable. Their empty niches have become 
part of history, and more people than before are taking an active 
interest in Bamiyan. Therefore, the statues should not be recon-
structed (e.g. Gamboni 2001; Flood 2002; Holtorf 2006). 
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To this I would like to reply that the Buddha statues had value 
for the knowledge that they alone could provide and the narratives 
they could communicate; that the empty niches are allowing the 
violence of the Taliban to win; and that the statues may be recreated 
using digital methods. 
But most of all I want to recall the connection between the destruc-
tion of remains of the past and the expulsion, rape, and murder 
of human beings. Vandalism and mass murder are companions in 
conflicts (Kramer 2007; Bevan 2016). The French Revolution, eulo-
gised by Boulez, is an early and illuminating example. In the course 
of it, quite a number of both humans and statues were decapitated. 
And the past century supplies notorious examples of bombings or 
massacres such as Guernica in 1937; Coventry in 1940; Oradour-
sur-Glane and Warsaw in 1944; Dresden in 1945; Mostar in 1993; 
Bamiyan in 2001; Timbuktu and Aleppo in 2012, and Palmyra 
in 2015, in all of which material destruction and massacre took 
place side by side. In Palmyra, the Roman amphitheatre was thus 
used in order to stage public executions. The aim in defiling and 
harming heritage is to defile and harm individuals, groups, peoples, 
and nations for whom this heritage is important. But it is never the 
victim who should bear the responsibility.
Remains of the past that are designated as heritage and World 
Heritage are given greater attention and normally attract more 
tourists. That makes for tourism that threatens to bring greater 
wear and degradation. At well-known tourist destinations and 
World Heritage sites such as the Pyramids (WHL 86, 1979), the Taj 
Mahal (WHL 252, 1983), Venice (WHL 394, 1987), and Angkor 
Wat (WHL 668, 1992), tourism is considered a problem. At the 
Palaeolithic caves at Lascaux (WHL 85, 1979), the problem has 
been solved by directing tourists to a replica. And at Stonehenge, 
visitors are kept at a good distance (WHL 373bis, 1986, 2008).
In the choice between preserving and destroying, it is possible to 
go for both options. Preservation of something may require some-
thing else to disappear, or the choice can be made to preserve in one 
context and destroy in another. Pope Pius II protected ancient ruins 
in Rome; but the same pope caused other ancient constructions to 
be dismantled (Schnapp 1993 (French): 338f; 1996 (English): 339f). 
On its home ground in Sweden, the engineering firm VBB built 
dams for hydropower plants that entailed the destruction of nature 
and ancient monuments; but in Egypt it contributed to moving 
Abu Simbel. Generally speaking, modernity may both rescue and 
threaten, both create and vandalise. 
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Something is elevated to heritage – perhaps even to World 
 Heritage – while other things, and more things, are changed and 
disappear. Most of what has happened is never recorded in history; 
it is forgotten, and none of it remains. Critics may discern a con-
spiratorial strategy here. “Cultural reservations” are created and 
can serve as an alibi to legitimise destruction. But the same strategy 
can also simply be described as a necessary prioritisation, because 
everything cannot always stay the same. Preservation must necessar-
ily involve a choice. Priorities are set, selected parts being expected 
to represent the whole, just as with the metonymic copying and use 
of spolia in the Middle Ages (cf. Krautheimer 1942; 1969). 
In critical heritage, a third way between preserving and destroy-
ing is also proposed: it consists in letting decay take its course, 
a post-preservation model – mainly with modern examples. This 
approach amounts to accepting that everything changes and van-
ishes, and curating without conserving or controlling (DeSilvey 
2017). But a hospice model, watching and perhaps alleviating 
without actively intervening, is also a choice. It means giving prior-
ity to the narrative about and reflection on impermanence, rather 
than to the possibility of gaining new knowledge or to the physical 
preservation of evidence. The choice of strategy therefore depends 
on what one wants with and for the remains of the past.
Abu Simbel was salvaged, but had to be changed as part of the 
salvage campaign. The temples could also have been documented and 
then removed. Or it would have been possible to look on, in a con-
templative mode, watching the rising Nile and the drowning temples. 
However, which solution was and is the right one remains an 
open question; that is, whether it was and is right to defend, protect, 
and preserve the temples of Abu Simbel, thereby assisting Pharaoh 
Ramses II in his ambition to attain monumental immortality. With 
reference to Kant’s categorical and hypothetical imperatives: is the 
preservation of Abu Simbel a good end in itself? Or is its preserva-
tion a means of achieving the good? There is no definitive answer. 
Consequently, we cannot avoid the existential challenge of 
choosing among options all of which may have both good and bad 
consequences. But if we do not choose ourselves, others will choose 
for us. We cannot avoid heritage policy.
Heritage and modernity
Heritage and modernity have been described as opposing concepts. 
However, they are merely examples from a larger field in which 
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expressions are set up as mutually contradictory – like black and 
white pieces facing one another on a chessboard. On one side of 
the field stand history, memory, heritage, tradition, monuments, 
memorials, museums, conservation, and nostalgia, and on the 
opposite side stand change, progress, modernity, modernisation, 
modernism, industrialisation, urbanisation, and secularisation. 
But as a metaphor, the game of chess soon turns out to be 
insufficient for describing the relationship between heritage and 
modernity. For while a move by one side is indeed followed by a 
countermove by the other, there is no single set of rules of the game, 
and the pieces seem to be able to change their roles as the game 
proceeds; in fact, they even seem to be able to change colour and 
thereby side in the game. The relationship between heritage and 
modernity is hence characterised by profound ambivalence.
Heritage and modernity may threaten each other. Heritage may 
prevent further modernisation – and modernisation may threaten 
the continued existence of heritage. In that case, extensive heritage 
might mean less modernity – and more modernity might mean less 
heritage, assuming a zero-sum game with ideas ranged against ideas 
and materiality ranged against materiality. 
At the same time, though, modernity constantly makes more 
advanced forms of protection and preservation possible, and 
is therefore also a resource. And heritage may contribute, as a 
resource, to modernisation. What is a threat and what is a resource 
thus depends entirely on the perspective adopted.
Outside a zero-sum game of ideas and materiality, the importance 
of heritage may increase the more it is threatened. This would mean 
that the importance of the phenomenon of heritage would increase 
when modernity increases (e.g. Lübbe 1982; 1983; 1996; Marquard 
1986; 2000; Choay 1992 (French); 2001 (English); Huyssen 1995). 
But the importance of heritage might also increase when modernity 
decreases (e.g. Wright 1985; Hewison 1987; Heller 1988; Füredi 
1992; Beckman 1993a; 1993b; Friedman 1994; Lowenthal 2011 
YouTube). 
There are two tendencies here. First, heritage that is threatened 
or decreases becomes rarer, and therefore increases in value. Second, 
changes in modernity, both upturns and downturns, create social 
uncertainty, for which compensation is sought. And the compensa-
tion may appear during periods of social, technological, or economic 
modernisation with or without confidence in modernity as an idea. 
Turning the argument around, I think that the importance of 
modernity may also increase when heritage increases or decreases. 
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A modernity that is threatened or decreases becomes more valu-
able. And changes in heritage may cause an experience of crisis. 
For here it is possible to observe how the experience of an increase 
creates unease and irritation among critics of heritage, who want 
more modernity instead (e.g. Boulez 1976; Hewison 1987; Heller 
1988; Füredi 1992). Conversely, a person who is favourably dis-
posed towards heritage, as in canonical heritage, will interpret an 
increase as a social expansion and democratisation, which gives 
more people the possibility of acquiring a fair share of heritage (e.g. 
Kristiansen 1981). 
Heritage and modernity as a dichotomy is thus, at a first glance, 
plausible and rhetorically powerful; but it is a misleading simplifi-
cation that fails to convince on closer inspection. For the concepts 
are contested, ambiguous, and entangled with each other. 
Heritage and modernity are both contested concepts. They gener-
ate either positive or negative associations and rarely leave anyone 
unaffected. Canonical heritage regards heritage as something posi-
tive, a resource that needs to be protected and preserved for the 
future. Here an increase in heritage may represent a success. In 
critical heritage, by contrast – as formulated most clearly by Robert 
Hewison  – heritage represents “bogus history” (Hewison 1987: 
144). A relative increase in heritage may therefore in itself be inter-
preted as a sign of crisis. For some, modernity represents progress 
to strive for; for others, it constitutes an unwanted development. 
Heritage has multiple meanings. Heritage can be associated 
with the unchanging, stasis, and the past; but present-day herit-
age includes modern examples representing change, speed, and 
the future. On the one hand, heritage is a modern concept that 
gradually established itself in the course of the twentieth century. 
On the  other hand, heritage may consist of both tangible and 
intangible phenomena that may belong to widely different eras, 
including the modern era. 
Modernity has multiple meanings, too. Modernity is associated 
with speed, transience, and renewal both in the world of ideas and 
in the material world. Modernity is thus bound up with the univer-
sal ideas of the Enlightenment as well as with the market economy 
and its creative destruction. 
The entanglement of heritage and modernity can be demon-
strated in several areas – in the modern context of the heritage 
concept, in the inclusion of modern phenomena in heritage, in 
the use of heritage in a modernisation of society, and finally in a 
 modernisation of the concept itself.
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The concept of heritage belongs, in itself, to the modern epoch. 
The concept appears in 1794 during the French Revolution, 
occurs throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and has 
its breakthrough in the 1970s as a collective term for whatever 
should be protected and preserved among the things that previous 
 generations have passed on to posterity. 
Heritage may be associated with the unchanging, stasis, and the 
past; but the boundary for what should be preserved and protected is 
constantly being moved forward in time, into the modern epoch and 
closer to the present. For example, in 2014 Sweden specified a limit 
at 1850 for antiquities (Swedish fornfynd) and ancient monuments 
(Swedish fornlämningar) in the Historic Environment Act (1988: 950). 
The establishment of industrial heritage as worth protect-
ing and preserving is evidence that heritage now also includes an 
archetypal expression of modernity. An interest in the remains of 
early  industrialisation emerged in the UK in the decades after the 
Second World War. But interest in closed-down industries as heritage 
increased especially after the deindustrialisation of the West in the 
1970s (Alzén 1996; Edensor 2005; Storm 2008, 2014; Willim 2008). 
Heritage has also come to be used in strategies for improving 
or modernising society. Here heritage is used as a tool in some-
thing that can rightly be called heritage policy, a will to bring about 
change and improvement using heritage as one of several instru-
ments. Consequently, heritage is regarded as a resource for foster-
ing identity, tourism, and economic development; for generating 
sustainable development; and for work on diversity and solving 
other current tasks in the present. This happens without the agents 
involved themselves necessarily wanting to refer to the strategy as 
 modernisation; on the contrary, modernisation as a controversial 
concept and phenomenon may be something they consciously reject. 
When heritage is redefined from something enduring to some-
thing undergoing change, from a stable phenomenon to a process 
in the present, that redefinition constitutes conclusive evidence of 
the modernisation of the concept. Heritage as a concept and prac-
tice then itself becomes part of modernity where, as is well known, 
“All That Is Solid Melts into Air” (cf. Berman 1982).
Heritage in the present
The past is everywhere, and heritage is everywhere. Often these 
words are used a bit haphazardly as synonyms. There is also a ten-
dency for more and more of the past to be regarded as heritage 
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worth protecting and preserving, so the words are gradually coming 
to denote the same field. But the past and heritage are not identical. 
When Lowenthal writes that “The past is everywhere” (Lowenthal 
1985: xv; 2015: 1), what he must really mean is that he sees remains 
of the past everywhere, and that these remains are being given too 
much attention. And when Lowenthal writes that “heritage is every-
where” (Lowenthal 1997: ix), this is a variant of the same observa-
tion, his point being that one type of remains of the past, namely 
heritage, is spreading at the expense of history and memory. 
The past in itself is both gone forever and ever-present. The events 
of the past are gone forever; but tangible and intangible remains of 
the past are ever-present as texts, images, memories, objects, and 
buildings. With their permanence, they reach across to us in our 
present. Everything in the present is made up of these accumulated 
remains of the past (Olivier 1999). Even that which we experience 
as the present moment is a memory, constructed by the brain from 
previously registered impressions (Eagleman 2016: 39ff). In this 
way the past may, in an initial response, be said to be everywhere, to 
quote Lowenthal again. But a more correct statement would be that 
the remains of the past are everywhere, and remains of the past are 
everything that exists. 
The present is therefore a mosaic of remains of the past, a mosaic 
whose component parts are of different ages. The development 
from a past reality to the present-day mosaic is termed a “forma-
tion process” in archaeology; this describes the formation of the 
source material of the present. It is a sequence of events in which the 
original world is reduced over time, both through natural processes 
and by means of active human interventions that may be either 
preservative or destructive. The formation process has attracted 
methodological interest owing to its potential when it comes to 
determining, with a fair degree of precision, the extent to which 
current remains, sources, and durations are representative of a past 
reality (e.g. Kristiansen 1985; Lucas 2012). 
When the present is made up of accumulated remains of the 
past, the whole of the present can be termed an “inheritance”, or 
something we take over from generations who came before us. And 
we inherit the remains of the past, whether or not we want to do so. 
In consequence, every single thing in the present could be termed 
either cultural heritage or natural heritage; and the  formation 
process could instead be referred to as a heritage process. 
But as long as not all remains of the past are regarded as herit-
age, the heritage process will have to be kept separate from the 
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 formation process. First, there is a sequence of events in the course 
of which the remains of the past are formed – the formation 
process; then comes a selection of what will be heritage – the herit-
age process. But after that, the selection of heritage will obviously 
affect what will survive in the future from the past; that is, what will 
be given permanence. 
The sequence of events in the course of which something comes to 
be selected as heritage – as worth defending, protecting, preserving, 
and possibly also continuing to use – is termed the “heritage process” 
(e.g. Grundberg 2000: 17ff, 47ff). The heritage process is a canonisa-
tion process in which parts of the past are assigned special values. 
It is a sequence of events in which a minor part is selected from the 
large quantity of remains of the past in a deliberate action that priori-
tises certain individual component parts of the mosaic for the future. 
The heritage process is regulated and made visible both through 
conventions, legislation, justifications, and criteria, and through 
established professional practice and antiquarian authorities and 
institutions. And the heritage process can be examined, discussed, 
and criticised in relation to issues of representativeness and  different 
interests. 
What is given permanence and survives up to the present depends 
entirely on what remains are involved, when they are from, and in 
what context they are found. The same applies to what is selected as 
heritage. Here, however, everyone can assert their own, individual, 
heritage. But what is crucial for permanence is whether the remains 
are given collective attention and recognition by those who actually 
have the possibility and the power to determine that something is not 
only called heritage, but is also treated accordingly in practice. 
In the formation process, the stone temples of Abu Simbel carved 
out of the cliffs stand a better chance of achieving permanence than 
the Nubian buildings of clay, just as the narratives of Ramses II 
have better prospects of surviving than those about the slaves who 
toiled in their construction. But irrespective of category, irrespective 
of whether history, memory, or heritage is involved, the great bulk 
disappears over time. So even if the remains of the past are all that 
exists, the past has been so much more.
In the heritage process, what can and should be selected for the 
future is, in principle, an open question. Even though Abu Simbel 
has lasted until today, more or less unchanged, it did not necessarily 
also have to be recognised as a heritage worth defending, protect-
ing, preserving, and also continuing to use in the future. Irrespective 
of the fact that Abu Simbel is part of a World Heritage site, this is a 
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priority set among many potential tangible and intangible cultural 
heritages, and that priority may be changed in the years ahead. 
With the global spread of modernity, with accelerating moderni-
sation, the set of potential cultural heritages is also increasing, while 
the set of natural heritages is perhaps decreasing to a corresponding 
degree. Ever more from the modern epoch may therefore come into 
consideration for protection and preservation, which may force the 
setting of priorities between pre-modern and modern remains. 
What, then, have people through the ages prioritised for protec-
tion and preservation? What is it in the inheritance from the past 
that has been thought to be so valuable that it needs to attain per-
manence? With a metaphorical analogy to natural selection in evo-
lution, heritage can be identified as the usable part of the past at any 
moment. What some interested party considered useful has been 
accorded permanence, provided that that person, group, author-
ity, state, or world community, whoever or whatever they may be, 
has also had the necessary means to actually ensure permanence. 
Conversely, it is the non-usable, the useless, that was not prioritised 
and was allowed to disappear. 
What is usable or useful varies over time and space and between 
different epochs, countries, cultures, groups, and individuals. 
Priorities are always set between different justifications, motives, 
and values, and there is always a choice between acting and remain-
ing passive. The heritage process – the selection of what is to be 
protected, preserved, and possibly also used – is therefore a ques-
tion of both values and will, of both ethics and politics, of heritage 
ethics and heritage politics. 
Heritage is a term for a way of regarding and relating to a 
 tangible and intangible present. Heritage thus represents both 
a perspective  and a practice. Employing the heritage concept, we 
bestow values on parts of the present and may choose to act as a 
consequence of that. We identify parts of the present as usable and 
useful for the reason that they constitute an important legacy from 
the past, whereas other parts are allowed to remain unrecorded or 
be forgotten or destroyed. This means that heritage is here and now. 
And it connects with everything that engages people in the present – 
politics, economics, religion, culture, identity, climate, or health. 
Hence it can come as no surprise that heritage can be – indeed, 
generally is – controversial. 
Questions about heritage are always fundamentally ethical and 
political because they are about a choice of values and a will to 
point out a direction in the present. When it is sometimes claimed in 
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a debate that heritage is now being “politicised”, this is unreflecting 
rhetoric. The cry of politicisation means that someone is trying to 
assert values and an aim that diverge from the established view or 
the respondent’s own standpoint, which is seen as self-evident. The 
paradigm of normality is being challenged. 
Justifications, motives, and values can be categorised, that is, 
grouped and systematically structured so as to provide an overview. 
Friedrich Nietzsche identified the use of history as either monumental, 
antiquarian, or critical (Nietzsche 1874 (German); 2005 (English)), 
which, when translated into the language of politics, becomes a reac-
tionary, conservative, or revolutionary usage. For my part, I have 
argued for a different categorisation based on the triad of the true, 
the beautiful, and the good in the search for knowledge, narratives, 
or justice. But there are no limits to the justifications, motives, and 
values that can be formulated. For we constantly find new ways of 
interpreting the remains of the past so that they remain relevant and 
useful. 
Instead of asking about justifications, motives, and values, we 
might examine practice, or what happens to heritage. With this 
change of focus, a practice can be discerned on the basis of the 
two parts in which the concept of time is divided, change and 
 permanence – a practice that runs along a scale from prioritising 
and accepting change to prioritising and accepting preservation. 
Heritage may be deliberately removed because it is seen as an 
impediment to change; heritage may be an impediment to moder-
nity – in the construction of a new motorway, for instance. Heritage 
can be deliberately destroyed, vandalised, as a reaction against 
what it stands for, as in the case of the Buddha statues in Bamiyan. 
Heritage may also be deliberately consumed, an act justified by the 
claim that new and different heritage will always come along and 
be able to replace the old. And heritage can be allowed to decay 
and disappear as an instructive example of impermanence, an act of 
contemplation ahead of the end. The choice of change is the point 
on the scale where we find the most extreme modernists. 
Another option consists in the balancing of change and perma-
nence. Some of the remains of the past are selected as heritage to 
be protected and preserved, while other traces are allowed to disap-
pear. This is a compromise in which representative or usable parts 
of a whole are selected. The challenge here is to be able to argue, 
in each individual case, for how change and permanence are to be 
balanced. This is the place on the scale where we find canonical 
heritage with its management, priorities, and criteria. 
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Finally, the remains of the past may, seen as a whole, be regarded 
as heritage that should be protected and preserved. Everything can 
be heritage, as English Heritage and the Swedish National Heritage 
Board have claimed. For everything may be important to someone, 
now or in the future. This is where we find the more extreme 
 antiquarian attitude that reacts every time a change is on the way. 
The different options along the scale may be concretised in the 
face of the temples of Abu Simbel: prioritising the modernisation of 
the Aswan High Dam and letting the temples drown in the Nile;. 
effecting a compromise in which the temples are relocated, mod-
ernised, and remain usable; or prioritising the temples and moving 
or abandoning the plan for a power plant by the Nile. As we know, 
the actual outcome was a compromise in the form of UNESCO’s 
salvage action in the 1960s. But in the shadow cast by the famous 
temples, innumerable other remains were either merely documented 
or not given any priority at all.
The two cultures of heritage – the canonical and the critical – 
were both represented in an anthology edited by Lowenthal and the 
historian of architecture Marcus Binney, Our Past before Us: Why 
do we save it? (1981). Lowenthal appeared in it with his engage-
ment in issues of preservation and heritage, while Binney was 
already engaged in SAVE Britain’s Heritage. Lowenthal concluded 
with four theses: 
What to save. We should save more than we might like to, remembering 
the pace of destruction and the needs of posterity.
How to use what we save. Not everything old belongs in museums 
or historic precincts; most of what is saved should be a vital part of 
the present.
Coping with the contrived. The past is what we make of it, not only 
what it was; the process of preservation changes the look and feel, 
if not the form and substance, of protected sites and artefacts. We 
must accept many such transformations as inevitable.
The past as inspiration. We do not preserve too much but do too 
little besides; we could treat our heritage more creatively. Past and 
present should often be commingled, not separated. (Lowenthal in 
Lowenthal & Binney 1981: 235f)
If, having reached this point, anyone is looking for clear positions, 
advice, or guidelines about how heritage can, should, or must be 
handled, I would like to highlight what the relatively “young” 
David Lowenthal wrote before his criticism of heritage became 
radicalised.
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Figure 6 Agricultural landscape of Southern Öland. Photo © Bodil 
Petersson, 2019.




The focus of the inquiry will now shift to World Heritage and to the 
temples of Abu Simbel and other sites. Focusing on World Heritage 
means that the inquiry’s questions about the past and its history, 
memory, and heritage will now be given precise coordinates: why, 
then, identify, examine, document, protect, preserve, mediate, and 
also develop World Heritage? Is it not a Sisyphean – an absurd or 
meaningless – task to try to protect and preserve World Heritage 
for the unlimited future? So, why even bother to define a special 
category of World Heritage sites?
World Heritage sites are defined as monuments, buildings, and 
places of outstanding universal value which require protection and 
preservation for future generations. World Heritage may be cul-
tural heritage, natural heritage, or a combination of both. World 
Heritage therefore represents both an idea and something concrete 
that can be visited. 
In a world full of diversity and conflicts, where people are sepa-
rated by gender, language, culture, history, religion, politics, and 
economics, the World Heritage List is an attempt at a common 
global perspective and a common global responsibility. In their 
encounter with World Heritage, human beings are expected to be 
part of humanity. As both an idea and a practice, World Heritage is 
therefore connected to the universalism of the Age of Enlightenment. 
World Heritage sites have been chosen as Archimedean points 
to represent heritage globally, or, to use another metaphor, chosen 
as a main thread throughout this inquiry. There are several reasons 
for this choice. World Heritage sites form a well-defined category 
of cultural and natural heritage linked to clearly formulated jus-
tifications, criteria, and provisions for their proper use. World 
Heritage sites are found all over the globe, and they cover all 
periods and numerous types of monuments, buildings, locations, 
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and  landscapes. There is extensive but relatively accessible informa-
tion at local, national, and international levels about the individual 
sites, providing facts, descriptions, criteria, protection details, and 
action plans. The information is available on the Internet and in 
numerous documents, reports, articles, and books. This makes it 
possible to compare sites, countries, and regions, to switch focus 
between individual sites and a broad global overview, and to move 
between the world of ideas and the material sphere. There is also 
extensive literature about World Heritage as a phenomenon – about 
its emergence and establishment and about the upholding of the 
Convention with its lists. Moreover, World Heritage as both an 
idea and a practice is surrounded by a debate in which dissimilar 
perspectives are represented. Once again, World Heritage sites are 
“good to think with” – and they are good to visit, too. 
The roads to the adoption of UNESCO’s Convention Concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), 
also known as the World Heritage Convention, are described in 
many contexts. However, the content of these histories varies with 
the purposes and perspectives concerned. A point on which they 
diverge especially markedly is the question how far back in time the 
origins of the Convention are sought – back to 1965, 1959, 1945, 
1919, the 1870s, 1789, or the seventeenth century. 
The shortest history was presented by persons involved in 
the creation of the Convention: two assistant directors-general 
of UNESCO, the engineer Michel Batisse and the lawyer Gérard 
Bolla. In L’invention du “patrimoine mondial” (2003) (English: The 
Invention of “World Heritage”, 2005), they describe a heroic process 
in which international agents with different interests presented 
rival proposals that could finally be reconciled with the Convention 
as a compromise, a process in which they themselves played a 
crucial role. The synthesis, which placed protection of nature and 
of culture within the framework of one and the same convention, 
is highlighted as a diplomatic achievement; Batisse represented 
nature conservation and Bolla cultural preservation. They describe 
the proposal, put forward at a conference at the White House in 
Washington DC in 1965, for a “World Heritage Trust” to protect 
“natural and scenic areas and historic sites”; the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), 
which proposed a similar trust in 1968; and UNESCO’s own plans 
for cultural heritage. The solution, which was proposed at a UN 
conference on the human environment in Stockholm in 1972, was 
a convention with the name World Heritage, covering both culture 
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and nature and including a fund. The World Heritage Convention 
was subsequently adopted in Paris on 16 November 1972. 
The dominant account of the background to the World Heritage 
Convention places UNESCO in the centre and starts out from Abu 
Simbel. It appears in official contexts at UNESCO and its World 
Heritage Centre and in the literature about World Heritage and the 
Nubian campaign (e.g. Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 220f; Batisse 1992; 
1996: 217f; Batisse & Bolla 2003 (French): 97; 2005 (English): 
92; World Heritage Information Kit, 2008: 7f; whc.unesco.org/
en/convention). The starting point is located at UNESCO’s inter-
national campaign from 1959 to 1960 to salvage the temples and 
other threatened ancient monuments along the Nile. Even at this 
early date, a convention for the protection of cultural heritage is 
said to have been in preparation. Mention is also made of a step-
by-step development with the UNESCO “Recommendation on the 
Safeguarding of the Beauty and Character of Landscapes and Sites” 
in 1962, the White House conference in 1965, the campaign spear-
headed by UNESCO to save Venice after the floods in 1966, and 
the IUCN proposal of a World Heritage Trust in 1968. After a first 
draft presented at the UN Conference in Stockholm in 1972, experts 
from UNESCO, ICOMOS, and IUCN prepared the final convention 
proposal, which could be adopted in Paris that same year.
The background to the World Heritage Convention may also be 
followed back to the Second World War (e.g. Labadi 2013: 26ff). 
After the war’s massive destruction and breakdown of the political 
order, developments restarted with new organisations. The UN and 
UNESCO were founded in 1945. And the Hague Convention for 
the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(1954) laid down provisions for protection that stressed the cul-
tural heritage and its protection as an international responsibility, 
as is evident in the following quotations: “the cultural heritage of 
all mankind” and “the preservation of the cultural heritage is of 
great importance for all peoples of the world and … it is important 
that this heritage should receive international protection” (Hague 
Convention, 1954: 8). 
The origins of the World Heritage Convention may be traced 
back to the experience of the First World War, in which many mon-
uments were destroyed. There are accounts of a development that 
started with the League of Nations, which was founded in 1919; the 
formation of the International Museums Office; and a conference 
in Athens in 1931, which resulted in a first international resolution 
on the protection of historic monuments, the Athens Charter for 
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Restoration of Historic Monuments (Titchen 1995: 12ff; Labadi 
2007: 26ff; Cameron & Rössler 2013: 1ff). 
However, there were initiatives for protection and preservation 
across nations as early as the decades after 1870, a period charac-
terised by colonial great powers of which the British Empire was the 
greatest. Alongside a gradual professionalisation and the building 
up of protection and preservation at national level, there were also 
international contacts, especially in the Church, the  universities, 
and the world of diplomacy (Hall 2011). 
The emergence of antiquarian protection and preservation can 
also be traced back to the Enlightenment ideas of a public sphere 
and to reactions against the French Revolution in 1789. Here, 
too, there were international contacts and ambitions, as well as 
both cooperation and rivalry between the great powers of France, 
Britain, and Germany (Harrison 2013: 42ff; Swenson 2013). 
It is, of course, possible to follow the idea of a canonised cultural 
heritage even further back in time. Initiatives involving ideas of 
protection during the wars of the seventeenth century form one 
example (e.g. Titchen 1995: 13f). So do earlier, more sporadic pro-
tection and preservation endeavours, such as preservation through 
reuse as spolia and the wonders of Antiquity that, in the eyes of that 
age, represented precisely the outstanding and universal.
The World Heritage Convention from 1972 has now itself become 
history, memory, and an intangible heritage. But what is it that is to 
be told, remembered, and preserved? Ideas about the Convention’s 
origins vary with the individual commentator’s purpose and choice 
of perspective. Narratives of its background provide an understand-
ing and explanation of the establishment of the Convention, but 
they do more than that. For history-writing is not solely informative. 
The various accounts of the Convention’s gradual development, 
which was attended by difficulties that had to be overcome by means 
of diplomatic ingenuity and successful campaigns geared to avert-
ing threats against it, confer legitimacy both on the Convention in 
its present form and on UNESCO and the World Heritage Centre 
as managers of the Convention. This is, once again, a typical Whig 
writing of history, in which the Convention and, indirectly, its 
 institutions are the self-evident goal of the developmental efforts. 
The Convention as innovation
The World Heritage Convention belongs to the modern epoch with 
its optimism about progress and its universal ambitions in the wake 
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of the Enlightenment. More specifically, ideas about a special cat-
egory for global protection and preservation emerged gradually in 
the twentieth century, the salvage campaign for Abu Simbel form-
ing an important milestone. They were realised with UNESCO’s 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage in 1972 (WHC 1972). 
The practical management of the Convention is characterised by 
modernity, with a thorough bureaucratisation at the World Heritage 
Centre in Paris and (in principle) rational processes, criteria, and 
regulations. For instance, the Centre organises annual sessions as 
well as seminars and workshops, advises countries about nomi-
nations, organises financial and other support for World Heritage 
sites, updates the World Heritage List with the associated data-
base, and develops educational materials. And the Centre itself is 
based in UNESCO’s headquarters at Place de Fontenoy in Paris – a 
complex of buildings in glass and concrete from 1958, shaped like a 
three-pointed star, which radiates modern architecture of its period 
(cf. whc.unesco.org/en/world-heritage-centre). 
World Heritage is a new concept, stemming from the idea of 
a particularly outstanding category of heritage that requires its 
own status, protection, preservation, and management. And World 
Heritage is an idea that has been transformed into a practical 
reality; that is, an innovation.
According to Michel Batisse, the World Heritage Convention has 
three central components that are perceived as innovative, both 
jointly and separately. The first is that places of “outstanding uni-
versal value” should be seen as a “common heritage”. The second 
is the drawing up of the World Heritage List. And the third is that 
cultural and natural heritage are given equal standing. Then comes 
a fourth in the form of the concept of World Heritage itself (Batisse 
& Bolla 2003 (French): 14ff; 2005 (English): 14ff). 
However, national lists of monuments to be protected and pre-
served can be followed back to the legislation and inventories of 
the seventeenth century (cf. Jensen 2002: 325ff). The concepts of 
“common heritage”, “universal value”, and “universal protection” 
appear in the appeal made by UNESCO’s Director-General Vittorino 
Veronese on behalf of the Nubian campaign in 1960 (Veronese 
1960: 7). The word “outstanding” is not found in the appeal, but it 
contains a related phrase: “[w]ondrous structures, ranking among 
the most magnificent on earth”. The concept of a “World Heritage 
Fund” was formulated by the lawyer Russell E. Train in Washington 
in 1965; but for linguistic reasons (there is no equivalent of “trust 
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fund” in French) it had to be changed to World Heritage (Batisse & 
Bolla 2003 (French): 17ff, 48, 98f; 2005 (English): 16f, 44, 94). The 
coordination of cultural and natural heritage was the final element 
to be put in place. 
The concept of innovation comes from the Latin word innovare, 
which means “to renew” and originates from the word novus for 
“new”. Innovations are new ideas, products, or methods that have 
also come into use. The words “innovation” and “modernisation” 
are partial synonyms. Innovations are thus something central, but 
not unique, to modernity. 
Innovation is an extensive field of research in its own right where 
researchers have, for instance, worked on models for the chronolog-
ical and geographical dissemination of new technologies. Particular 
inspiration is provided by the classic work Diffusion of Innovations 
(2003) by the sociologist Everett M. Rogers. On the basis of a great 
deal of empirical material, Rogers tried to systematise and generalise 
the course of the innovation process, examining when, where, and 
how innovations spread in social networks. According to Rogers, 
this development follows a bell-shaped curve when frequency 
is measured over time and an S-shaped curve when it is regarded as 
a cumulative process. He divided the agents involved in the process 
of innovation into five phases –  innovators (2.5 %), early adop-
ters  (13.5  %), early majority (34  %), late  majority (34  %), and 
laggards (16 %) (Rogers 2003). 
Instead of analysing technical innovations such as tiles, clocks, 
phones, or tractors, the present discussion focuses on an interna-
tional convention in which traces of the past are canonised. Inspired 
by Rogers, I wonder when, where, and how the World Heritage 
Convention was and is being disseminated as an idea and as a 
practice. Does it adhere to the same curve as other innovations? 
Who were the social agents involved in the process? Moreover, how 
was World Heritage as an innovation affected by criticism and by 
potential competition? And is World Heritage as an idea threatened 
by creative destruction, like other innovations?
On the basis of facts collected directly from UNESCO and the 
World Heritage Centre, World Heritage can be analysed as an inno-
vation (Appendix 2). It is possible to follow how ever more coun-
tries ratify the Convention over time, and to identify the points in 
time when signatory countries are given their first World Heritage. 
In preparing and interpreting the statistics, account must be taken 
of the fact that the potential “market” grows over time with the 
formation of new states. There has thus been a striking increase in 
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the number of UN member states that can accede to the Convention 
since 1972, when it was 132 countries, to the present number of 
193 (whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties; September 2020). 
The World Heritage Convention came into being in 1972; and 
the first country to ratify it, in 1973, was the US, which had also 
played a central role in the whole process (cf. Batisse & Bolla 2003 
(French): 32, 89; 2005 (English): 29, 85) – as one of the world’s 
two superpowers at that time, serving as a model for others. In 
1974, a further nine countries followed – Egypt (7 February), Iraq 
(5 March), Bulgaria (7 March), Sudan (6 June), Algeria (24 June), 
Australia (22 August), Democratic Republic of the Congo (23 
September), Nigeria (23 October), and Niger (23 December). By 
the end of 1974, 10 (7.2 %) of the UN’s then 138 member states 
had ratified the Convention. The Convention was formally able 
to enter into force when ratified by 20 countries, and this number 
was reached with the accession of Switzerland in 1975. The first 20 
countries hence created the necessary critical mass for the  continued 
existence of the Convention.
It may be noted here that out of the first 10 ratifying countries, 
6 were involved in UNESCO’s salvage campaign in Nubia, either as 
hosts or as donors (cf. Säve-Söderbergh 1987: 232). Moreover, with 
these first 20 countries, all 5 inhabited continents were represented; 
that is, both the “old” and the “new” world. 
If we follow Rogers, the innovators would be the first 2.5 %, 
a figure achieved with the accession of Bulgaria in March 1974. 
This would mean that four countries were the innovators – the US, 
Egypt, Iraq, and Bulgaria. But that would amount to interpreting 
the material in an overly formalistic way. In view of the differences 
in respect of administrative and political systems between these 
countries, it would be a mistake to attribute too much importance 
to a few months or a year here or there in the date of ratification. 
In the course of the subsequent years, the number of countries 
ratifying the Convention remained relatively constant between 0 
(2008, 2013, 2015) and, at most, 10 (1975) new countries per year. 
Phase 1 (innovators, 2.5 %) was thus reached in 1974, phase 2 
(early adopters, cumulative figure 16 %) in 1976, phase 3 (early 
majority, 50  %) in 1984, and phase 4 (late majority, 84  %) in 
2000, while phase 5 (laggards, up to 100 %) closed in 2020. More 
than 90 % of UN member states had ratified the Convention by 
2002  – and those ratifying thereafter are mostly small or new 
states like Swaziland (2005), Cook Islands (2009), South Sudan 
(2016) and then, most recently, Somalia (2020). The dissemination 
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of the innovation over time may be described as relatively rapid, 
as 50 % was attained a mere 12 years after the Convention came 
into being. 
It is worth observing that France, as the seat of UNESCO and the 
World Heritage Centre, joined in 1975 in phase 2 while the Nordic 
countries, for instance, belong to phase 3 (Norway 1977, Denmark 
1979) or phase 4 (Sweden 1985, Finland 1987, Iceland 1995). 
At first sight, the innovation process would appear to be com-
plete, since 193 states have ratified the World Heritage Convention 
and the UN has 193 member states. But these figures conceal 
a statistical complication. Three UN member states have still 
not ratified the Convention; they are Liechtenstein (1990, not 
a member of UNESCO), Nauru (1999), and Tuvalu (2000). By 
contrast, four  other states that are not UN member states, but 
have observer status or are members of UNESCO, have ratified it; 
they are Niue (ratified in 2001), Cook Islands (2009), Holy See/
Vatican (2011, not a member of UNESCO), and Palestine (2011). 
All UNESCO’s 195 member states have ratified the Convention. 
The last was Somalia, a country long ravaged by civil war, which 
ratified the convention in July 2020. Countries belonging to the 
group of “laggards” were not ignored; on the contrary, they have 
been the subject of special action to persuade all of them to join. 
Here it can be noted that Taiwan represented China up until 1971, 
but has not been a member of the UN or UNESCO since that 
time – and has therefore not been able to ratify the Convention 
either. But irrespective of how the counting is done, there is, in 
principle, global consensus about World Heritage. And no country 
has chosen to leave the Convention after signing it. 
Statistical accounts of World Heritage sites generally present 
their growing number and much discussed geographical distribu-
tion across the world. Italy and China have the largest number with 
55 each, followed by Spain with 48, Germany with 46, and France 
with 45. The regional distribution is Africa 96 (8.6 %), the Arab 
countries 86 (7.7 %), Asia and the Pacific 268 (23.9 %), Europe 
and North America 529 (47.2 %), Latin America and the Caribbean 
142 (12.7 %). Of the 193 states that have ratified the Convention, 
26 (13.5 %) do not have a World Heritage (yet) – nor does Taiwan. 
Social agents and networks have been and continue to be impor-
tant, both formally and informally. Agents with their positions and 
contacts were crucial at the establishment of the World Heritage 
Convention, and they may continue to be so in future work on 
determining which heritages will be entered in the list. On the one 
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hand, there is a formal process in which nations nominate a pro-
posal for a coming World Heritage from tentative lists. This pro-
posal is then assessed by the International Centre for the Study of 
the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), 
ICOMOS, and IUCN, while UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee 
makes decisions at its annual meeting of selected delegates. On 
the other hand, there is the work behind the scenes where individ-
uals with their knowledge, personality, contacts, and lobbying may 
be of crucial importance for the success of a nomination, as may 
chance circumstances (e.g. Turtinen 2006).
The archaeologist Lynn Meskell has presented a chilling picture 
of how work in UNESCO with its World Heritage Committee is 
characterised by geopolitical intrigue, power-wielding states, alli-
ances, rivalry, self-interest, and inconsistencies, in which small 
states and minorities are ignored, as are recommendations from 
UNESCO’s own expert bodies. World Heritage is reduced to a 
 cultural commodity in the international game (Meskell 2018). 
As early as the salvage campaign for the temples of Abu Simbel, 
the importance of single individuals was in the foreground. 
Initiatives by named individuals – a minister of culture, an assistant 
director-general, an Egyptologist, and several others – are presented 
as heroes in the narrative of a sequence of events characterised by 
pressure of time and obstacles that had to be overcome (cf. Säve-
Söderbergh 1987: 64ff; 1996: 59ff). 
However, what catches the eye in the literature about the 
salvage campaign and the establishment and administration of the 
Convention is how the texts are given legitimacy by a succession of 
forewords by individuals higher up in the hierarchy (e.g. Desroches-
Noblecourt & Gerster 1968: 7, 9), and how those involved either 
describe themselves as central agents or are so described by others. 
This is sometimes followed up by photographs showing those 
involved in single portraits, at gatherings, in meetings, or in front 
of monuments (e.g. Batisse & Bolla 2003 (French): 47ff; 2005 
(English): 43ff; Cameron & Rössler 2013). In sumptuous publi-
cations, the forewords may also be accompanied by conspicuous 
portrait photographs (e.g. Anker & Snitt 1997: 5, 8f). And in the 
media, politicians and high officials appear at the inauguration of a 
new World Heritage site, at the same time as the number of sites in 
the country concerned is apt to be noted with pride.
World Heritage sites are thus not only places to protect and 
preserve for the future, but also a capital that may yield a cultural, 
social, and political dividend for the countries, institutions, and 
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individuals involved. There is prestige in being responsible for a 
World Heritage site. Publications about World Heritage sites are 
thus part of a social game about positions and memory, in which 
the agents try to associate themselves with valuable World Heritage. 
These agents cause themselves to be depicted in an endeavour to 
obtain a share of the outstanding and eternal – at least as its heroic 
defenders. 
And no one is allowed to share this honour undeservedly. 
The evening before the reinauguration of Abu Simbel in 1968, 
UNESCO’s Secretary-General discovered a memorial praising the 
efforts of the then President Abdul Nasser without mentioning 
UNESCO or its member states. In the face of the threat that the 
Secretary-General would not attend the ceremony, the memorial 
was speedily excised (Säve-Söderbergh 1996: 99; not mentioned in 
the English edition of 1987). 
The interplay between the international, national, and local 
levels in the process of having a World Heritage site established 
may be followed in several studies. For instance, the establish-
ment of the Hanseatic Town of Visby (WHL 731, 1995) and the 
Agricultural Landscape of Southern Öland (WHL 968, 2000), both 
in Sweden, is discussed in several articles and books, favourably by 
agents involved (Jonsson 2015) and more critically by researchers 
from the outside (e.g. Saltzman 2001: 205ff; Turtinen 2006: 140ff; 
Ronström 2007: 120ff). Another study of this kind of interplay 
concerns Angra do Heroismo on the Azores in Portugal (WHL 
206; 1983; Johansson 2015). A third is a critical account of how 
Çatalhöyük in Turkey became a World Heritage site (WHL 1405, 
2012; Meskell 2018: 134ff). 
It is normal for new products to be met by criticism from con-
sumers, and for producers to then try to improve their product so as 
not to lose market shares. World Heritage has not been reinvented, 
but it has been adjusted as an idea and a practice in relation to 
critical views. The management of the World Heritage Convention 
from 1972 has thus been changed over the nearly five decades 
that have passed: thematically new categories are constantly being 
added, culture and nature meet in mixed sites, new countries are 
included, national borders are crossed, more sites from a modern 
epoch have gradually been inscribed in the list, and attempts are 
made to redress any geographical or thematic imbalances (cf. WHL 
Filling, 2004). 
In 1992, the World Heritage Convention was complemented by a 
scheme called the Memory of the World Programme, whose purpose 
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was to protect and highlight particularly valuable documents or col-
lections in archives and libraries. Since 1997 its Register includes, 
for example, Memory of the Suez Canal (1997), Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (2003), Ingmar Bergman Archives 
(2007), Diaries of Anne Frank (2009), documents about Timor-
Leste, On the Birth of a Nation: Turning points (2013), and The 
Scientific and Mathematical Papers of Sir Isaac Newton (2015). 
The Register now consists of 427 memories in 118 countries (www.
unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-
the-world/homepage; Memory of the World, 2012; overview July 
2019). 
The traditional World Heritage is tangible, material, and fre-
quently monumental. To complement this, UNESCO has defined a 
new category of intangible cultural heritage that is also to be pro-
tected for the future – “oral traditions and expressions”, “perform-
ing arts”, “social practices, rituals, and festive events”, “knowledge 
and practices concerning nature and the universe”, and “traditional 
craftsmanship”. In 2003, the Convention for the Safeguarding of 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003) was therefore put in place. 
So far, it has  been ratified by 178 (91.3  %) of UNESCO’s 195 
member states (ich.unesco.org/en/convention; December 2019). 
The  list includes, for instance, Vanuatu sand drawings (2008), 
Chinese calligraphy (2009), falconry (2010), the gastronomy of 
the French (2010), traditional carpet-weaving skills in Kashan in 
Iran (2010), and Fado singing in Portugal (2011). At the outset, 
in 2008, the list covered 90 instances of cultural heritage in 70 
countries. The intangible cultural heritage items on the list have 
been divided into three categories: cultural heritage in urgent need 
of protection, the representative list, and good examples/good safe-
guarding practices. Now there are a total of 549 intangible cultural 
heritage elements in 127 (65.1 %) of member states (ich.unesco.
org/en/lists; December 2019).
Can World Heritage as an idea and a practice be subjected to 
creative destruction just like other innovations, in other words be 
replaced by new and better solutions? This raises the question of 
what needs World Heritage is expected to meet.
The purpose of the World Heritage Convention is to select sites 
of particular value that are to be protected and preserved for future 
generations. But the idea of preservation is a phenomenon that 
arose in specific historical conditions. Protection and preservation 
became more important in the modern epoch from the end of the 
eighteenth century, and the concept of World Heritage belongs to 
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the late twentieth century. It may be imagined that in the future, 
humanity will have other priorities, and that the protection and 
preservation of nature and culture will have to give way to other 
considerations; if nothing else, history demonstrates the impor-
tance of the unforeseen. World Heritage status may then become 
irrelevant. 
So far, only two World Heritage sites have been removed from 
the list on account of other priorities. The first is the Arabian Oryx 
Sanctuary in Oman, which was delisted in 2007 when the protected 
area was reduced by 90 % (WHL 654, 1994; delisted 2007). The 
second example is Dresden, where the construction of a new motor-
way bridge was thought to be more important than Dresden Elbe 
Valley as a World Heritage site (WHL 1156, 2004; delisted 2009). 
Here World Heritage had to give way to the latest manifestation of 
modernity. 
The conditions for World Heritage may also become different 
if the present world community built up around the UN and its 
subsidiary organisations such as UNESCO is dissolved or replaced 
by something else. The UN is a historical construction both created 
and characterised by the victorious great powers after the Second 
World War. It is an organisation where states can meet, and it is 
neither better nor worse than its members – not necessarily demo-
cratic or effective when that might be desired. Its future is not self-
evident. The known world community is changing. For example, 
both the US and Israel have withdrawn from UNESCO as of 31 
December 2018. 
The purpose of listing as a World Heritage site is protection 
and preservation for the future; but the outcome may be the oppo-
site. Listing can give the site a status, attention, and an association 
to modernity which, contrary to its purpose, attracts destruction. 
Greater tourism may entail undesirable wear and tear, which anti-
quarian authorities try to regulate with plans for management. 
Furthermore, World Heritage status may also increase the risk of 
vandalism, as has already been seen in Mali and Syria, for example. 
Listing as a World Heritage site creates a well-defined target for 
attacks. But it is doubtful whether this means that agents will or 
should refrain from making nominations. 
Since 1978, the World Heritage Centre has supplemented 
the  World Heritage List with its own list which shows World 
Heritage sites that are in the danger zone for various reasons – World 
Heritage in Danger. Of the 1121 World Heritage sites, 53 (4.7 %) are 
in danger: they consist of 36 cultural and 17 natural World Heritage 
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sites in 33 (19.8  %) of the 167 countries with World Heritage 
(whc.unesco.org/en/158; overview July 2019); and current war 
zones such as Congo, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Syria, and Yemen are 
 abundantly represented. 
Rogers has demonstrated an innovation paradox – that those 
who have least need of an innovation are the first to adopt it, 
whereas those who would have the greatest need show the great-
est resistance and are among the last (Rogers 2003: 295f). But 
in the present context it is noteworthy that the war zones of our 
time, by contrast, acceded to the Convention at a relatively early 
date – Congo (1987), Iraq (1974), Libya (1978), Mali (1977), Syria 
(1975), and Yemen (1980).
If a regional or national ambition for World Heritage is to 
increase tourism and economic development, disappointed expec-
tations may lead to reconsidered priorities. In the work to achieve 
World Heritage status, unrealistically high aims may easily be set. 
For instance, two decades after listing, it must be concluded that 
the Agricultural Landscape of Southern Öland (WHL 968; 2000) 
is perhaps unable to meet the great expectations for a peripheral 
rural district. Moreover, current plans for new windmills appear to 
collide with the status of the area – even though Öland does, in fact, 
have a long tradition of windmills.
If the purpose of the Convention, and of listing, is to protect, 
preserve, and make accessible, solutions other than physical preser-
vation and restoration may also be considered in the years ahead. 
Digitalisation is rapidly gaining ground, so the future may bring 
schemes of “preservation” in the form of digital documentation 
that includes an experience using all the senses. Since 2003, for 
instance, World Heritage sites are documented in 3D as part of their 
preservation for the future (www.cyark.org).
Digital documentation may be a break with a traditional Western 
view of preservation and authenticity, but protection and preserva-
tion through transformation into documentation is nothing new; 
it is, for example, done all the time in archaeological excavations. 
And the Western view of authenticity as concrete material conti-
nuity is not the sole possibility given the “Asian” model, which 
stresses continuity in ideas and crafts, not the material dimension 
(cf. Larsen 1995; Labadi 2013: 113ff; Operational 2019: §§78ff). 
But if the purpose of World Heritage is to define an exclusive 
heritage category in a reaction against the inflation in heritage, 
the constant increase in World Heritage sites must be a problem. 
The brand loses value if too many products are in circulation. The 
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project of the seven new wonders of the world, New7Wonders, 
may be regarded as an attempt to re-establish an overarching cat-
egory of excellence; but it has not succeeded in replacing World 
Heritage. 
New7Wonders was founded by the filmmaker and museum curator 
Bernard Weber. The organisation wanted to contribute to creating a 
global and democratic memory with precisely seven wonders which 
everyone can remember, and which should be protected and pre-
served for the future. Global votes were used to select New 7 Wonders 
of the World (2000–2007), New 7 Wonders of the World Nature 
(2007–2011), and New 7 Wonders Cities (2011–2014) (www.new7 
wonders.com). 
The New 7 Wonders of the World were chosen on the basis of a 
list of 177 potential monuments. 77 of the 177 were nominated in 
a voting procedure. A panel of experts, headed by a former director-
general of UNESCO, then selected 21 finalists that went on to a 
vote in which around 100 million people took part. Most votes 
went to the Great Wall of China (WHL 438, 1987), Taj Mahal in 
India (WHL 252, 1983), Machu Picchu in Peru (WHL 274, 1983), 
Chichén-Itzà in Mexico (WHL 483, 1988), the statue of Jesus Christ 
at Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (WHL 1100rev, 2012), the Colosseum 
in Rome in Italy (WHL 91ter, 1980, 1990, 2015), and Petra in 
Jordan (WHL 326, 1985). After Egyptian protests, the pyramids in 
Giza (WHL 86, 1979) were given their own place of honour as the 
sole preserved site among the seven original wonders of Antiquity 
(www.new7wonders.com). 
Not unexpectedly, voters chose much-visited tourist destina-
tions and national monuments in populous countries which, with 
one exception, already had World Heritage status: the statue of 
Jesus Christ received it in 2012 (WHL 1100, 2012). Consequently, 
no great difference can be observed between what is accepted in 
UNESCO by national representatives and experts and what people 
think more generally. High culture and popular culture coincide, 
but the reason for that may be that the selection involved both 
experts and the general public. And both cases involve a democratic 
process – in the case of World Heritage representative democracy 
and in the case of New7Wonders direct democracy, at any rate in 
choosing between the finalists. 
If inflation in heritage and World Heritage is a problem, 
UNESCO can put a ceiling on how many can be inscribed on 
the list. UNESCO can simply put a stop to more World Heritage 
sites – or not list any new ones unless old ones are removed – in 
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brief, by prioritising. But at the moment there is no formal limit to 
the total number of World Heritage items that may be listed (cf. 
Operational 2019: §58). 
The 42 years in the period 1978–2019 saw the listing of 1121 sites 
of World Heritage, which amounts to an average of 26.7 new sites 
per year. UNESCO could, for instance, set a ceiling at a maximum of 
1200 World Heritage sites, a figure that would, at the present rate, 
be reached in 2022, on the 50th anniversary of the Convention. But 
that kind of self-imposed restriction is probably impossible to apply 
in view of cultural-policy considerations, being attractive neither 
to individual UNESCO member states nor to the World Heritage 
Centre as an organisation.
Outstanding, universal, and representative
The World Heritage Convention has been ratified by virtually all 
countries, and after nearly five decades there are World Heritage 
sites everywhere on earth. World Heritage sites are spread across all 
continents with the exception of Antarctica and across variations 
in language, culture, history, religion, politics, and economics. The 
great popularity of World Heritage may be a cause of wonder – 
wonder that a world deeply divided in many contexts is able to 
come together in the protection and preservation of an increasing 
number of monuments, buildings, places, and  landscapes. What is 
it, then, that so many can agree on? 
The core of the Convention, and the common denominator of all 
listed instances of World Heritage, is the requirement of “outstand-
ing universal value” (e.g. Labadi 2013). This involves two different 
values that have to be fulfilled at the same time: a World Heritage 
site has to be assessed as being both outstanding and universal. By 
way of specification, the Operational Guidelines document (2019: 
§49, §77) sets out ten criteria, at least one of which has to be 
met for listing as a World Heritage site. The guidelines also point 
out that “Nominations of immovable heritage which are likely to 
become movable will not be considered” (Operational 2019: §48). 
However, the prior relocation was apparently not an impediment 
to nominating and listing the temples of Abu Simbel as part of a 
World Heritage site. 
This shows us that the Convention and its World Heritage concept 
are dependent on a difficult balance; for the terms “outstanding” 
and “universal” may coincide, but they may also contradict each 
other. On the one hand, there is the assessment of the outstanding, 
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pre-eminent, the superbly ingenious, or the excellent, and on the 
other, the assessment of the universal or general. The complication 
arises when the outstanding is not universal and the universal is 
not outstanding. The outstanding may be reserved for a few and 
the universal may be something that just does not stand out. A 
specification in ten criteria does not solve the problem; it merely 
moves the assessment to a different level. This does not address 
the fundamental difficulty, which is coming to an agreement about 
what is both outstanding and universal; that is, attaining a common 
human consensus about what is valuable in nature and culture. 
My truth, beauty, and goodness need not be yours, too. My 
proposal for World Heritage does not need to be yours as well. 
What I see as outstanding and universal, you may reject as indif-
ferent, provincial, or perhaps typically Western. When this is com-
bined with questions of nationalism, identity, tourism, growth, and 
geopolitics, a chasm of potential conflicts opens up. If my or our 
World Heritage proposal is not accepted, then it is I, my people or 
country, my nature or culture, my nation, identity, development, 
and economy that is being ignored or insulted. Respect!
The established or so-called “authorized heritage”, includ-
ing World Heritage, has been criticised for not being universal or 
sufficiently representative. The Convention is also seen as having 
elevated a typical Western view of cultural and natural heritage 
to a general norm. In addition, it is regarded as having, in prac-
tice, favoured elite monuments and buildings in the West. History, 
memory, and heritage belonging to hitherto neglected nations, 
groups, and genders are thought to require more attention (e.g. 
Smith 2006: 85ff). 
Lynn Meskell wants to see a more general prioritisation of living 
people before the stones of the past; of archaeological investiga-
tions before the preservation of monuments; and of visions of peace 
before technological assistance. The early, global UNESCO under 
the leadership of the biologist Julian Huxley was intended to be 
peopled by intellectuals and academics; but the organisation then 
developed into an intergovernmental technocracy characterised 
by consultants, bureaucrats, and politicians. Meskell nevertheless 
takes the view that UNESCO would have to be reinvented if it did 
not exist (Meskell 2018: 1ff, 59ff, 76, 226).
However, UNESCO, with its World Heritage General Assembly, 
Committee, and Secretariat, has tried to respond to the criticism. 
For instance, there has, in principle, been criticism of the selection 
of sites ever since the Convention came into practice with the listing 
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of the first World Heritage sites in 1978. The uneven geographical 
distribution came in for particular criticism.
First, ICOMOS established a Global Study Working Group from 
1989 onwards, and then, in 1994, a Global Strategy was adopted 
for greater representativeness, balance, and credibility. Analyses 
were carried out to demonstrate what was represented or under-
represented in relation to categories, chronology, regions, and 
themes. There was, for example, said to be an over-representation 
of cultural heritage in Europe, of historic towns, religious monu-
ments, Christianity, historical periods, and “elitist” architecture. 
ICOMOS concluded that imbalances could be attributed to coun-
tries not having overviews of their heritage and systems for protec-
tion and preservation, as a result of which the necessary tentative 
lists were either flawed or not provided at all. UNESCO’s strategy 
has therefore been to encourage, assist, and include, with a view 
to inscribing new alternative sites to supplement the existing ones. 
It therefore encouraged the establishing of new World Heritage 
sites within the framework of cultural landscapes, cultural routes, 
agricultural settlement, secular architecture, industrial heritage, 
and the modern period (whc.unesco.org/en/globalstrategy; WHL 
Filling, 2004; Operational 2019: §§54–61). Finally, the establish-
ment of a convention for Intangible Cultural Heritage (ich.unesco.
org/en/convention) in 2003 can be  interpreted as an attempt to 
complement the World Heritage Convention, which was charac-
terised by a Western material view of cultural heritage, with a new 
convention focusing on the intangible. 
World Heritage must not only be outstanding and universal; it 
has to be representative too. But the equation with three variables is 
not unique to the World Heritage Convention. The same problems 
are to be found in the debate on human rights. 
Intimations of human rights can be found far back in time, 
actually as far back as pharaonic Egypt. However, the Age of 
Enlightenment has been assigned a special role in the narrative 
of human rights, with the American Declaration of Independence 
in 1776 and the French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen in 1789 as milestones. The UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is usually regarded as a reac-
tion against the atrocities of the 1930s and 1940s. The Declaration 
was adopted by 48 UN member countries, while 8 abstained (Bring 
2011: 11ff). 
But human rights are disputed. What is at issue here is the inter-
pretation of the Declaration’s background in the history of ideas, 
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the importance of individual agents, and, more specifically, different 
political and religious views about how human rights can, should, 
or must be formulated. From the very beginning, the rights were 
criticised for being too limited and for being too extensive. The UN 
Declaration has been criticised for imposing a Western norm on the 
countries of the world as universal. Another critical view holds that 
the rights may be in conflict with cultural or religious requirements. 
For example, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference adopted 
an alternative Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990), 
in which the rights are delimited in relation to Sharia (hrlibrary.
umn.edu/instree/cairodeclaration.html). 
Several commentators have asked whether heritage is a human 
right. In one instance, the answer is unclear (Kristiansen 2001: 
150f), and in another, it is negative (Barthel-Bouchier 2013: 27ff). 
Referring to human rights may be a rhetorical strategy geared to 
gaining further support for heritage since, despite all the conflicts, 
these rights do have a relatively high international legitimacy. Even 
so, there is no mention of heritage at all in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (1948). Nor is there any such mention in the Cairo 
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) or, for instance, in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966/1976). 
Is World Heritage a human right? Anyone who wishes to assert 
that it is must also consider what that would entail. Is it the right 
of all groups, peoples, or nations precisely to “their” cultural and 
natural heritage as World Heritage? Or is it World Heritage that is a 
right for everyone as a collective, that is, for the whole of humanity? 
And in both instances, what would that mean more specifically? 
For instance, it may be noted that while World Heritage is laid 
down in a binding treaty, the Declarations may be more prestigious, 
but they are not binding. 
There is, however, an ongoing debate precisely about the rela-
tionship between World Heritage and human rights. The debate 
may, for instance, deal with the fact that a World Heritage site 
can as such become a symbol of rights, an example being Robben 
Island in South Africa (WHL 916, 1999). It may also address the 
fact that the absence of the establishment of a World Heritage may 
be regarded as a violation of rights. In addition, it may be about 
whether the management of World Heritage sites should take 
account  of the rights of, for example, indigenous peoples. And 
it  may be about the fact that different principles can collide  – 
universalism, diversity, and relativism. The debate may also 
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arise on account of vandalisation of World Heritage sites (e.g. 
Silverman & Fairchild Ruggles 2007; Langfield et al. 2010; Logan 
2012; Harrison 2013: 140ff; Ekern et al. 2015; Bille Larsen 2018; 
Meskell 2018: 218ff).
The relationship between the outstanding and the universal in 
the case of World Heritage is part of a larger debate about the par-
ticular and the general. On one side is the universalism of the Age 
of Enlightenment, with humanity as an imagined collective, and on 
the other is the particularism of Romanticism, with its emphasis on 
the distinctive character of specific nations, peoples, and individuals 
with their culture and history. We meet the latter in the preoccupa-
tion of the present with identities – who you “are”, not who or 
what you may become. 
How can the paradoxical oppositions built into the very design 
of the World Heritage Convention be resolved? Tentative World 
Heritage sites are nominated nationally, conferring national 
 legitimacy on a proposal. Here the particular perspective is taken 
into account. Decisions on nomination and listing are subse-
quently made by international representatives in consultation with 
expert bodies. This amounts to considering the global perspective. 
Consequently, a negotiation is evolved in which the particular and 
the universal, the local and the global, the national and the inter-
national, try to meet. Combining several levels, World Heritage 
becomes “glocal”, with double legitimacy (cf. Robertson 1995; 
also Turtinen 2006: 62). The global “product” is to a certain extent 
adapted to local conditions. It is a matter of the art of the possible, 
of diplomacy and politics, where there is give and take. A diplo-
matic negotiation ensues – if you accept my World Heritage, I will 
accept yours.
When the World Heritage Convention has been a success envel-
oped in practically global consensus, this is due partly to its par-
ticularly ingenious design, which unites opposites, and partly to 
responsive management, which has taken account of the priori-
ties of different decades. The Convention has gained permanence 
through adjustments and supplements that served to modernise 
it – just like World Heritage itself. 
What is particularly ingenious is that the Convention succeeds in 
embracing a number of apparent opposites: culture and nature, the 
particular and the universal, the local or national and the global, 
the popular and the elitist. For each country nominates what that 
country considers important. World Heritage occurs globally, but 
it is managed locally. And despite being steered by experts, it also 
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appeals to local and popular engagement. World Heritage is of use 
when it comes to asserting antiquarian protection and preservation 
as well as national pride and identity, and it is often included in a 
strategy for increased tourism and growth. 
Even so, the strength of the design of World Heritage, with 
national nominations and an international decision, is, at the same 
time, its weakness. States cannot have their cultural or natural herit-
age accepted as World Heritage against the will of the international 
community – and the international community cannot impose 
World Heritage on a country. 
Just as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
may come into conflict with religious views, the World Heritage 
Convention (1972), as practised, may collide with the sacred in reli-
gion. This is likely to be the reason why the Kaaba in Mecca is not 
a World Heritage site as a building. It undoubtedly meets one or 
more criteria; but it has such a central role as a shrine in the Muslim 
world, and for Saudi Arabia, that there is no question of placing it 
on a tentative list. By contrast, other holy monuments, buildings, and 
sites are instances of World Heritage – for example St Peter’s Basilica 
in Vatican City (WHL 286, 1984) and Durham Cathedral in England 
(WHL 370bis, 1986, 2008). Cultural heritage and the sacred can live 
in symbiosis, but not without complications, not without compro-
mises, and not in all contexts (e.g. Clausén 2016: 95ff, 117ff). If the 
“sacred” in an antiquarian context competes with the sacred in a 
religious context, and coexistence is not possible, a choice must be 
made. For instance, the currents of tourists pouring into cathedrals 
can be seen as a problem for their use  precisely as churches. 
The weakness of the design also becomes visible in relation to 
contested heritage. Why should Poland take responsibility for 
Auschwitz-Birkenau (WHL 31, 1979) as a World Heritage site when 
it is a Nazi German facility? How can, must, or should Jerusalem be 
managed as a World Heritage site (WHL 148rev, 1981) when three 
world religions and several nations make claims on the site? And can 
Hebron/al-Khalil on the West Bank in Palestine be managed as a new 
World Heritage site (WHL 1565, 2017) in the face of Israeli pro-
tests? Conflicts in the present also become conflicts about the past. 
If a map is a model of reality, a map can also reshape this reality. 
Similarly, reality can be shaped through written words in decla-
rations and conventions. The World Heritage Convention shapes 
our view of the listed monuments, buildings, sites, and landscapes, 
and hence has an impact on their actual future. The Convention 
talks about something outstanding, universal, and representative 
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for which everyone is responsible. An idea is fused with materiality, 
and something new is created. 
Exclusive World Heritage
UNESCO’s organisation of World Heritage is reminiscent of the 
structure of the UN, with member states that meet in a general 
assembly, a security council, expert bodies, and a secretariat; 
but there are no permanent member states that hold a veto. The 
member states of the Convention meet every other year for over-
arching discussions in a General Assembly. Decisions on inscription 
in the World Heritage List – and on the List of World Heritage 
in Danger – are made annually in the World Heritage Committee. 
The Committee consists of elected representatives of 21 member 
states, who serve on the Committee for a period of at most six 
years (WHC 1972: Article 8; Operational 2019: §§17–26). A sec-
retariat is required to assist the World Heritage Committee, and in 
conjunction with the 20th anniversary of the Convention in 1992 it 
was set up in a World Heritage Centre in Paris (WHC 1972: Article 
14; Operational 2019: §§ 27–29; whc.unesco.org/en/world-herit 
age-centre). Its work is to take place in consultation with experts 
from the Rome Centre (now also called ICCROM), ICOMOS, and 
IUCN (Operational 2019: §§30–37).
UNESCO’s intentions with World Heritage are explicitly stated 
in the Convention from 1972, and they amount to “ensuring the 
identification, protection, conservation, presentation, and trans-
mission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage” 
(WHC 1972: Article 4). 
To achieve this aim, each of the participating countries is under 
express obligations pertaining to five areas: 
1. to adopt a general policy which aims to give the cultural and 
natural heritage a function in the life of the community and to 
integrate the protection of that heritage into comprehensive planning 
programmes; 
2. to set up within its territories, where such services do not exist, 
one or more services for the protection, conservation, and presenta-
tion of the cultural and natural heritage with an appropriate staff 
and possessing the means to discharge their functions;
3. to develop scientific and technical studies and research and to 
work out such operating methods as will make the State capable 
of counteracting the dangers that threaten its cultural or natural 
heritage;
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4. to take the appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative, 
and financial measures necessary for the identification, protec-
tion, conservation, presentation, and rehabilitation of this heritage; 
and
5. to foster the establishment or development of national or regional 
centres for training in the protection, conservation, and presentation 
of the cultural and natural heritage and to encourage scientific 
research in this field. (WHC 1972: Article 5)
On the basis of the World Heritage sites proposed by individual 
countries, the Committee established a World Heritage List, as 
well as a List of World Heritage in Danger, in respect of which 
active measures may be required (Article 11). In addition, a World 
Heritage Fund, based on both compulsory and voluntary contribu-
tions, was established to support the work of individual countries 
(Article 15). 
The process by which something is elevated to a World Heritage 
site, and is entered in the list, is lengthy and involves laypeople, 
experts, and politicians at several levels over a good many years. 
The process generally starts with local lobbying work in which sites 
compete with one another for inclusion on a national tentative list. 
Each country then presents proposals drawn from this list – and 
the international lobbying can start or continue. As of 2018, each 
country will only be able to nominate one World Heritage site, and 
at most 35 nominations will be assessed. The decisions are made 
by UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee once a year after receiv-
ing advice from the experts in ICOMOS and IUCN, in a process 
that is reminiscent of a peer-review process for the publication of 
academic articles and books (cf. WHC 1972; Operational 2019: 
§§34–37, §§45–95, §§143–151). 
Since 2010, nomination work has included an “Upstream Process” 
that provides advice, consultation, and analysis (whc.unesco.org/en 
/upstreamprocess). The tentative lists are public (whc.unesco.org/
en/tentativelists), and UNESCO offers guidance on how to go about 
the nomination itself (whc.unesco.org/en/nominations). 
A fundamental point about World Heritage sites is that they have 
to possess outstanding universal value: monuments and buildings 
must have “outstanding universal value from the point of view of 
history, art or science”, and sites must have “outstanding universal 
value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological 
point of view” (WHC 1972: 1; Operational 2019: §§45–53). 
Outstanding value is characterised by ten criteria, and a World 
Heritage has to meet one or more of them. From the first  instructions 
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in 1977 until 2004, there were two lists of criteria – one for culture 
with six criteria (i–vi) and one for nature with four (i–iv). Since 
2005, a common list is applicable: 
(i) represent a masterpiece of human creative genius; (ii) exhibit an 
important interchange of human values, over a span of time or within 
a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or 
technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design; 
(iii) bear a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural 
tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared; 
(iv) be an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural 
or technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant 
stage(s) in human history; (v) be an outstanding example of a tradi-
tional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use which is representative 
of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment 
especially when it has become vulnerable under the impact of irrevers-
ible change; (vi) be directly or tangibly associated with events or 
living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and literary 
works of outstanding universal significance. (The Committee considers 
that this criterion should preferably be used in conjunction with 
other criteria); (vii) contain superlative natural phenomena or areas 
of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance; (viii) be 
outstanding examples representing major stages of earth’s history, 
including the record of life, significant on-going geological processes 
in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or 
 physiographic features; (ix) be outstanding examples representing 
significant on-going ecological and biological processes in the evolution 
and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal, and marine 
ecosystems and communities of plants and animals; (x) contain the 
most important and significant natural habitats for in-situ conservation 
of biological diversity, including those containing threatened species 
of Outstanding Universal Value from the point of view of science or 
conservation. (Operational 2019: §§77–78)
Moreover, a monument, building, or location has to have integ-
rity and/or authenticity, adequate protection, and a management 
system to ensure its safeguarding. 
The document Operational Guidelines for the Implementation 
of the World Heritage Convention (2019) supplies a detailed pres-
entation, description, and definition of everything conceivable with 
a connection to World Heritage – the Convention, the participating 
countries, the General Assembly and Committee, the Secretariat, 
advisory bodies, the definition of World Heritage, representativ-
ity, balance and credibility, tentative lists, assessment criteria, 
integrity and authenticity, protection and management, the process 
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of preparations for nomination containing format and content, 
requirements, registration, evaluation, withdrawal and decisions, 
modifications to the boundaries of World Heritage properties or 
of the criteria used, the timetable, reactive monitoring, the List of 
World Heritage in Danger with guidance, criteria, and evaluation, 
reporting on the implementation of the Convention, encouraging 
support for the Convention in the form of awareness-raising, edu-
cation, and research, information about the fund and international 
assistance, the World Heritage emblem, sources of information, 
forms, and a bibliography. 
The emblem and plaques may be mentioned as an example of the 
degree of detail in the Operational Guidelines. A thorough account 
is given of the World Heritage emblem, setting out its meaning 
and proper use in a large number of sections (Operational 2019: 
§§258–279). One recommendation is that a plaque should be set up 
at every new World Heritage, and there is a description of where it 
should in that case be placed and how it should be designed, includ-
ing a suggestion regarding the wording on it (Operational 2019: 
§§269–272). Clearly, nothing is left to spontaneous  initiatives or 
to chance. 
The purpose of this extremely carefully established process, all 
the instructions and documents, must be twofold: first, to generate 
rational uniformity and predictability in assessment and manage-
ment; second, to bestow international legitimacy on the Convention 
and the World Heritage Centre and hence also on the World 
Heritage List.
The number of new World Heritage sites listed each year has 
varied all the time. In the first year, 1978, 12 World Heritage sites 
were listed in 7 countries. The fewest, a mere 7, were listed in the 
politically turbulent year 1989, whereas the largest number, 61, 
was listed in the year 2000. Of the 1121 World Heritage sites that 
have been listed in 167 countries, 869 are cultural, 213 natural, and 
39 mixed (WHL; overview July 2019; Appendix 1).
A World Heritage site can be justified by several criteria. For 
example, the Nubian monuments from Abu Simbel to Philae were 
justified by three criteria – i, iii, and vi (WHL 88; 1979). By making 
searches in the World Heritage List, it is possible to obtain statistics 
about the use of criteria. The distribution is as follows: criterion i 
is found in 254 (22.7 %) of all 1121 World Heritage sites, ii in 449 
(40.1%), iii in 466 (41.6 %), iv in 597 (53.3 %), v in 157 (14.0 %), 
vi in 246 (22.9 %), vii in 146 (13.0 %), viii in 93 (8.3 %), ix in 
128 (11.4 %), and x in 156 (13.9 %). In other words, the cultural 
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criterion iv occurs most often and natural criterion viii least often 
(WHL; statistics July 2019). 
In a broad sense, World Heritage sites may be said to be rep-
resentative of heritage and the past. World Heritage covers all 
periods of human history; and as is the case with cultural herit-
age, there is a gradual shift so that modern monuments, build-
ings, sites, and landscapes are also being included in the List to a 
greater extent. Geographically, World Heritage sites have spread 
to most of the earth, even though (so far) not all countries that 
have acceded to the Convention have their own World Heritage 
sites. And thematically, World Heritage represents a wide range 
of nature and culture (Operational 2019: §§54–61). The wording 
of the criteria also shows that World Heritage sites have to be 
representative (i) and to act as “examples” of something greater 
(iv, v, viii, ix) (Operational 2019: §77). Different regions and cul-
tures in the world have to be represented on the World Heritage 
Committee (WHC 1972: §8:2). 
Paradoxically, however, while all World Heritage sites are part 
of cultural or natural heritage, they differ from it on several key 
points – in their definition, process, growth, and need for protec-
tion. Cultural heritage and natural heritage are therefore both more 
and less than World Heritage. 
Unlike cultural heritage, which is an open and expansive concept 
that can cover all tangible and intangible expressions of human 
influence, World Heritage is a well-defined concept reserved for 
monuments, buildings, and sites that meet one or more set criteria. 
But World Heritage may, at the same time, be something different 
from cultural heritage, since it also covers outstanding and  universal 
natural heritage. 
While everyone is perfectly free to claim that something is herit-
age, the requirements for becoming a World Heritage are formal-
ised in a particular way. The organisation and process surrounding 
World Heritage has been laid down to the very last political, eco-
nomic, legal, and bureaucratic detail. There are an international 
World Heritage Convention, a World Heritage Committee, a 
Secretariat at the World Heritage Centre, Operational Guidelines 
that have been adjusted numerous times, a large number of direc-
tions and reports, meetings, conferences, and a website containing 
masses of additional information, statistics, and references. 
And while the concept of heritage can grow freely, while more 
and more is constantly being seen as heritage, the increase in the 
number of World Heritage sites is strictly regulated. Each year, an 
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announcement is made as to how many new World Heritage sites 
have been inscribed.
At first sight, the importance of threats and destruction in justify-
ing protection would seem to be something that heritage and World 
Heritage have in common. The very first lines of the Convention 
formulate the need for its existence by referring specifically to 
threats: “Noting that the cultural heritage and the natural heritage 
are increasingly threatened with destruction not only by the tradi-
tional causes of decay, but also by changing social and economic 
conditions which aggravate the situation with even more formida-
ble phenomena of damage or destruction …” (WHC 1972: 2, italics 
in the original; also Operational 2019: §4). 
Further on, the Convention specifies possible examples of threats 
in connection with the establishment of a separate List of World 
Heritage in Danger: 
the threat of disappearance caused by accelerated deterioration, 
large-scale public or private projects or rapid urban or tourist develop-
ment projects; destruction caused by changes in the use or ownership 
of the land; major alterations due to unknown causes; abandonment 
for any reason whatsoever; the outbreak or the threat of an armed 
conflict; calamities and cataclysms; serious fires, earthquakes, landslides; 
volcanic eruptions; changes in water level, floods, and tidal waves. 
(WHC 1972: Article 11.4; also Operational 2019: §§177–191)
The temples of Abu Simbel were threatened in the 1950s by the 
modernisation of Egypt, by the Aswan High Dam and by the higher 
water level in the Nile; but when Nubian monuments from Abu 
Simbel to Philae became a World Heritage site in 1979 (WHL 88, 
1979), they were no longer threatened. And this is typical of the 
great majority of monuments, buildings, places, and landscapes 
listed as World Heritage sites. For even though threats are stressed 
as a justification for the Convention, the tentative World Heritage 
sites are rarely if ever threatened. They generally belong to the her-
itage category that has long come in for national, and often also 
international, attention. Inscription is more of a final confirma-
tion of a pre-existing canonisation as something outstanding and 
universal. But why categorise something as World Heritage to be 
protected for the future if it is already protected? What is the need 
for a convention for the protection of World Heritage sites with 
reference to threats, if these threats have no real existence?
To understand and explain World Heritage as a phenomenon, 
I want to focus on the points where World Heritage differs from 
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heritage. The paradoxical relationship between heritage and World 
Heritage is the very place to look for an answer, because while her-
itage is open, informal, and expansive, World Heritage is bounded, 
formalised, and regulated. While everyone is entitled to assert a her-
itage, experts determine what will be World Heritage. Everything 
can be heritage, whereas World Heritage is something outstanding 
and exclusive. And if heritage should, just like World Heritage, be 
protected, it can be noted that World Heritage is protected already. 
If we look at what the Convention does not explicitly express 
but what it actually does, it distinguishes an extremely exclusive 
group of cultural heritage and natural heritage sites as some-
thing exceptional. While Sweden, for example, has thousands of 
 cemeteries filled with memorials, only one of them, the Woodland 
Cemetery (Skogskyrkogården) in Stockholm, has been made a 
World Heritage site (WHL 558rev, 1994). The Woodland Cemetery 
is outstanding.
The canonical exclusiveness of World Heritage is also clear to 
see in a report produced by the Swedish National Heritage Board: 
Sweden has 15 World Heritage sites, 43 cultural reserves, 264 listed 
government buildings, 1647 museums, 1650 national interests 
for cultural environment protection, 2266 listed non-government 
buildings, 3422 protected churches, 30,011 buildings marked in 
municipal plans for their heritage value (but this statistic is based 
on information from only 11 of 21 counties/regions), 283,669 
ancient monuments, 595,872 other cultural heritage remains, and 
a total of 7,608,094 buildings (Räkna med kulturarvet, 2017: 7). 
Summarised as a simple and instructive statistic, there are thus 
507,206 buildings for every World Heritage site in Sweden. 
The Convention creates a category separated from the mass of 
heritage. When a gradual democratisation of heritage has created 
inflation in the concept, a new category, managed by an elite, is 
introduced. When everything can, in principle, be designated 
as heritage, a carefully selected part is given certified status as 
World Heritage. The devaluation of the heritage concept leads to 
the establishment of a new currency. The establishment of World 
Heritage can therefore be interpreted as a compensatory response 
to the inflation in heritage. 
The Convention establishes a hierarchy of values that not only 
has consequences for the handling of the remains of the past, but 
also confers social status on the countries, institutions, and indi-
viduals involved. The Convention has created what may be called a 
“distinction”, to use a concept borrowed from the sociologist Pierre 
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Bourdieu (1979 (French); 1984 (English)). Consequently, World 
Heritage is not (only) about protection and preservation; it is (also) 
about distancing. 
In order to be able to manage the World Heritage sites and main-
tain hierarchical distance, no depreciation of their value can be 
permitted. This makes it essential to have sharp definitions, spe-
cific criteria, a difficult process, and a regulation of their growth. 
Here UNESCO’s World Heritage Centre, with its Committee, func-
tionaries, Convention, and Guidelines, functions as a gatekeeper. 
Rejections of applications are essential to maintain the standard, 
and any potential threats must be given careful consideration: the 
outstanding must not become too general (e.g. Batisse 1992: 30). 
Still, it is difficult to maintain a distance. Innumerable monuments, 
buildings, places, and landscapes are competing to become World 
Heritage sites. And sites that do become World Heritage rise in 
popularity, so that the frequently desired tourism becomes a new 
menace.
However, it is inconsistent when the journalist Peter Hanneberg 
regrets the tourism and the inflation in the number of World 
Heritage sites – cultural ones in particular – while writing frequently 
in the  media about trips to World Heritage sites and publishing 
coffee-table books lavishly illustrated with photographs geared to 
augmenting interest in them (Hanneberg 1998; cf. 2012). And it is 
inconsistent, or at any rate problematic, when the local level has 
hopes of increased tourism while increased tourism may become a 
threat.
This brings to mind the Nobel Prize for Literature, an exclusive 
distinction for something and someone already honoured; there, 
however, the distinction is accompanied by a cash reward. And for 
50 years, secrecy shrouds who was nominated and exactly how the 
discussion went, unless somebody breaks their obligation to remain 
silent…
Modern World Heritage
You can be a World Heritage site; but if you are, you must be 
modern too. World Heritage as both a concept and a reality can 
be surprisingly modern. And if World Heritage is not modern to 
begin with, it can be brought into modernity through modernisa-
tion, management, and representations. On the face of it, World 
Heritage is expected to be remains of the past to be protected and 
preserved for the future – monuments such as the temples of Abu 
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Simbel. But World Heritage as a concept and as a collection of 
actual sites does not by any means represent the past only. The 
very categorisation as World Heritage, with its Convention and 
management, is a modern phenomenon. And in the course of the 
process of being accepted as World Heritage – or, subsequently, as 
a consequence of that acceptance – a World Heritage is irretriev-
ably thrown into a modernity characterised by change, renewal, 
and movement. 
Most cultural World Heritage sites are of an impressive age, 
measured in centuries or millennia. The natural World Heritage 
sites may even be of an age that can be measured in millions of 
years, for instance the Grand Canyon in the US (WHL 75, 1979) 
and the Dolomites in Italy (WHL 1237rev, 2009), at the same time 
as nature with its plants and animals is constantly being recreated 
in the present. But modernity is also abundantly represented, with 
more than 50 World Heritage sites from the eighteenth, nineteenth, 
and twentieth centuries. They include sites that mark crucial his-
torical events, the architecture of modernism, and the infrastruc-
ture of industrialism with its bridges, tunnels, canals, railways, and 
factories.
The first modern World Heritage site on the list is also perhaps 
the most controversial one, namely Auschwitz-Birkenau (WHL 31, 
1979) of 1940–1945, which became a World Heritage site in 1979, 
the second year of listing. The problematic character of the site is 
indirectly shown by the fact that the UNESCO list officially gives 
it a supplementary designation as a “German Nazi Concentration 
and Extermination Camp” – not a Polish camp, even though it is 
geographically located in Poland, and not just “German” either. 
The question of where the camp belongs is a disputed issue. On 
good grounds, neither Poland nor democratic Germany wants to 
recognise the site as “its” heritage. Otherwise, Germany is known 
and recognised for its Vergangenheitsbewältigung, that is, its exer-
tions to deal with a problematic past (e.g. Dudek 1992). In 2018, 
Poland adopted a law that imposes a sentence of imprisonment for 
up to three years for calling Auschwitz-Birkenau a “Polish death 
camp”. As a World Heritage site, Auschwitz-Birkenau can represent 
a modern epoch, a site of crimes against humanity that must not be 
forgotten – and according to Zygmunt Bauman a modern rational 
(death) industry (Bauman 1989). 
The next modern example is less controversial and represents 
the emergence of revolutionary ideas. It is Independence Hall, or 
Pennsylvania State House (WHL 78, 1979), which also became a 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   225 25/01/2021   08:09
226 Heritopia
World Heritage site in 1979. The building is not primarily being 
preserved for its style, which is Georgian. The reason for the build-
ing’s status is that it is where the Declaration of Independence and 
the US Constitution were signed, in 1776 and 1787 respectively. 
The first example of modern uncontroversial industrial heritage 
as World Heritage is the Ironbridge Gorge (WHL 371, 1986) in 
England, with its bridge erected in 1779. The subsequent decades 
saw the addition of a large number of modern World Heritage 
sites  – the capital city of Brasilia (WHL 445, 1987), Bauhaus in 
Weimar, Dessau, and Bernau (WHL 729bis, 1996, 2017), the 
Hiroshima Peace Memorial (WHL 775, 1996), Zollverein Coal 
Mine Industry (WHL 975, 2001), Mountain Railways of India 
(WHL 994ter, 1999, 2005, 2008), White City of Tel Aviv (WHL 
1096, 2003), Grimeton Radio Station (WHL 1134, 2004), Central 
University City Campus at UNAM in Mexico (WHL 1250, 2007), 
17 buildings by the architect Charles-Édouard Jeanneret, known as 
Le Corbusier (WHL 1321rev, 2016), Bikini Atoll Nuclear Test Site 
on the Marshall Islands (WHL 1339, 2010), Japan’s Meiji Industrial 
Revolution (WHL 1484, 2015), Asmara: a Modernist City of Africa 
(WHL 1550, 2017), eight buildings by the architect Frank Lloyd 
Wright (WHL 1496rec, 2019) – and many more. 
The youngest World Heritage so far is the architect Jørn Utzon’s 
Sydney Opera House (WHL 166rev, 2007), erected in the period 
1957–1973. The Sydney Opera House represents modernism, is an 
icon of Australia’s largest city, and became a World Heritage site in 
2007. 
But it is probably only a matter of time before a monumental 
construction work in the present – such as the Millennium Wheel 
from 1999, also called the London Eye – achieves World Heritage 
status. Another candidate might be the “Bird’s Nest”, as Beijing’s 
National Stadium at the 2008 Olympic Games is known; the artist 
Ai Weiwei was involved in its design, but his political activism may 
prove an obstacle. As yet, none of these examples appears on a 
tentative World Heritage list. 
In fact, most of the World Heritage sites – or, at any rate, most of 
the cultural ones – may be connected to the concept of modernity, 
since they were once modern in the sense of constituting something 
new in their own present. For example, one of the very first World 
Heritage sites on the list is Chartres Cathedral (WHL 81bis, 1979, 
2009) in France, where the Gothic building style of the twelfth 
century was an expression of bold new ideas about light, form, and 
technology. Another example that was modern in the sense of being 
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a technical innovation is the Ottoman Stari Most (Old Bridge) in 
Mostar (WHL 946rev, 2005) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When Stari 
Most was opened in 1566, its free span across the Neretva River 
was supposedly the broadest ever. In Walter Benjamin’s words, every 
epoch has been able to feel modern (Benjamin 1983 (German): 2, 
677; 1999 (English): 545). 
If a World Heritage site is not already modern, it can be modern-
ised so as to remain relevant and useful. For example, a good many 
sites have been renewed or substantially restored in order to even 
come under consideration as World Heritage. Others have been 
modernised or given modern additions as a result of their listing. 
Notably, many World Heritage sites have had to build parking 
places, paths, and visitor centres, and many have been illuminated 
so as to be able to attract or regulate an expected or actual increase 
in tourist numbers.
Like other examples of heritage, World Heritage sites are 
managed by antiquarian and environmental authorities in a process 
called heritage management. In the canonical tradition of herit-
age, there is a continual production of manuals, journals, articles, 
reports, courses, and conferences about how heritage can, should 
be, or is managed in relation to threats, protection, preservation, 
and accessibility, with general recommendations, instructions, and 
examples adapted to the legislation of different countries or to 
international conventions (e.g. Leask & Fyall 2006). 
The World Heritage Centre has, for instance, published a series 
of manuals for the management of World Heritage sites, covering 
what are termed “Disaster Risks” and referring to both natural 
and cultural World Heritage (whc.unesco.org/en/managing-
cultural-world-heritage). And the World Heritage List contains a 
careful presentation, under the heading “Protection and manage-
ment requirements”, of what antiquarian regulations apply in each 
individual case and what action is going to be taken (WHL). The 
concept of management refers to principles for leading operations 
or organisations that are, as such, typical expressions of rational 
modern society. 
Wooden buildings in Asia may be perceived as old and authen-
tic, even though they have been renewed a number of times. Here 
authenticity is linked not to the materiality in itself, because wooden 
structures are often replaced, but to the preservation of the craft 
tradition and architecture, which amounts to applying a view of 
authenticity that differs from what is traditional in the West (Byrne 
1995; Larsen 1995). One example is found in the World Heritage 
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site in the previous capital Kyoto in Japan. This site comprises 
wooden buildings and gardens from the tenth century up to and 
including the sixteenth; but both buildings and gardens have been 
fully or partly renewed since they were first constructed (WHL 688, 
1994).
However, constant change and renewal are not unique to an 
“Asian” way of thinking. Continuous management also occurs as 
a strategy in the West in the form of repeated restorations, full 
or partial reconstructions, and other interventions. At the World 
Heritage site of Stonehenge (WHL 373bis, 1986, 2008), stones 
were raised again and secured throughout the twentieth century; 
a nearby road with heavy traffic has been closed; footpaths and 
car-parking spaces have been created; and 2013 saw the opening of 
the new Stonehenge Visitor Centre, placed further away from the 
monument than its predecessor (Chippindale 2012; www.english-
heritage.org.uk/visit/places/stonehenge). 
At the Acropolis in Athens (WHL 404, 1987; Beard 2010; Sandis 
2014: 57ff), the Classical period has been given priority with the 
temple of the Parthenon, which is intended to legitimise the Greek 
State. In 1834, only a few years after the country’s new-won inde-
pendence, the Parthenon was opened as an ancient monument and 
as a symbol of the young nation. During the subsequent decades, 
the Acropolis was “liberated” from buildings or ruins that were 
not from Antiquity – traces of the Parthenon as a Byzantine or 
French cathedral or as an Ottoman mosque, Roman and Florentine 
remains, and Turkish settlements. A restoration of the ancient 
Acropolis has been under way since 1975, and its justification as a 
World Heritage site puts special emphasis on the Classical period. A 
new Acropolis Museum was opened in 2009, to provide more room 
for the many tourists visiting the site and to act as a setting for a 
long-sought-for return of the Parthenon frieze (also known as the 
Elgin Marbles) from the British Museum (e.g. Melotti 2011: 191ff). 
Another example is Jelling (WHL 697, 1994, 2018; Hvass 2000; 
2011) in Denmark, where the buildings in the railway-station 
community around grave mounds, rune-stones, and the church 
have been bought up and removed since the 1910s, so as to be 
able to uncover the monuments – not without conflicts with local 
people who wanted to protect business and trade. A nearby visitor 
centre called Kongernes Jelling was built in 2000 and has since 
been renewed. Shortly after the act of graffiti vandalism in 2011, 
in the course of which “GELWANE” was painted on the largest 
stone, both rune-stones were placed in outdoor display cases. The 
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excavated remains of a large ship-setting, a palisade, and halls were 
marked clearly in concrete in 2013. The whole area now looks like 
a gigantic outdoor installation from the 2000s. 
In a few cases, the character of modern restorations and recon-
structions has itself been sufficient to justify the status of a site 
as a World Heritage site. This applies, for instance, to Warsaw, 
where more than 85 % of the historic centre of the capital city was 
destroyed during the rising in 1944, but where the city centre was 
practically reconstructed in full during the period 1945–1984 
(WHL 30bis, 1980, 2014; Appelbom Karsten 1987: 72ff). Another 
example is the Fortified City of Carcassonne (WHL 345rev, 1997) 
in France, which was threatened with demolition but where the 
architect Eugène Viollet-le-Duc succeeded in carrying out an exten-
sive restoration in 1853–1879, which was continued after his death. 
Viollet-le-Duc’s modern restoration is an important reason why 
Carcassonne was made a World Heritage site. 
In addition, there are World Heritage sites that have not yet 
been completed but where the construction process is under way. 
For instance, seven works by the architect Antoni Gaudí (WHL 
320bis, 1984, 2005) became World Heritage sites in Spain in 1984. 
However, the church of La Sagrada Familia in Barcelona, which 
was started in 1882 and where Gaudí had time to contribute to the 
crypt and the facade before his death in 1926, is not expected to be 
(largely) completed until 2026.
A renewal in the form of a reconstruction or a radical restora-
tion may also be taken into consideration when a World Heritage 
site has been destroyed in war or through acts of terrorism. For 
example, the Stari Most bridge in Mostar (WHL 946rev, 2005; 
Nikolic 2012: 53ff) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was fired on and 
destroyed by Croatian artillery in 1993; but it was reconstructed 
and reopened in 2004 as a symbol of reconciliation, cooperation, 
and coexistence. Mausoleums in the World Heritage in Timbuktu 
(WHL 119rev, 1988) in Mali, which were destroyed in 2012, are 
being reconstructed as well. By contrast, the reconstruction of 
the Buddha statues in Bamiyan in Afghanistan, which were both 
destroyed in 2001, has been abandoned (WHL 208rev, 2003). 
However, the lack of any great measure of consistency in dealing 
with the reconstruction, restoration, and modernisation of World 
Heritage sites is clear from the different positions that are taken 
from site to site. For instance, the Dresden Elbe Valley (WHL 1156, 
2004, delisted 2009) in Germany became a World Heritage site in 
2004. Dresden, with its baroque architecture, was largely destroyed 
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in bomb raids in 1945. After the reunification of Germany, the 
Frauenkirche (Church of Our Lady) was reconstructed in the period 
1994–2005, as were parts of the surrounding buildings from the 
eighteenth century. The World Heritage site also includes modern 
industrial heritage with bridges, a cableway, and a railway; one 
example is the Loschwitzer Bridge, also called the “Blaues Wunder” 
(“Blue Wonder”), a steel bridge from 1891–1893. But when a new 
motorway bridge of steel and concrete, the Waldschlösschen Bridge, 
was planned in order to reduce city traffic, it was a bridge too 
far. The World Heritage Centre warned that Dresden risked being 
removed from the World Heritage List and proposed building a 
tunnel instead. A referendum was held, as were court hearings, but 
work on the bridge continued. Dresden Elbe Valley was placed on 
the List of World Heritage in Danger in 2006 and was removed 
from the World Heritage List in 2009. Or, to be correct, it still 
appears on the list; but now it is firmly crossed out as a reminder 
that it has been discredited. The new bridge was opened in 2013.
The temples of Abu Simbel are excellent examples when it comes 
to illustrating a modern World Heritage site. With their style and 
size, the temples constituted something new in the Nubian fron-
tier region in their pharaonic present. They were rediscovered and 
investigated in what has been classed as the modern epoch, in which 
the past as well as territories were colonised by European great 
powers. Nature was to be tamed so as to modernise postcolonial 
Egypt as well. The Aswan High Dam and the power stations would 
compel the waters of the Nile to produce electricity, and the annual 
floods would be regulated. But the dam project created a lake that 
threatened the temples of Abu Simbel and other remains of the 
past. Modernity threatened heritage. The solution was a gigantic 
salvage campaign, a feat of engineering that lifted the temples above 
the rising water mirror of the Nile (The Salvage of the Abu Simbel 
Temples 1976: 200). The temples were brought into modernity as 
reconstructions at nearby new sites. They were “reborn” into a 
modern time and a modern society.
The temples of Abu Simbel were cut up, moved, and reassem-
bled using modern science and technology under arched domes of 
concrete and hidden in artificial hills. The temples were illuminated 
both internally and externally, and their interior was given modern 
ventilation. Modern buildings, hotels, roads, and an airport were 
constructed nearby (The Salvage of the Abu Simbel Temples 1976; 
Säve-Söderbergh 1987; 1996). The salvage action was regarded as 
an international success, which paved the way for the  phenomenon 
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of World  Heritage – and for Nubian monuments from Abu Simbel 
to Philae to become a World Heritage site as early as 1979, the 
second year of listing (WHL 88, 1979). The temples were thus 
adapted to Egyptian tourism, in which visitors could be driven, 
sailed, or flown to the site. It was a development in which the first 
European adventurers and the select few who had travelled along 
the Nile in earlier times paved the way for latter-day mass tourism 
encouraged by travel guides, (crime) novels, film, and advertising. 
There was a modernisation of Abu Simbel in the world of rep-
resentations too. There is a technological development from the 
first drawings and watercolours to the photographs of the 1850s, 
the film of the 1900s, and the 3D scans of the twenty-first century. 
Pictures of the temples were mass-produced and widely dissemi-
nated. In 1959, before the cutting and relocation, the temples were 
also documented by photogrammetry (Desroches-Noblecourt & 
Gerster 1968; The Salvage of the Abu Simbel Temples 1976: 33, 
72 with Fig. 13.1:1). The temples can be visited virtually, sitting in 
front of a computer screen. In the virtual world, too, the temples 
can be reconstructed digitally and coloured to give viewers an expe-
rience of their original appearance (e.g. Siliotti 1997). Today, the 
drawing pad, the easel, and the relatively slow technology of the 
photographic apparatus have been replaced by a smartphone, in 
which tourists at the site are able to instantly share images and films 
from their visit with other people all over the world. Obviously, 
representation is also subject to the acceleration of modernity.
The reconstruction of Abu Simbel included careful planning of 
how the temples would be illuminated both internally and exter-
nally. First and foremost, the great temple was orientated so that 
the sun could continue to penetrate to the statues in its interior 
twice a year, as before. Then artificial lighting was created, lighting 
that would on the one hand permit studies and on the other hand 
imbue the temples with a “mysterious and sacred atmosphere” (The 
Salvage of the Abu Simbel Temples 1976: 191f with Fig. 20: 1). The 
light was thus intended to permit both the clarity of knowledge and 
the enchantment of beauty. 
In this respect, Abu Simbel is only one of numerous World 
Heritage sites whose dark interiors have been made accessible 
to the scrutiny of human eyes by means of artificial lighting, and 
whose exteriors are illuminated at night in order to create an experi-
ence, and perhaps also as a preventive measure for protection. Abu 
Simbel, Auschwitz-Birkenau, Independence Hall, the Ironbridge 
Gorge, the Sydney Opera House, Chartres, the Bridge in Mostar, 
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Timbuktu, the Acropolis, Jelling’s rune-stones, Warsaw, Carcassonne, 
and La Sagrada Familia – all are floodlit at night, whereas this is not 
normally the case at Stonehenge or Bamiyan. Light moves World 
Heritage into modernity.
Destination World Heritage
The Past is a Foreign Country! We often employ metaphors in order 
to describe our relationship to the past. We travel – or escape – to or 
from another time or another country. In nostalgia, a home country 
or a lost time is being missed. People also travel more tangibly to 
monuments, buildings, and places that represent the past. But why 
do we travel to seek out the past? 
The temples of Abu Simbel were destinations from the very 
moment of their construction; they must have required a great 
inflow of labour. Greek graffiti from 592 bce on the legs of 
the  statues of Ramses II, the name of the adventurer Belzoni 
from  1817, and other inscriptions are memories of numer-
ous visits  (MacQuitty 1965: 76, 84, 91, 98f, 134; Desroches-
Noblecourt & Gerster 1968: 30f). After their rediscovery, the 
temples became destinations on cruises along the Nile. Travel 
books, novels, and films established Abu Simbel as Egyptian 
icons along with destinations including the Museum of Egyptian 
Antiquities, the pyramids of Giza, the Valley of the Kings, Karnak, 
and Luxor; upper-class  travel paved  the  way  for mass  tourism. 
The salvage campaign  of  the  1960s increased the attraction of 
the temples by  means of a new narrative, and the construction 
of a town, hotels, roads, an airport, and a port made even more 
visits possible. Inscription on the World Heritage List along with 
other Nubian monuments between Abu Simbel and Philae (WHL 
88, 1979) only confirms the importance of the temples as tourist 
destinations. 
The World Heritage List contains numerous other sites that have 
been destinations for centuries. They include places of religious 
pilgrimage, for instance Jerusalem (WHL 148rev, 1981), St Peter’s 
Basilica in Rome (WHL 286, 1984), and Santiago de Compostela 
in Spain (WHL 347, 1985). Another is Venice in Italy (WHL 394, 
1987), which became a destination at an early date. Most World 
Heritage sites were established tourist destinations long before 
being entered on a tentative national list, nominated, and inscribed. 
Even so, most destinations for pilgrimage or tourism are of course 
not World Heritage sites. 
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The linking of tourism and World Heritage is not a matter of 
chance. Established World Heritage sites are usually already impor-
tant destinations. And when nominations are made, there is often a 
local hope that the new World Heritage site will become a destina-
tion that attracts more visitors and therefore promotes develop-
ment and economic growth in the local area. World Heritage sites 
are “modernised”; that is, they are adapted to the needs of the 
tourist industry with signage, illumination, visitor centres, paths 
and trails, and car parks. 
However, UNESCO’s ambition for World Heritage sites is not 
limited to development and the economy. According to the anthro-
pologist Michael A. Di Giovine in The Heritage-scape (2009), 
UNESCO’s aim is to create a new global system and a new global 
identity with the aid of World Heritage sites. UNESCO wants (or 
wanted) to create a borderless and peaceful world (cf. also Meskell 
2018). 
At the same time, there is constant criticism of tourism to World 
Heritage sites. That criticism stresses how World Heritage sites 
themselves are adversely affected by commercialisation and wear 
and tear from mass tourism. The effects of the many visitors on the 
local population and the surroundings are a factor too.
At such destinations as the Ironbridge Gorge in the UK (WHL 
371, 1986), Visby in Sweden (WHL 731, 1995), and Venice in Italy 
(WHL 394, 1987), the point is made that the gradual transition to 
heritage and World Heritage has led to a gentrification, in other 
words a change of the social mix in the area. Conflicts of interest 
may also arise between the local population, newcomers, and tour-
ists (e.g. Ronström 2007; White & Devlin 2007). For example, in the 
summer of 2017, there were demonstrations in Venice against mass 
tourism and its consequences. The city now has more tourists every 
day than it has permanent year-round residents. The World Heritage 
site with its souvenir shops has become a threat to modern city life, 
with its need for shops for convenience goods. But gentrification 
of attractive urban environments in recent decades is a widespread 
phenomenon, not solely the preserve of World Heritage; and it began 
long before the concept of World Heritage had been devised. 
UNESCO has worked actively to regulate tourism at World 
Heritage sites in the awareness that it can have both benefits and 
drawbacks. For instance, strategies were formulated at an early stage 
for “sustainable” tourism that works with, and not against, the local 
population (World Heritage Sustainable Tourism Programme, 2001; 
Bourdeau et al. 2015; 2017; whc.unesco.org/en/tourism). 
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If one wishes to claim that the primary purpose of World Heritage 
is to create tourist destinations, the response will be that the great 
majority were destinations already. But listing has undoubtedly 
served to attract more attention. The sites become part of an inter-
national branding exercise. But why, then, do people visit the past 
at all? 
In The Great Museum (1984), Donald Horne compared heritage 
tourism in Europe to medieval pilgrimages, museums to churches, 
exhibited objects to relics, and tourists to pilgrims – and many 
others have thought along the same lines. The attraction is the 
perception of authenticity in a period of modernity, industrialism, 
crisis, and nervousness. But tourism is extensive, and it is growing 
swiftly, irrespective of whether the present can be characterised as 
modern or postmodern, as bearing the stamp of industrialism or 
deindustrialisation. Tourism is growing in Europe; and it is growing 
in China as well. Everywhere people are given the opportunity to 
travel – sufficient freedom, leisure, money, and health – they go 
and visit other places. Tourism is growing because more and more 
people are being given the opportunity to travel, something that 
used to be the preserve of a few. 
There is no single reason to travel, no single reason to visit World 
Heritage sites. At this point, I would again like to invoke the triad 
of truth, beauty, and goodness. Travel to the past can engender 
new knowledge, contribute to the forming of new experiences, and 
make reflection possible.
Enchantment and expectations
World Heritage is everywhere. While the list, when started in 1978, 
consisted of 12 World Heritage sites in seven countries, there are 
now 1121 World Heritage sites in 167 countries (WHL, July 2019). 
But why does a special category called World Heritage exist in the 
first place, and why did the temples of Abu Simbel become World 
Heritage sites? 
UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention came into being in 1972 
in order to protect and preserve monuments, buildings, and sites 
that possess “outstanding universal value” for future generations. 
To justify this need, the Convention refers to increasing and new 
threats to cultural and natural heritage (WHC 1972: 1). In other 
contexts, the campaign at Abu Simbel in the 1960s is highlighted 
as an important background, since threatened monuments were 
salvaged through international cooperation (e.g. Batisse 1992; 
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whc.unesco.org/en/convention). Nubian monuments along the 
Nile from Abu Simbel to Philae were listed as World Heritage site 
in 1979, with the criteria of being (i) a masterpiece (ii) testimony 
to a vanished civilisation, and (vi) an open-air museum that rep-
resents the unfolding of a long sequence of Egyptian pharaonic 
history (WHL 88, 1979). 
The temples of Abu Simbel are undoubtedly masterpieces and 
represent a vanished civilisation; but are they not already lost, at 
least partly? For salvaging the temples from drowning meant that 
they had to be broken up, relocated, and reconstructed at a new 
site under concrete arched domes in artificial hills. So the temples 
became World Heritage despite debatable authenticity. The temples 
of Abu Simbel appear as they did at the time of Ramses II, but are 
largely the result of a modernisation in the 1960s. 
Several other World Heritage sites mix old and new. The wooden 
buildings in Kyoto in Japan have been renewed repeatedly (WHL 
688, 1994); the Fortified City of Carcassonne in France was sub-
stantially renewed in the nineteenth century (WHL 345rev, 1997); 
and Warsaw in Poland was reconstructed after the Second World 
War (WHL 30bis, 1980, 2014). Here, too, continued permanence 
was achieved through radical changes where that which appears, 
at first sight, to be from Antiquity – or to be pre-modern – may in 
fact be modern. 
The past is indeed everywhere; for the whole of our present, 
everything in our “now”, has been accumulated from parts of 
various ages. The present consists of innumerable “archaeological” 
layers in a complicated stratigraphy. The view from my remembered 
or current office is composed of parts, some of which have existed 
for centuries while others are modern; and the view is in constant 
change. But in point of fact, this present, this now, is also already 
past, since it takes time for my senses to register and coordinate the 
impressions into an interpretation in my brain (Eagleman 2016: 
52f). Consequently, we can state that the past is everywhere and 
that this is, in itself, not problematic. 
The composition of my view depends on where I am and where I 
direct my gaze. It also depends on how my surroundings are affected 
over time in the course of interplay between humans, culture, and 
nature, with an ongoing building up and breaking down. In archae-
ology, this is called taphonomic or formation processes. 
What survives from the past to the present, what gains 
 permanence – the temples of Abu Simbel, for example – depends 
on which materials were used from the outset, on forces of nature 
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including the climate and weather at the location, and on human 
interventions such as clearing from sand after rediscovery. The 
choice made by Pharaoh Ramses II to have the temples carved out 
in the rock has ensured permanence for thousands of years. And 
the campaign in the 1960s ensured further permanence into the 
future when the Aswan High Dam brought the threat of flood-
ing and destruction, but it was a permanence that entailed radical 
changes. 
In an analogy with evolution, what has survived until today may 
be described as a process of selection in which only the useful sur-
vives. The past with its history, memory, and heritage survives until 
the present if the prerequisites for permanence exist thanks to the 
choice of durable materials or favourable conditions for preserva-
tion. And it is not sufficient to have an environment that counters 
natural degradation; the past also has to be useful in the present, 
and that is why it comes in for attention and is told about, remem-
bered, and protected. That which is not “of use” will be ignored, go 
undocumented, be forgotten, or be allowed to decay. At the same 
time, every retelling, recalling, or preservation involves a change on 
the part of that which is to remain. This is why nature is not alone 
in “developing”; history, memory, and heritage do so too. 
With another analogy, the past is a landscape of ruins from 
which spolia are gathered that may be moved to new places and 
given a new use. History, memory, and heritage are invested with 
new meanings as the issues and needs of the present shift. The past 
may thus be used for the true, the beautiful, and the good – and for 
the false, the ugly, and the evil. With this perspective, nostalgia is 
not a longing for a lost or “foreign country”, but a hunt for narra-
tives that can be reused. Lowenthal’s books, with their innumerable 
examples and contradictory interpretations, are precisely that kind 
of quarry, where everyone can find something that suits whatever 
they may be building. That is the reason for their attraction and 
popularity, despite Lowenthal’s critical attitude.
That the past is everywhere is nothing to be surprised about. 
For heritage to suddenly be everywhere is a completely different 
matter. If heritage is everywhere – or if everything can be heritage – 
that means that everything should also be protected and preserved. 
The ultimate consequence of such a principle is that all change, 
all renewal, is forced to cease. This is not realistic. So how did the 
perception that heritage is everywhere arise? 
The inflation in the demand for preservation is a consequence of 
the acceleration of change. The phenomenon has been given many 
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names – modernity, supermodernity, late capitalism, the great accel-
eration, or a completely new period in which the impact of humans 
dominates around the globe, the Anthropocene epoch. Since the 
industrialisation of the nineteenth century, continuing during the 
twentieth century, since the Second World War, and especially since 
the 1970s, with more countries sharing in modernity, the speed of 
change has increased. The quantity of accumulated past – and the 
rate of turnover of this past – has grown. 
Asserting heritage everywhere and for everything is a compensa-
tory and psychological reaction to the great acceleration. Nor is this 
reaction illogical, since experience shows that remains of the past 
can be useful now or at some time in the future in contexts that we 
cannot predict. But since everything cannot be preserved and pro-
tected, because then society would ossify, several  methodological 
and overlapping strategies can be discerned.
One established strategy is to prioritise and only preserve 
selected parts, whereas other remains are allowed to disappear with 
or without documentation. An archaeological excavation does not 
document everything, just as not all finds are transported for exhi-
bition or storage in museums. Similarly, priorities are set among 
narratives, memories, and heritage sites. These priorities are, in 
principle, assigned on the basis of what the present finds relevant; 
that is, useful. Speculation about what might become relevant in the 
future occasionally forms part of this process. 
But the preservation of original remains of the past in libraries, 
archives, and museums for future use is under pressure, since it 
is costing more all the time. There is, however, a rapid develop-
ment of (relatively expensive) digital methods for documentation 
and reconstruction. We can hence envisage ever more remains 
being documented and preserved digitally, so as to be recreated 
later as required. With a less “Western” and more “Asian” attitude 
to  authenticity, this would be a strategy that could be combined 
with a continuation of the rapid developments in this area.
Prioritisation can be combined with creative reuse, in which herit-
age is modernised so as to remain relevant. Monuments, buildings, 
sites, and landscapes can be given new functions and meanings. Abu 
Simbel becomes a tourist destination, while industrial heritage build-
ings become offices, homes, or hotels. In my view, this extensive 
“management” amounts to a strategy in which cultural and natural 
heritage are deliberately adapted to the present – not least tourism.
Still, it is also possible to choose not to tell, not to remember 
or preserve. Here two different attitudes meet: the futurists, who 
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want to confirm progress, modernity, and the future, so away with 
the remains of the past, and the romantics, who want to leave well 
alone and contemplate the beauty of decay or decline, so let the 
remains of the past go away naturally. From widely different starting 
points, they arrive at attitudes that have the same consequences – 
the disappearance of heritage. 
The World Heritage Convention is a modernist strategy for pri-
oritisation and management, so that the outstanding and universal 
is protected and preserved for the future while being adapted to 
the ideological and economic needs of the time. World Heritage is 
thus a compensatory reaction both against the great acceleration 
and against the subsequent inflation in heritage. The Convention 
and its highly organised bureaucracy recreate order, hierarchy, and 
distance. But if there is inflation in World Heritage as well, then the 
process may start again with the creation of new priority categories.
Should the temples of Abu Simbel go, so that progress is not 
impeded, or should they be blown up or drown? No: when the 
modernisation of Egypt with the Aswan High Dam formed a threat, 
the choice that was made was an international salvage campaign 
which also partly modernised the temples, so that they continued 
to be of use. Otherwise, both futurists and romantics would have 
been able to look on while the faces of Ramses II slipped below the 
water’s surface day by day – either relieved to be rid of the past or 
reflecting pensively on what had disappeared.
Abu Simbel represents cultural heritage; but the same attitudes 
can, in principle, be transferred to natural heritage: prioritise, docu-
ment, modernise, root out, or leave be. If it is part of modernity to 
distinguish between nature and culture, the opponents of moder-
nity have some explaining to do if they want to treat (the heritage 
of) culture in one way and (the heritage of) nature in a completely 
different way. For modernity is, after all, a human creation, and as 
such it is also a consequence of a “natural” development. 
The World Heritage Convention represents order, hierarchy, 
and distance in relation to proliferating heritage. At the same time, 
though, listing as a World Heritage adds something invisible. The 
special elevated and distanced status of World Heritage as outstand-
ing and universal may be described as a modern “enchantment”, or 
something sacred in a more or less secularised modern world. This 
is why World Heritage as a phenomenon may be compared with the 
sacred in the religious sphere. In both spheres, the enchanted rep-
resents different perspectives and narratives that may both coexist 
and collide. 
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Not unexpectedly, there is enormous faith in World Heritage; it is 
expected to be able to work miracles – or it is blamed for erroneous 
deeds. Either World Heritage is expected to contribute to greater 
knowledge, growth, diversity, and peace, or World Heritage is held 
responsible for abuse, mass tourism, gentrification, and destruction. 
World Heritage becomes a projection plane for the hopes and frus-
trations of the present. And either it is not possible to have enough 
of history, memory, heritage, and especially World  Heritage  – or 
there is already far too much.
But why focus so much on history, memory, and heritage? Why 
not focus on modernity instead? The main problem may, for better 
or worse, be that “modernity is everywhere”. 
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World Heritage and modernity
Heritopia
UNESCO’s salvage campaign in Nubia, with the temples of Abu 
Simbel as its main attraction, was described as a great success both 
at the time and afterwards. The Aswan High Dam’s threats to the 
ancient monuments could be averted. The temples of Pharaoh 
Ramses II were saved from the rising water level of the Nile by 
being cut up, moved, and reassembled in a new and safer place. 
Heritage had been threatened by Egypt’s modernisation, but it was 
salvaged in an international campaign that employed the rational 
organisation, finances, knowledge, and technology of modernity in 
order to succeed. 
Even so, despite all the words about success, the campaign 
appears to have been associated with seven paradoxes, which may 
be reformulated as questions. The contradictions are to do with 
the impossibility of preserving the past; the relationship between 
preservation and change; protection and preservation as an excep-
tion; the significance of threats; the relationship between heritage 
and modernity; trends and tendencies in modernity; and heritage as 
both local and global. The paradoxes and the associated questions 
will be discussed in this concluding chapter in order to round up 
my inquiry, but they will be reviewed in the reverse of the order in 
which they were first presented. 
It was noted that World Heritage, with Abu Simbel as an 
example, does not at first sight fit in with a postmodern interpreta-
tion of the present, since World Heritage is a category for protec-
tion and preservation geared to creating structure, unity, wholeness, 
and universalism. World Heritage as a phenomenon is one of many 
expressions of a globalisation; but it includes national and local 
places, where diversity is also deliberately pursued. World Heritage 
can thus be designated as glocal; that is, a phenomenon that com-
bines the global and the local. But glocality as a concept is not an 
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exhaustive answer, since the World Heritage Convention with its 
list of World Heritage sites crosses borders in several respects: in 
its intentions; in relation to the categories of nature and culture; in 
respect of World Heritage themes; and with regard to chronology, 
geography, and engagement.
The fundamental intention of the World Heritage Convention 
is to protect and preserve heritage that is viewed as outstanding 
and universal (WHC 1972: 1). But since the establishment of the 
Convention, additional objectives to which World Heritage is 
meant to contribute have also been developed, one example being 
sustainable development (Operational, 2019: §6; cf. Bille Larsen 
& Logan 2018). However, the overall objective of protection and 
preservation and the subordinate objective concerning development 
are not always compatible. Indeed, they may be opposed. 
The combination of the categories of nature and culture in the 
same convention for protection and preservation was presented with 
pride by the convention’s agents (Batisse & Bolla 2003 (French); 
2005 (English)). The great achievement consisted in making two 
established discourses and bureaucratic fields, each with its own 
agenda and ambitions, work together. The specific combination of 
nature and culture is symbolically expressed in the World Heritage 
emblem – a square inscribed in a circle, designed by the artist Michel 
Olyff. The emblem is intended to symbolise how “the results of human 
skills and inspiration” represented by the square are  accommodated 
in and bound up with “gifts of nature”  represented by the circle, 
and how the circle also refers to the globe of the earth (whc.unesco.
org; Operational 2019: §§258–279). Besides, the emblem may serve 
to recall the ground plan of a passage grave from the Stone Age, 
and also, in simplified form, the ground plan of the temples of Abu 
Simbel in their artificial hills.
If the division between nature and culture is something char-
acteristic of modernity, we can observe that the Convention of 
1972 presented an attempt to unite the two several years before 
Jean-François Lyotard proclaimed the arrival of the postmodern 
condition in 1979 (Lyotard 1979 (French); 1984 (English)). But 
the symbiosis between nature and culture only came about gradu-
ally. Until 2004, there were two separate lists of criteria; and even 
after they were brought together in a single list, it is still obvious 
that criteria i–vi apply to culture and criteria vii–x to nature. The 
provision of advice is also split between different bodies with, by 
and large, ICOMOS for culture and IUCN for nature. The integra-
tion is clearer in the 39 so-called “mixed” World Heritage sites 
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(WHL, noted in July 2019), examples being the “Holy Mountain” 
Mount Athos in Greece (WHL 454, 1988) and Machu Picchu in 
Peru (WHL 274, 1983). 
In the same way as the Convention covers both nature and 
culture, it also accommodates various types of World Heritage that 
have to be protected and preserved, namely monuments such as 
buildings and sites, objects that may belong in different institutions 
and disciplines. The theme of cultural landscapes, which was added 
in 2002, is a cross-cutting perspective, in which the landscape may 
contain elements of differing ages (Fowler 2004). There are 112 
World Heritage sites that are characterised as cultural landscapes 
(WHL, noted in July 2019). One example is the Bamiyan Valley 
in Afghanistan, with the niches of the destroyed Buddha statues as 
well as other remains (WHL 208rev, 2003). 
The chronological range of the Convention is enormous. It 
extends from nature such as the Grand Canyon in the US, with 
deposits up to 2 billion years old (WHL 75, 1979), to the Sydney 
Opera House, which was begun in 1957 and opened in 1973 (WHL 
166rev, 2007). Once again, the Convention gathers objects across 
institutions and disciplines, the Grand Canyon being connected 
with paleogeology and the Sydney Opera House with modern 
architectural history. 
In conjunction with the World Heritage List, the Convention 
operates at several geographical levels. It deals with local sites, nomi-
nated by the nation for elevation to an international level, where 
they become not only a national responsibility but also a responsi-
bility for everybody, in practice under the supervision of UNESCO 
with the World Heritage Centre. More specifically, World Heritage 
sites may extend across one or more national borders; there are 
thus 39 “transboundary” World Heritage sites (WHL, July 2019). 
One example is the Struve Geodetic Arc, a chain of survey trian-
gulations along a meridian through ten countries in Europe from 
Norway to Ukraine (WHL 1187, 2005); a second example is the 
Architectural Work of Le Corbusier with buildings in seven coun-
tries (WHL 1321rev, 2016); and a third is the Silk Roads through 
China, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (WHL 1442, 2014).
The glocality of World Heritage sites is also reflected by the 
people involved. Initiatives concerning cultural and natural herit-
age often begin locally; but they are obliged to persuade a regional 
and national level, so as to be included in a tentative list and then 
actually be nominated. Work at local, regional, and national levels 
may take place in consultation with representatives of the World 
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Heritage Centre; and the decision to approve inscription is made 
by the World Heritage Committee with its 21 representatives, fol-
lowing opinions from ICOMOS, IUCN, and ICCROM as expert 
bodies. The process up to potential inscription as a World Heritage 
thus involves a large number of agents with widely different roles, 
at different levels, and in many countries. 
The World Heritage Convention with its World Heritage List 
crosses borders in a number of areas. Features that would, at first 
sight, come across as obstacles – such as separate categories, types, 
periods, or levels – are allowed to work together here. In my view, it 
is the very cross-border character of the Convention, and of World 
Heritage, that has laid the foundation for its success. Here interna-
tional cooperation succeeds – and it cannot be stopped by a veto, as 
in the UN Security Council. A need is met; and problems have been 
solved in a relatively pragmatic spirit, in a way that is responsive to 
current needs and trends. 
For despite all the criticism of the World Heritage Convention – 
criticism of the process from initiative to inscription, of the actual 
selection of World Heritage sites, and of how the World Heritage 
sites are managed – it is easy to establish that the Convention is a 
great success. This is seen from accession to the Convention, which 
proceeded relatively rapidly in the period from 1972 onwards and 
has since, without defections, reached a level amounting to a global 
consensus; as of July 2020, even Somalia has ratified the convention. 
It is also apparent from the tentative lists, in which numerous monu-
ments, buildings, and sites are queuing to become World Heritage 
sites. Besides, it is clear from the intensive work being done in many 
places to get a monument, building, site, or landscape on to the tenta-
tive list and nominated; some of these efforts are new attempts to win 
approval after a previous rejection. Places are prepared for nomina-
tion, being “modernised” in order to be experienced as relevant. 
Two examples of tentative World Heritage sites that I have run 
into in my work as a historical archaeologist are Viking Monuments 
and Sites, with cooperation between Denmark, Iceland, Latvia, 
Norway, and Germany, and The Rise of Systematic Biology, with 
cooperation between Australia, England, France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and South Africa. The latter example involves botani-
cal gardens and sites from the eighteenth century, places that are 
linked to the botanist Carl Linnaeus in Sweden (whc.unesco.org). 
At local, regional, or national levels, there is great keenness to attain 
World Heritage status for one thing or another. The nomination of 
a presumptive World Heritage site is associated with great hopes 
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for attention, funding, and development. World Heritage status is 
attractive. 
It may briefly and counterfactually be concluded that if the World 
Heritage Convention had not existed, it would have been necessary 
to (re)invent it, for the need and its popularity cannot be doubted. 
The genius of the Convention is based on its cross-border ambi-
tions and capabilities. It combines the apparently contradictory. 
The Convention is a creative construction, since it has generated 
new thinking and practice both about what can be cultural and 
natural heritage and about what protection and preservation may 
mean.
World Heritage sites are cross-border and glocal; but the full 
complexity of the phenomenon is not captured by the glocal 
concept. A similarity to franchising in business may be pointed out, 
too; there, payments are made to obtain a share of a well-known 
brand. In the case of World Heritage, however, the point is not to 
trade under a certain brand name but to have a right to protection, 
preservation, and promotion under the World Heritage emblem. 
States pay UNESCO as well as making both mandatory and vol-
untary payments to the World Heritage Fund; they may then apply 
for a monument, a building, a site, or a landscape to be made part 
of the World Heritage brand, which confers the right to use the 
Convention’s emblem. But most of the responsibility and the work 
remains local, regional, and national. If the rules are not adhered 
to, a site may, after warnings, lose the right to call itself a World 
Heritage site and use the emblem, as happened to the Arabian 
Oryx Sanctuary in Oman (WHL 654, 1994, delisted 2007) and the 
Dresden Elbe Valley (WHL 1156, 2004, delisted 2009). 
Sites are modernised in order to become World Heritage – and 
they are modernised after having achieved this status. But in actual 
fact, nothing happens on inscription. It is a matter of recognition of 
a pre-existing status. If a site is inscribed in the World Heritage List, 
it is because it is in fact already outstanding and universal. This is 
reminiscent of the canonisation of a person as a saint after several 
stages of scrutiny. The deceased was already a saint, but is now 
officially deemed to be worthy of the respect due to such a person-
age. Nonetheless, recognition as a World Heritage after a long and 
often difficult process is associated with so much hope and prestige. 
A World Heritage site is not just a material place; it is also a starting 
point for utopian expectations. 
The World Heritage Convention and the inscription of a site 
as World Heritage adds something invisible. The special status 
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or increased value as a World Heritage site is best described as a 
modern “enchantment” that makes everything possible. The World 
Heritage site is lifted into its own elevated sphere, a sphere charac-
terised by the immoveable, invaluable, and eternal; here heritage is 
united with the no-place of utopia, and the sphere may hence be 
designated as Heritopia. 
In Heritopia, paradoxes are no obstacles; if anything, they 
enhance the enchantment. The analogy with the sacred and reli-
gious is thus entirely justified and does not necessarily convey 
unfavourable connotations. That World Heritage sites by no means 
remain untouched, but are visited by large numbers of tourists; that 
they are valued in terms of money, generally in the form of paying 
visitors and hotel nights; and that they do not remain unchanged, 
but are actually modernised – all this is part of the narrative of the 
border-crossing paradoxes inherent in World Heritage. 
The new concept Heritopia, made by uniting Heritage and 
Utopia, signifies the land of the future, which is being pursued with 
the aid of a modernised heritage and World Heritage. Here, remains 
of the past are used to create the future in a manner completely 
opposed to Zygmunt Bauman’s depressing concept “Retrotopia”. 
The future is not being sought nostalgically in the past, but looked 
for as a utopia with the aid of the past. While my inquiry opened 
with a sense of wonderment about the temples of Abu Simbel 
and the Nubian campaign, Heritopia may serve to summarise the 
optimistic final outcome of this inquiry. In more ways than one, 
Heritopia is a place and a situation to long for.
Regardless of trends
Both more and less modernity creates heritage. On the one hand, 
the ambition of modernising Egypt through the Aswan High Dam 
launched an international campaign in the course of which the cliff 
temples of Abu Simbel were salvaged and later inscribed in the 
World Heritage List together with other temples along the Nile. On 
the other hand, the decline of modernity, the emergence of postmo-
dernity, and deindustrialisation entailed a transition to a “heritage 
industry”. Here income from industrial production is replaced 
by income from heritage tourism, and at the same time the remains 
of industry may themselves be reclassified as heritage worth pro-
tecting, preserving, and visiting. In Egypt, however, tourism was 
an important “industry” long before the construction of the Aswan 
High Dam, indeed before all talk of postmodernism, deindustri-
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alisation, and World Heritage. Ramses II’s temples at Abu Simbel 
have been important destinations ever since their (re)discovery 
in 1813.
In crisis theories, both more and less modernity can be made to 
bear the responsibility for varying periods’ obsession with the past. 
Consequently, the more – or less – modernity, the more history, 
memory, and heritage. The paradox can be explained in several ways, 
however. First, the view taken of the concept of modernity varies in 
different crisis interpretations. Second, examples are chosen that 
may strengthen a particular thesis concerning the past and moder-
nity, while others are overlooked or deliberately excluded. Third, 
all change can create relics in need of protection and preservation, 
irrespective of whether a rise or decline of modernity is involved. 
An emerging modernity means new ideas, new monuments, 
buildings, places, and landscapes; but it also means that earlier 
ideas lose their relevance and that the older infrastructure is trans-
formed, abandoned, or destroyed. Modernity leaves relics that may 
live on as history, memory, and heritage. But modernity in decline 
creates relics too. When industry moves to new places or countries 
with cheaper labour or lower taxes, ideas, technologies, factories, 
and housing that were modern once become redundant. The crea-
tive destruction of ideas as well as materiality is common to both 
rise and decline.
In view of how heritage may be combined with both modernity 
and post-modernity, both industrialisation and deindustrialisation, 
it can be no surprise that the same tendencies appear regarding 
World Heritage. Here, however, the picture is even clearer. Thus, 
there are no simple correlations between the establishment of World 
Heritage and trends in the history of ideas and the economy. 
The World Heritage Convention came into being in 1972, right 
at the end of a unique period of economic growth and confidence in 
modernity in the West. The Convention was developed in the 1960s 
during a modern boom, which coincided with the establishing of 
new states after decolonisation. As an idea, the Convention thus 
belongs to modernity with its ambition to protect and preserve 
remains of the past that modernisation is threatening directly, or 
risks abandoning as useless relics. Shortly after the adoption of the 
Convention came the turning point of the Oil Crisis of 1973–1974, 
which marked the end of the economic boom, and of optimism, in 
the West. 
Consequently, the situation had changed when the Convention 
was to be implemented in practice with the inscription of the 
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first World Heritage sites in 1978. The UK, the former colonial 
great power, was in an economic and political crisis in the 1970s 
because of deindustrialisation and unemployment. The concept of 
postmodernism was established to characterise the new tendencies 
in the history of ideas. 
The Convention is managed pragmatically in relation to the new 
needs of the time, as is seen in varying editions of the Operational 
Guidelines (most recent from 2019). The Convention was justified 
by threats and needs for protection and preservation; but its man-
agement at the World Heritage Centre came to be about identity, 
tourism, multiplicity, sustainable development, representativeness, 
balance, and credibility. More than ever, the Convention is becom-
ing a political project in which choices must be made between dif-
ferent objectives, interests, and values.
One concrete expression of how the Convention is managed as 
an idea in a period with new conditions and needs is seen in the 
inscription of industrial heritage as World Heritage. This is a ques-
tion both of a general interest in the early history of industrialisa-
tion with its material remains and of facilities that economic cycles 
have made redundant. One example of early industrialisation is the 
Ironbridge Gorge (WHL 371, 1986) in the UK; and an example of 
a topical closure is the Zollverein Coal Mine Industry in Germany 
(WHL 975, 2001), where industrial activities ended in 1986. 
Another concrete expression of the relevance of the Convention 
in a new period is the nomination and designation of monuments, 
buildings, places, and landscapes that have national iconic status. 
States have proposed and received acceptance for World Heritage 
sites that are central to the narrative of their country’s history and 
identity, often doing so at a relatively early stage in the Convention’s 
history. Examples include the Giza pyramids in Egypt (WHL 86, 
1979), the Persepolis in Iran (WHL 114, 1979), the Taj Mahal in 
India (WHL 252, 1983), Machu Picchu in Peru (WHL 274, 1983), 
the Statue of Liberty in New York (WHL 307, 1984), Petra in 
Jordan (WHL 326, 1985), Great Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe (WHL 
364, 1986), the Acropolis in Athens, Greece (WHL 404, 1987), 
the Great Wall in China (WHL 438, 1987), Uluru (Ayers Rock-
Mount Olga) in Australia (WHL 447rev, 1987, 1994), and Jelling 
in Denmark (WHL 697, 1994, 2018). 
A third concrete expression is the modernisation carried out 
before and/or after sites have been inscribed as World Heritage. This 
is modernisation both of the sites themselves by providing signs, 
paths, lighting, and ventilation, and of their surroundings by means 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   248 25/01/2021   08:09
World Heritage and modernity 249
of the provision of visitor centres, car parks, and access roads – all 
to make the World Heritage sites attractive as destinations in an 
expansive tourist industry. One example here is the temples of Abu 
Simbel (WHL 88, 1979); Stonehenge in England (WHL 373bis, 
1986, 2008) is another, and a third is Jelling in Denmark (WHL 
697, 1994, 2018).
If the World Heritage Convention and its practical manage-
ment are seen not only as an antiquarian project for protection 
and preservation of the outstanding and universal, but also as a 
political project shaped by states in both rivalry and cooperation, 
other patterns emerge. First and foremost, note must be taken of the 
remarkable consensus about the Convention, with ratifications by 
193 states (noted in September 2020). The types of World Heritage 
vary between states, but they appear across economic, political, and 
religious classifications of the world. Thus, around the same number 
of World Heritage sites exists in the US (24; 1973; noted in July 
2019), Iran (24; 1975), Russia (29; 1988), and Japan (23; 1992). 
Iran ratified the Convention as early as 1975 and obtained its 
first World Heritage in 1979, the same year as the revolution. But 
no new World Heritage sites were added in the period 1980–2002. 
China, which deliberately destroyed remains of the past during 
the Cultural Revolution in 1966–1976, ratified the Convention 
in 1985, obtained its first World Heritage in 1987, and now 
has no fewer than 55 World Heritage sites (WHL, July 2019). 
We may also note the contrast on the Korean Peninsula, where 
night-time lights also show a clear difference. Capitalist South 
Korea ratified the  Convention in 1998 and has 14 World Heritage 
sites, the first being inscribed in 1995. Communist North Korea 
ratified the Convention in 1998 and only has two World Heritage 
sites, the first dating from 2004. 
The World Heritage Convention is thus interpreted and managed 
with political pragmatism and remains meaningful regardless of 
trends. As is the case with World Heritage sites themselves, varying 
meanings may be ascribed to the Convention so that it remains 
relevant and therefore “useful”. 
World Heritage and modernity
What is the relationship between World Heritage and modernity? 
This question has been a pivotal point throughout my inquiry. 
It is the pivotal point for understanding and explaining how the 
past is apparently seen everywhere, and how history, memory, and 
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 heritage are expanding. The novel La lenteur (English Slowness) by 
Milan Kundera formulates an elegant existential mathematics: “le 
degré de la lenteur est directement proportionnel à l’intensité de 
la mémoire; le degré de la vitesse est directement proportionnel à 
l’intensité de l’oubli” (Kundera 1995 (French): 45; 1995 (English): 
39, “the degree of slowness is directly proportional to the inten-
sity of memory; the degree of speed is directly proportional to the 
 intensity of forgetting”).
Similarly, the relationship between modernity and heritage has 
often been expressed in a formula, but the concepts that are used 
in it may vary. For modernity and World Heritage are examples of 
concepts from a broad field of dichotomies, in which expressions 
of the future and of the past are set up as opposites. Concepts 
that may be entered on one side of the dividing line are change, 
progress, modernity, modernisation, modernism, industrialisa-
tion, urbanisation, and secularisation, and concepts that may be 
written on the other side are history, memory, heritage, tradition, 
monuments, memorials,  museums, conservation, and nostalgia. 
When  modernity increases,  so  should nostalgia. But paradoxi-
cally,  when modernity decreases,   nostalgia also increases. The 
formulas synthesise statements or chains of arguments that are 
seldom if ever accompanied by concrete qualitative reasoning or 
by the adducing of quantitative evidence. 
The point of an “existential mathematics” is undoubtedly to 
bring persuasive precision and clarity to bear on a problem area in 
the humanities. At first sight, the formulas look plausible; but the 
paradoxes that gradually become visible reveal that the assump-
tions regarding the mathematics are dubious. The paradoxes arise 
because the concepts that are used are complex, ambiguous, and 
entangled with one another. 
Modernity thus has several faces. It is associated with speed, 
volatility, and renewal, both in the world of ideas and in the mate-
rial world. Modernity is therefore connected with the universal 
ideas of the Enlightenment and with the market economy and its 
creative destruction. 
World Heritage has several faces too. As part of heritage, World 
Heritage can be associated with the unchanging, with stasis and 
the past; but the examples of World Heritage include modern 
ones representing change, speed, and the future. On the one hand, 
World Heritage as such is a modern concept, linked to the inter-
national system organised around the UN that evolved after the 
Second World War. The World Heritage Convention is managed by 
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a Centre, where the process from tentative lists via nomination to 
inscription and monitoring is rationally regulated down to the very 
last bureaucratic detail. On the other hand, World Heritage sites 
are concrete material monuments, buildings, places, and landscapes 
that may belong to widely different periods, including the modern 
era. 
We perceive the complex, ambiguous, and entangled not only in 
the ideal world of concepts, but also in encounters with concrete 
World Heritage sites. Ramses II’s cliff temples at Abu Simbel with 
their sculptures and images have more or less survived for thou-
sands of years. Consequently, the ancient temples may stand out as 
a contrast to the modern Aswan High Dam with its turbines and 
production of electricity. The dam threatened the very existence of 
the temples, but they survived thanks to a modern international 
salvage campaign. The temples were sawn into pieces, moved, 
and recreated in a concrete structure, which an attempt has been 
made to conceal. The cliff temples thus mix the old and the new. 
Abu Simbel also acts as one of several important destinations in 
the Egyptian tourist industry, a place that tourists visit for a few 
hours. 
To deepen the confusion, the canonical tradition of heritage con-
siders that modernity often threatens heritage and World Heritage. 
But at Abu Simbel, modernity was both a threat (the dam) and a 
solution to the problem (the salvage campaign). The temples were 
salvaged by engineers and archaeologists using the most modern 
knowledge and technology of their time, which may itself become 
a recognised part of World Heritage in the future: an outstanding 
and universal “monument to the engineering skill” of the 1960s 
(cf. Berg 1978: 49). In the critical tradition of heritage, both moder-
nity and heritage may, by contrast, constitute a threat. What is a 
threat and what is threatened is hence a relative matter. 
In my humanities-based mathematics I would instead, despite 
the conceptual complications, like to call attention to the emer-
gence of a compensatory chain reaction: hypermodernity or the 
Anthropocene, where humans radically influence nature and 
society and there is an initial compensatory counter-reaction, with 
more and more being held up as being natural and cultural her-
itage worth protecting and preserving for several reasons. As a 
second compensatory reaction against this inflation of natural and 
cultural heritage, World Heritage is then constructed as a clearly 
defined and separate category of its own. And whereas the increase 
in the changes of modernity and the compensatory expansion in 
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natural and cultural heritage are exponential, the increase in World 
Heritage is, in principle, linear, with an extremely limited number 
of new sites each year. 
Threats, realities, and rhetoric
Threats of change, decay, or destruction are central to the first, and 
canonical, culture of heritage. For threats of destruction or change 
are crucial in establishing remains of the past as heritage. Actual or 
imagined threats may activate an opinion and generate action and 
legislation. The mission of the canonical culture is to avert threats 
to heritage, to protect and preserve it. 
Threats of change, decay, or destruction are also central to the 
second, and critical, culture of heritage. Here, that which is threat-
ened is itself transformed into a threat. For heritage can be an actual 
or imagined obstacle to development. Criticism of heritage is some-
times transmuted into a particular fascination with change, decay, 
and destruction. And since heritage is regarded as a constructed 
category, and therefore as an infinite resource, not only may sus-
tainable use be acceptable but consumption may be so as well. 
Threats thus create heritage, and heritage creates threats. 
Modernity may be one such threat to parts of heritage, at the same 
time as aspects of modernity may themselves become heritage. So 
the relationship between threat, heritage, and modernity is, at first 
sight, confusing and riddled with contradictions. But the paradoxes 
are due to the simple fact that what is being threatened and what is 
doing the threatening depends entirely on the perspective applied. 
The importance of a threat in activating opinion, generating 
action, and transforming monuments into World Heritage is 
graphically illustrated at Abu Simbel (WHL 88, 1979). The con-
struction of the Aswan High Dam threatened the cliff temples with 
flooding and thereby with destruction. The threat was obvious and 
could be followed almost day by day in the steadily rising level of 
the Nile. The patent contrast between present and past, between 
modernisation and the monuments, between the dam and the cliff 
temples, created the drama, narrative, and focus necessary for ena-
bling UNESCO to justify, set up, and implement an international 
salvage action.
The threats to the monuments in Nubia form part of the back-
ground to the establishment of the World Heritage Convention. 
But the background contains other instances of destruction as 
well, caused by both people and nature. This is the experience of 
WIENBERG 9789198469936 PRINT.indd   252 25/01/2021   08:09
World Heritage and modernity 253
the massive devastation of heritage during the First and Second 
World Wars. And alongside Abu Simbel, emphasis was placed on 
UNESCO’s action after a natural disaster when wind, high water 
levels, and violent rain caused flooding in Venice and Florence, 
Trento and Siena in 1966; subsequently, Venice and its lagoons 
(WHL 394, 1987), Florence (WHL 174bis, 1982, 2015), and Siena 
(WHL 717, 1995) all became World Heritage sites. 
The World Heritage Convention begins by mentioning the need 
to protect the outstanding and universal; protection presupposes 
that something is a threat. And here the Convention explicitly 
asserts that the heritage is “increasingly threatened”. Later, the 
Convention goes on to specify different threats in detail (WHC 
1972: 1 quotation, Article 11: 4). 
The importance of threats in the management of the Convention 
is also shown by the special list of World Heritage in Danger. Here, 
it is a formal decision that determines – after an investigation, and 
according to set criteria – whether a World Heritage site should 
be entered on the list of World Heritage in Danger. The decision 
is made at the annual meeting of the World Heritage Committee 
(WHC 1972: Article 11: 4; Operational 2019: §§177ff). At present 
(2019), there are 53 World Heritage sites on the list: 36 cultural 
and 17 natural in a total of 33 countries, including Jerusalem (whc.
unesco.org/en/158; July 2019). 
But whether a World Heritage site is threatened or itself consti-
tutes a threat depends on the choice of perspective. At the Dresden 
Elbe Valley, the plans to build a new motorway bridge of steel and 
concrete meant that the area was first placed on the list of World 
Heritage in Danger in 2006 and was then deprived of its status as a 
World Heritage site in 2009. The matter was presented in an obvi-
ously menacing tone by UNESCO: if the bridge was put in place, 
Dresden would be removed from the World Heritage List. And 
to make matters clear, Dresden is still on the list, but it has been 
crossed out (WHL 1156, 2004, delisted 2009)! Here, World Heritage 
and modernity are presented as each other’s opposites. But they could 
also have been integrated, if the modern bridge had been accepted as 
part of the World Heritage site. And viewed from another perspec-
tive, it was UNESCO’s management of the World Heritage site that 
became a threat to a solution of present-day traffic problems. 
Considering that the Dresden Elbe Valley has bridges from different 
periods, it is strange that the most recent bridge was not interpreted 
as part of the World Heritage site, as a new annual ring in a historical 
development. First, modernity is not necessarily an obstacle to status 
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as World Heritage; there are many modern World Heritage sites, 
including some that are built in concrete. Second, there are World 
Heritage sites where modern restoration and reconstruction have con-
tributed to the sites becoming World Heritage. Examples are Warsaw 
city centre, which was reconstructed in the period 1945–1984 (WHL 
30bis, 1980, 2014), and Carcassonne (WHL 345rev, 1997) in France, 
which was restored in 1853–1879. In the same way, the definition of 
the World Heritage Nubian Monuments from Abu Simbel to Philae 
(WHL 88, 1979) could be expanded to include the international 
salvage campaign, with its modern relocation and reconstruction of 
the Abu Simbel temples beneath arched domes made of concrete.
It is relatively easy to demonstrate inconsistencies in relation 
to changes in monuments, buildings, places, and landscapes. Old 
modernities are acceptable, but new ones are not. Graffiti on the 
leg of Ramses II in front of the great temple, containing the Greek 
name Potasimto – the military commander of an expedition to 
Nubia in 592 bce – is part of World Heritage, as is the name Belzoni 
from 1817 inside the temple along with other older inscriptions 
(MacQuitty 1965: 76, 84, 91, 98f, 134; Desroches-Noblecourt & 
Gerster 1968: 30f; Grove & Thomas 2014: front cover). But when 
a local teenager sprayed “GELWANE” on the great rune-stone 
of the Jelling monument in 2011, the green paint was carefully 
removed, and not many months passed before the rune-stones were 
protected in outdoor display cases (Hvass 2011: 14ff, 66ff). In Abu 
Simbel, the graffiti is history to admire – in Jelling, it is heritage 
crime, which triggered a court order for psychiatric treatment and 
the payment of compensation for cleaning the stone. The context 
determines the choice. 
At Abu Simbel, the volume of tourists has been regarded as a 
problem. To reduce damage, Nile cruises were not to be allowed to 
moor directly at the temples (Hassan 2007: 91). But that was before 
the Arab Spring. 
Venice came into focus again in the summer of 2017. Now, 
however, the issue was not rising water-levels threatening destruc-
tion but tourists. One reason is the rise in tourism, to which listing 
as a World Heritage site has contributed, although tourism to 
Venice has a long history. There were even demonstrations against 
mass tourism and its consequences. Other tourist destinations such 
as Oxford, Barcelona, San Sebastian, and Palma in Majorca also 
saw protests, demonstrations, and actions that same summer. 
That the defence of a World Heritage site may threaten a modern 
development became apparent in Dresden, just as it  obviously 
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threatens everyday life in Venice; but can the World Heritage 
 Convention itself come under threat as an international convention 
despite the present consensus? Yes: if “Pax Americana”, the global 
world order after the Second World War with organisations such as 
the UN and UNESCO, falls, the convention will fall as well. Michel 
Batisse wrote, “[l]ike many international agreements, the World 
Heritage Convention remains a fragile instrument, and the list 
could be seen as a sophisticated house of cards that could tumble 
down in a storm” (Batisse 1992: 32). In this context, it may be 
noted that on 31 December 2018, both the US and Israel withdrew 
from UNESCO. The inscription of Hebron/Al-Khalil Old Town on 
the West Bank as a World Heritage site (WHL 1565, 2017), and 
as World Heritage in Danger (whc.unesco.org/en/158) at the same 
time, is said to have been a contributing factor. 
Threats are rhetorical expressions denoting an undesirable 
change. When a change is desirable, it is described as progress; 
when it is considered undesirable, it is described as a backward step 
and, at worst, as a threat. If the aim is to establish sites as heritage 
and World Heritage, they are represented as threatened and in need 
of protection; and to critical observers, the sites themselves may 
constitute a threat. And in the same way, modernity may be both 
threatening and threatened. 
Conspicuous protection
Nubian Monuments from Abu Simbel to Philae were salvaged in 
UNESCO’s international campaign and then inscribed in the World 
Heritage List (WHL 88, 1979). The outstanding and universal was 
salvaged. Monuments, buildings, and places that were not as spec-
tacular disappeared into Lake Nasser, after having been examined 
and documented. Other remains could never be examined,  however, 
and had to be denied priority. 
World Heritage, the outstanding and universal, is protected and 
preserved for future generations; but what happens to everything 
else? That the outstanding must be an exception cannot come as a 
surprise. But is World Heritage merely an alibi, so that the outside 
world can be changed, modernised, or destroyed more or less freely? 
A temporal reservation for relics of the past? And, more generally, 
are history, memory, and heritage only islands in a sea dominated 
by silence, oblivion, and vandalism?
That a World Heritage site may indeed be an exception is seen 
from the example of Auschwitz-Birkenau (WHL 31, 1979). The 
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Nazi death camp is a profoundly unsettling metonymic icon of the 
Holocaust; it is concrete, material testimony to something much 
more extensive that can be difficult to comprehend. Despite the 
size of the camp, it was only the centre of a complex with shorter 
and longer-term satellites, the great majority of which disappeared 
long ago. Moreover, Auschwitz-Birkenau was one of several death 
camps, and there were concentration camps and sites where people 
also died or were murdered across most of Europe (Snyder 2015: 
207ff). These matters are not consigned to silence, oblivion, and 
destruction, although Auschwitz-Birkenau has been given most 
attention and also World Heritage status. Even so, there are repeated 
attempts to ignore, minimise, or deny the Holocaust; and here the 
protection and preservation of actual sites may be of importance as 
concrete testimony. 
The Bridge in Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina (WHL 946rev, 
2005), the Buddha statues in Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan (WHL 
208rev, 2003), and Palmyra in Syria (WHL 23bis, 1980, 2017) are 
iconic World Heritage sites that have been vandalised. The sites and 
their destruction have come in for a great deal of attention; but 
they are only the tip of an iceberg. Many more and other material 
and intangible remains of the past, and also of the present, have 
been vandalised or plundered in wars in these countries without 
 receiving the same attention. 
When the Hanseatic Town of Visby on the island of Gotland 
in Sweden (WHL 731, 1995) became a World Heritage site, this 
did not mean that change and destruction could be given free rein 
outside the town wall. In modern, well-organised Sweden, there 
are rules for development and changes that cover all environments. 
Consequently, Visby as a World Heritage site is no alibi for chang-
ing Gotland’s rural districts, even though the degree of protection 
and preservation may vary from place to place. 
When more and more is changed and when, as a psychological 
reaction, more and more is regarded as heritage worth protecting 
and preserving, then World Heritage constitutes a special prioriti-
sation of the outstanding and universal. As a reaction against the 
inflation in the concept of heritage, which has become boundless, a 
category of conspicuous World Heritage is established with clear dis-
tinguishing criteria that have to be met for inscription to be granted. 
World Heritage becomes something conspicuous, exclusive, and 
“enchanting” in the mass of gradually “disenchanting” heritage. 
The heritage inflation affects both traditions of heritage. When 
everything can be heritage, the canonical tradition chooses to take 
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the initiative for a new currency with a higher value, namely World 
Heritage. For something to be designated as an outstanding and 
universal World Heritage site, set criteria have to be met, and the 
path goes through a long and strictly regulated process. By contrast, 
the critical tradition is indignant about the omnipresence of the past 
and at the increase in heritage, which is held to be threatening. It 
prefers either “real” history or, at the very least, a different selection 
of heritage. 
But both heritage traditions fail to see that the whole field of 
history, memory, and heritage is growing because change in society 
in general is accelerating. And while the focus is on protection and 
preservation as something either positive or negative, all the more 
is changed or disappears. While the number of World Heritage 
sites rises each year under strictly regulated forms, all the more 
monuments, buildings, places, and landscapes change or disap-
pear. If something needs to be discussed or managed, it is thus not 
heritage or World Heritage but the underlying causes – the global 
 acceleration of change in both nature and culture. 
Permanence through change
The endeavours to protect and preserve heritage lead to heritage 
changing. However, what is central about heritage is neither pres-
ervation, as held by most members of the canonical tradition of 
heritage, nor change, as is argued by some members of the critical 
tradition of heritage, but the relationship between preservation and 
change. Similarly, authenticity – the central capital of heritage – is 
affected by efforts to protect and preserve. 
The preservation of the cliff temples at Abu Simbel took place 
at the expense of extensive change to the temples themselves 
and  their surroundings. The temples had to be sawn into pieces, 
lifted away, and reconstructed under concrete arched domes in a 
new and safe  site, using modern technology and materials. The 
nearby landscape was also changed radically. The cliffs into which 
the temples were originally carved were replaced by artificial hills. 
Ramses II had been reflected in the Nile for thousands of years, but 
now a large lake is spread out in front of the temples. And a new 
 settlement grew up alongside the destinations.
More examples of protection and preservation initiatives leading 
to changes may be adduced. The Lascaux Cave in France (WHL 
85, 1979) had to close as early as 1963 because the many visitors 
altered the climate inside the cave, affecting the Palaeolithic images; 
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thereafter, access was relatively restrictive. But since 1983, tourists 
are able to visit a modern replica of the World Heritage site instead. 
At Stonehenge in England, visitors are not allowed to approach the 
monument itself either, except on certain occasions. And here the 
surrounding landscape was altered for the sake of tourism, with 
the construction or removal of paths, roads, parking places, and a 
visitor centre (WHL 373bis, 1986, 2008). 
The establishment of the Jelling monuments in Denmark (WHL 
697, 1994, 2018) as heritage and World Heritage has taken place 
at the expense of great changes both to the monuments themselves 
and to their surroundings. Many surrounding buildings were 
demolished to clear the site, traffic was reorganised, the church 
was restored several times, the rune-stones were placed in display 
cases made of glass, a new visitor centre was constructed, and the 
archaeological finds of a stone ship, a palisade, and halls were 
marked clearly in the terrain. The modern alterations to the Jelling 
monuments may, with time, become part of the narrative about the 
history of the site and therefore part of the World Heritage. The 
GELWANE inscription might also have formed part of the World 
Heritage, as has happened with graffiti at other sites. 
The protection and preservation of tentative, nominated, or actual 
World Heritage sites may be dependent on, or lead to, antiquarian 
or environmental interventions such as conservation, restoration, 
reconstruction, and nature conservation. Archaeological investiga-
tions can also be carried out so as to obtain more  knowledge about 
a monument, a building, a place, or a landscape. 
That protection and preservation for the future is best achieved 
through continued use, not through functioning as a “museum”, has 
long been a widely held antiquarian attitude. The use involved is 
often aimed at tourism; but buildings can also be arranged so that 
they can continue to serve practical purposes, in fortunate cases 
supporting themselves financially, for instance as housing or as exhi-
bition spaces, assembly rooms, or conference premises. Tourism and 
continued use may then require alterations to the property itself 
and to its surroundings with signage, lighting, ventilation, disability 
adaptation, lifts, sprinkler systems, emergency exits, toilets, a restau-
rant, and the construction of paths, roads, a car park, and a visitor 
centre. 
World Heritage is modernised in order to remain relevant in 
the present. The purpose of this modernisation is that by being 
renewed  or made topical, the World Heritage site will remain 
useful in the face of current requirements – and will therefore also 
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stand a realistic chance to live on for the benefit of future gen-
erations. Present-day needs may be to do with knowledge, on-site 
experiencing, or ethics. They may involve national identity or expe-
rience tourism. The modernisation of a World Heritage site brings 
it into the present. The same process also applies to large parts of 
heritage in general, which are being adapted to the role of tourist 
destination. 
The changes are bound to lead to a debate in which different 
values, views, and objectives may collide since they are not imme-
diately compatible, as Alois Riegl observed many years ago (Riegl 
1903 (German); 1929 (German); 1982 (English)). The canonical 
tradition of heritage might be particularly critical of interventions 
that affect authenticity. But the canonical and the critical tradition 
will often be able to agree to reject a modernisation that serves com-
mercial objectives, and to view mass tourism as a threat; profit and 
popularity are controversial across the heritage divide. 
When it comes to the concept of authenticity, things are not that 
simple. The original feature may relate to the material, to the work 
process, or to the context. Here I would like to see greater freedom 
in the use of “creative anachronism”, in which old and new are 
combined in new ways (e.g. Petersson 2017). One example is spolia, 
where ancient building components were reused in medieval con-
texts and given new meanings there. Another example in which new 
and old, fact and fiction, are combined is the film Marie Antoinette 
by the author and director Sofia Coppola. This film shows the story 
of the French Queen at Versailles. The narrative and the environ-
ment are more or less historically correct; but the colours are exag-
gerated and the attitudes and music modern, all in order to create 
proximity and understanding in the present (Coppola 2006 film). 
For its time, UNESCO’s international salvage campaign was 
ambitious and bold. But Abu Simbel represents a more discreet 
example of creative anachronism. Old and new were combined to 
protect, preserve, and reuse for the future. Both the monuments 
themselves and their surroundings were renewed, but apart from 
artificial lighting and ventilation, the modern interventions were 
concealed from visitors. The cliff temples are intended to appear 
to be authentic in the material sense – as if nothing had happened 
since the time of Ramses II. 
Here it is tempting to quote from the novel Il Gattopardo (English 
The Leopard) by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa: “Se vogliamo 
che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi” (Lampedusa 
1958 (Italian): 42; 2007 (English): 19; “If we want things to stay 
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as they are, things will have to change”). But the quotation does 
not describe what has happened at Abu Simbel and other World 
Heritage sites. Things do not stay just as they have been, and every-
thing does not need to change. Some things are modernised; others 
are not. Permanence for the future is created through change, in 
which the two dimensions of the concept of time balance each other: 
greater permanence in some parts may mean more change in others. 
Sisyphus and Abu Simbel’s stone
Is it possible and meaningful to try to protect and preserve Abu 
Simbel’s temples and other World Heritage sites for the future? Is 
this not impossible and therefore meaningless? For no preservation 
campaign or move, no elevation to heritage or World Heritage, can 
prevent change, degradation, and impermanence in the long run.
In the first and canonical heritage tradition, heritage is frequently 
described as a resource; in the second and critical tradition, heritage 
is described as a liability. Even an Annales historian may charac-
terise the past as something that needs to be handled so as not 
to be a burden. Lucien Febvre thus writes about “L’Histoire, qui 
est un moyen d’organiser le passé pour l’empêcher de trop peser 
sur les épaules des hommes” (Febvre 1949 (French): 245; 1973 
(English): 41; “History is a way of organising the past so that it 
does not weigh too heavily on the shoulders of men”). Inspired by 
this, I would argue that World Heritage is a way of setting priorities 
among natural and cultural heritage phenomena, so that they do 
not weigh too heavily on human shoulders. But is World Heritage 
also a burden to be borne into the future? 
This brings Sisyphus, King of Corinth, to mind once more – 
Sisyphus who pushes a great stone up a mountain, from whose 
top the stone rolls down to the plain again. Sisyphus toils uselessly 
forever in the land of the dead as punishment for having put Death 
in chains; that is, for trying to prevent impermanence. The philoso-
pher and author Albert Camus used this myth in order to discuss the 
hopeless situation of human beings (Camus 1942 (French): 163ff; 
2005 (English): 107ff). A few years later, however, Camus changed 
his standpoint and called for an idealist revolt against the absurdity 
of life, a revolt against merely accepting one’s fate, a revolt against 
“amor fati” (Camus 1951 (French); 1991 (English)). 
Sisyphus is a mythical person who does not need to have existed. 
Myths are not expected to reflect an ancient reality, but they can 
communicate existential experiences. The story of Sisyphus is 
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known from ancient images and from Homer’s epics The Iliad and 
The Odyssey (Homer, The Iliad: VI 153f; The Odyssey: XI 593), 
epics dated to the eighth century bce, although the existence of 
Homer is open to discussion. Sisyphus has since been commented 
on and illustrated countless times. Camus thus reuses parts of a 
both material and intangible heritage in order to reflect on topical 
(and eternal) issues. 
Above the ancient city of Corinth on the plains of Greece, there 
rises a steep hill bearing the ruins of Acrocorinth, which may have 
inspired the myth’s tale of the great stone rolling down the hillside. 
I would like to interpret Sisyphus’s stone not as a boulder that hap-
pened to be lying around but as an ancient worked stone that can 
be reused time and again. Both Sisyphus and his stone are spolia 
from the past.
The stones of Abu Simbel were not rolled; they were raised up 
and laid down in a new place. They ought to sit there securely 
for many generations to come. One of Ramses II’s heads fell off 
during his reign, and it has been left lying on the ground after the 
reconstruction. But Abu Simbel is no longer two pharaonic temples; 
that was long ago. They have been transmuted into destinations in 
Egypt’s international tourist industry. The stones of the temple have 
therefore been given a new meaning. 
So, yes, it is possible to protect and preserve Abu Simbel’s temples 
and other World Heritage sites for the future. With modernity, the 
technological possibilities of protecting and preserving remains of 
the past have increased dramatically, providing that a more open 
interpretation of the concepts of preservation and authenticity is 
accepted. As at Abu Simbel, preservation may involve change, a 
relocation, and modernisation. And authenticity does not neces-
sarily have to be defined in terms of the material remaining intact. 
Preserving remains of the past by transforming them into docu-
mentation is no novel idea. This is done every day in archaeological 
investigations. What is relatively new is that digitalisation using 
3D technology makes detailed documentation and reconstruction 
possible. DNA technology might be of use in recreating threatened 
or extinct animal species. In addition, in a more traditional and 
practical vein, monuments, buildings, places – and why not also 
landscapes – can be moved to new locations where they are no 
longer threatened, as happened at Abu Simbel. 
And, yes, it is also meaningful to protect and preserve Abu 
Simbel’s temples and other World Heritages for the future. For like 
spolia, the monuments, buildings, places, and landscapes of the 
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past can be reused in new and unforeseen contexts. Consequently, 
protecting and preserving the past for the future is no Sisyphean 
labour – doing so is both feasible and meaningful. 
Remains of the past, such as the temples of Abu Simbel and the 
myth of Sisyphus of Corinth, are not only good to think with or to 
visit, but also good as a starting point for action. In the encounter 
with the past, it is possible to formulate new knowledge, narra-
tives, and ethical reflections that may be put to use in facing the 
challenges of the present and the future. And there are enough chal-
lenges to address. 
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Appendix 1
World Heritage inscriptions, 1978–2019
World Heritage List – number of properties inscribed each year 


























2002  9 (730)
2003 24 (754)
2004 34 (788)




2007 22 (851, delisted 1)
2008 27 (878)
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Appendix 2
Ratification of the World Heritage 
Convention, 1973–2020
World Heritage Convention – ratification by states with numbers for 




INNOVATORS 2.5 % –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1973: 1 (0.7 %) of 135 members
United States of America
EARLY ADOPTERS 2.5 % ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1974: 9, total 10 (7.2 %) of 138 members
6 Algeria (24/6), 7 Australia (22/8), 4 Bulgaria (7/3), 8 Democratic 
Republic of Congo (23/9), 2 Egypt (7/2), 3 Iraq (5/3), 10 Niger 
(23/12), 9 Nigeria (23/10), 5 Sudan (6/6)
1975: 10, total 20 (13.9 %) of 144 members
Cyprus, Ecuador, France, Ghana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), 
Jordan, Morocco, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia
EARLY MAJORITY 16 % ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1976: 6, total 26 (17.7 %) of 147 members
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Canada, Germany, Pakistan, Poland, 
Senegal
1977: 8, total 34 (22.8 %) of 149 members
Brazil, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Guyana, India, Mali, Norway, United 
Republic of Tanzania
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1978: 8, total 42 (27.8 %) of 151 members
Argentina, Italy, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Nepal, Panama, Saudi Arabia
1979: 6, total 48 (31.6 %) of 152 members
Afghanistan, Denmark, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, 
Nicaragua
1980: 7, total 55 (35.7 %) of 154 members
Central African Republic, Chile, Haiti, Portugal, Seychelles, Sri 
Lanka, Yemen
1981: 5, total 60 (38.2 %) of 157 members
Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Greece, Mauritania, Oman
1982: 9, total 69 (43.9 %) of 157 members
Benin, Burundi, Cameroon, Holy See, Malawi, Mozambique, Peru, 
Spain, Zimbabwe
1983: 8, total 77 (48.7 %) of 158 members
Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Colombia, Jamaica, Lebanon, 
Luxembourg, Madagascar, Turkey
LATE MAJORITY 50 % –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1984: 5, total 82 (51.6 %) of 159 members
Mexico, New Zealand, Qatar, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, Zambia
1985: 5, total 87 (54.7 %) of 159 members
China, Dominican Republic, Hungary, Philippines, Sweden
1986: 3, total 90 (56.6 %) of 159 members
Gabon, Maldives, Saint Kitts and Nevis
1987: 8, total 98 (61.6 %) of 159 members
Burkina Faso, Congo, Finland, Gambia, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam
1988: 7, total 105 (66 %) of 159 members
Belarus, Cabo Verde, Malaysia, Paraguay, Republic of Korea, 
Russian Federation, Ukraine (+ DDR/German Democratic Republic, 
integrated 1990)
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1989: 3, total 108 (67.9 %) of 159 members
Albania, Indonesia, Uruguay
1990: 5, total 113 (71.1 %) of 159 members
Belize, Fiji, Mongolia, Romania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
1991: 8, total 121 (72.9 %) of 166 members
Angola, Bahrain, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ireland, Kenya, Saint 
Lucia, San Marino
1992: 9, total 130 (72.6 %) of 179 members
Austria, Croatia, Georgia, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Solomon Islands, Tajikistan
1993: 6, total 136 (73.9 %) of 184 members
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Uzbekistan
1994: 3, total 139 (75.1 %) of 185 members
Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Turkmenistan
1995: 6, total 145 (78.4 %) of 185 members
Dominica, Estonia, Iceland, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Mauritius
1996: 1, total 146 (78.9 %) of 185 members
Belgium
1997: 5, total 151 (81.6 %) of 185 members
Andorra, Papua New Guinea, South Africa, Suriname, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
1998: 4, total 155 (83.8 %) of 185 members
Botswana, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Grenada, Togo
1999: 2, total 157 (83.5 %) of 188 members
Chad, Israel
LAGGARDS 84 % ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
2000: 4, total 161 (85.2 %) of 189 members
Comoros, Kiribati, Namibia, Rwanda
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2001: 6, total 167 (88.4 %) of 189 members
Bhutan, Eritrea, Niue, Samoa, Serbia, United Arab Emirates
2002: 8, total 175 (91.6 %) of 191 members
Barbados, Kuwait, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated 
States of), Palau, Republic of Moldova, Vanuatu
2003: 2, total 177 (92.7 %) of 191 members
Lesotho, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
2004: 1, total 178 (93.2 %) of 191 members
Tonga
2005: 3, total 181 (94.8 %) of 191 members
Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago
2006: 3, total 184 (95.8 %) of 192 members
Guinea-Bissau, Montenegro, São Tomé and Príncipe
2007: 1, total 185 (96.4 %) of 192 members
Djibouti
2008: 0, 185 (96.4 %) of 192 members
2009: 1, total 186 (96.9 %) of 192 members
Cook Islands
2010: 1, total 187 (97.4 %) of 192 members
Equatorial Guinea
2011: 2, total 189 (97.9 %) of 193 members
Brunei Darussalam, Palestine
2012: 1, total 190 (98.4 %) of 193 members
Singapore
2013: 0, total 190 (98.4 %) of 193 members
2014: 1, total 191 (99 %) of 193 members
Bahamas
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2015: 0, total 191 (99 %) of 193 members
2016: 1, total 192 (99.5 %) of 193 members
South Sudan
2020: 1, total 193 (100.0 %) of 193 members  
Somalia
Holy See Non-member observer status 1964
Palestine Non-member observer status 2012
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Appendix 3
Cultural Heritage and Natural Heritage in 
Svenska Dagbladet, 1884–2019
Frequency of words “Historia” (“History”), “Kulturarv”/ 
“Kulturarf” (“Cultural heritage”), and “Naturarv” (“Natural her-
itage”) in the Swedish broadsheet Svenska Dagbladet, 18 December 
1884 to 31 December 2019. Source: www.svd.se/arkiv.
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1951 2085 9 1
1952 2104 19
1953 2230 13
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1967 2260 13 1
1968 2368 22 1
1969 2153 23 1
1970 2299 34
1971 2019 16 1
1972 2105 18
1973 2142 24





1979 2582 62 2
1980 2781 72 1
1981 2947 66 1
1982 2826 64
1983 2875 62 1
1984 3311 88 1
1985 2823 45
1986 2657 46
1987 3489 110 1
1988 3663 91
1989 3777 60 2
1990 3759 93
1991 4276 120 1
1992 4161 93
1993 4238 106 1
1994 4764 113
1995 4097 134
1996 4243 123 1
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Year History Cultural Heritage Natural Heritage
1997 4240 135 3
1998 3936 108
1999 4230 153 7
2000 4182 261 5
2001 4753 133 5
2002 4055 125 1
2003 3957 149 2
2004 4288 133
2005 4464 156 1
2006 4510 133
2007 4519 105





2013 2844 53 1
2014 2781 42
2015 2439 64 1
2016 2692 177
2017 3189 104 2
2018 3173 53
2019 3442 49
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